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Rachel Ashcroft 
Time in the Works of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Giordano Bruno 
(1548-1600) 
This thesis explores the philosophical concept of time through a detailed comparison of 
Michel de Montaigne’s Essais with Giordano Bruno’s six-text series of Italian dialogues. 
Modern scholarship in the field of time studies has either ignored the true significance of 
the 16th century, or relied on familiar tropes - including Christian eschatology and 
apocalyptical end-times - to define time from this period. Instead, this thesis demonstrates 
that Montaigne and Bruno are excellent examples of two thinkers whose innovative 
thought led them to consider time in radically different ways to standard 16th-century 
conceptions of temporality. I use a new conceptual methodology of ‘embodied time’ in 
order to explore the dichotomy that arises between mental perceptions of time and the 
physical effects of time. Initially, both Montaigne and Bruno employ images of 
corruptible bodies in time to emphasise the linear, uncontrollable nature of human time. 
Yet both thinkers use the temporal freedom of the mind to experiment with seemingly 
rigid characteristics of time such as death, ageing and change. Montaigne revisits his own 
near-death experience and rethinks attitudes towards suicide in order to exercise a degree 
of control over time while Bruno’s radical cosmology dramatically subverts traditional 
responses to human mortality. Such discussions reveal a willingness to challenge the 
seemingly rigid nature of time which is simply not reflected in general scholarship on 
16th-century time. Furthermore, eternity emphasises the temporal impermanence that 
characterises human time. This notion of temporal flux leads both Montaigne and Bruno 
to explore how individuals should utilise the time at hand, which in both cases leads to a 
call for deep and studied introspection. Finally, their exploration of custom and time 
reveals a fascinating relationship between the two concepts that holds serious 
repercussions for the productive use of time they both exhort.  
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Introduction 
 In 1536, the great reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) wrote on the doctrine of 
original sin that ‘original sin […] is not substantially or essentially destroyed except in the 
conflagration of fire by which the whole world and our bodies will be completely purified 
on the last day. When we have been reduced to dust, then at last sins will be entirely 
extinguished’.  In doing so, he defined original sin within a typical understanding of time 1
in 16th-century Western European society. Christianity believed that human history was 
moving from the Creation story of Genesis - when the time of men began - towards the 
Final Judgement or ‘last day’ when humans and the whole world would return to dust. 
This conception of time was distinctly linear in nature - it possessed a clear beginning to 
time and an equally clear ending. In the Book of Revelation, Jesus declared himself the 
arbiter of human time: ‘I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the first and 
the last’.  One of the early Church fathers, St. Augustine of Hippo (354 AD-430 AD), 2
described such time in his book of Christian philosophy, The City of God (426 AD), as 
‘newness, with nothing repeated’, always moving forward - time was ‘the rectum iter, the 
vita recta, which is the Christ’.  Over one thousand years later, Luther was merely echoing 3
a long tradition of Christian eschatology that considered time as a phenomenon tied to 
collective human history that was always moving towards a very specific end-point. 
 Modern-day scholars working in the field of time studies often characterise this 
view as one of the most important aspects of 16th-century time.  Although the 4
Reformation had divided Europe along sectarian lines by the latter half of the century, 
critics have repeatedly turned to linear time as one concept which appeared to transcend 
 Martin Luther, ‘The Disputation Concerning Justification, 1536’, in Luther’s Works, American Edition, vol. 34, ed. by 1
Jaroslav Pelikan & Helmut T. Lehmann, 55 vols. (Philadelphia: Muehlenberg and Fortress, and St. Louis: Concordia, 
1955-1986), p. 164. See also Luther, ‘Lectures on Galatians, 1535’, vol. 26: ‘Meanwhile, as long as we are alive, we are 
supported and nourished at the bosom of divine mercy and forbearance, until the body of sin is abolished and we are 
raised up as new beings on that Day. Then there will be new heavens and a new earth, in which righteousness will dwell’ 
(p. 235). 
 Revelation 22:13.  2
 Henri-Charles Puech, ‘Gnosis and Time’, in Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, Eranos 3: Man and Time, ed. by 3
Joseph Campbell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 38-84 (p. 50). The original Latin from City of God 
reads ‘novitas, nullo repetita, nullo repetenda circuitu’. See Augustine of Hippo, The City of God against the Pagans, 
ed. by Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, n.d.) in Loeb Classical Library 
<www.loebclassics.com>. 
 See Arthur Hilary Armstrong & Robert A. Markus, ‘Time, History, Eternity’, in Christian Faith and Greek 4
Philosophy (London: Dartman, Longman & Todd, 1960), pp. 116-134; Constantinos A. Patrides, The Phoenix and the 
Ladder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).
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the different branches of Christianity that were emerging in the late 1500s. Krzysztof 
Pomian states that ‘aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, l’histoire événementielle acquiert un sens 
grâce à une théologie de l’histoire’.  Indeed, despite the ramifications of the term 5
‘Renaissance’ with its suggestions of rebirth, renewal and the humanist interest in the 
revival of Antiquity, in the years following the Reformation, it was still common to 
believe in the idea of ‘un temps linéaire et irréversible’ that was rooted firmly in Christian 
doctrine.  Thus a millenarian obsession with the end of time has often been attributed to 6
the 16th century. ‘Taking 4000 B.C. as the date of Creation, Luther calculated that men 
were already in the sixth and last age of universal history - the age of the Pope’.  Stephen 7
Toulmin and June Goodfield argue that ‘while few of Luther’s contemporaries in 
Northern Europe were such extreme pessimists, something of his gloom coloured the 
beliefs and attitudes of all educated men’.  The idea of an imminent end-time appeared to 8
transcend religious divisions and dominated 16th-century views of the future.  
 Modern scholarship has also noted that certain celestial events appeared to 
support the popular notion that time was coming to an end. In 1524, a close grouping of 
the five planets visible to the naked eye occurred; a new star emerged in the constellation 
of Cassiopeia from 1572 to 1574, and a comet appeared in the sky in 1577. In a continent 
which was already being devastated by bloody religious wars and sectarianism, such 
unexpected phenomena ‘only confirmed the widespread pessimism’ inherent in 16th-
century society and fuelled further social anxiety about the end of time.  Discussing the 9
observation of satellites around Jupiter in 1610, M.A. Granada suggests that these planets 
formed part of an eschatological timeframe that had been repeatedly reinforced 
throughout the 16th century: ‘les planètes…s’inséraient dans le cadre des nouveautés 
célestes (des novas, des comètes et d’autres signes envoyés par Dieu) qui préludent au 
 Krzysztof Pomian, L’ordre du temps (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), p. 27.5
 Ibid., p. 49. Pomian argues that while elements of cyclical time were developing amongst the reformers, in the years 6
following the Reformation a linear time existed that aimed to trace a direct line of virtuous Church fathers from the 
early days of Christianity to the 16th century. I return to the idea of 16th-century cyclical time at various points 
throughout this thesis.
 Stephen E. Toulmin & June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 76. 7
The concept of millenarianism in Renaissance Europe has received more attention from modern scholars; see Denis 
Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu : la violence au temps des troubles de religions (vers 1525 - vers 1610) (Seyssel: Champ 
Vallon, 1990). 
 Ibid.8
 Ibid. These discoveries troubled the cosmological status quo concerning the unchanging firmament of the stars. See 9
Chapter Two, ‘Context: 16th-Century Futures’; also Pietro Redondi, Storie del tempo (Rome: Laterza, 2007), pp. 
103-104. The 1524 planetary conjunction in the sign of Pisces was believed to signal an impending deluge. See Ottavia 
Niccoli, Prophecy and People in Renaissance Italy, trans. by Lydia G. Cochrane (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), ‘6 - Between Astrology and Prophecy: The Flood of 1524’.
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temps eschatologique’.  An obsession emerged with the year 1588, which theologians 10
predicted would bring widespread famine, plague and disease: ‘some thinkers, religious 
men in particular, even thought it might mark the end of man’s time on earth’.  11
Consequently, many present-day critics have judged that ‘age-old religiously and 
astrologically inspired millenarian ideas held powerful sway’ in the 16th century.   12
 While efforts have been made to draw out other aspects of time from this period, 
it appears that any discussion amongst modern scholars concerning time in the 16th 
century has often been overshadowed by the nature of how time might end. This 
tendency to focus on what J.K. Barret has termed ‘apocalyptical ends of time’ has been 
supported by literature reviews in two very promising and recent studies of time in the 
Renaissance which both seek to go beyond these images.  Indeed, in the introduction to 13
her monograph Untold Futures: Time and Literary Culture in Renaissance England 
(2016), Barret highlights the research gap that has emerged due to the tendency of 
previous critics to consistently attach religious or apocalyptic symbols to ideas of time in 
the 16th century: 
 Religious paradigms are repeatedly reinforced as the most important component  
 of the earlier period’s future. As a result, the scholarship that reconstructs   
 Reformation religious discourse about salvation and endtime sidesteps an interest 
 in the earthly future, while those studies that view in the early modern period the  
 precursor for secularization tacitly subscribe to modernity as the future. The   
 implications are twofold: first, a presumption that no one thought about the   
 future except vis-à-vis Christian paradigms; second, an implicit association   
 between a future characterized by open-endedness and modernity.  14
 It appears that wider Christian eschatology often forms the basis of how present-
day scholars begin to define temporality during this period, with associated themes of 
impermanence, transition and apocalypse punctuating these discussions. Barret also 
 M.A. Granada, ‘Helisaeus Röslin: 4 Esdras et l’avènement du royaume du Christ’ in Le temps des astronomes: 10
l’astronomie et le décompte du temps de Pierre d’Ailly à Newton, ed. by Edouard Mehl & Nicolas Roudet, pp. 123-149 
(pp. 124-125).
 C. Scott Dixon, ‘Popular Astrology and Lutheran Propaganda in Reformation Germany’, History, 84.275 (1999), pp. 11
403-418 (p. 403).
 David W. Pankenier, ‘The Planetary Portent of 1524 in China and Europe’, Journal of World History, 20.3 (2009), pp. 12
339-375 (p. 339). Other ‘familiar tropes’ used to describe 16th-century time include the popular symbol of ‘Father Time’, 
an image depicting an old man - usually carrying a scythe or sickle - who represented relentless, devouring time. For a 
fascinating explanation of this image in Renaissance art, see Erwin Panofsky, ‘Father Time’, in Studies in Iconology: 
Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 69-94. See also ‘Da 
Kronos al Padre Tempo’ in Redondi, Storie del tempo, pp. 38-54. 
 J.K. Barret, Untold Futures: Time and Literary Culture in Renaissance England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 13
2016), p. 7. 
 Ibid., p. 8. 14
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alludes to the repercussions of this approach in respect of 16th-century time and its 
‘modernity’, an issue I discuss in more detail below. Meanwhile, in her monograph 
entitled Transformations of Time and Temporality (2014), the art historian Simona Cohen 
also argues that, rather than a uniform Christian eschatology becoming the accepted 
temporal framework in the Renaissance, there was a vast difference in attitudes towards 
time between the early humanists of the 15th century ‘and those that emerged in the 
context of the sixteenth century social, political and religious debates and conflicts’.  15
During a period of religious and political upheaval, new ways of viewing time were 
beginning to appear. Cohen explores how and why the linear time described above existed 
alongside popular non-linear conceptions of temporality such as Kairos, the Greco-
Roman notion of a decisive and expedient moment.   16
 Following these recent trends, it is the view of this thesis that time in the 16th 
century was not solely understood through a religious lens. Instead, thinkers frequently 
discussed temporality in terms that did not refer at all to Christian notions of history or 
collective end times, and in some cases, such ideas were being actively contradicted. I 
concentrate on two thinkers whom I believe exemplify these new conceptions of time: 
Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). Montaigne sought to 
understand time as it became apparent to the individual through ageing, change, and 
death. He famously remarked that he used his writing, which drew on a combination of 
personal experience and classical philosophy, in order to record the changing individual 
over time: ‘Je ne peints pas l’estre, je peints le passage’ (III.II.805).  Meanwhile, Bruno’s 17
cosmological theories required a dramatic re-thinking of time on Earth and its place 
within a heliocentric, infinite universe. In particular, his notion of ‘la ruota del 
tempo’ (Furori II.661) - a reworking of the more familiar 16th-century image of fortune’s 
turning wheel - necessarily departed from the linear conception of Christian historical 
time presented above and instead presented an infinite universe in which matter and form 
were constantly renewed.  This thesis explores some of the most significant responses to 18
time presented by Montaigne and Bruno as a result of these approaches. Why does a near-
 Simona Cohen, Transformations of Time and Temporality in Medieval and Renaissance Art (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 15
116.
 See Cohen, ‘Chapter 8 - Kairos/Occasio - Vicissitudes of Propitious Time from Antiquity to the Renaissance’. 16
 All primary source quotations from the Essais are taken from Michel de Montaigne, Essais, ed. by Pierre Villey & V.L. 17
Saulnier (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965). The format of all in-text citations reads as follows: (Volume 
number.Chapter number.Page number). 
 All primary source quotations from Bruno’s series of Italian dialogues (see footnote 19 below) are taken from 18
Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane, ed. by Nuccio Ordine, 2 vols (Turin: UTET, 2002). The format of all in-text citations 
reads as follows: (Name of work.Volume number.Page number).
'9
fatal accident lead Montaigne to recount his own ‘death’ after falling from a horse - ‘moy 
dix ou douze pas au delà, mort’ (II.VI.373)? Why does Bruno appear to deny the existence 
of death altogether, ‘e però né per sé né per accidente alcuno può esser detta 
morire’ (Causa II.181)? I will attempt to set forth how and why such thinkers displayed an 
eagerness to experiment with time in exciting and innovative ways. In doing so, I hope to 
present a deeply complex picture of 16th-century time.  
  
Time in the 16th century? 
 This thesis argues that the representations of time in both Montaigne’s Essais and 
Bruno’s Italian dialogues are simply not reflected in most modern scholarship about time 
in the 1500s.  Consequently, it would be useful here to briefly consider some of the main 19
definitions of 16th-century time that have been suggested by scholars from the last 
century.  However, this arguably presents a difficult task. During the initial stages of 20
research, it quickly became apparent that modern scholars tasked with documenting 
broader histories of time - covering time in different cultures across centuries and even 
millennia of history - have perhaps overlooked the importance of the 16th century, 
whether such critics were focusing on chronology or indeed the evolution of 
philosophical definitions of time. Pietro Redondi’s Storie del tempo (2007) - which traces 
the measurement and depiction of time in the history of Western literature, art and 
culture - focuses heavily on the chronological innovations of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), 
Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) and Isaac Newton (1643-1727). In comparison, little 
attention is given over to thinkers from the 16th century.  Anthony Aveni’s lengthy study 21
Empires of Time: Calendars, Clocks and Cultures (1989) - which explores chronology in 
various societies from around the world - features only eight passing references to the 16th 
century. Aveni alludes to the effects of the age’s bloody colonial expansion while 
 Bruno’s ‘Italian dialogues’ refer to the six philosophical dialogues published in the vernacular between 1584 and 1585. 19
Some scholars also include Bruno’s satirical play Candelaio (1582) in this series - for more on this debate see Nuccio 
Ordine, ‘Introduzione’ in Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane, ed. by Nuccio Ordine, 2 vols (Turin: UTET, 2002).
 In Chapter One, ‘Popular definitions of time in the 16th century’, I summarise some of the main currents of classical 20
philosophy that informed later Christian-Scholastic conceptions of time.
 The only exception is a brief chapter, less than ten pages long, entitled ‘La simmetria del tempo’ which focuses solely 21
on the findings of Copernicus as a precursor to Galileo and other thinkers. 
'10
simultaneously omitting any detailed explanation of 16th-century notions of time.  22
Hervé Barreau’s extended introduction to the history of time in Le temps (2009) passes 
directly from the concerns of ‘les théologiens médiévaux’ to the scientific developments of 
‘la physique moderne’ without comment on the Renaissance.  Initially, G.J. Whitrow’s 23
Time in History: Views of Time from Prehistory to the Present Day (1989) appears to be 
more promising - Chapter 8 is entitled ‘Time and History in the Renaissance and the 
Scientific Revolution’.  However, the discussion favours analysis of the invention of the 24
pendulum clock and ‘the achievement of greater precision in mechanical timekeeping in 
the second half of the seventeenth century’.  16th-century time is summarised by familiar 25
tropes including its ‘backwards looking tendency’, another typical characteristic of time 
from this period which - according to Whitrow - arose from a seemingly uniform 
obsession with Antiquity.   26
 The 1500s fare slightly better in studies which approach time through the lens of 
historical consciousness. French scholar François Hartog recognises that something new 
was happening in the Renaissance concerning notions of history. For example, Hartog 
examines the belief amongst certain early modern thinkers that present society required 
an ironic act of renovatio through the restitution of classical Roman ideals; such an idea 
conflicted with the linear ‘nullo repetita, nullo repetenda circuitu’ of eschatological 
time.  However, this thesis is concerned with the immediate human experience of time 27
rather than collective ideas of human history, and in this respect there often appears to be 
far greater detailed attention devoted to St. Augustine of Hippo (354 AD-430 AD) and 
the Late Antique; the Middle Ages with its reliance on the temporal cycles of Nature and 
 See Anthony Aveni, Empires of Time: Calendars, Clocks and Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 129 for a very 22
brief discussion of Joseph Scaliger’s impact on the 16th-century understanding of calendrical beginnings. Arguably one 
finds a more comprehensive explanation of 16th-century chronology in Leofranc Holford-Strevens, The History of 
Time: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See ‘Chapter Three - Prehistory and the 
History of the Calendar’ for a short summary of the Gregorian calendar. 
 Hervé Barreau, Le temps (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), pp. 12-19. 23
 G.J. Whitrow, Time in History: Views of Time from Prehistory to the Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 24
1989). 
 Ibid., p. 127.25
 Ibid., p. 133. 26
 Augustine of Hippo, XII.21. See François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps (Paris: 27
Seuil, 2003). Hartog discusses Montaigne and his visit to Rome; see ‘Rome’ pp. 176-185. See also Reinhardt Koselleck, 
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and Zachary Sayre 
Schiffman, The Birth of the Past (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2017) for an introduction to current 
scholarship on historical time in the Renaissance. 
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daily religious ceremony; and finally the 17th century and the subsequent development of 
‘Newtonian time’.   28
 In each of these cases, there is a consistent tradition of modern scholarship, which 
only serves to highlight the lack of attention towards time in the 16th century. St. 
Augustine famously proposed in the Confessions (c. 400 AD) that time existed in the 
mind - ‘it is in you, my mind, that I measure periods of time’.  The far-reaching influence 29
of this definition appears not only in studies devoted to time in Augustine’s works but is 
also referenced in nearly every other history of time from the 20th and 21st centuries. 
There is also substantial research dedicated to time in both Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages by scholars from Richard Sorabji to Jacques Le Goff.  Sorabji’s Time, Creation and 30
the Continuum (1983) has proved invaluable in tracing the influence of ancient 
philosophers such as Heraclitus, Lucretius and Plato on later Medieval concerns and 
assessing key questions of temporality, i.e. is time real? Does time flow or stand still? Did 
the universe have a beginning? Le Goff’s assessment of the impact of historical and 
societal change on conceptions of time in Time, Work and Culture (1980) is still highly 
relevant today, while Pasquale Porro has recently edited a valuable collection of essays on 
Medieval time which explores the Muslim philosopher Averroes’ influence on Scholastic 
debates about time, as well as eternity and the concept of aevum or ‘angelic time’. Finally, 
scholarship on 20th-century definitions of time consistently engages with the challenges 
that philosophers currently face when presented with emerging scientific theories such as 
quantum physics and relativity.  With a handful of exceptions to be discussed in the 31
literature review, it is reasonable to argue that time in the Renaissance, much less the 16th 
 Donald J. Wilcox emphasises the importance of Isaac Newton’s absolute time and its influence on what he terms the 28
relative time of modernity. Such ideas are contrasted with the ‘pre-Newtonian’ times of the centuries preceding the 17th 
century; see Donald J. Wilcox, The Measure of Times Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric of Relative 
Time (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987). 
 Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 242.29
 See Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell 30
University Press, 1983); also Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); Wilhelm Streckert, Le temps chrétien de la ﬁn de l’Antiquité au Moyen Age, IIIe-XIIe siècle 
(Paris: Éditions du Cnrs, 1984). For time in Antiquity see Duncan Kennedy, Antiquity and the Meanings of Time: a 
Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Literature (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). Notable studies devoted to researching time 
in the Middle Ages include The Medieval Concept of Time, ed. by Pasquale Porro (Boston: Brill, 2001); Richard Lock, 
Aspects of Time in Medieval Literature (New York: Garland, 1985); Wesley M. Stevens, Cycles of Time and Scientiﬁc 
Learning in Medieval Europe (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995). 
 One such challenge is the conundrum posed by the metaphysician J.M.E. McTaggart on the unreality of time and his 31
introduction of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ series into theories of time. See Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, eds., The 
Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For more on post-Enlightenment theories of time see 
David Couzens Hoy, The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012). 
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century, has not received the same amount of attention as Antiquity, the Middle Ages or 
the extended period spanning the Enlightenment through to the present day. 
 As well as a simple lack of distinguished scholarship, the large quantity of research 
which focuses on time in the periods surrounding the 16th century has created another 
difficulty. When present-day critics do refer to this period in relation to the Middle Ages 
or the 17th century, they have often attempted to do so by fitting it into a pre-arranged 
narrative, suggesting that thinkers in the 16th century were simultaneously rejecting the 
temporal concerns of the Middle Ages and somehow anticipating the ‘modernity’ of 
Newton’s advances. G.J. Whitrow summarises attitudes towards past time in the 16th 
century through his comparison with 17th-century thinkers, whom he claims preferred to 
look forward to the potential of the future rather than focus excessively on the teachings 
of Ancient Greece and Rome: ‘In the course of the seventeenth century the pessimistic 
and backward-looking attitudes to time that had characterised the previous century were 
gradually replaced by optimistic and forward-looking views’.  Since the 1970s, Ricardo 32
Quinones has written various articles and chapters on time in the Renaissance; his most 
well-known work on the topic is The Renaissance Discovery of Time (1972).  Quinones’ 33
contribution is an excellent foundation to understanding time in the 16th century and is 
still one of the only monographs devoted solely to studying conceptions of time in the 
Renaissance. However, while Quinones regularly acknowledges the Medieval attitudes 
towards time that survived into the Renaissance - such as a preoccupation with the 
afterlife - he still tends to characterise Renaissance time as a stepping stone towards a fully-
fledged 17th-century modernity.  For example, Quinones claims that Montaigne is 34
‘modern’ because he seemingly rejects the religious obsession with a time beyond life on 
 Whitrow, Time in History, p. 134. This bizarre characterisation of 16th-century attitudes towards time is justified by 32
the fact that in the early 1600s, Francis Bacon wrote an unpublished essay entitled Temporis partus masculus or ‘The 
Masculine birth of time’. This signified Bacon’s faith in the idea that science should be sought from the truth of nature 
and not ‘the darkness of antiquity’, p. 135. 
 Ricardo J. Quinones, The Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).33
 Interestingly, two notable scholars who have contributed towards historical attitudes towards death have proved 34
themselves to be highly aware of the nuanced evolutions between centuries. Alberto Tenenti clearly traces the changing 
attitudes towards time that evolved between the 14th and 16th centuries in Il senso della morte e l’amore della vita nel 
Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1957). Philippe Ariès is another historian of attitudes towards death in Western Europe 
and again proves to be more aware of how conceptions of time change even across fifty-year periods. See Philippe Ariès, 
Essais sur l’histoire de la mort en Occident du Moyen Age à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1975).
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Earth, but this assertion is dangerous since it automatically equates time in the 17th 
century and beyond with secularism.   35
 In recent years, critics studying aspects of time in the 16th and 17th centuries have 
become distinctly aware of the limitations of such an approach. John Spencer Hill labels 
this approach as ‘post-Enlightenment prejudice’ which assumes that any non-religious 
view of time in the Renaissance ‘must necessarily be a material anticipation of post-
Renaissance scepticism and secularism’.  Michael Edwards states that ‘viewing early 36
modern theories of time solely through a Newtonian lens can distort our perspective 
strikingly’ as thinkers in the 1500s could not have predicted the creation of absolute 
time.  While this thesis acknowledges where currents of thought have been clearly 37
adopted from previous centuries or may even have influenced successive cultures, I will 
avoid any attempt to explain 16th-century time solely through Medieval and post-
Newtonian theories of time. In particular, this study will demonstrate that it is impossible 
to place time in the works of either Montaigne or Bruno into such a narrative since their 
approaches to temporality are often different even from other unconventional thinkers of 
their age. 
 I will argue that where 16th-century time has been studied or analysed to any 
degree, scholars often highlight the same general attitudes towards time in a uniformity 
that does not reflect the complexity of responses to time in both Montaigne’s Essais and 
Bruno’s series of Italian dialogues. I believe that analysing the work of these two thinkers 
reveals an understanding of time that does not align with previous statements by critics 
on the types of Renaissance ‘destructive’ time described above, i.e., time that was 
seemingly beyond the control of an individual. As Quinones has previously suggested, 
Montaigne rejected many mainstream developments in Renaissance temporality ; 38
meanwhile, Sarah Hutton, discussing Bruno’s response to Aristotle, claims that ‘Bruno is 
seeking to substitute an alternative theory of time’.  Therefore in this thesis, I argue that 39
certain thinkers in 16th century Europe possessed an understanding of time that largely 
 As stated above, Quinones traces the influence of Medieval time and its largely spiritual nature on the early modern 35
period; yet he does so within a framework that eventually equates the centuries beyond with secularity: ‘For the 
Christian Middle Ages, “everything in the world was an effect of something beyond the world; everything in life was a 
step to something beyond life.” […] But Montaigne would have us focus on the thing at hand, in itself, and find our 
fulfilment in its own basic worth. His modernity lies here’ (Discovery of Time, p. 205). 
 John Spencer Hill, Inﬁnity, Faith and Time (Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University, 1997), p. xi.36
 Michael Edwards, Time and Science of the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 3. 37
 Quinones, Discovery of Time, p. 204. ‘Montaigne stood in determined opposition to many of the larger 38
developments in Renaissance temporal response’. 
 Hutton, p. 355. 39
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rejected the temporal concerns that have traditionally been associated with their age by 
previous scholars. While time is not the sole focus of their respective bodies of work, I 
propose that when Montaigne and Bruno explore temporality, they do so without 
reference to apocalyptic end-times. Instead they experiment with concepts of time that lay 
on the fringes of acceptable religious and philosophical belief in the 16th century. 
 Naturally, several research questions result from this initial thesis statement. In 
both the Introduction and Chapter One, I explain my choice of Bruno and Montaigne in 
this study by emphasising that the originality of thought common to both thinkers 
naturally lead to a tendency to experiment with traditional conceptions of time. 
Furthermore, Chapters One, Two and Three assess the understanding of time that 
Montaigne and Bruno work from, while Chapter Four explores how this definition of 
time affects certain aspects of Montaigne’s and Bruno’s thought, particularly their attitude 
towards custom. I hope to provide answers as to how the representations of time 
proposed by these two thinkers often differ greatly in respect to the 16th-century temporal 
concerns established by modern critics.  
Delineations and Limitations 
 In light of the research areas (and subsequent research questions) identified above, 
I have chosen to focus my study on the works of two of the most recognisable thinkers of 
this period - Michel de Montaigne and Giordano Bruno. The influential German scholar 
Hugo Friedrich very briefly but importantly labelled them as ‘the two most original 
philosophical products of the sixteenth century’.  Indeed, Montaigne and Bruno have 40
already been identified and studied (separately) as thinkers with well-founded claims to 
originality.  
 In the case of Montaigne, this perceived inventiveness often stems from 
Montaigne’s writing style in the Essais. Terence Cave notes that Montaigne’s fluctuating, 
shifting and changing writing is still one of the most original attempts to pin down the 
flow of human thought: ‘His reflections are thought-experiments rather than 
propositions or statements of position, and collectively they make up what is probably 
the richest and most productive thought-experiment ever committed to paper’.  41
Montaigne’s commitment to speaking firmly in his own voice was extremely rare in the 
 Hugo Friedrich, Montaigne (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 29.40
 Terence Cave, How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta, 2007), p. 95. 41
'15
16th century, and the author himself was certainly aware of this, declaring of his text that 
‘c’est le seul livre au monde de son espece, d’un dessein farouche et extravagant’ (II.208). 
Consequently, Ian Maclean has unravelled the various ways in which Montaigne defies 
any neat classification as a philosopher; his ‘dessein farouche et extravagant’ in the Essais is 
characterised by an unsystematic use of personal anecdote and moral reflection to reach 
open-ended conclusions.  As a result, Maclean and several other Montaigne scholars have 42
declared the French thinker to be entirely unphilosophical in his writing. More often than 
not, Montaigne’s writing is characterised by ambiguity and contradiction rather than a 
desire to provide absolute answers to life’s major questions.   43
 Meanwhile, Bruno was developing an alternative cosmology in the Italian 
dialogues and beyond that completely subverted the cosmological status quo in the 16th 
century. These texts, written in the Italian vernacular rather than the more traditional 
Latin, were published in quick succession between 1584 and 1585; Bruno’s radical theories 
were clearly ‘opening out to him as quickly as he could write them down’.  In particular, 44
Bruno believed that the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) had not gone 
far enough in setting forth a heliocentric cosmos and instead Bruno posited an infinite 
universe with infinite solar systems, ‘un corporel infini et homogène tant dans l’espace que 
dans le temps’.  Such theories were incompatible with the Scholastic philosophical and 45
theological worldview throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. As we will 
see, Bruno employed several literary strategies - satire, mixing genres, textual alter-egos - to 
present his philosophy to 16th-century audiences in an accessible way.  
 Ian Maclean, ‘Montaigne and the Truth of the Schools’, The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, ed. by Ullrich 42
Langer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 142-162. Maclean lists the many ways in which Montaigne 
flouts philosophical convention: ‘He sets out to write not impersonally but personally, not comprehensively but 
partially and inconsistently, not supra-temporally but consciously immersed in the passage of time; he relies on an 
unsystematic mixture of anecdote, quotation, and moral reflection, into which in the course of the last twelve years of 
his life he interpolated intermittently yet more thoughts and quotations; his text rarely takes on the character of a 
sustained argument that is explicit about its own forms of validation. He is even willing knowingly to breach the rule of 
non-contradiction, and yet claim not to breach truth-conditions…’ (p. 144). For more on Montaigne’s use of language, 
see André Tournon, Route par Ailleurs: le ‘nouveau langage’ des Essais (Paris: Champion, 2006); also Ian Maclean, 
Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997).
 Ian Maclean, ‘Montaigne and the Truth of the Schools’, p. 144. 43
 Ingrid Rowland, ‘Introduction’, in Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Ingrid D. Rowland (Toronto: 44
University of Toronto Press, 2013). References will be made wherever appropriate to other works by both Bruno and 
Montaigne, particularly in Chapter One. However, I believe that within the six texts that constitute the Italian 
dialogues, there is certainly sufficient material to explore in relation to time and temporality.
 Miguel A. Granada, ‘Introduction’, in Giordano Bruno, Des fureurs héroïques, ed. by Miguel A. Granada (Paris: Les 45
Belles Lettres, 1999). ‘La série des dialogues italiens, que Bruno commence de publier à Londres quelques mois plus 
tard, constitute la riposte ou la vengeance de Bruno. Il ne s’agissait pas, cependant d’une simple question personnelle, 
mais d’une bataille “épochale” “ celle de la défense et revendication de la philosophie, comme entreprise héroïque, face à 
sa négation et á son occultation dans l’univers vulgaire de la pédanterie…’ (p. xiv).
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 While this thesis accepts that Montaigne and Bruno were not the only 16th-
century thinkers to contemplate the world in new and exciting ways, I believe that 
examining time in their works will help to close another particular research gap. 
Montaigne and Bruno were both writing during the last decades of the 1500s, a period 
even within the 16th century that has frequently been overlooked by studies on time. A 
small number of recent critics have already researched 14th to mid 16th century France and 
Italy in detail. Simona Cohen states that she has researched art history from the early and 
mid-Renaissance due to an erroneous belief that studies of time in literature from the 14th 
to the 16th century ‘have not been lacking’.  Emmanuelle Lacore-Martin has produced 46
an extensive monograph on conceptions of time in the works of the French humanist 
François Rabelais (1494-1553) which includes reflections on calendrical and cosmic times.   47
 In addition to this focus on the first half of the 16th century, many recent works 
concentrate on late 16th- and early 17th-century English thinkers, particularly Francis 
Bacon (1561-1621) and William Shakespeare (1564-1616). Barret’s recent monograph is 
devoted entirely to rethinking conceptions of time in the works of English Renaissance 
writers, including Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus (c.1588) and The Faerie Queene (1590) 
by Edmund Spenser (1552-1599). Hill has produced a valuable study of time and faith in 
the Renaissance which devotes the second half of the text to assessing time in Shakespeare 
(amongst other chapters on Augustine and Henri Bergson (1859-1941)).  Their 48
contemporaries on the continent have not received the same amount of attention. In 
conclusion, continental Europeans writing on time in the latter half of the 16th century 
have arguably been overlooked to a certain degree. Therefore, I have deliberately limited 
my discussion to the works of Montaigne and Bruno. In doing so, I hope that this 
approach will contribute new and original ideas to existing scholarship in this area by 
assessing diverse approaches to time in the last decades of the 1500s. 
  In addition to the shared sense of innovation that has been attributed to both 
thinkers, I believe that a comparison between Montaigne and Bruno will build upon a 
minimal but growing area of study which has already begun to identify potential 
connections between the two thinkers. Arguably present-day scholars have avoided 
lengthy comparison of Montaigne and Bruno after considering how different their 
 Cohen, p. 1. 46
 Emmanuelle Lacore-Martin, Figures de l’histoire et du temps dans l’oeuvre de Rabelais (Paris: Droz, 2011).47
 See John Spencer Hill, ‘Time in Shakespeare’; G.F. Waller, The Strong Necessity of Time: the Philosophy of Time in 48
Shakespeare and Elizabethan Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1976). See also Ricardo J. Quinones, ‘Views of Time in 
Shakespeare’,  Journal of the History of Ideas, 26.3 (1965), pp. 327-352. In The Renaissance Discovery of Time Quinones 
devotes chapters to Spenser, Milton and Shakespeare, as well as Montaigne.
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intellectual objectives appear to be at first glance. However, many modern critics have 
already suggested how fruitful a large-scale comparison between the two thinkers would 
be, with some scholars even mentioning time as a potential starting point. In a relatively 
obscure article (yet significant for the purposes of this thesis), G.F. Waller explicitly 
identifies both Montaigne and Bruno as two thinkers who did not conform to standard 
conceptions of time in the 1500s: ‘There are signs that in the works of Montaigne and 
Bruno, in particular, new attitudes of time are being explored’.  However, Waller does 49
not build upon this connection in his short article and leaves this enticing remark 
completely unexplored. Michele Ciliberto has recently stated that there are in fact 
similarities between the two thinkers and even suggests time as one potential starting 
point.  Furthermore, Fulvio Papi paved the way for a comparison between the two 50
intellectuals by outlining connections between both thinkers’ interaction with the New 
World. This thesis builds on the research that these scholars have begun by producing the 
first ever full-length study to compare the two thinkers. 
 Naturally, I have been forced to curtail some aspects of the Essais and the Italian 
dialogues in a bid to compose a coherent and well-structured thesis. In particular, I have 
avoided extensive analysis of the chronological layers inherent in Montaigne’s text. Here I 
refer to the staggered publication of the Essais and Montaigne’s subsequent additions, 
corrections and deletions to his original work. The first two volumes of the text appeared 
in 1580, while Montaigne published volume III in 1588 alongside significant revisions to 
the first two books. In 1595, his protégée Marie de Gournay published the first 
posthumous edition of the Essais which contained various corrections Montaigne made 
to a 1588 copy of the text (known as the exemplaire de Bordeaux) alongside several other 
additions, the authenticity of which is still under dispute.  Furthermore, the order in 51
which Montaigne arranged the chapters of his first two books was not based on 
chronology (‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’ (II.XII)’ was written after ‘De l’Institution 
des Enfans’ (I.XXVI)), while his subsequent revisions range from the deletion of single 
 G.F. Waller, ‘Transition in Renaissance Ideas of Time and the Place of Giordano Bruno’, Neophilologus, 55 (1971), pp. 49
3-15 (p. 7). Waller is arguably one of the earliest proponents of the idea that in the Renaissance there were several 
thinkers working outside traditional temporal norms; he identifies some Renaissance thinkers as ‘confusedly or 
explicitly, no longer setting a discussion of time within the traditional religious framework and that, earlier than has 
generally been recognised, some quite radical alternative views were developing’ (p. 3). However, while these ideas are 
sound, I have drawn upon the more recent work of Barret and Cohen who actively avoid following a history of ideas 
approach in the manner of earlier scholars such as Waller. 
 Michele Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno: il teatro della vita (Milan: Mondadori, 2007), p. 24. 50
 For more on the relationship between Montaigne and Marie de Gournay, see Arnould, Jean-Claude, ed., Marie de 51
Gournay et l’édition de 1595 des « Essais » de Montaigne (Paris: H. Champion, 1996). 
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words to the addition of extensive pages of text.  Naturally, an entire area of scholarship 52
has devoted itself to examining the changing editions and revisions that the Essais 
underwent both during and after Montaigne’s lifetime; critics writing monographs on the 
reception of the text have often illustrated these developments as evidence of the 
temporally shifting nature of the text. However, the present study compares Montaigne 
with Bruno, and sustained analysis of the many repetitions and deletions inherent in the 
Essais would arguably prove distracting to the reader when attempting to make explicit 
connections between ideas of time in Montaigne and Bruno.  
 Instead, I must acknowledge that the Essais are not ‘stationary’ texts while also 
limiting my references to chronological layers. Rather I have discussed them at various 
points concerning Montaigne and ‘writing the self’, La Boétie’s friendship and the quest 
for truth in the Essais. Furthermore, my own textual analysis loosely imitates the creative 
projects contained in both Montaigne and Bruno’s writing by visiting and revisiting 
temporal concepts such as death from ever-more complex perspectives. As stated above, 
Montaigne’s writing style is defined by his changing, often contradictory remarks on a 
range of subjects; his additions and revisions to the 1580 and 1588 editions bear witness to 
an internal dialogical process. Meanwhile, Bruno’s explosion of creativity between 1584 
and 1585 is a testament to his philosophy, which was urgently refined and corrected with 
the publication of each new text. The philosophical dialogues of the earlier texts, 
combined with the unique blend of poetic form and extended conversation between 
interlocutors (particularly in the Eroici Furori), express Bruno’s openly dialogical creative 
project. His manipulation of different characters allows Bruno to satirise the opinions of 
thinkers he does not agree with and insert a literary mouth-piece into the text as he 
continues to refine his philosophy with the publication of each book. Although my thesis 
does not explore this process through detailed textual analysis, I have attempted to reflect 
their open-ended creative process by structuring my own investigation of concepts such as 
death through a layered exploration which spans entire chapters rather than paragraphs or 
chapter sections alone. 
 I would also like to briefly note that I will limit any references to the depiction of 
fortune, hazard, and chance in the works of Montaigne and Bruno. Fortune and other 
such concepts in the Renaissance constitute a consistently popular area of study amongst 
scholars of the early modern period, and a lot of excellent research already exists in this 
 Michel Jeanneret reminds us that this was highly characteristic of the Renaissance. Works were often presented as 52
unfinished or ‘in progress’; once a text was published it often received corrections or supplements. See Jeanneret’s 
introduction in Perpetuum mobile. Métamorphoses des corps et des oeuvres de Vinci à Montaigne (Paris: Macula, 1997).
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area.  Fortune itself has experienced a long history regarding its evolving portrayals over 53
time. As I mentioned above, Fortune was often represented by the ‘ruota del tempo’ or 
turning wheel, an image which originated in Ancient Rome and survived well into the 
16th century (so that thinkers such as Bruno were able to manipulate it). From the image 
of Fortuna as a blind deity to Niccolò Machiavelli’s distinct portrayal of fortune in Il 
Principe (1532), Fortune continually reappeared in literature and history from antiquity to 
the Renaissance.  In short, while Fortune and its related concepts possess an interesting 54
relationship to time, it would be impossible to do justice to this topic by referring to all of 
the necessary sources and influences while managing to incorporate it convincingly into a 
thesis on time. While Fortune and related concepts such as hazard possess clear links to 
time, they have already received ample attention from scholars - instead I will explore 
other time-related concepts that have not been studied as widely, such as customary law 
and second nature.   
Deﬁnition of Terms 
 It will now be necessary to explain what my own approach to time has been and 
how I have defined it in the works of Montaigne and Bruno. I explore time in this thesis 
through the doctrine of temporal experience.  In other words, I approach time in the 55
source material with a particular focus on the direct, sensory human understanding of 
time. This includes the manner in which time becomes apparent to Montaigne and 
Bruno through direct physical changes to themselves such as ageing, as well as the 
perception of time that stems from their observation of changes to the world around 
them, such as the seasons or weather. I avoid any attempt to define time in absolute terms 
and instead focus on how Montaigne and Bruno perceive time and their place within it.  
 In the Essais, an attempt to formulate one single definition of time would be 
impossible, since Montaigne prefers to focus on understanding concepts such as time 
through direct, applicable experience. As Marcel Conche has stated, on defining the exact 
 For an introduction to fortune in Bruno, see Michele Ciliberto, La ruota del tempo (Roma: Editori riuniti, 1986), 53
‘Chapter IV - Angeli Nocentes’; on Montaigne and fortune see Alain Legros, ‘Montaigne entre Fortune et Providence’, 
in Actes du cinquantenaire de la fondation du CESR et XLIXe Colloque International d’études Humanistes, Centre 
d’Études Supérieures de la Renaissance, Tours 3-9 July 2006.
 Thomas Flanagan, ‘The Concept of Fortuna in Machiavelli’, in The Political Calculus: Essays on Machiavelli’s 54
Philosophy, ed. by Anthony Parel (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972), pp. 127-156 (p. 135).
 Philosophers such as Edmund Husserl would articulate time perception and time consciousness in a more systematic 55
way. For precursors to this way of thinking see Holly Andersen & Rick Grush, ‘A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: 
Historical Precursors to James and Husserl’,  Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47 (2009), pp. 277–307.
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nature of time, ‘Montaigne repousse la question elle-même, comme étant de celles qui ne 
peuvent, par principe, conduire à rien de plus clair que mon savoir immédiat’.  56
Attempting to articulate a concrete definition of something as abstract as time only leads 
to endless unsatisfactory answers: ‘On eschange un mot pour un autre mot, et souvent 
plus incogneu’ (III.XIII.1069). Montaigne concludes that the only solution to this 
seemingly limitless supply of definitions is to observe and record how he himself 
experiences time - his emotional reactions to it, his awareness of it, his sensory responses 
to it: ‘Je sçay mieux que c’est qu’homme que je ne sçay que c’est animal, ou mortel, ou 
raisonnable’ (III.XIII.1069).  
 Bruno’s initial awareness of time is motivated by the constant change, or 
mutazione, that he witnesses all around him. As he states in De l’inﬁnito, universo e 
mondi, ‘tutto per infinito spacio discorrendo cangia il volto’ (De l’inﬁnito II.26). 
Furthermore, his deliberate self-portrayal as a grandiose philosopher on the cusp of 
bringing the light of truth to civilisation - ‘per amor della vera sapienza e studio della vera 
contemplazione’ (De l’inﬁnito II.10) - is heavily imbued with a sense of the future and the 
limit of his capabilities in time.  Therefore, Bruno articulates a conception of time that 57
fits into the wider cosmological theories he proposes, while also accounting for his actions 
in time.  As Nicola Badaloni has previously suggested, ‘il tempo, che tutto dà e tutto 58
toglie, è il fato’, but it is also ‘una divisione definita come “mutazione”’.  Bruno witnesses 59
the physical effects of time through mutation but is simultaneously aware of his status 
within the development of human civilisation.  
 When I refer to an approach that prioritises temporal experience, I am particularly 
interested in the dichotomy that arises between mental perceptions of time and physical 
effects of time. While some work has been carried out on this phenomenon in the Essais, I 
bring a more systematic approach to the question of mental and physical time. My central 
 Marcel Conche, Temps et destin (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000), p. 24. Paul Mathias seemingly confirms 56
this tendency in ‘Temps’ in Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, ed. by Philippe Desan (Paris: H. Champion, 2004): 
‘Le temps constitute ainsi assurément le thème essentiel des Essais, parce qu’ils forment une série indéfinie de petites 
différenciations discursives - “un contrerolle de divers et muables accidens et d’imaginations irresoluës et, quand il y 
eschet, contraires”’ (p. 1121).
 For a concise summary of Bruno’s representation of his own status in the history of knowledge, see Sergius Kodera, 57
‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, Literary Self-Fashioning and De 
revolutionibus orbium coelestium’, in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern Transformations of the Scientist and his 
Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn & Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 2014). Kodera states that Bruno ‘claims to 
have liberated the human mind, which had been caught for centuries in the fetters of a finite, geocentric, and 
anthropocentric cosmology’ (p. 231). 
 Maria Elena Severini, ‘Vicissitudine e tempo nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno’, in La mente di Giordano Bruno, ed. by 58
F. Meroi (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), pp. 225-258 (p. 230). 
 Badaloni, p. 15. 59
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claim to originality lies in my conceptual - rather than methodological - approach which 
investigates 16th-century time through the lens of what I term ‘embodied time’. For 
example, I demonstrate how issues arise from the understanding that an individual will 
die due to his or her degenerating body, but that the mind - which inhabits the body - 
offers them a degree of freedom from this process, to reflect on past, present and future 
time. Conche alludes to some of the historical debates surrounding this problem thus:  
 Plotin et saint Augustin ont très bien exprimé le contraste entre, d’une part,   
 l’impression claire que, spontanément, l’on a du temps, ainsi que la facilité avec   
 laquelle on use du mot “temps” si l’on ne s’interroge pas sur la chose, et, d’autre  
 part, l’embarras dans lequel on tombe si l’on aborde le sujet de plus près et si on le  
 soumet à un examen attentif.  60
 Plotinus and Augustine well understood the difference between our sensory 
awareness of time and the difficulties that arise from contemplating it at length; I hope to 
illustrate that this idea clearly filters into the works of Montaigne and Bruno. In Chapter 
One, I situate time between physical and mental responses to temporality. I believe that 
the ability to see the direct effects of time in the present moment, combined with a 
simultaneous awareness of the past, present and future, leads both thinkers to generate 
fascinating approaches to temporality that do not conform to 16th-century end-times 
such as the Last Judgement or the Final Age of Men. I have previously alluded to this 
process as a type of ‘experimentation’ with time. Their tendency to ignore or even 
deliberately subvert the temporal norms that previous scholars have attributed to the late 
1500s frees both Montaigne and Bruno from an obligation towards upholding 
conventional ideas of temporality. I demonstrate that their experimentation lies in 
accepting and understanding the foundations of human existence in time - mortality, 
change, ageing - then attempting to manipulate them regardless. As a result, I reveal new 
approaches to temporality which do not align with the religious ideas of time that critics 
have previously attributed to the 1500s, such as Heaven and Hell or the soul’s immortality. 
While such experiments do not represent the final word on time in the Essais and the 
Italian dialogues, both thinkers show that the traditional tenets associated with time can 
be manipulated. 
 My intellectual approach to time has been influenced in part by Ian Maclean’s 
excellent analysis of Montaigne’s response to the philosophical tradition in Montaigne 
philosophe (1997), as well as the discussion of time found in Michele Ciliberto’s 
 Ibid., p. 25. 60
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monograph Giordano Bruno (1990).  In both cases, Maclean and Ciliberto have not 61
devoted studies specifically to time but their resulting research embraces many aspects of 
temporality in Montaigne and Bruno, as both scholars attempt to synthesise the 
philosophical strands of their subjects. In doing so they have separately uncovered some 
of the most fundamental points of comparison between Montaigne and Bruno. In 
particular, they both suggest an approach to temporality which acknowledges the 
difficulties that arise between a temporally finite body and a simultaneous consciousness 
of this finitude.  
 Indeed, both critics have alluded to the significance of the mind-body duality in 
various ways without examining primary source material in more detail. Ciliberto 
discusses the figure of the furioso amante in the Eroici Furori and emphasises that while 
human beings are aware of the small possibility of accessing divine knowledge (which 
exists in a state outside human comprehension), humankind is unable to transcend time 
because humans do not utilise time properly: ‘l’uomo resterebbe rinchiuso nelle muraglie 
della mutazione’.  Through this epistemological dilemma, Ciliberto recognises Bruno’s 62
understanding that the human body is a finite entity, ‘un limite oggettivo, corporeo. Ma, 
al tempo stesso, questo si configura come limite soggettivo, gnoseologico’.  Human 63
cognitive powers present other possibilities not tied directly to the time of the body, such 
as thinking about the future and one day accessing divine knowledge. Maclean has also 
discussed Montaigne’s act of self-study - a strategy present across many of his chapters but 
arguably culminating in ‘De l’experience’ (III.XII) - with reference to ‘le problème du 
temps par rapport à l’être et à l’essence’.  While the self is always present in time, our 64
minds are simultaneously thinking of other things - ‘le moi-objet échappe au moi-sujet’ - 
and our selves are constantly changing - ‘le moi se recrée et se modifie’.  Both scholars 65
have outlined the difficulties that emerge from such an understanding of time and how 
they affect the respective intellectual projects of Montaigne and Bruno. I build on the 
work of Ciliberto and Maclean by bringing the two thinkers together in a full-length 
study and exploring both bodies in time and mental perceptions of time in more detail. 
My conceptual originality emerges through an initial focus on the reality of time as it 
 Michele Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno (Roma: Laterza, 1990). 61
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presents itself to Montaigne and Bruno through bodily changes, human emotion, and 
other physical markers.   
 As I have previously stated, the 16th century was undoubtedly a period when 
Christianity was becoming fractured due to the Reformation and subsequent Counter-
Reformation. While I argue that Montaigne and Bruno were exploring the question of 
time in new and exciting ways, they were writing alongside many theological ‘innovators’ 
who also touched on the issue of temporality. Therefore one must be particularly careful 
when discussing conceptions of ‘Christian time’ in the late 16th century.  Many vital 66
matters of doctrine were being hotly debated by prominent theologians in the European 
Renaissance, from the sacraments and sainthood to the Papal office itself. Arguably the 
idea of salvation lay at the heart of these matters. Scholars such as Justin S. Holcomb and 
David A. Johnson have already emphasised this idea thus:  
 All of the diverse and contested points that so animated the age - justification, the  
 sacraments, mediation, scripture, hierarchy, and even saints and sainthood -   
 ultimately can be reduced to the question “What must I do to inherit eternal   
 life?”  67
 As a result, the Reformers and Counter-Reformers were primarily concerned 
with practical ways to achieve salvation. The exact nature of time was an abstract concept 
that key thinkers such as Luther and John Calvin (1509-1564) were not wholly concerned 
with. Indeed, one of the only significant time-related changes to Christian time occurred 
when Protestants removed Purgatory from the Afterlife. Overall, most currents of 
Christianity (including Protestantism, Calvinism, and Reformed Catholicism) were still 
content to view God as the end of human time.  However, as I describe in further detail 68
in the literature review below, a handful of scholars have already noted differences 
emerging in 16th-century theological conceptions of time. Therefore, when comparing 
the more abstract concepts of time in Montaigne and Bruno to Christian ideas of time, I 
will generally be referring to time in the broader Christian tradition. In general I allude to 
issues such as eschatology and end-time which were not as fiercely debated in the 16th 
 I include this delineation in spite of the fact that many 20th century scholars of time failed to adequately convey 66
religious differences in the 16th century when discussing the significance of time during that period. 
 Justin S. Holcomb & David A. Johnson, Christian Theologies of the Sacraments: A Comparative Introduction (New 67
York: New York University Press, 2018), p. 226.
 See William Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes. A Biblical and Historical Study on the Doctrine of Final 68
Punishment (Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 2012), p. 55 & pp. 314-315. Fudge states that - unlike Heaven and 
eternal salvation - Calvin wasn’t interested in describing Hell, while Luther was largely uninterested in thinking about 
what happens after we die.
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century as the sainthood, sacraments or the indulgences. However, where appropriate I 
will make sure to highlight any divisions or debates between the various Christian 
denominations.  
Literature Review 
 Here I move from assessing general studies of 16th-century time towards more 
specific research concerning Montaigne and Bruno, before presenting the small amount 
of research that has already attempted to forge direct connections between the two 
thinkers. The purpose of this literature review will be to justify my use of Montaigne and 
Bruno; highlight the significance of this research and where exactly it will be filling a gap; 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of previous criticism about time in 16th century. This 
analysis will provide further evidence of my belief that previous scholarship has focused 
mainly on ‘destructive’ notions of time (such as apocalyptical ideas of the Last Judgement, 
old Father Time), whereas little criticism has assessed how and why well-known 16th-
century thinkers such as Montaigne and Bruno were questioning or even ignoring such 
concerns altogether. 
 I have already stated the importance of Quinones and his contribution towards 
time in the 16th century, and in The Renaissance Discovery of Time he emphasises how 
individuals understood their existence in time compared to God’s eternity. Quinones 
argues that the Renaissance is defined by a temporal paradox: ‘man’s greater desire is to 
savour the present wholeness and being that he has always conceived to be the properties 
of divinity. Of course, as long as man is involved in time this is impossible’.  69
Furthermore, his illuminating Chapter Six devoted to time in Montaigne begins by 
asserting one of the key beliefs of this thesis; namely that Montaigne did not engage with 
many of the main currents of Renaissance temporal response.  However, unlike 70
Quinones I avoid making direct connections between this difference on the part of 
Montaigne and the idea that it made him ‘startlingly modern’.  I have also highlighted 71
Barret as the most recent scholar to produce a study dedicated to exploring conceptions of 
 Quinones, p. 26. In doing so, Quinones finds a continuity from the Middle Ages which is denied by Belgian scholar 69
Georges Poulet in his well-known study in Études sur le temps humain I (Paris: Plon et Éditions Du Rocher, 1952). 
Poulet inadvertently highlights the dangers of differentiating too carefully between the Renaissance and the Middle 
Ages by claiming that while Medieval society was aware of enduring in time (due to the Afterlife), a 16th-century 
Christian ‘sentait […] le caractère précaire et fugitif de chaque moment vécu’ (p. 14). 
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time in the Renaissance, while Cohen has assessed time and temporality from an art 
history perspective with her study from 2014. Again Cohen recognises that ‘the 
development of temporal conceptions and attitudes from the fourteenth to the sixteenth 
centuries was not uniform, consistent or progressive’.   72
 Cohen’s monograph forms part of a few recent additions to the field of time 
studies that have sought to explore particular aspects of Renaissance time. Michael 
Edwards’ Time and Science of the Soul (2013) is an excellent analysis of the perceived 
connections between time and the soul in early modern philosophy. Another 
contribution is J.J.A. Mooij’s Time and Mind: the History of a Philosophical Problem 
(2005) - while this study does not focus solely on the Renaissance, it is notable not only 
for its focus on time but also its approach, which traces philosophical and religious 
traditions concerning time and the mind. Mooij considers Aristotle, Plotinus, and 
Augustine to be the main proponents of time as dependent on consciousness, but argues 
that these issues ‘continued to dominate discussion in the Middle Ages and after’.  Max 73
Engammare’s L’ordre du temps (2004) traces the Protestant obsession with punctuality in 
the latter half of the 16th century; he has also published On Time, Punctuality and 
Discipline in Early Modern Calvinism (2010); both texts have provided invaluable 
context and yet possess a rather narrow focus.  Similarly, Neil Kenny has published 74
extensively on 16th-century attitudes towards death, a topic which has naturally led to 
various reflections on time through the lens of mortality; his most recent monograph 
entitled Death and Tenses (2015) features a chapter on Montaigne and provides interesting 
context on attitudes towards death in the late 16th century.  75
 As well as these larger scale monographs, a handful of brief articles and book 
chapters must also be noted. Georges Matoré’s article ‘Le temps au XVIème siècle’ is only 
short but summarises some of the standard temporal concerns of the 16th century 
including ‘temps et esthétique’ and ‘chronologie’, as well as a brief section on memory 
 Cohen, p. 116. 72
 J.J.A. Mooij, Time and Mind: the History of a Philosophical Problem, trans. by P.  Mason (Leiden: Brill 2005), p. 261.73
 Max Engammare, L’ordre du temps: l’invention de la ponctualité au XVIe siècle (Geneva: Droz, 2004); also by 74
Engammare, see On Time, Punctuality and Discipline in Early Modern Calvinism, trans. by Karin Maag (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 Neil Kenny, Death and Tenses: Posthumous Presence in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 75
2015); also by Kenny, see ‘Je ne me réputerai totalement mourir’, in Evocations of Eloquence: Rhetoric, Literature and 
Religion in Early Modern France: Essays in Honour of Peter Bayley, ed. by Nicholas Hammond & Michael Moriarty 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 337–350; ‘“Il ne faut pas être si exact en temps”: la mort au croisement de la fiction et de 
l’érudition humanistes’, in Érudition et ﬁction: troisième rencontre internationale Paul-Zumthor, ed. by É. Méchoulan 
(Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2014), pp. 65–80.
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and custom.  In the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, further 76
sporadic publications on time in the Renaissance continued to appear, with notable 
contributions by French scholar Yvonne Bellenger, who produced an edited collection of 
essays on time in the Middle Ages and Renaissance in the late 1980s, Le Temps et la Durée 
dans la littérature au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance (1986).  Julius Thomas Fraser 77
included a brief section on ‘The Renaissance’ in his well-known study Of Time, Passion 
and Knowledge: Reﬂections on the Strategy of Existence (1990); Fraser focuses on the 
‘biologically oriented outlook on time’ which he believes was perpetuated by anatomists 
such as Paracelsus (1493-1541).  However, by far the most recent collection of articles on 78
time in the Renaissance is a special edition of the Journal of Early Modern Studies 
entitled ‘A Time of Their Own: Experiencing Time and Temporality in the Early Modern 
World’ (2017) edited by Alessandro Arcangeli and Anu Korhonen; the edition includes 
articles on time and historicity and female time-keeping routines, as well as an article by 
myself which constitutes a shortened version of some of the themes explored in Chapters 
One and Two of this thesis.  Furthermore, as previously stated in ‘Time in the 16th 79
century?’, a vast amount of present-day research has been devoted to exploring time in the 
Middle Ages - some of these studies have also alluded to early modern concerns as part of 
their remit. 
 It is also worth briefly acknowledging that recent studies have already begun to 
highlight the increasingly fractured nature of 16th century time. These divisions are most 
apparent when we consider chronology and time-keeping; Engammare’s On Time, 
Punctuality and Discipline examines how Reformed Protestant circles were developing a 
new approach to individual time-keeping. Furthermore, in their respective monographs, 
Quinones and Cohen have both explored the idea that a more individualistic approach to 
time emerged in the Renaissance as a response to religious upheaval. This idea is echoed 
by Hill who describes a number of temporal concepts which revolved around the 
individual rather than the (Christian) collective; these include ideas which survived from 
Antiquity including the present as a decisive moment, the notion of carpe diem and the 
 Georges Matoré, ‘Le temps au XVIe siècle’, L’Information Grammaticale, 32 (1987), pp. 3-8. See also Henry Hornik, 76
‘Time and periodization in French Renaissance Literature: Rabelais and Montaigne’, Studi francesi, 13.39 (1969), pp. 
477-481.
 Yvonne Bellenger, ed., Le Temps et la Durée dans la littérature au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance (Paris: Nizet, 1986).77
 Julius Thomas Fraser, Of Time, Passion and Knowledge: Reﬂections on the Strategy of Existence (Princeton: Princeton 78
University Press, 1990), p. 30. 
 Alessandro Arcangeli & Anu Korhonen, eds., ‘A Time of Their Own: Experiencing Time and Temporality in the 79
Early Modern World’, Journal of Early Modern Studies, 6.1 (2017); Rachel Ashcroft, ‘(Re)thinking time: Giordano 
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replacement of eternity with sempiternal secular duration through poetic fame and 
physical procreation. Finally, Sarah Hutton - who has also produced one of the few 
studies on Bruno and time - argues that while Aristotelian theories of time were 
dominant in the institutions, they often came under attack not only from Bruno, but also 
his fellow Italians such as Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588) and Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597). 
 It is surprising to note just how little research has been devoted to time in 
Montaigne, when the topic appears to permeate so many aspects of his writing. A 
necessary starting point is Françoise Joukovsky’s Montaigne et le problème du temps 
(1972), which is still the only monograph devoted to studying time in the Essais.  80
Joukovsky compresses many different aspects of time in the Essais into her study, from 
Stoic definitions of the present moment to the importance of memory. She also 
investigates an idea that I explore further in Chapter Three concerning ‘le problème de la 
connaissance’ in the Essais, which Joukovsky describes as being ‘posé sur les bases 
incertaines du temps’.  While her research is thorough and incorporates many different 81
aspects of temporality found in Montaigne’s work, her thesis relies heavily on an outdated 
current of scholarship in Montaigne studies which tends to classify the three books of the 
Essais into various modes of thought.  In response, I have rejected a systematic approach 82
to defining time in each book in favour of a study which opens out layers of temporality 
across the Essais and acknowledges contradictions where necessary. This method of 
analysis has allowed me to dispense with the need to establish a rigid scholarly structure to 
the study (as in Joukovsky’s work) and instead mirrors the flux and flow of Montaigne’s 
often-contradictory thought.  
 Various chapters and articles have focused on exploring particular aspects of time 
in Montaigne; for example, both Yvonne Bellenger and Marie-Madeleine de La 
Garandière discuss representations of ageing in the Essais.  Richard A. Sayce has explored 83
an element of time incorporated by many respected Montaigne scholars not writing on 
time, namely the ‘peinture du passage’ or Montaigne’s unique ability to ‘write’ himself 
 Françoise Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps (Paris: Nizet, 1972).80
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over time.  I also include here Albert Ahmeti’s study De la peinture du temps dans les 84
‘Essais’ de Montaigne (2014) as an example of a more recent study on time in Montaigne, 
with the caveat that this is a self-published thesis.  However, Ahmeti’s bibliography 85
includes a worthy selection of texts on Montaigne and time - including many of the 
articles and chapters highlighted above - and argues primarily against the ideas that 
Joukovsky originally put forward. He takes issue with her notion that the conclusion of 
time in the Essais is a ‘seizing’ of the present moment. Rather, temporal mutation lies at 
the heart of time in the Essais: ‘L’auteur échappe continuellement au présent car chez lui 
la constance (par laquelle l’instant peut être saisi) s’avère impossible’.  Other recent 86
studies include an article by Antoine Compagnon on the nature of the present in 
Montaigne’s work, while Daniel Ménager has assessed ‘la question du commencement’ in 
the Essais.  I hope to cover new ground by exploring Montaigne’s experiments with the 87
philosophical significance of suicide and fear of death while setting him firmly within the 
context of a writer purposely breaking free of the temporal conventions of the late 16th 
century.  
 For various reasons, there is less Bruno scholarship to draw on than the range of 
criticism consistently being published on Montaigne. However, while this means that 
there is also less research available on time in Bruno, some highly significant studies have 
recently been published. Most modern scholars have approached time in Bruno through 
the concept of vicissitude. Echoing the idea of temporal mutation in the Essais, Elena 
Maria Severini and Badaloni have both begun to explore time in Bruno’s works through 
the related concepts of mutazione and vicissitudine. Furthermore, Enrico Giannetto and 
Hutton have discussed aspects of physical time in Bruno’s works, focusing on both his 
response to Aristotelianism and also how Bruno may have pre-empted the temporal 
theories of scientists such as Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955).  88
Hutton’s brief but important article also includes a comparative angle, which assesses 
Bruno alongside his Italian contemporaries such as Telesio. While there are still no full-
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length monographs devoted to time in Bruno, Paul-Henri Michel’s La cosmologie de 
Giordano Bruno (1962) touches on various aspects of temporality across the full breadth 
of Bruno’s works, including similar ideas to Ciliberto surrounding time, nature and 
truth.  I build on this research by revealing further aspects of time across the entirety of 89
the Italian dialogues, countering Granada’s belief that there is little worthwhile evidence 
on time in the six texts. Instead, this thesis shares the view of Badaloni that time is a 
central component of the dialogues from the Cena onwards. 
 In recent years, a small number of critics have attempted to establish significant 
biographical and intellectual connections between Bruno and Montaigne. Bruno, born in 
Nola (near Naples) in 1548, spent around two years (1579-1581) living in Toulouse, a city 
that Jordi Bayod has argued the Frenchman was well-acquainted with.  The two men 90
were also resident in Paris in 1582, where Bruno was staying at the same time Montaigne, 
then mayor of Bordeaux, arrived at court regarding diplomatic matters.  Critics have also 91
analysed the link with John Florio, an Italian-English scholar and good friend of Bruno, 
who produced the first translation of Montaigne’s Essais into English in 1603.  92
Considering all of these possible points of connection, one would assume that at least one 
major study would already have been published with the aim of establishing further 
crossover in their works.  However, no such large-scale study exists to date. 93
 One possible explanation for this hesitation may be the relative complexity that 
arises from comparing two thinkers who lack any truly significant historical evidence to 
connect them. Furthermore, their initial purposes in writing appear to be very different. 
Bruno’s Italian dialogues are an excellent example of the thematic and stylistic scope that 
Bruno experimented with; he attempts a philosophical project that encompasses detailed 
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discussion of cosmology, natural philosophy, ethics and more.  These works are unlike 94
most other 16th-century texts since they are firmly rooted in Bruno’s theory on the infinite 
universe. Furthermore, he experiments with the traditional philosophical dialogue, often 
including elements of satire and comedy in his work in an attempt to incorporate 
traditional strands of philosophy such as ethics into his unique cosmology. The Essais are 
altogether different in genre. This series of essais or ‘attempts’ comprise three books which 
cover a wealth of topics from child-rearing to suicide. In each chapter, Montaigne 
attempts to convey the flow of his thoughts as they enter his mind and express them 
through writing.  The word essai had never been used to express an intellectual or literary 95
project in the French language of the 16th century; l’essai represented the origins of an 
entirely new literary genre altogether.  Clearly, Bruno and Montaigne engaged with 96
philosophy in different ways to their contemporaries, perhaps helping to explain why no 
major works have appeared that directly compare the two thinkers.  
 It is the radical nature of these thinkers that my thesis will embrace using an 
approach which justifies the comparison of Montaigne and Bruno by considering them as 
thinkers who defied classification and whose interests overlapped. In this sense, both 
thinkers converge due to their willingness to move between and even challenge established 
literary and philosophical norms. On the one hand, Bruno appears to be a natural 
philosopher interested in literary form; across the breadth of his works he employs 
multiple genres comprising poems, philosophical dialogues and satire, as well as switching 
to vernacular in the Italian dialogues. On the other hand, Montaigne is a literary 
innovator who combines his unique style with extensive knowledge of and interest in the 
schools of classical philosophy, including a thorough understanding of Lucretius, Plato, 
and Socrates. In accepting this fluidity on the part of Montaigne and Bruno, this thesis 
has focused more on their respective originality and in doing so has actually revealed a 
series of fascinating similarities between the two thinkers.  
 Since the middle of the 20th century, various articles and book chapters have 
begun to highlight connections between Montaigne and Bruno in an effort to begin 
 Ordine states that: ‘È qui che Bruno comincia ad abbozzare un percorso globale che dalla filosofia della natura (Cena, 94
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analysing the two thinkers. While Montaigne critics have remained indifferent to Bruno, 
several Bruno scholars have taken the initiative, beginning with Fulvio Papi’s Antropologia 
e civiltà nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno (1968).  Many of the themes discussed by later 97
critics - such as Eric MacPhail and Bayod - take Papi’s text as their primary influence. 
Chapter Seven, ‘La civiltà come dignità dell’uomo’, is of particular interest. Here Papi 
identifies a veiled reference to Montaigne in Bruno’s satirical work Spaccio della bestia 
trionfante (1584); Montaigne is the personaggio pazzo or ‘crazy person’ being referred to 
when Jupiter is addressing Otium, complaining that some do not realise there is 
‘differenza molta tra il non esser vizioso e l’esser virtuoso’.  Papi considers this a direct 98
attack on Montaigne’s essay, ‘Des Cannibales’ (I.XXXI), and its favourable portrayal of 
New World tribes and their supposedly ‘virtuous’ lifestyle. Papi then identifies a key 
pattern which will later be confirmed by other scholars working on Montaigne and Bruno 
- namely their tendency to reach entirely different conclusions, having identified the same 
problem at hand.  Indeed, Papi argues that for the first time in the history of Western 99
thought, two different positions are established here. One argues that while nature should 
be a primary point of influence, society must act towards transforming itself ‘come 
armonizzazione e temperamento delle esigenze naturali’; the other believes that New 
World society is already a beacon of virtue with its simple, tribal existence, while Europe 
has corrupted itself beyond recognition with bloody civil wars.  Papi is one of the first 100
critics to acknowledge the difficulties that arise between interpreting the two thinkers, 
while simultaneously highlighting the potential value of a comparison between the two. 
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M.A. Granada, La reivindicación de la ﬁlosofía en Giordano Bruno (Barcelona: Herder, 2005). Granada briefly 
mentions parallels with Montaigne concerning their shared interest in philosophy and its translation into the practical 
morality that was embodied by Socrates: ‘It is true that at the same time Bruno reiterated this principle, Montaigne was 
questioning it in the Essais, and specifically the opening pages of the ‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’’ (p. 215). 
Translation own. Nicola Panichi’s monograph I vincoli del disinganno: per una nuova interpretazione di Montaigne 
(Florence: Olschki, 2004) attempts a more wide-ranging comparison between the two writers. In Chapter Three ‘Le età 
della storia’, Panichi identifies history as one of the main connections in the Essais - ‘il vero intertesto di tutti i saggi’ (p. 
67). She claims that Montaigne defines historical time in terms of repeating cycles, and subsequently compares this 
cyclical concept of history with Bruno’s vicissitudine (pp. 88-89). 
 Papi, p. 346; see also Ordine, pp. 90-120 and Brian Vickers, ‘Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance: the Ambivalence 98
of otium’, Renaissance Studies, 4 (1990), pp. 1-37, for a useful survey of the classical influences of the Otium vs. Negotium 
debate: ‘Throughout this tradition human worth was evaluated in terms of the degree, and success of one’s involvement 
in society, for the public good’ (p. 2). 
 In Umbra profonda: studi su Giordano Bruno (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1999), Michele Ciliberto echoes 99
this sentiment, stating that although they often move from a common issue, ‘presentino due soluzioni radicalmente 
differenti’ (p. 193). 
 Papi, p. 351. Papi discusses Montaigne’s relativism and the notion of the ‘good native’: ‘La patologia della civiltà 100
europea sta per far nascere il mito del buon selvaggio naturalmente morale, e, per questo, immediatamente felice’ (p. 
350).
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 Perhaps the most promising recent works that have sought to compare 
Montaigne and Bruno are a series of brief articles by Bayod, and a study by MacPhail. 
Bayod aims to uncover a textual link between the two authors in light of the contextual 
evidence that unites them. He discusses the cosmological implications of Copernicus 
found in a passage of Montaigne’s well-known sceptical exercise the Apologie de Raimond 
Sebond (II, XII) and revisits Papi’s discussion, supporting it with textual evidence from 
other Bruno works. MacPhail begins from a slightly different premise, stating that in 
order to understand these ‘two complex figures’ he has chosen to work from a basis of 
anthropocentrifugalism, ‘the radical alternative to anthropocentrism’.  Despite differing 101
approaches, both critics identify common ground between Montaigne and Bruno that 
has previously gone unstudied - namely the importance of their views about human 
beings and nature. MacPhail believes that both thinkers ‘subordinate and ultimately […] 
negate the importance of humanity and human history in the scope of the cosmos’.  102
Bayod agrees that despite their differences of opinion regarding objective truth and 
scepticism, ‘it seems the two come together through the idea of the homogeneity of 
nature and particularly with respect to all forms of life’.  I hope to uncover further 103
connections between the two thinkers using a highly different approach to Bayod and 
MacPhail. Instead of referring back to Papi’s earlier thesis, I build on research revolving 
around inner and outer time in order to explore the similarities and differences between 
Montaigne’s and Bruno’s responses to time.  
Summary of Thesis Structure 
 In Chapter One, ‘Bodies in Time’, I approach time through one of the most 
visible physical markers of temporal passage - bodies in time. I believe that ‘bodies’ - i.e. 
corruptible bodies from the human body to plants, trees, and mountains - inform initial 
responses to time in the works of Montaigne and Bruno. First I examine some of the most 
significant 16th-century conceptions of time familiar to Montaigne and Bruno, as well as 
exploring their respective literary aims in more detail and suggesting how contextual 
 MacPhail, p. 532. ‘To enlarge on this recent trend and to reorient the prevailing view of Bruno’s reaction to 101
Montaigne, I want to propose a new basis of comparison between two figures who were, in terms of their publishing 
career, exact contemporaries. This basis I will call anthropocentrifugalism […]. Both authors concur in their tendency to 
subordinate and ultimately to negate the importance of humanity and human history in the scope of the cosmos’ (p. 
531). 
 Ibid., p. 532. 102
 Bayod, p. 206. 103
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factors may have influenced a degree of indifference toward temporal conventions. I then 
explore ‘bodies in time’ in both the Essais and the Italian dialogues through textual 
analysis of themes such as death, war, substance, and matter which serve to highlight what 
I term the ‘natural order’ of bodies in time. Time emerges as a seemingly uncontrollable 
force, an exterior concept that acts upon bodies. However, I then move towards a more 
human-oriented response to time and introduce the first layer of complexity into the 
discussion through the idea of time-consciousness. The last section of Chapter One aligns 
the two thinkers more closely together by highlighting a shared awareness of what is truly 
at stake in the human temporal condition.  
 Chapter Two builds on these ideas by introducing how Montaigne and Bruno use 
human time-consciousness to experiment with different conceptions of time. As stated 
above, I have chosen a deliberate focus on future time and the notions of suicide, fear of 
death and afterlife. What emerges from this discussion is an experimentation with time 
that challenges deeply religious notions of time. Both Montaigne’s account of his own 
near-death experience and Bruno’s radical cosmology are responsible for dramatically 
subverting traditional responses to mortality. Such discussions reveal a willingness to 
challenge the seemingly rigid nature of time, an attitude which is not reflected in general 
scholarship on 16th-century time.  
 In Chapter Three, I take these ideas further by focusing on the interplay between 
eternity and time in the works of Montaigne and Bruno. I set the discussion in context by 
explaining the historical relationship between time and eternity and its status in the late 
1500s. I highlight the tendency of both thinkers to experiment with strict notions of time 
and argue that they also treat eternity in an extremely unconventional manner. 
Montaigne and Bruno then appear to unite in their belief that human beings and the 
world around them exist in a state of temporal flux. I then use the last section of this 
chapter to explore how Montaigne and Bruno believe individuals should utilise time. This 
discussion reveals a deeply complicated relationship between time and epistemology that 
once again necessitates a very different approach to the future.  
 Chapter Four explores how their conceptions of time influence other aspects of 
their thought; in this case, I will assess the notion of custom and shed light on intriguing 
direct connections between Montaigne and Bruno that were previously ignored. Custom 
and time possess a fascinating relationship that both thinkers characterise in remarkably 
similar ways. Furthermore, their depiction of custom holds severe repercussions for the 
productive use of time discussed in the previous chapter.  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Chapter One: Bodies in Time 
 This chapter explores how Montaigne and Bruno understand time through the 
notion of ‘bodies in time’. Admittedly, in the 16th century, this conceptual term did not 
exist within intellectual thought. It is certainly true that thinkers and artists had begun to 
represent bodies - particularly the human body - in new and intriguing ways, but these 
approaches chiefly sought to attribute order or symmetry to corporeal substance. The 
German painter and printmaker Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528) published a series of texts that 
attempted to apply detailed mathematical and scientific research on the human anatomy 
to aesthetics. His most famous collection of works, Vier Bücher von menschlicher 
Proportion (1528) contained over 100 anthropometric woodcuts and was widely circulated 
in Europe. The French printer and author Geofroy Tory (1480-1533) produced a well-
known philological work, Champﬂeury (1529), which contained several diagrams 
combining Roman capital letters with human bodies and faces in order to highlight their 
matching proportions.  Furthermore, the famous Belgian physician Andreas Vesalius 1
(1514-1564) transformed the study of human anatomy with his text De humani corporis 
fabrica libri septem (1543), which presented the physical structure of the human body in 
extensive and meticulous detail. Arguably such trends in philology, art and anatomy were 
all approaching the human figure in a way that emphasised the universal proportions of 
the human body and wished to systematise them further. However, alongside these 
developments, there were little to no currents of thought in 16th-century Europe which 
focused exclusively on the temporality of the body, a theme which - as I suggest in this 
chapter - emphasises the inconsistencies and changes inherent within human beings. Since 
neither thinker wholeheartedly engages with the popular ‘bodily’ trends identified above, 
‘bodies in time’ is an original concept used here to provide a helpful framework for 
exploring time in this thesis. 
 In this chapter, ‘bodies’ refer to any body that is composed of a corruptible 
substance i.e., it is capable of undergoing a change to its current state. Throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, thinkers have often begun to think about time through 
observing changes both to themselves and their surroundings, i.e., the alternation of day 
and night, the seasons and the motions of the heavens. Such observations have provided 
the starting point for many prominent definitions of time within the history of 
 Tory’s diagrams were not unlike Leonardo da Vinci’s famous Vitruvian Man. See Barbara C. Bowen, ‘Geofroy Tory’s 1
“Champ Fleury” and Its Major Sources’, Studies in Philology, 76.1 (1979), pp. 13-27.
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philosophy on time, from Aristotle’s belief that time cannot exist without change, to 
David Hume’s assertion that the idea of time arises when we perceive a sequence of 
impressions. In the late 16th century, Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588) stated that the 
succession of things that humans perceive in the world around them is a perfectly natural 
place to begin discussing time since it is this succession that alerts us to the idea that a time 
in kind has ‘passed’.  As we will see, Montaigne was particularly (but not exclusively) 2
fascinated with the microcosm of his own body over time, while Bruno sought to explain 
time through radical theories concerning the substance and form of mutable bodies. 
Human beings sense the passage of time occurring and they can note the duration of 
different events. This experience of time is partly ‘informed by the body’ and its constant 
inner changes, such as physiological functions and transitions in mood or emotion.  3
Arguably it is also informed by the physical succession of external bodies, and thus it is 
through an analysis of changes to bodies, from the human body through to theories of 
matter more generally, that this thesis analyses how Montaigne and Bruno develop their 
understanding of time. 
Context 
Deﬁnitions of time in the 16th century 
 In the Introduction, I suggested that the complex range of attitudes towards time 
in the 16th century may not yet have been fully explored. However, it is still important to 
be able to establish a general picture of how most thinkers would have defined time 
during this period, particularly as I propose that Montaigne and Bruno often understood 
time differently to their contemporaries. Consequently, this section will briefly outline the 
influence of Aristotle’s definition of time on 16th-century Scholastic education within the 
universities and other establishments, including the limited adoption of variations on this 
theme during the Renaissance (particularly those definitions by well-known critics of the 
Stagirite such as Proclus and Plotinus). Aristotle’s philosophy underpinned the specific 
workings of Christian-Scholastic conceptions of time and was easily modified by 
 Sarah Hutton, ‘Some Renaissance critiques of Aristotle’s theory of time: Telesio, Bruno, Patrizi’, Annals of Science, 34 2
(1977), pp. 345-363 (p. 354). See also Marcel Conche, ‘Temps, temporalité, temporalisation’, L’enseignement 
philosophique, 6 (2009), pp. 9-20; Conche describes Hume’s approach to time as the ‘méthode qui consiste à partir de 
l’expérience’ (p.  10). 
 Marc Wittmann, ‘Embodied Time: The Experience of Time, the Body, and the Self’ in The Philosophy, Psychology, 3
and Neuroscience of Temporality, ed. by Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 507-523 
(p. 511). Wittmann focuses more on the self and the individual body as an entity that informs our experience of time, 
whereas I assess the role of external bodies too. 
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commentators to fit a finite cosmos within a linear historical timeline. I will also outline 
how Bruno engages with Aristotle’s definition of time in the Acrotismus Camoeracensis 
(1588). While Montaigne makes over 80 references to Aristotle, ‘le Dieu de la science 
scholastique’ (II.XII.539), in the Essais he does not discuss Aristotle’s definition of time at 
all, perhaps a notable omission in itself considering that the term temps appears over 500 
times.  Bruno’s response to Aristotle is much more sustained and must, therefore, be 4
acknowledged within any discussion of late 16th-century definitions of time.  
 The small quantity of modern scholarship on 16th-century philosophy of time 
often identifies Aristotle’s definition in the Physics as being the most widely-accepted 
response to the question ‘what is time?’, particularly amongst the various scholarly and 
religious establishments of the period.  Tamar Rudavsky has stated that Aristotle’s 5
connection between time and motion continually reappears in medieval and early 
modern philosophy.  Furthermore, Michael Edwards claims that philosophical 6
discussions of time in the late 1500s and early 1600s nearly always began with Aristotle.  7
Aristotle had defined time as the number of change in respect of before and after. In other 
words, time is a measure of motion, and thus - far from being independent of motion in 
any way - time can only exist where motion does too. As Granada has stated in a 
comprehensive survey of sources related to time and eternity in Bruno, it appears that 
Aristotle reduces time to a mere accident of movement:  
 Time is thus an accident present in the corporeal substance due to the fact that   
 essentially defines this substance: movement. And in this mobile substance time is 
 A brief remark towards the end of the Apologie comes close to Aristotle’s definition without naming it as such: ‘Autant 4
en advient-il à la nature qui est mesurée, comme au temps qui la mesure’ (II.XII.603). The extent to which Montaigne 
was influenced by Aristotle has often been dismissed by scholars of Montaigne, but Ann Hartle has recently argued that 
Aristotelianism lies at the heart of the Essais. For a literature review and subsequent response to this issue, see Ann 
Hartle, ‘Chapter One: Reversing Aristotle’ in Montaigne and the Origins of Modern Philosophy (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2013), pp. 5-28. Edilia Traverso’s thorough account of Montaigne’s borrowings from 
Aristotle is still useful; see Edilia Traverso, Montaigne e Aristotele (Florence: Le Monnier, 1974). 
 This section will draw particularly on Hutton, ‘Some Renaissance critiques…’ and Miguel A. Granada, ‘El concepto de 5
tiempo en Bruno: tiempos cósmicos y eternidad’, in La ﬁlosoﬁa di Giordano Bruno: Problemi ermeneutici e storiograﬁci, 
ed. by Eugenio Canone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2003), pp. 85-113. For more on the 16th century and Aristotelian 
conceptions of time, see Michael Edwards, Time and Science of the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013); John Spencer Hill, 
Inﬁnity, Faith and Time (Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University, 1997), pp.  69-77; Ricardo J. Quinones, The 
Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), ‘Chapter 1 - The Setting’.
 Tamar Rudavsky, Time Matters: Time, Creation and Cosmology in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Albany, NY: State 6
University of New York Press, 2001), p. 13.
 Edwards, p. 15. Edwards goes on to provide an excellent account of Aristotle’s connection between time and the soul, 7
and its subsequent reception in the late 16th century. See pp. 15-18 for further background to this discussion in the 
Physics. 
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 present in two forms, consistent with the two classes of mobile substance that   
 exist.  8
 In the Physics, Aristotle defines two types of movement; therefore there are two 
types of time. One exists in sublunar beings which are both corruptible and created (the 
‘bodies’ referred to in the chapter title); therefore time in the sublunar world is finite. The 
other type of time is infinite, as it measures the existence of celestial beings which are 
incorruptible and are not created.  Time is a measure of the motions generated by these 9
types of beings; thus the existence of time depends wholly on the occurrence of motion. 
Furthermore, Aristotle undermines the importance of the present moment within the 
traditional temporal distinctions of past, present, and future; time is primarily evidenced 
by the transformation of the future into the past, as confirmed solely by an object in 
motion.  10
 Within the history of philosophy on time, Aristotle’s definition is influential but 
is not without its flaws. Indeed, several critics have already identified problems inherent in 
this definition of time. Richard Sorabji argues that in the Physics, Aristotle provided an 
enticing set of paradoxes on time that has influenced Western philosophy for centuries; 
yet Aristotle himself failed to answer them satisfactorily and ‘[as] a result his solutions 
[…] tend to be less interesting than those of many of his successors’.  In particular, time 11
anchors itself to motion so completely that Aristotle struggles to explain why time 
continues in the absence of motion.  As a result, the reception of Aristotle’s definition of 12
time in 16th-century Europe is not entirely straightforward. These issues certainly did not 
go unnoticed in the Renaissance, and Bruno was amongst a small number of Italian 
thinkers in the 16th century who attacked this definition of time outright.  
 Furthermore, Aristotle’s belief in the eternity of time in both directions clashed 
directly with Christian doctrine. The only instance in the Essais in which Montaigne 
explicitly discusses Aristotle and temporality involves his brief remark that - according to 
 Granada, p. 482. 8
 Christianity will later be forced to adapt such elements of Aristotle’s work, since according to Genesis, the celestial 9
beings are incorruptible but are technically created: ‘He [God] also made the stars’ (Genesis 1.16). See Granada (ibid., p. 
497) for a further discussion of the third kind of time - angelic time - represented by aevum. See also Edwards, Time and 
Science of the Soul: ‘Time is the measure of things that have a beginning and an end; Aevum is the measure of things 
that have a beginning that lack an end; Eternity is called the measure of things that have neither beginning nor end’ (p. 
16).
 Hutton states that in Aristotelian time ‘the present has no dimension, being merely the mark of transition of the 10
future into past’ (p.  346). 
 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell 11
University Press, 1983), p. 7.
 Hutton, p. 347.12
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Aristotle and Cicero - ‘la naissance du monde est indéterminée’ (II.XII.572). As John 
Spencer Hill has argued, Aristotle’s theories only gained real traction in Europe from the 
12th century onwards, when his texts ‘made their way from Arab Spain to Christian 
France’ and had to be adapted to more than one thousand years of Christian belief in the 
cosmology of Genesis.  Whereas the Bible presents a clear delineation of a beginning (the 13
Creation in seven days) and an end (the Second Coming) to the Earth and thus to time, 
Aristotle argued for the eternity of the world - there can be nothing before nature since 
there can be nothing ‘before’ what is eternal.   14
 However, despite the obvious differences between these ideas of time, Aristotle’s 
theories survived from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance owing to their malleable 
nature; a long tradition of commentaries conveniently modified his texts to reflect 
contemporary interests, and his definition of time was no exception. The writings of 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) firmly cemented Aristotle 
as the figurehead of Scholastic teaching in the Middle Ages, and arguably Nicolaus 
Copernicus (1473-1543), Hobbes and John Donne (1572-1631) are notable thinkers from the 
16th and early 17th centuries who continued to express time in distinctly Aristotelian 
terms.  Aristotelianism was unquestionably the foundation of Scholastic teaching in the 15
late 16th century, a mainstay of education in the universities that Bruno would inevitably 
be forced to confront after receiving such an education himself.  
 However, Aristotle was not the sole classical authority available to philosophers 
and theologians during the early modern period. Already in the late 15th century, some of 
the greatest thinkers of the Italian Renaissance, including Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) and 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), had turned to the variations on Aristotle’s 
definition of time put forward by the ancient philosopher Plotinus (204 AD-270 AD), 
who had criticised the Stagirite in the Enneads. Instead, both Plotinus and the 
Neoplatonic thinker Proclus (412 AD-485 AD) developed Plato’s theory of time as a 
moving image of eternity.  Plotinus argued that time is not movement, nor is it a measure 16
of movement; this is because ‘movement is no more than something that occurs in time: 
 Hill, p. 15.13
 Henry Cuffe (1538-1601) was amongst those Christian theologians who attacked Aristotle for posing the eternity of 14
time. For more on this debate see Marcel Conche, ‘Temps, temporalité, temporalisation’, p. 9 and Hutton, pp. 347-348. 
 See Hutton, p. 348.15
 See also Granada, pp. 485-488 for a discussion of Plotinus and Proclus which includes a special emphasis on their 16
understanding of infinite time and eternity. For an excellent translation of Plato’s Timaeus see Plato, Complete Works, 
trans. and ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 1241.
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“movement can stop altogether or be interrupted, but time cannot”’.  Plotinus’ resulting 17
definition of time as a ‘power of the soul’ - and the philosophical tradition that derived 
from it - will be explored in more detail towards the end of this chapter.  Meanwhile, one 18
must acknowledge that it was thanks in large part to the Latin translations of Plotinus 
published by Ficino in 1492, as well as various comments on Proclus in his Platonic 
commentaries, that these philosophers were gradually introduced into Western thought 
from the 15th century onwards.  
 As well as the influence of classical philosophers working outside the Peripatetic 
school, Hutton has suggested in an early work on Bruno and time that Telesio and 
Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597) were part of a handful of 16th-century thinkers who actively 
responded to the more ‘mainstream’ Aristotelian definition of time with a notable degree 
of criticism.  Telesio conceived of time as completely separate from motion, while Patrizi 19
severely condemned Aristotle’s teachings on time before ultimately deciding to adopt the 
Stagirite’s philosophy.  Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) was a French humanist and Protestant 20
convert who was slaughtered in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre; he was also an 
outspoken critic of Scholasticism who claimed that Aristotle had merely talked about the 
measurement of time, not time itself. In the late 1500s, Bruno joined this group and 
engaged directly with Aristotle’s idea of time as a number of motion in the Acrotismus 
Camoeracensis, his treatise that systematically attacked each key tenet of Aristotle’s 
philosophy in the Physics.  This work has naturally received considerable attention by the 21
small number of critics who have already addressed time in Bruno’s work, and there is 
little need to go beyond the earlier studies of Hutton, Granada, and others in this 
respect.  Articles 38 to 40 and 43 to 44 of the Acrotismus all engage with aspects of time; 22
 Hill, p. 78.17
 Ibid.18
 See also Edwards, Time and Science of the Soul, ‘Introduction’ in which he lists Telesio and Patrizi as thinkers who 19
pre-empted Newtonian absolute time in the late 16th century. 
 ‘In Telesio’s view it does not follow that because perception of time depends upon motion, the very existence of time 20
does too. Instead, he says that time and motion are quite separate, and that time is prior to motion’ (Hill, p. 355).
 I will be translating extracts from the following edition: Giordano Bruno, Acrotismus Camoeracensis, ed. by F. 21
Fiorentino (Naples: Dom. Morano, 1879). Publication of the original Acrotismus Camoeracensis followed Bruno’s 
infamous dispute at the Collège de Cambrai in Paris; for further information surrounding this particular event see 
Giordano Bruno, Acrotismo cameracense. Le spiegazioni degli articoli di ﬁsica contro i Peripatetici, trans. and ed. by 
Barbara Amato, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 7 (Pisa: Serra, 2009), pp. 11-34.
 See also Enrico Giannetto, ‘Giordano Bruno and the Relativity of Time’, in Turning Traditions Upside Down: 22
Rethinking Giordano Bruno’s Enlightenment, ed. by Henning Hufnagel & Anne Eusterschulte (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 2013), pp. 121-130.
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article 39 in particular directly responds to the definition of time as a number of motion 
thus: 
 Rather it is movement which measures time, and not time which measures   
 movement. In fact, it is  better to say that we understand duration through   
 motion and not vice versa, because even though it appears that each one measures  
 the other, a certain point in time will never be a measure of movement, if before  
 that a particular movement has not already been a measure of time.  23
 As part of his reaction to Aristotle, here Bruno concludes that rather than time 
being a measure of movement, ‘time is a species of duration’; the two concepts of time 
and duration merge in so far as there are two types of duration - finite and infinite - and 
these correspond to time and eternity respectively. Time is the duration of individual 
things, whereas eternity is universal duration, ‘the collective name for time’.  Time 24
measures the duration of corruptible substances while eternity measures the duration of 
non-corruptible substances. Bruno developed this theory on time a couple of years after 
the Italian dialogues were published, and it is defined as part of a systematic criticism of 
each article in the Physics; this thesis focuses on aspects of Bruno’s time in the earlier 
Italian dialogues, referencing his later works where appropriate.  In any case, it is clear 25
that criticism of Aristotle and Scholasticism was not unheard of in the late 16th century, 
and many philosophers such as Bruno were actively reacting against such teachings.  
  
Montaigne and Bruno 
 As Joukovsky reminds her readers in Montaigne et le problème du temps (1972), 
there is no chapter in the Essais entitled ‘Du temps’, while Bruno scholars such as Hutton 
and Granada tend to dismiss the importance of the admittedly scattered references to 
tempo in the Italian dialogues.  However, I have already suggested that time is a key 26
 Bruno, Acrotismus Camoeracensis, p. 147. Translation own. Original text: ‘Potius motus est mensura temporis, quam 23
tempus mensura motus: verius enim per motum novimus durationem, quam e contra: quamvis enim haec mutuo se 
mensurari contingat, nunquam quoddam tempus mensura motus erit, ni prius quidam motus mensura temporis 
extiterit’. Furthermore, the original Latin title of Article 39 reads ‘Malo motum mensurare tempus; quam tempus 
motum’. 
 Hutton, p. 356. 24
 See the Introduction, ‘Delineations and Limitations’ for further acknowledgment of the potential contradictions and 25
changes inherent in both Bruno’s and Montaigne’s ideas of time, as well as selected relevant bibliography. 
 Françoise Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps (Paris: Nizet, 1972), p. 9. See also Hutton, p. 355; in ‘The 26
Concept of Time in Giordano Bruno’ Granada claims that ‘the problem of time - especially its physical-cosmological 
and metaphysical aspects - does not occupy a place of any great importance in the Italian dialogues’ (p. 492). 
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aspect of how they reflect on their existence. As such these ideas arguably require more 
than a cursory reflection on time; instead they touch on many different aspects of 
philosophy throughout the entirety of the works in question. Therefore it will also be 
useful to keep in mind the purpose of their writing, combined with certain contextual 
factors that influenced them as they began to write; these points may well begin to 
provide reasons as to why they understood time in a particular way. In ‘Des Livres’ (II.X), 
Montaigne describes the purpose of the Essais thus: ‘C’est icy purement l’essay de mes 
facultez naturelles, et nullement des acquises’ (II.X.407). While he doesn’t doubt that 
there are many things of which he knows little, and to which he would have to defer to 
‘les maistres du mestier’ (i.e. philosophers), he can reliably talk about himself: ‘Ce sont icy 
mes fantasies, par lesquelles je ne tasche point à donner à connoistre les choses, mais 
moy’ (II.X.407). Here he suggests a willingness to relinquish the bookish authority of 
thinkers such as Aristotle; the Essais will draw upon his own direct experience rather than 
solely relying on the knowledge found in books, and it is his natural faculties, rather than 
supra-natural faculties i.e. faith in religion, that will take precedent.  Such an approach 27
also begins to explain why Montaigne is concerned with the experiences of his natural and 
mutable human body rather than the inner workings of celestial or godly beings.  
  In a certain sense, Bruno is similarly keen to shed the traditional authority found 
in the scholarly books of his day, albeit for different reasons. Originality is a key feature of 
the Italian dialogues, from the Cena de le Ceneri - in which Bruno dismantles the 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology that has been in use for centuries - to the unique 
combination of literary genres contained in the Eroici Furori.  Like Montaigne, Bruno is 28
doing something new in his writing, which he makes very clear in the Cena within the 
context of his new cosmology. As I explain in further detail below, Bruno often employs a 
literary strategy in which he refers to himself as ‘il Nolano’, and in the following 
quotation il Nolano’s status within the history of philosophy is confirmed: ‘lui [Bruno] 
non vedea per gli occhi di Copernico, né di Ptolomeo…ma per i proprii quanto al giudizio 
e la determinazione’ (Cena I.447). Despite his praise of Copernicus, Bruno still possesses 
doubts about the theories of this respected innovator - instead Bruno claims to see the 
world through his own eyes and his own mind rather than those of Copernicus, Ptolemy, 
or indeed the ‘innumerabili sciocchi, insensati, stupidi ed ignorantissimi’ (Cena I.537) of 
 For an introduction see Terence Cave, How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta, 2007); also Ian Maclean, 27
Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997).
 See Giordano Bruno, The Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Paul Eugene Memmo (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Pr., 28
1964). Memmo states that ‘De gli eroici furori combines, for the first and the last time in Italian literature, the dialogue 
of the Platonic love treatise with the earlier tradition of prose commentary upon verses’ (p. 21).
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the Peripatetic school whose teachings he was once educated in. The various functions of 
bodies within Bruno’s infinite universe must now be redefined, from planets and stars to 
the smallest atoms. The context below may begin to provide important clues as to why 
they formed these aims, and why such concerns would leave them free to develop 
individual conceptions of time rather than ones based on the dominant philosophical 
framework of their age. Although this section mainly draws upon criticism from critical 
editions of both the Essais and the Italian dialogues, I provide further insight by 
highlighting the inadequacy of previous 16th-century definitions of time when 
confronted with the objectives of Montaigne and Bruno. 
 Perhaps the thing that is most striking about the initial conception of the Essais is 
how much tragedy had already marked Montaigne’s life before he began writing. 
Montaigne began writing the Essais in 1571, after mostly retiring from public life (he had 
previously entered into the magistrature as a member of the Bordeaux Parlement). His 
beloved father Pierre Eyquem de Montaigne - ‘[le] meilleur pere qui fut onques’ (II.XII.
440) - had already died in 1568. Étienne de la Boétie was the author of the Discours de la 
servitude volontaire (1577) and Montaigne’s closest friend, but he had also passed away a 
few years earlier in 1563 (the chapter ‘De l’amitié’ (I.XXVIII) is a reflection on their close 
friendship).  Death was a recurring feature of Montaigne’s life; he and his wife had many 29
children, but only his daughter Léonore survived childhood, while his family estate near 
Bordeaux was encircled by the bloody Wars of Religion between Catholics and 
Protestants. The violence of ‘nos guerres civiles’ would continually be referred to by 
Montaigne throughout the Essais, and the infamous St Bartholomew’s Day massacre of 
1572 - which prompted the killing of thousands of Huguenots across France - occurred 
just a year after Montaigne had begun writing in his tower.  
 M.A. Screech has already highlighted these circumstances as having imprinted 
death, and particularly his own death, on Montaigne’s mind as he sat down to write.  30
Montaigne certainly alludes to this concern in his preface ‘Au lecteur’: 
 Montaigne’s father died before the publication of his son’s translation of Raymond Sebond’s Theologia Naturalis 29
(1436), which Pierre himself had commissioned Montaigne to translate. The Discours was published clandestinely in 
1577; the first phase of the text was written around 1549, while the second phase was completed in 1557. 
 M.A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy (London: Duckworth, 1983); see also Georges Poulet, Études sur le temps 30
humain I (Paris: Plon et Éditions Du Rocher, 1952) and more recently Albert Ahmeti, De la peinture du temps dans les 
‘Essais’ de Montaigne (Paris: Books On Demand, 2014). Philippe Desan is one prominent critic who takes exception to 
what he regards as a tendency to over focus on Montaigne’s private life at the expense of his time in public office; see for 
example ‘Montaigne, philosophe au quotidien: vie privée et vie publique dans les Essais’, Kriterion, 53 (2012), pp. 
331-349.
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 C’est icy un livre de bonne foy, lecteur. Il t’advertit dès l'entrée, que je ne m'y suis  
 proposé aucune fin, que domestique et privée. […] Je l’ay voué à la commodité   
 particuliere de mes parens et amis: à ce que m’ayant perdu (ce qu'ils ont à faire   
 bien tost) ils y puissent retrouver aucuns traits de mes conditions et humeurs, et  
 que par ce moyen ils nourrissent plus entiere et plus vifve, la connoissance qu’ils  
 ont eu de moy.  (I.3) 31
 The foreword to his readers is extremely short, but in it, he clearly expresses a 
belief that his own death will occur relatively soon - he already considers his writing to be 
a kind of legacy, a way for his close friends and family to remember him after he is dead. 
Screech suggests that Montaigne wrote the Essais in order to exorcise the grief he felt after 
the death of his friend La Boétie.  I argue that not only in light of the passing of his dear 32
friend, but the deaths of so many people around him (friends, family and strangers alike), 
that Montaigne projected this reality onto himself and began to think more about his 
own death.  Thus the Essais may well have grown from a desire to somehow come to 33
terms with a future overshadowed by death; it is not unreasonable to suggest that this 
awareness of death would strongly affect Montaigne’s understanding of time more 
generally.  34
 Furthermore, it is interesting to note, in relation to his comments in ‘Des Livres’, 
Montaigne’s apparent distancing of himself from society as he sat down to write. 
Although previous critical editors from M.A. Screech to Michel Magnien disagree as to 
the true extent of Montaigne’s actual retirement from public life, it is clear that part of his 
motivation was a desire to write a project about himself: ‘L’heure était venue de se donner 
à lui-même, et il se pensait prêt’.  While it is important to remember that many of his 35
contemporaries would still primarily have thought of his book as a series of ‘moral, 
political and military discourses’ (the first Italian translation in 1590 referred to them as 
 Emphasis own.31
 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), p. xiv. See also 32
Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2007), ‘Un homme un livre’; George Hoffmann, ‘Portrayal from Life, or to Life. The Essais’s Living Effigy’, 
French Forum, 25.2 (2000), pp. 145-163.
 See Ahmeti, ‘Introduction’ in which he argues that the wording of the preface reveals Montaigne’s sentiment that he is 33
on the verge of death, but he knows not when: ‘Montaigne désigne les destinataires particuliers de son livre et révèle la 
finalité de l’écriture de celui-ci, finalité qu’il lie étroitement à sa mort’ (‘Introduction’).
 Ahmeti has already argued that these contextual factors led Montaigne to acknowledge ‘la fugacité du temps’. He 34
translates Montaigne’s angoisse into ‘ce sentiment très prononcé de la brièveté du temps de vie’ (‘Introduction’).
 Montaigne, Les Essais, p. xii. See also The Complete Essays, trans. by M.A. Screech and Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, 35
Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen. Screech describes Montaigne’s purpose in retiring thus: ‘His plan was, 
like cultured gentlemen in Ancient Roman times, to devote himself to learned leisure’ (p. xiv). On the other hand, in 
‘Un homme, un livre’ Michel Magnien and Catherine Magnien-Simonen wish to dispel some of the myths surrounding 
the author, the first being that he retired completely from public life.
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such), scholars have argued that Montaigne viewed himself as the primary subject of his 
writing from at least 1580 onwards.  In his short preface to the reader, Montaigne 36
carefully states that his writing has only one subject - himself. ‘Ainsi, lecteur, je suis moy-
mesmes la matiere de mon livre’ (I.3); ‘Je veus qu’on m’y voie en ma façon simple, 
naturelle et ordinaire, sans contention et artifice: car c’est moy que je peins’ (I.3). Here 
Montaigne deliberately addresses the reader as someone who knows (or will get to know) 
the author intimately, as a friend or family member. This open and honest approach is 
partially a strategy to protect himself; Montaigne is aware that parts of his book test the 
limits of 16th century religious and political convention and so he styles the text more 
along the lines of a confessional.  More importantly, the Essais are the attempted 37
elaboration of a ‘sagesse personnelle’, a ‘peinture de moi’ as the overarching subject.  38
Arguably the Essais were produced amidst a genuine awareness of death - and 
consequently the brevity of time - combined with a desire to look inwardly at oneself and 
grasp the essence of being. 
 I have suggested that Montaigne’s decision to retreat to his library and write was 
spurned partly by an acknowledgement that he himself was a worthy subject for 
discussion. Arguably Bruno had also started to develop an awareness of the need to 
distance himself from certain sections of society - particularly those people he considered 
to be pedants and blind followers of Aristotle - albeit for very different reasons.  At the 39
age of thirty-five, he wrote the Cena de le Ceneri (1584), the first of six texts that 
constitute the so-called Italian dialogues. By this time, Bruno had already fallen foul of 
various institutions. Against the backdrop of the Counter Reformation - which 
continued to divide Europe along religious lines - Bruno found himself clashing with 
many different sects. He had been forced to move from country to country after a trial for 
heresy had begun to be prepared by the Catholic Church in Rome - Bruno had been 
caught reading and promoting banned texts during his days as a Dominican friar at the 
Convento San Domenico Maggiore in Naples. In 1578 he went to Geneva, but after 
 Szabari claims that Montaigne’s project of self-representation can be found ‘at least’ from 1580 onwards until his 36
death. See Antonia Szabari, ‘parler seulement de moi: The Disposition of the Subject in Montaigne’s Essay “De l’art de 
conferer”’, Modern Language Notes, 116.5 (2001), pp. 1001-1024 (p. 1005). 
 See Cave, How to Read Montaigne, ‘Chapter 7 - Documenting the Self’. 37
 Michel de Montaigne, Essais, ed. by Alexandre Micha (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), p. 11. 38
 I refer once more to the scholars of academic institutions in the 16th century - Bruno was not entirely cut off from 39
society, and in fact he had presented his work to the most prominent figures in the European courts, including the Pope, 
the French King and also courtiers to Queen Elizabeth I. For more information on Bruno’s wanderings in Europe, see 
Eugenio Canone, Giordano Bruno: gli anni napoletani e la “peregrinatio" europea : immagini, testi, documenti (Cassino: 
Università degli studi di Cassino, 1992).
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publishing criticism of a Calvinist professor, Bruno was arrested and eventually had to 
leave the city. Following a stint in Toulouse and a two-year sojourn in Paris, Bruno 
suffered severe humiliation within academic circles in England - upon travelling to Oxford 
in 1583 he gave a series of lectures there, but had been accused of plagiarising Ficino and 
was hounded from the intellectual community. Thus at the time of writing the Cena he 
was not lecturing but acting as a gentleman scholar in London, in the house of Michel de 
Castelnau, the French ambassador. The Cena de le Ceneri was written after just under ten 
years of drifting from country to country, falling foul of various religious factions and 
members of the intellectual establishment in the late 1500s.  
 Bruno does not give the equivalent of an ‘Au lecteur’ to his readers, although the 
inclusion of a sonnet at the start of the Cena entitled ‘Al Mal contento’ arguably betrays a 
similar sense of willingness to retreat from society as Montaigne (a ‘malcontent’ in 
Elizabethan drama was a character discontented with the social structure and other 
characters in a play). Furthermore, the ‘Proemiale Epistola’ which follows this sonnet 
hints at a sense of self-imposed intellectual isolation,  linked not only to Bruno’s 40
experiences with the Catholic Church, the Calvinists and the Oxford dons, but also due to 
his radical transformation of Copernican theory (Copernicus’ De revolutionibus had been 
published over forty years earlier).  Indeed, Bruno’s main purpose in the Cena is to 41
expound a brand new cosmology that undermines Christian doctrine and Aristotelian 
thought. In the first dialogue, Bruno states his belief that Copernicus did not go far 
enough in his own efforts to change how learned society viewed the cosmos: 
 Al che è dovenuto per essersi liberato da alcuni presuppositi falsi de la comone e  
 volgar filosofia,  non voglio dir cecità. Ma però non se n’è molto allontanato;   
 perché lui [Copernicus], più studioso de la matematica che de la natura, non ha  
 possuto profondar e penetrar sin tanto che potesse a fatto toglier via le radici de  
 inconvenienti e vani principii… (Cena I.448-449) 
 Despite the best efforts of Copernicus before him, Bruno felt that there was still a 
flaw in the Polish astronomer’s cosmology, and Bruno believed that it was he who was on 
the verge of expounding the true cosmology. He considered the geocentric Ptolemaic 
 The frontispiece of the Candelaio, published just before the Cena, famously describes Bruno as ‘accademico di nulla 40
accademia’. However, it must also be acknowledged that Bruno’s literary presentation of himself can sometimes be 
slightly exaggerated (see footnote 36 above). 
 For more on Bruno’s reimagining of Copernicus and how this conflicted with the standard cosmological model of the 41
time, see Sergius Kodera, ‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, 
Literary Self-Fashioning and De revolutionibus orbium coelestium’, in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern 
Transformations of the Scientist and his Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn & Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 
2014).
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system, in which a static Earth was at the centre of (amongst other spheres) the fixed stars 
and the primum mobile, to be a grave fallacy.  He well understood the conflict that his 42
theories would create with Scholastics and religious groups alike. As suggested above, an 
important literary technique that Bruno adopts from the Cena’s epistola onwards is to 
refer to himself as ‘il Nolano’ rather than using the usual ‘io’.  Sergius Kodera claims that 43
with this choice Bruno was trying to forge a new identity for himself as an author - 
referring to himself in this way allowed him a certain freedom to move outside the 
bounds of the institution and express radical new theories under the literary guise of ‘il 
Nolano’. He combines this technique with several passages of bombastic language that 
appear to herald the dramatic arrival of Bruno’s philosophy: 
 che de’ farsi di questo [il Nolano], che ha ritrovato il modo di montare al cielo,   
 discorrere la circonferenza de le stelle, lasciarsi a le spalli la convessa superficie del  
 firmamento? (Cena I.452) 
 Or ecco quello [il Nolano], ch’ha varcato l’aria, penetrato il cielo, discorse le stelle,  
 trapassati gli margini del mondo, fatte svanir le fantastiche muraglie de le prime,  
 ottave, none, decime ed altre, che vi s’avesser potuto aggiongere, sfere, per   
 relazione de vani matematici e cieco veder di filosofi volgari… (Cena I.454) 
 After his honest evaluation of Copernicus’ legacy, Bruno presents himself as one 
who has pierced the skies, ‘penetrato il cielo’ with his theories; he has broken through the 
boundaries of Ptolemy’s firmament to go beyond the ‘margini del mondo’ and will now 
introduce his conception of an infinite universe (in opposition to the theories of ‘vani 
matematici’). Of course, there is a hidden purpose to this exaggerated - almost messianic - 
self-portrayal; Bruno adopts this strategy as a way of preparing his readers for the new 
cosmology he is about to introduce. If Bruno is purposely expanding and opening out the 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology in spatial terms, then equally Aristotle’s definition of 
time - which relies on the premise that the universe is closed and that movement on Earth 
is caused by the primum mobile - will no longer be valid within Bruno’s philosophy. In 
other words, Bruno has identified a pressing need to respond to centuries of error with a 
new theory that would involve a complete upheaval of late 16th-century philosophy; one 
in which the dominant Scholastic definition of time would certainly no longer be 
 See Hill, Chapter 2 ‘The Aristotelian Cosmos’ for a brief but clear description of this cosmology, including helpful 42
images from Peter Apian’s Cosmographia (1524). 
 Kodera on Bruno’s literary self-fashioning: ‘In an environment hostile to his ideas, ‘il Nolano’ (as he liked to call 43
himself, thus also trying to forge a new identity for himself as an author) not only defended the heliocentric system, but 
went much further than what he considered to be the limited mathematical and geometric calculations of Copernicus 
(whom he nevertheless regarded an enormously gifted astronomer)’ (p.  230). 
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appropriate. As we will see, the existence of bodies in time would need to be carefully 
redefined as part of this highly complex process. I hope to have illustrated here that Bruno 
wrote Italian dialogues amidst a very real disillusionment with the religious and 
intellectual establishments of his age. Bruno developed individual conceptions of time 
rather than ones based on Aristotle’s definition as part of his wider attempts to refute the 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmos.  
 At first glance, the respective biographical context surrounding both thinkers 
appears to be worlds apart. Montaigne was a nobleman retiring at the age of 38, around 15 
years before Bruno began writing the Cena. Although he was very well-educated and well-
versed in classical works, Montaigne had not written that much save for the translation of 
Sebond.  In addition, he had already experienced a series of devastating personal losses. 44
Bruno was a 35-year-old ‘runaway friar’ who had undergone a self-imposed exile due to his 
persecution by the Catholic Church. He had already published some works on the art of 
memory, but his relationship with the so-called academic elites of Europe was now 
strained.  Despite these differences, I hope to have illustrated here that it is relatively easy 45
to understand why neither thinker would have felt particularly compelled to uphold the 
accepted teachings of the intellectual establishment. Montaigne was often writing in a 
state of self-imposed isolation, sat in his library tower and still grieving the losses of his 
close friend and father, ever mindful of his children and the sectarian violence ravaging his 
countrymen and women. Bruno had already severed ties with religious institutions in 
Catholic Italy and Calvinist Geneva. He was now growing philosophically distant from 
the English intellectuals he had clashed with, convinced that the cosmology they had been 
teaching was severely mistaken and taking it upon himself to put forward the correct 
theory on the infinite universe. Ageing, retirement, and death; exile, frustration, and 
innovation - these are arguably the conditions under which Montaigne and Bruno begin 
to write.  
  
 Montaigne received a distinctly humanist education, which was directed by his father and which Montaigne reflects 44
on in the Essais. In ‘De l’expérience’ (III.XIII) he makes it clear that he did not receive anything like a traditional 
scholastic education: ‘Non en gros, par leçons scholastiques, que je ne sçay point (et n'en vois naistre aucune vraye 
reformation en ceux qui les sçavent)…’ (III.XIII.1077). See also ‘De l’institution des enfans’ (I.XXVI) for more of 
Montaigne’s reflections on his childhood education. 
 For an introduction to the history of mnemonic systems and Bruno’s place within it see Frances Yates, The Art of 45
Memory (London: Routledge, 1966). 
'48
Bodies in Time 
Montaigne, death and ageing 
 In light of the context above, it is unsurprising that death is a significant theme in 
the Essais, and Montaigne’s approach to it has not gone unnoticed by critics in the past. 
Previous scholars who have studied Montaigne and time - such as Françoise Joukovsky 
and Antoine Compagnon - have generally analysed chapters from the first book of the 
Essais (particularly the well-known ‘Que philosopher c’est apprendre à mourir’ (I.XX)), 
and discussion has often been devoted primarily to identifying the philosophical sources 
most useful to Montaigne in his thoughts on death.  Earlier studies have emphasised 46
Montaigne’s adoption of the Stoics in this regard, no doubt influenced by Pierre Villey’s 
thesis about the Essais and the ‘stoicism’ of the first book.  Furthermore, recent scholars 47
and critical editors have disagreed over the extent to which theological concerns influence 
Montaigne in his thoughts on death.  However, this thesis will begin by leaving aside 48
Montaigne’s contemplation of philosophical sources and instead will look in more detail 
at the role of the human body in the Essais as a fundamental symbol of death and, 
consequently, of time.  
 Indeed, not only in the first book but arguably throughout the full span of the 
Essais, the most visible and immediate indicator of time is the human body, whether in 
reference to someone else’s body, or indeed Montaigne’s own. In ‘De l’exercitation’ (II.VI) 
he famously recounts his near-fatal horse accident and its aftermath, while later chapters 
such as ‘De l’experience’ (III.XIII) dwell on various age-related bodily changes. 
Furthermore, Montaigne’s interest in writing about himself naturally leads us to question 
what exactly he means by the ‘self’, and it appears that the body is an integral part of this 
selfhood, particularly concerning time. Ian Maclean has stated that in the Essais the moy is 
 See Ahmeti, ‘Étape initiale’; Antoine Compagnon, ‘L’écriture de l’instant dans les “Essais”’, Montaigne. 1588-1998, 46
Revue d’Histoire Littéraire de la France, 5 (1998), pp. 1-20; Joukovsky, ‘Chapitre I - Zénon et Epicure’.
 Pierre Villey, Les sources et l’évolution des Essais de Montaigne (New York: B. Franklin, 1968). It must be stated that 47
Villey’s hypothesis, while rigorous in its attention to sources, is often disregarded today due to the belief among 
modern-day Montaigne scholars (including this author) that it is impossible to classify each book under one single 
philosophical current. For a particularly illuminating response to Villey see Terence Cave, The Cornucopian Text 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
 See ‘Mort’ by Claude Blum in Philippe Desan, Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne (Paris: H. Champion, 2004). 48
Blum argues that in the first and second books, Montaigne’s representation of time is overwhelmingly Christian. On the 
other hand, Micha boldly states that Montaigne’s art of living and art of dying are not related to Christian principles, 
rather ‘la mort qu’il [Montaigne] souhaite est un brusque saut dans le néant’ (p. 22). 
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made up of both body and soul,  and also that ‘Montaigne prend grand soin de souligner 49
l’importance du corps, C’est tousjours à l’homme que nous avons affaire, “duquel la 
condition est merveilleusement corporelle” (111.8, 930)’.  The body in time that one 50
encounters in these examples is a vulnerable body; it is changeable and susceptible to 
decay and disease. 
 This section examines evidence primarily taken from three chapters of the Essais: 
‘Que le Goust des biens et des maux depend en bonne partie de l’opinion que nous en 
avons’ (I.XIV), ‘Coustume de l’Isle de Cea’ (II.III) and ‘De l’experience’, alongside brief 
references to ‘De l’exercitation’.  Despite appearing in different books, the Villey-Saulnier 51
edition notes that the first two chapters listed here were probably written around 1572.  52
Many of the chapters produced during this period are heavily concerned with death and 
time; both the ‘Isle de Cea’ and ‘Que le Goust’ contain a particular focus on la mort 
volontaire and its subsequent relationship to time. On the other hand, ‘De l’experience’ is 
the final chapter of the entire oeuvre and was written over a decade later, between 1587 and 
1588. The questions at the heart of ‘De l’experience’ bear a striking resemblance to the 
central themes of the two chapters listed above, as well as those of ‘De l’exercitation’: 
‘Comment vieillir? Comment faire face à la maladie et à la douleur? À la mort?’.  53
However, the title of ‘De l’experience’ suggests that the Essais have come full circle; 
Montaigne is still concerned with drawing upon ‘l’observation du réel’ rather than the 
words of philosophers, a desire he originally expressed in the ‘Au lecteur’.  I will illustrate 54
that the graphic destruction of the human body plays a highly significant role in 
Montaigne’s attempts to understand mortality. 
 ‘Le corps n’a, sauf le plus et le moins, qu’un train et qu’un pli’ (I.XIV.266). This 
observation by Montaigne appears towards the middle of ‘Que le Goust’, a chapter that, 
like the ‘Isle de Cea’, contains numerous examples of the body dying in various ways. 
While the pli refers to the customary ‘bent’ of the body i.e. its natural and instinctive 
habits, the train of the body is arguably death, and Montaigne carefully emphasises that 
 In Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49
Augustine responds to the question ‘Who are you?’ thus: ‘I replied ‘A man’. I see in myself a body and a soul, one 
external, the other internal’ (p. 184). 
 Maclean, p. 70.50
 For the ease of the reader, the first two chapters will subsequently be referred to as ‘Isle de Cea’ and ‘Que le Goust’.51
 Montaigne, Essais, ed. by Pierre Villey & V.L. Saulnier, p. 305.52
 Montaigne, Les Essais, p. 1831.53
 Ibid.54
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he is interested in le corps. Indeed, although both chapters are fairly short in length, they 
are filled with countless instances that portray humans being stabbed, poisoned or 
otherwise mutilated. For example, Montaigne frequently recounts the dramatic and 
bloody violence of death in war-ravaged lands. In ‘Que le Goust’ Montaigne laments ‘nos 
dernieres guerres de Milan’ (I.XIV.53), and begins by recounting a tale of Counter-
Reformation violence he heard from his father. Upon hearing which side was winning the 
war, ‘il y veist tenir conte de bien vingt et cinq maistres de maison, qui s’estoient deffaits 
eux mesmes en une sepmaine’ (I.XIV.53).  In fact this episode is one of the less shocking 55
anecdotes; both ‘Que le Goust’ and ‘Isle de Cea’ feature several military examples of 
weapons devastating the body: ‘dix coups d’espée en la chaleur du combat’ (I.XIV.58); 
‘Damocritus […] se donna de l’espée au travers le corps’ (II.III.355); ‘un Sicilien […] 
mettant l’espée au poing, s’alla mesler furieusement, où il fut soudain envelopé et mis en 
pieces’ (II.III.356); ‘Jacques du Chastel […] donna seul, à la veue d’un chacun, dans l’armée 
des ennemis, où il fut mis en pieces’ (II.III.360). In ‘Nos Affections s’emportent au delà de 
nous’ (I.III) - a chapter well known for its reflections on death and dying - Captain 
Bayard, a celebrated commander in the wars of Milan, is described as having been ‘blessé à 
mort d’une harquebusade dans le corps’ (I.III.18). In this dizzying array of examples, the 
bodies of the soldiers are obliterated by knives and guns; the frailty of their bodies is 
emphasised whether they are being dismembered or stabbed. It is probable that the 
inclusion of such violent accounts of individuals killed in battle are partly a consequence 
of the bloody civil wars Montaigne had witnessed for years in his home country. 
Montaigne’s chateau was encircled by violence; although Bordeaux remained Catholic, the 
Périgord and Guyenne regions experienced an influx of Protestantism. Several of 
Montaigne’s neighbours converted to Protestantism or Calvinism, while others set up 
their own Catholic militias to support the king.  It is therefore unsurprising that battle 56
imagery was so prevalent in the pages of the Essais when Montaigne himself felt like a 
prisoner in his own home due to the ongoing religious conflict in France.   57
 The onslaught of examples continues with graphic accounts of deaths that are not 
all necessarily related to war. There are some instances of group deaths: ‘Xerxes […] ayant 
ordonné allumer un grand bucher, et esgosiller femme, enfans, concubines et serviteurs, 
 The Wars of Milan occurred around the first half of the 16th century (1484-1559). See Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth 55
Century Europe: Expansion and Conﬂict (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1993), ‘Some Chronological Landmarks’. 
 See Philippe Desan, Montaigne: A Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 101-108. 56
 He states as much in the Essais themselves, describing the area around his estate thus: ‘une lieue de chez moy, qui suis 57
assis dans le moiau de tout le trouble des guerres civiles de France’ (II.VI.373). 
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les meit dans le feu, et puis soy-mesme’ (II.III.357). Stabbings are also recounted several 
times, for example in the case of Fulvius, who kills his own family: ‘ayant de ma main occis 
ma femme et mes enfans’ (II.III.359).  Montaigne also includes some noteworthy Biblical 58
acts of violence, including the fate of Nicanor, ‘tout ensanglanté et chargé de coups….par 
l’une de ses plaies à deux mains ses entrailles, les dechirant et froissant…’ (II.III.356). 
Images of blood, entrails and flesh permeate these chapters, either in the heat of battle or 
in cases of murder or suicide more generally, and Montaigne was certainly aware of how 
shocking the harsh brutality of these chapters would have appeared to his 16th-century 
readers. In this case, the individuals described above have succumbed to the one train or 
fate of the body in a somewhat gory and bloody manner. Indeed, his continued insistence 
on representing the body being stabbed, burnt - even eviscerated - in honest and open 
detail, focuses significant attention on the human body’s role in our experience of time. 
As a result, the body becomes an undeniably physical representation of the precious 
nature of time. Rather than assessing key philosophical debates or theological issues, in 
the Essais temporal existence becomes entirely dependent on the image of the body and 
its continued survival. 
 However, this rather simple idea regarding the certainty of death is complicated 
by Montaigne’s reflections on the ‘natural order’ of time. There are both natural and 
unnatural ways to die, and all of the examples above feature humans dying due to the 
actions of other human beings (or indeed themselves). According to Montaigne, these are 
lives which have been cut short, ‘avant le temps et l’occasion’ (II.III.355) i.e. before the 
‘right’ time. Instead, in ‘Nos Affections’ Montaigne refers to those who die from old age 
as those people ‘qui a vescu et qui a mort selon ordre’ (I.III.17). In ‘Que philosopher’ he 
finds comfort in the idea that for each individual, their existence in time (of which death is 
one part) is dictated by an overarching ‘order’: ‘Vostre mort est une des pieces de l’ordre de 
l’univers. C’est une piece de la vie du monde’ (I.XX.92). Nature also has a plan for 
humans from the moment they are born, and unsurprisingly death is the intended 
outcome: ‘Elle (la Nature) n’a ordonné qu’une entrée à la vie, et cent mille yssues’ (II.III.
368-369). It is Nature that has given human beings one entry into the world, and - rather 
than the bloodthirsty actions of other human beings - Nature should also offer ‘cent mille 
yssues’ out of it.  
 ‘Jubellius […] tirant un glaive qu'il avoit caché, se donna au travers la poitrine, tumbant renversé mourant aux pieds 58
du Consul’ (II.III.359); ‘Auguste…sans autrement marchander, se donna d’une espée dans le corps’ (II.III.358). Even 
incense appears in a deadly context: ‘un autre donnant de l'encens à un sacrifice, le charbon luy estant tombé dans la 
manche, se laissa brusler jusques à l’os’ (I.XIV.59).
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 In ‘De l’experience’ Montaigne expands on these sentiments even further. He 
employs graphic imagery to illustrate that over time; one may begin to experience some 
unpleasant bodily changes, for example to ‘vomir jusques au sang, souffrir des 
contractions et convulsions estranges’ (III.XIII.1091) or to experience ‘les urines espesses 
et effroyables’ (III.XIII.1091). However, this is just a natural part of life: ‘tu ne meurs pas 
de ce que tu es malade; tu meurs de ce que tu es vivant’ (III.XIII.1091). Human beings 
have no control over whether they are born or not. Similarly, when we take into account 
the natural order of time, they appear to have little choice in their death, it is a necessary 
condition of their existence. Montaigne is fascinated by deaths that have occurred due to 
murder, suicide or accidental death, but these are decidedly unnatural i.e., they have taken 
place before the right time, or rather, before Nature’s time. He understands that the 
body’s existence in time is primarily dictated in natural terms - it is born, it undergoes 
change (ageing and disease), and then it dies - this process constitutes the ‘natural order’. 
Eventually, we will see that the body’s time is not always fully understood in such simple 
terms, even by the mind. 
 In the examples above, Montaigne uses various history books and philosophical 
accounts - particularly Plutarch’s Moralia and Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius - to illustrate 
examples of death and dying before the ‘right time’. However, if the Essais are partly an 
account of himself, then it is only natural that Montaigne simultaneously contemplates 
his own body in time. As proof of what Maclean has termed Montaigne’s ‘vérité de 
l’expérience’, Montaigne dutifully examines his own ageing body in order to probe the 
idea of the body in time further.  The examples below illustrate how different his 59
approach to the body was in comparison to artists and engravers such as Tory. The 
Champﬂeury used the body in a proportionate sense, representing its perfect dimensions, 
whereas Montaigne unveils the body in all of its imperfections. Tory considered the body 
to be a universal measure of proportion; he saw in the body the exact measurements and 
shapes of letters and other forms. In the Champﬂeury the body is a symbol of order, ‘les 
orifices du visage de l’homme, organes de perception et de connaissance, correspondent 
ainsi aux modalités des lettres’.  The Essais consider the human body in an extremely 60
different light. In the opening sentences of ‘De l’experience’ - bearing in mind the 
significance of the chapter title - Montaigne remains true to the purpose he initially 
expressed briefly but eloquently in the ‘Au lecteur’:  
 Maclean, p. 70. Joukovsky argues that ‘c’est surtout sa propre expérience qui révèle à Montaigne la loi de la mutation 59
physique’ (p. 73). 
 Pierre Cordier, ‘Geoffroy Tory et les leçons de l’Antique’, Anabases, 4 (2006), pp. 11-32 (p. 27). 60
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 En fin, toute cette fricassée que je barbouille icy n’est qu’un registre des essais de  
 ma vie, qui est, pour l'interne santé, exemplaire assez à prendre l’instruction à   
 contre-poil. Mais quant à la santé corporelle, personne ne peut fournir    
 d’experience plus utile que moy, qui la presente pure, nullement corrompue et   
 alterée par art et par opination. (III.XIII.1079) 
 The Essais have acted as a record of Montaigne’s life, and in his old age he is 
interested in his santé corporelle, particularly since ‘la vieillesse [….] est un signe 
indubitable de l’approche de la mort’ (III.XIII.1095). The very last page of the Essais 
contains a prayer for good health to the god Apollo, ‘protecteur de santé et de 
sagesse’ (III.XIII.1116).  Furthermore, the ‘Au lecteur’ stated that ‘Je veus qu’on m’y voie 61
en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans contention et artiﬁce’ (I.3). Therefore the 
act of writing bears honest witness to the changes to his aged body: ‘A faute de memoire 
naturelle j’en forge de papier, et comme quelque nouveau symptome survient à mon mal, 
je l’escris’ (III.XIII.1092). Rather than the body representing a universal source of 
proportion, Montaigne considers the body in a distinctly individual sense as a profound 
and honest symbol of change. Throughout ‘De l’experience’ he makes several references to 
his (old) age and ageing in general: ‘les bastimens de mon aage ont naturellement à 
souffrir quelque goutiere…je paye par là le loyer deu à la vieillesse’ (III.XIII.1090).  62
Montaigne reveals a preoccupation with the bodily changes he has experienced as he 
grows older: ‘L’aage affoiblit la chaleur de mon estomac; sa digestion en estant moins 
parfaicte’ (III.XIII.1092). However, as well as minor age-related complaints, Montaigne 
also famously suffered from painful kidney stones (pierres), a condition he was genetically 
predisposed to and one which began to trouble him in the late 1570s onwards.  63
Consequently he suffers some distressing bodily symptoms; if ‘les urines’ that he manages 
to produce are not ‘espesses, noires, et effroyables’ (III.XIII.1091), then they have been 
stopped altogether by ‘quelque pierre espineuse et herissée qui te poinct et escorche 
cruellement le col de la verge’ (III.XIII.1091).  
 The infamous pierres take on an even more prominent role in the Journal de Voyage 
- written in both French and Italian - which detailed a journey Montaigne made with his 
 The full address from Horace’s Odes reads thus: ‘Frui paratis et valido mihi,/Latoe, dones, et, precor, integra/Cum 61
mente, nec turpem senectam/Degere, nec cythara carentem’ (III.XIII.1116).
 ‘Le dormir a occupé une grande partie de ma vie, et le continue encores en cet aage’ (III.XIII.1096).62
 See Cave, How To Read Montaigne, ‘Chapter 6 - Travel’; Montaigne also recounts the awful pain this condition must 63
have caused him in ‘De la diversion’ (III.IV): ‘L’opiniastreté de mes pierres, specialement en la verge, m’a par fois jetté en 
longues suppressions d’urine, de trois, de quatre jours, et si avant en la mort que c’eust esté follie d’esperer l’eviter, voyre 
desirer, veu les cruels effors que cet estat apporte. O que ce bon Empereur qui faisoit lier la verge à ses criminels pour les 
faire mourir à faute de pisser, estoit grand maistre en la science de bourrellerie!’ (III.IV.837).
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secretary through Switzerland, Germany, and Italy in 1580 and 1581.  The Journal is very 64
different in tone and purpose from the Essais, to such an extent that some scholars 
initially doubted whether the passages attributed to Montaigne were even really his at all 
(Montaigne’s secretary is responsible for recording most of the trip until Rome). 
Furthermore, despite its relatively straightforward name, the text is arguably a detailed 
record of Montaigne’s struggle with his medical condition and its side effects. The 
attention devoted to bodily concerns is clear and graphic physical descriptions of 
Montaigne’s body - similar to those found in the Essais - quickly emerge, albeit with a 
slightly more detached tone. For example, at one point the secretary notes in passive terms 
that ‘il [Montaigne] a toujours cependant la bouche toute sanglante’ (II.128). A typical 
passage from the Journal (again narrated by the secretary) notes Montaigne’s symptoms 
with careful attention to detail: 
 Nous arrestames audict lieu depuis ledict jour 18e jusques au 27e de Septembre. M.  
 de Montaigne beut onze matinées de ladicte eau, neuf verres huict jours, & sept   
 verres trois jours, & se beigna cinq fois. Il trouva l’eau aysée à boire & la randoit tous 
 jours avant disner. Il n’y connut nul autre effect que d’uriner. L’appetit, il l’eut bon ; 
 le sommeil, le ventre, rien de son état ordinaire ne s’empira par cette potion. Le   
 sixiesme jour il eut la colicque très vehemente, & plus que les siennes ordineres, &  
 l’eut au costé droit, où il n’avoit jamais senty de doleur qu’une bien legiere à Arsac,  
 sans opération. (I.34-35) 
 Readers solely familiar with the Essais will note that the tone is vastly different here. 
The passage is almost clinical and appears to resemble a medical record with its attention 
to the amount of water Montaigne drank, while the physical effects suffered by the 
nobleman are listed in stringent detail.  With regards to time, the dates are often 65
meticulously noted throughout the Journal as above: ‘depuis ledict jour 18e jusques au 27e 
de Septembre’. However, despite the strict attention given over to dates and duration, the 
temporality of the text arguably comes to be dictated by the rhythmic interference of the 
kidney stones. Indeed, unlike in the Essais, a fascinating intersection emerges between 
time and the kidney stones as the reader moves through Montaigne and his secretary’s 
detailed account of the nobleman’s changing body each day. The pierres are the real 
markers of time, in all of their painful reality. They crop up persistently at every turn: ‘Les 
 See Michel de Montaigne, Journal de voyage de Michel de Montaigne en Italie, par la Suisse et l’Allemagne en 1580 & 64
1581, 3 vols, ed. by Anne Gabriel Querlon (Paris: 1774). All quotations taken from the Journal will be followed by in-text 
citations in the following format: (Volume Number.Page Number). 
 See also Cynthia Skenazi, ‘Une écriture de la vieillesse: Les “excremens d’un vieil esprit” et la vanité Montaignienne’, 65
Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 68.2 (2006), pp.289-305; José Miguel Marinas, ‘Le sujet est le corps: de 
Montaigne à Lacan à travers les mystiques’, Rue Descartes, 26 (1999), pp.33-43. 
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deux premiers jours, il rendit deux petites pierres qui estoint dedans la vessie’ (I.36); 
‘Questo dì sentii un dolore al pettignone come del cascar di pietre, e ne feci una 
picciola’ (III.104). Much like time itself, the pain caused by his kidney stones cannot seem 
to be fully mastered or brought under control - Montaigne is merely searching for ways to 
alleviate it temporarily. As a result, the text returns periodically to the stones, which are 
dotted continuously throughout the text. 
 Perhaps the most extreme reflections on Montaigne’s own body appear in ‘De 
l’exercitation’, a chapter which appears towards the beginning of the second book of the 
Essais. In a confused and hazy account of the injuries he suffered after being thrown from 
a horse, Montaigne himself is put forward in the Essais as another bloody and dramatic 
example of the fragility of the body. After the fall, the rest of his party saw his ‘visage tout 
meurtry et tout escorché’ (II.VI.373), his body was lifeless ‘n’ayant ny mouvement ny 
sentiment’ (II.VI.373). He recounts the ‘grand abondance de sang dans mon 
estomac’ (II.VI.373); that his ‘pourpoinct estoit taché par tout du sang’ (II.VI.374). 
Amongst the confusion he remembers believing that he had experienced ‘une 
harquebusade en la teste’ (II.VI.374). As we will see in Chapter Two, Montaigne’s stylistic 
innovation while narrating this incident allows him to experiment with the seemingly 
rigid and linear understanding of time outlined here. For now, it is enough to understand 
that Montaigne’s act of recording himself and his own body in time includes his dramatic 
brush with death and the effect of ageing on his body.  
 Montaigne also couples these reflections with a criticism of the doctors of his 
time. Similarly to the bloodthirsty, ‘unnatural’ examples of death that opened this section, 
Montaigne believes that doctors are tampering with the natural order of time by trying to 
cure illnesses. Thus he proudly states: ‘J’ay laissé envieillir et mourir en moy de mort 
naturelle des reumes, defluxions gouteuses, relaxation, battement de coeur, micraines et 
autres accidens’ (III.XIII.1089).  Montaigne staunchly believes that it is better to suffer in 66
line with ‘les loix de nostre condition’; the fevers and heart flutterings are natural 
symptoms of an ageing body: ‘Nous sommes pour vieillir, pour affoiblir, pour estre 
malades, en despit de toute medecine’ (III.XIII.1089). A couple of paragraphs later he 
states that ‘la goutte, la gravelle, l’indigestion sont symptomes des longues années, comme 
des longs voyages la chaleur, les pluyes et les vents. […] Il faut apprendre à souffrir ce 
qu’on ne peut eviter’ (III.XIII.1089). Such remarks appear to suggest that one should 
leave these changes untreated and accept them as natural effects of ageing. This attitude 
 Emphasis own. 66
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becomes even more apparent when Montaigne’s tooth falls out, and he famously remarks 
that this happened because the tooth had reached the end of its duration: ‘Voilà une dent 
qui me vient de choir, sans douleur, sans effort: c’estoit le terme naturel de sa 
durée’ (III.XIII.101).  Arguably even our teeth possess their own duration, and one must 67
accept this rather than attempt to control it. He also considers his painful kidney stones to 
be a result of the body’s natural propensity to cleanse itself: ‘nature vuide en ces pierres ce 
qu’elle a de superflu et nuysible’ (III.XIII.1094). Montaigne takes comfort in the certainty 
of his destiny, which conforms to the natural order of time: ‘A la verité, je recoy une 
principale consolation, aux pensées de ma mort, qu’elle soit des justes et 
naturelles’ (III.XIII.1101). Doctors who ‘interfere’ with diseases are meddling with this 
certainty: ‘Tout ce qui vient au revers du cours de nature peut estre fascheux’ (III.XIII.
1102). According to Montaigne, doctors are guilty of taking time into their own hands and 
altering the course of the body, when they should be allowing the body to follow its 
natural progression instead.  
 In the Essais, the human body holds an important function within Montaigne’s 
understanding of time. If it is true that ‘le corps a une grand’part à nostre estre, il y tient 
un grand rang’ (II.XVII.639), then concerning time, it is used in the Essais to express in 
the most basic and clear terms the reality of human existence. The body’s uninterrupted 
advance from birth to death constitutes the natural order of time, and this simple 
trajectory is largely independent of individual control. Some natural times and rhythms 
exist within the body, and according to Montaigne’s criticism of doctors, they should be 
left to endure naturally.  Humans cannot know when and how exactly they will die if the 68
circumstances are left to Nature, but this appears to be the best way to go about living. 
Montaigne remarks that most people believe it is better to live in accordance with Nature, 
‘selon Nature’, by prolonging life until it ends of its own accord i.e. ‘maintenir sa vie, 
encore qu’il soit miserable’ (II.III.369-370). In the next chapter I explore how Montaigne 
manages to question even this basic fact of life. However, here it is important to note that 
the body will always succumb to death, if through nothing else then certainly through old 
 There has been some interesting work done on the subject of Montaigne’s tooth. See Jules Brody, ‘From Teeth to Text 67
in ‘De l’expérience’: A Philological Reading’, L’Esprit Créateur, 20.1 (1980), pp. 7-22. In a similar vein, see Brody, ‘De 
mesnager sa volonté (III.10): lecture philologique d’un essai’, in O un Amy!: essays on Montaigne in honour of Donald 
M. Frame, ed. by Raymond C. La Charité (Lexington: French Forum, 1977), pp. 190-218. For further bibliography see 
Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 262.
 In ‘De la ressemblance’ (I.XXXVII) Montaigne argues that doctors hasten our death, not lengthen it. He recounts 68
how his uncle believed in doctors and died at the age of 45: ‘Le seigneur de Gaviac, mon oncle paternel, homme d’Eglise, 
maladif dés sa naissance, et qui fit toutefois durer cette vie debile jusques à soixante-sept ans, estant tombé autrefois en 
une grosse et vehemente fiévre continue, il fut ordonné par les medecins qu’on luy declaireroit, s’il ne se vouloit aider (ils 
appellent secours ce qui le plus souvent est empeschement), qu’il estoit infalliblement mort. Ce bon homme, tout 
effrayé comme il fut de cette horrible sentence, si respondit-il: Je suis donq mort’ (I.XXXVII.764-765). 
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age, or as we say even now, ‘naturally’: ‘Tout revient à un, que l’homme se donne sa fin, 
ou qu’il la souffre; qu’il coure au devant de son jour, ou qu’il l’attende’ (II.III.351). For 
Montaigne, the human body ‘in time’ as it were, has one trajectory to complete: it is born, 
it lives for a certain amount of time, it dies. This process is the single train or line that the 
body is naturally bound to follow. 
Bruno, vicissitude and death 
 Montaigne’s initial enquiry into bodies and temporality is admittedly very 
different to that of Bruno’s. In the Essais it is arguably easier to know where to look for 
thoughts on time, since Montaigne is honest about his consciousness of ageing and death, 
even recounting his own ‘death’ - or at least quasi-death - from falling off a horse. On the 
other hand, Bruno does not reflect on his death and says comparatively very little about 
death in general in the Italian dialogues. Unlike Montaigne, it certainly does not appear to 
constitute a fascinating and significant aspect of temporal existence. Of course, Bruno 
wrote his vernacular texts well before his lengthy imprisonment by the Catholic Church, a 
period in which a decidedly unnatural death by burning at the stake eventually defined 
Bruno’s tragic fate.  He did not appear to write anything during this time that might 69
have led to specific reflections on the nature of his own death. Rather, in the earlier Italian 
dialogues, perhaps the most fundamental reality of time for Bruno - that would correlate 
to a certain degree with Montaigne’s understanding of the trajectory of the human body - 
is the notion of vicissitudine.  
 The few recent critics that have written exclusively on Bruno and time have all 
paid careful attention to vicissitude.  It is a concept that relates to Bruno’s monism, 70
particularly his theories on the physical matter or materia (the human body would be one 
 One must assume that Bruno did not have an opportunity to write about (or at least publish) his thoughts on death 69
during his time in prison. However, there are scant but nonetheless significant documents relating to Bruno’s processo, 
including a summary of his eight-year trial and final questioning by the Roman Inquisition. For more on Bruno’s trial, 
see Vincenzo Spampanato, Vita di Giordano Bruno: con documenti editi e inediti (Messina: Casa Editrice Giuseppe 
Principato, 1921); Angelo Mercati, Il sommario del processo di Giordano Bruno con appendice di documenti sull’eresia e 
l’inquisizione a Modena nel secolo XVI (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1942); Luigi Firpo, Il processo 
di Giordano Bruno (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1959). See also Ingrid Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/
Heretic (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008) for a comprehensive biography of Bruno. I return to the topic of 
Bruno and his own death in Chapter Two, ‘Montaigne, suicide and near-death experience’.
 Nicola Badaloni, ‘Sulla struttura del tempo in Giordano Bruno’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 3.1 (1997), pp. 11-45; 70
Maria Elena Severini, ‘Vicissitudine e tempo nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno’, in La mente di Giordano Bruno, ed. by 
F. Meroi (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), pp. 225-258.
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example of this) which he believes mutates endlessly.  However, vicissitude arguably 71
encompasses everything that constitutes a change of state - it not only appears in specific 
philosophical discussions concerning matter, substance, and form, but also incorporates 
more abstract temporal concepts such as death, fortune and history. Vicissitude was a 
term being explored in the 15th and 16th centuries by well-known thinkers such as 
Machiavelli; it was a particularly popular concept in France, employed by the French 
writer Louis Le Roy (1510-1577) and - as we will see in Chapter Three - even Montaigne 
himself.  Vicissitude was also a fundamental aspect of Bruno’s radical philosophy; 72
according to Maria Elena Severini, it is the ‘struttura fondamentale della realtà’ across the 
entirety of his works.  As such, this section will begin to explore what exactly vicissitude 73
is, and how it can be used to think about bodies in time within the Italian dialogues. 
While Montaigne focused on the microcosm of the human body to explain fundamental 
characteristics of time, Bruno examines another microcosmic concept - the atom - which 
he then uses to explain the existence of all bodies in time.  
 This section analyses evidence from Bruno’s first work in the Italian dialogues - 
the Cena de le Ceneri - as well as passages taken from his third dialogue, De l’inﬁnito, 
universo e mondi (1584), and Bruno’s satirical play Candelaio (1582). However, the 
majority of examples in this section derive from the first dialogue of the second part of the 
Eroici Furori (1585). While the first three texts in the Italian dialogues are primarily 
devoted to expounding aspects of Bruno’s infinite universe, the later dialogues attempt to 
reshape individual behaviour in light of these theories.  The Furori was the final text 74
written by the author in Italian and is described by Nuccio Ordine in a corresponding 
foreword as the conclusion to this particular series of Bruno’s works.  It is primarily a 75
reaction to the superficial language of the Petrarchists, an attempt to transform ‘un 
 For a general introduction see Bruno, Opere Italiane, ‘L’unità di materia e forma’ by Nuccio Ordine. 71
 See Marie-Madeleine de La Garandière, ‘La méditation philosophique sur le temps au XVIème siècle : Budé, 72
Montaigne’, in Le Temps et la Durée dans la littérature au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance (Paris: Nizet, 1986), pp. 
193-209 (p. 195). 
 Severini, p. 225. 73
 Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Ingrid D. Rowland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 74
Bruno was actively copying Platonic dialogue form in setting about to write this final text in the series: ‘Bruno carefully 
specified that the furori he would treat in his own dialogue were “heroic” cases of divine possession, preparing his 
readers for a dialogue that, like Plato’s Symposium, aimed to bring them closer and closer to understanding the joys of a 
love that took wisdom as its object - an eternal principle rather than a single individual. Nothing in the restrained, 
elegant Plato can compare, however, with the bitter impetus Bruno puts into his Argument’ (p. xix).
 Ordine writes in his introduction to the Opere italiane: ‘Inanella i testi con particolare abilità. Getta prima le basi della 75
sua cosmologia infinitistica. E dopo aver liberato l’universo dalle sue catene del geocentrismo, cerca di liberare…la 
materia, l’etica, l’estetica e la conoscenza. […] Bruno scrive la Cena ed ha già in mente, per grandi linee, i Furori’ (p. 41).
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linguaggio asfittico, svuotato di ogni rapporto con il mondo’ into something that can 
express Bruno’s newly-theorised infinite universe with energy and meaning.  Bruno uses 76
an inventive play on Platonic dialogue form, whereby each dialogue sees two interlocutors 
(in this case Cesarino and Maricondo), analysing a series of sonnets that describe various 
stages of ‘heroic love’ and attempting to uncover their true meaning hidden beneath the 
language. In this section I examine how the existence of various bodies is defined by a 
constant change from state to state - death is but one part of this process, which (as in 
Montaigne’s work) appears to constitute a kind of ‘natural order’ in time. 
 Bruno often discusses vicissitudine in terms of matter, which is composed of 
substance and form. Unlike Aristotle, who proposed that corruptible substances exist 
solely in the terrestrial sphere, Bruno considered all substances in the infinite universe to 
be corruptible, even planets and stars.  This discussion is primarily concerned with what 77
Bruno terms sustanza corporea or corporeal substance, i.e. the substance that mortal, 
sublunar beings are made up of (in opposition to sustanza soprasustanziale).  Bruno 78
primarily expresses all earthly ‘bodies’ - such as the human body, plants, mountains and 
trees - in terms of their material composition. One of the most detailed explanations of 
vicissitude appears in the fifth and final dialogue of the Cena de le Ceneri.  Smitho, a 79
sceptical English interlocutor and Teofilo, Bruno’s literary mouthpiece, are discussing the 
cause of ‘il moto locale della terra’ (Cena I.555). Teofilo attributes the cause of the Earth’s 
movement to vicissitude; he also explains that all of the various forms of matter on Earth 
do not stay the same and instead ‘si vanno tutta via cangiando faccia di faccia’ (Cena I.555). 
However, the substance of matter is incorruptible, and thus things only change state, 
rather than being destroyed entirely: 
 per che essendo la materia e sustanza delle cose incorrottibile, e dovendo quella   
 secondo tutte le parti esser soggetto di tutte forme, a fin che secondo tutte le parti  
 (per quanto è capace) si fia tutto, sia tutto, se non in un medesimo tempo et   
 instante d’eternità, al meno in diversi tempi, in varii instanti d’eternità, successiva e 
 vicissitudinalmente: per che quantumque tutta la materia sia capace di tutte le   
 forme insieme, non peró de tutte quelle insieme può essere capace ogni parte della 
 materia. (Cena I.555-556) 
 Ibid., p. 123.76
 For an illuminating discussion on the corruptibility of stars and planets across Bruno’s works see Miguel A. Granada, 77
‘“Voi siete dissolubili, ma non vi dissolvete”. Il problema della dissoluzione dei mondi in Giordano Bruno’, Paradigmi: 
rivista di critica ﬁlosoﬁca, 53 (2000), pp. 261-289. 
 I will refer to celestial bodies where appropriate; see also Chapter Three ‘Eternity, Time and Truth’. 78
 Nuccio Ordine argues in his Introduction to the Opere Italiane that the Candelaio (1582), a play written in the 79
vernacular in Paris, should be considered the first text within this series (p. 41).
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 Teofilo continues to explain that ultimately ‘la morte e la dissoluzione’ of all 
things on Earth is impossible; instead, ‘a tempi a tempi, con certo ordine, viene a rinovarsi 
alterando, cangiando, mutando le sue parti tutte’ (Cena I.556). Vicissitude involves the 
constant change or mutation of things from state to state. While the substance of matter 
itself is incorruptible, it is ‘soggetto di tutte forme’ - the existence of bodies is one defined 
by perpetual transformation as substance continually moves through innumerable forms. 
Furthermore, we see here the first brief reference to a fundamental aspect of vicissitude, 
namely that since everything made of sustanza corporeale cannot be everything at once, 
the forms that it takes must be temporary: ‘in diversi tempi, in varii instanti d’eternità, 
successiva e vicissitudinalmente’. 
 Furthermore, in the Cena de le ceneri Bruno is faced with the difficulty of proving 
that the universe is infinite since it is impossible to demonstrate infinity without using 
abstract or metaphorical language.  Fortunately, the concept of vicissitude is much more 80
easily visible to the human eye: 
 […] e questo l’esperienza d’ogni giorno nel dimostra: che nel grembo e viscere della 
 terra, altre cose  s’accoglieno et altre cose da quelle ne si mandan fuori. E noi   
 medesmi e le cose nostre andiamo e vegnamo passiamo e ritorniamo: e non è cosa  
 nostra che non si faccia aliena, e non è cosa aliena che non si faccia nostra. (Cena I. 
 556) 
 Again there is a strong spatial component to this description; Bruno describes 
matter as leaving and then returning. But the second half of this description is particularly 
important - ‘noi medesmi e le cose nostre’ will come and go. We can witness how our 
bodies (as in the Essais) and the bodies of things around us are coming and going 
endlessly - our bodies change and die, to be replaced by others. Furthermore, Bruno uses 
everyday experience, rather than the words of philosophers, to support this argument: ‘e 
questo l’esperienza d’ogni giorno nel dimostra’. Vicissitude is a constant changing from 
state to state, which Bruno observes daily in nature itself; while he often explains 
vicissitude using philosophical terms, he still turns to direct experience as further proof, 
bringing to mind Montaigne’s strategy in the Essais and his devotion to exploring the so-
called truth of experience. However, thus far vicissitude primarily appears to be a spatial, 
rather than a temporal theory: ‘il che conviene che sia con certa successione, ogn’una 
 Kodera, p. 232. Kodera also claims that this was a difficulty shared by both Bruno and his contemporaries: ‘One of the 80
many serious difficulties in his [Bruno’s] message lies in his claim to realist physics in an infinite cosmos. For Bruno’s 
contemporaries the most fundamental problem consisted in making plausible what goes against all sensory experience 
and reason: the daily rotation of the earth around its axis and its annual motion. Vision cannot prove it because one 
cannot see that the earth is moving’ (p. 232). 
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prendendo il loco de l’altre tutto’ (Cena I.556); each form takes the place (loco) of the one 
before it. The substance of matter is incorruptible, and subject to all forms; in an infinite 
universe this idea is transformed even further since the possible forms of matter become 
infinite too, ‘tanto di forme quanto di luoghi’. 
 How exactly then does vicissitude relate to time, particularly the existence of 
bodies in time? Earlier I recounted Telesio’s belief that vicissitude was a perfectly 
justifiable way to begin contemplating time, since that is how human beings first become 
aware of time. As we have seen, Bruno expresses similar ideas in the quotation from the 
Cena above, stating that humans can readily perceive the effects of vicissitude for 
themselves. However, in the first book of his De rerum natura (1565), Telesio develops this 
line of thought by criticising Aristotle; although time perception relies upon motion, this 
does not mean that the existence of time does too: ‘It is not correct to conclude that time 
cannot exist without motor or mutation’.  As well as his criticism in the Acrotismus, like 81
Telesio, Bruno departs from Aristotle and instead develops a theory of temporal 
impermanence which has more in common with atomism than Aristotelianism, and 
affects not only earthly bodies but indeed everything within the infinite universe.  In De 82
l’inﬁnito, universo e mondi Bruno continues to explain vicissitude in terms of flux, but 
here he emphasises its temporal characteristics with an explanation of what Badaloni 
describes as the birth, growth, and decline of bodies through the movement of atoms: 
 Nel corso del dialogo…Bruno dà un’interpretazione della teoria della vicissitudine, 
 per cui nascita e crescita dei corpi e loro declino sono spiegati con l’influsso ed   
 efflusso degli atomi, essendo assai ragionevole che “le parti et atomi abbiano corso  
 e moto infinito per le infinite vicissitudini e transmutazioni, tanto di forme   
 quanto di luoghi”.   83
 All things come into being, grow and then die. Bruno is repeatedly careful to note 
that everything cannot be everything at once but in fact matter is changing at different 
times: ‘ma tutto…cangia il volto’ (Inﬁnito II.26); ‘dall’infinito sempre nova copia di 
materia sottonasce’ (Inﬁnito II.26). This idea that the nature of vicissitude brings about 
innumerable forms of matter is how Bruno expresses time in the Candelaio, in a 
humorous preface ‘alla Signora Morgana B’. The play possesses a tripartite structure 
 Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura libri I-III, ed. by Luigi De Franco (Cosenza: Casa del Libro, 1965). Translation 81
own. Original quotation: ‘at non recte, ut videtur, ex iis tempus sine motu et mutatione non esse colligit’ (11.8-9). See 
also Hutton, p. 355.
 On the development of atomism in the late 1500s, see Hilary Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno (Princeton N.J.: 82
Princeton University Press, 2011), Chapter Three - ‘Bruno and the New Atomism’. 
 Badaloni, p. 32. 83
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centred around three common characters in Renaissance theatre: the lover, the alchemist 
and the pedant. However, Bruno’s opening preface to the mysterious Signora Morgana B 
is a parodic choice, ‘facendo riferimento a una prostituta mascherata da celebrazioni 
roboanti’ (Candelaio I.261).  The speech on time comes at the end of a dedication in 84
which Bruno addresses her thus: ‘Ricordatevi, signora, di quel che credo che non bisogna 
insegnarvi’ (Candelaio I.263): 
 il tempo tutto toglie e tutto dà; ogni cosa si muta, nulla s’annihila; è un solo che  
 non può mutarsi, un solo è eterno, e può perseverare eternamente uno, simile e  
 medesmo. […] Però qualumque sii il punto di questa sera ch’aspetto, si la   
 mutazione è vera, io che son ne la notte, aspetto il giorno, quei che son nel giorno, 
 aspettano la notte. Tutto quel ch’è, o è cqua o llà, o vicino o lungi, o adesso o poi,  
 o presto o tardi. (Candelaio I.263-264) 
 Barberi Squarotti suggests that although Bruno wrote this passage in haste 
towards the end of the play’s preface, the rest of the dialogues confirm this view of time. It 
certainly resonates with the descriptions of vicissitude in the Cena; there is a ‘fullness’ to 
time expressed in the Candelaio which relates to the idea that ‘non è cosa nostra che non si 
faccia aliena, e non è cosa aliena’; due to the nature of vicissitude, time reveals everything. 
Discussing vicissitude in the Italian dialogues, Granada has emphasised that within 
vicissitude everything becomes everything else.  Bodies in time are expressed in terms of 85
their temporary nature; they will eventually give way to something else that will replace 
them. I also believe that this description of time reassures the reader by lessening any 
concerns over the ambiguity of the future; ‘si la mutazione è vera, io che son ne la notte, 
aspetto il giorno’ -  the existence of bodies in time is vicissitudinal to such an extent that 
the future possesses a significant degree of predictability. 
 Further examples of the ‘ritmo vicissitudinale degli eventi’ appear in the Eroici 
Furori. Indeed, discussing Bruno and time, Badaloni suggests that the Eroici Furori is 
important since it presents mutation through the lens of time.  In addition, the image of 86
 Giorgio Barberi Squarotti, ‘Note’ in Opere Italiane, ed. by Nuccio Ordine, vol. 1 (Turin: UTET, 2002), pp. 257-424 84
(p. 261). 
 Giordano Bruno, Cena de las cenizas, trans. by Miguel A. Granada (Madrid: Alianza, 1987), p. ccxix.85
 Badaloni, p. 34. ‘‘Nel De gli eroici furori è contenuta un’illuminata discussione sul tempo’. He also discusses a 86
different conversation between Cicada and Tansillo on the present moment and eternity which will be analysed further 
in Chapter Three.
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‘la ruota del tempo’ (Furori II.661) continues to link the language of vicissitude to time.  87
Bruno’s literary form sees four sets of speakers discussing a series of verses and images in 
what has been described as a lengthy and intense discussion on the nature of poetry.  88
One of the symbols that the two interlocutors analyse is that of a wheel that moves 
continually around its centre, which appears alongside the motto Manens Moveor. 
Maricondo likens time to the movement of a wheel turning, ‘si muove in circolo’ (Furori 
II.661): 
 dove il moto concorre con la quiete, atteso che nel moto orbiculare sopra il   
 proprio asse e circa il proprio mezzo si comprende la quiete e fermezza secondo il  
 moto retto: over quiete del tutto, e moto secondo le parti; e da le parti che si   
 muoveno in circolo si apprendeno due differenze di lazione, in quanto che   
 successivamente altre parti montano alla sommità, altre dalla sommità    
 descendono al basso; altre ottengono le differenze medianti, altre tengono   
 l’estremo dell’alto e del fondo. (Furori II.661) 
 While the centre of the wheel stays the same, spinning, the parts of the edge turn 
constantly. Note the sense of balance and completeness that pervades this image of ‘la 
ruota del tempo’ - as one part of the wheel reaches ‘la sommità’ it must be replaced by 
another part descending towards ‘il basso’. The existence of bodies in time is defined by 
continual generation, ‘in questo stato e condizione si vederà sempre che trovarassi sotto il 
fato della generazione’ (Furori II.662). In his later Latin works, Bruno explicitly describes 
the stages of human life in terms of an expanding and contracting circle: ‘Se la nascita 
rappresenta l’inizio di un processo in espansione, la vita una sfera compiuta, la morte una 
contrazione verso il centro, ogni fenomeno naturale, ogni corpo rimandano alla sfera ed al 
centro’.  Furthermore, as I have already suggested, Bruno uses this characteristic of 89
vicissitude to demonstrate how a degree of predictability can be assigned to the future. As 
Bruno suggests in the Cena and subsequent texts, humanity’s existence within the process 
of historical change allows one to predict the next phase in the cycle: ‘però ora che siamo 
stati nella feccia delle scienze […] possiamo certo aspettare de ritornare a meglior 
stati’ (Furori II.643). However, here it is enough to know that, as in the extracts from the 
Cena de le Ceneri, Bruno understands time through continual movement; the natural 
 See Giordano Bruno, Opere italiane, p. 849. Previous critics have interpreted the ‘ruota del tempo’ as a symbol of 87
fortune, but this theory does not explain why Bruno links vicissitude directly to his image. See Michele Ciliberto, La 
ruota del tempo (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1986). Ciliberto adopts the phrase as the title of his monograph, in which he 
argues that Bruno’s thought in general possesses a distinct order and circularity: ‘è distinto da fortissimi, continui 
elementi di rielaborazione e di autoripensamento’ (p. 11). 
 See Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Ingrid D. Rowland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 88
2013), p. xxiii.
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Latine, p. 5. 89
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order of things comprises a continual motion of states that endure and replace one 
another.  
 Furthermore, Bruno emphasises how this conception of time is both a natural 
phenomenon and one that is outside of human control, seemingly affecting everything 
and everyone. All things on Earth exist within an order of time that, like Montaigne, he 
describes as the ‘natural’ order of things. Montaigne illustrates this idea through graphic 
corporeal imagery, ascribing a simple entry into and eventual departure from life. Bruno, 
on the other hand, identifies a vicissitudinal order of time which affects all material things, 
of which the human body is just one part. Badaloni describes this as a form of ‘divenire 
temporale’ while Carlo Monti characterises Bruno’s conception of the human body 
through constant change: ‘per cui, permanendo la medesima anima, il corpo va via via 
cambiando e rinnovandosi’.  This process of change and renewal also applies to the 90
natural world; in the Cena we see geographical examples of how vicissitude affects natural 
phenomena such as sea and land: ‘i luoghi acquosi in certo tempo rimagnono; poi di novo 
si disseccano et invecchiano’ (Cena I.558). Bruno also describes the formation of 
mountains thus: 
 …come anco da le Alpe e gli Pirenei, che son stati altre volte la testa d’un monte   
 altissimo. La qual, venendo tutta via fracassata dal tempo (che ne produce in altra  
 parte per la vicissitudine de la rinovazione de le parti della terra) forma tante   
 montagne particolari, le quale noi chiamiamo monti. (Cena I.517) 
  
 All of these processes occur within Nature, ‘la nostra perpetua nutrice e 
madre’ (Cena I.557), which is constantly changing and renewing itself. Interestingly, the 
quotations above paraphrase passages from Book I of Aristotle’s Meteorologica. Indeed, 
Bruno’s conception of time is so closely anchored to movement that one would be 
forgiven for questioning his disdain for Aristotle. In the Cena Bruno acknowledges that 
in some respects Aristotle’s descriptions of the Earth in constant mutation resound 
strongly with his own and that in the Meteorologica Aristotle ‘dice per il più e per il 
principale il vero’ (Cena I.557).  However, Aristotle attributes the prime cause of this 91
phenomenon to the movement of the sun; as Bruno remarks, ‘dimandate ad Aristotele 
 Ibid., p. 31. See also Badaloni, p. 33. Badaloni remarks that ageing is attributed to the ancient gods of Mount Olympus 90
in the Spaccio. Even Venus is susceptible to bodily changes, as Vulcan is quick to point out: ‘Tu ancora (mia sorella) se 
non credi ad altri, dimandane al tuo specchio: e vedi come per le rughe che ti sono aggionte, e per gli solchi che l’aratro 
del tempo t’imprime ne la faccia, porgi giorno per giorno maggior difficultade al pittore’ (Spaccio II.211). 
 See Aristotle, Meteorologica, trans. by H.D.P. Lee (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). Bruno paraphrases the 91
argument to Book I, Chapter XIV: ‘The same districts of the earth are not always wet and dry, nor the same places 
always sea and land. The reason for this is that different parts of the earth grow old and dry up at different times, while 
others correspondingly revive and grow wet’ (351 a 19-b 8). 
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“Onde questo avviene?”; risponde: “Dal sole, e dal moto circolare”’ (Cena I.560).  The last 
pages of the Cena are devoted to refuting this theory and instead arguing that ‘questa 
terra et altri simili corpi si muovano non con una, ma con più differenze di moti’ (Cena I.
438).  As a result of different internal motors, and not the Sun, Cesarino states that 92
everything on Earth undergoes constant change, ‘per l’ingiuria del tempo e vicissitudine de 
le cose’; ‘per forza della vicissitudine delle cose’ (Furori II.646) i.e. because of the 
vicissitude of all things. Emotions - ‘felicità et infelicità’, movements, materials; ‘con certo 
ordine’ everything is guaranteed to move from one contrary to the other, ‘questo 
comporta l’ordine naturale’ (Furori II.646). 
 Bruno’s original interpretation of vicissitude becomes more apparent when we 
compare his use of the term to that of his European contemporaries. As I have previously 
stated, vicissitude itself was not a particularly unusual concept in the 16th century; a 
diverse array of thinkers including Louis Le Roy (1510-1577), Gerolamo Cardano 
(1501-1576) and Girolamo Fracastoro (1478-1553) had already begun to explore the idea of 
vicissitude from various perspectives. The Italian mathematician Cardano published De 
rerum varietate in 1557, which sought to unravel the varietas of the natural world, while 
Fracastoro’s theories on vicissitude in Homocentrica (1538) were read with great interest by 
Bruno (amongst others).  Le Roy’s seminal text De la vicissitude ou variété des choses en 93
l’universe was first published in 1575 and was followed by an Italian translation in 1585. It 
quickly became one of the most widely read history of civilisations in Europe between the 
16th and 17th centuries.  Writing in response to the religious wars waging in his home 94
country of France, Le Roy’s history of humanity is a highly ambitious undertaking which 
seeks to demonstrate that the principle of change can explain everything.  Le Roy’s 95
originality emerges in his attempt to combine human history with the workings of nature; 
the text explains historical developments and human culture by exploring their 
relationship to the mutating natural world.  De la vicissitude ‘takes the form of a general 96
review of physical mutations followed by a more extensive study of various civilizations 
 For a more detailed explanation of the exact nature of these motors see Bruno, Opere italiane, vol 1, pp. 561-571.92
 Maria Elena Severini, ‘«Italian accorti» e «francesi arditi»: Letture e lettori italiani del trattato sulla vicissitudine 93
universale di Loys Le Roy’, Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 74.2 (2012), pp. 311-324 (pp. 317-318).
 Ibid., p. 311.94
 Michel Jeanneret, Perpetual Motion. Transforming Shapes in the Renaissance from Da Vinci to Montaigne, trans. by 95
Nidra Poller (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), ‘7 - The Hazards of Art: Le Roy’. 
 Ibid., p. 166-167. 96
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and their genius’.  Throughout the text, Le Roy demonstrates a firm belief in the idea 97
that ‘life, in any and all realms, would seem to depend on the balance of contraries, unity 
in diversity, stability in movement’.  Naturally, this includes the progress of human 98
history, which in Le Roy’s work is subject to the general laws of variété and vicissitude:  ‘tel 
temperament est cause que les choses paravant diverses et differentes, conviennent et 
accordent ensemble’.  Indeed, at first glance Le Roy’s understanding of historical change, 99
defined as it is by change and repetition, appears to echo that of Bruno’s famous notion of 
‘light’ and ‘dark’ ages in history. However, despite their similarities, a closer examination 
of Le Roy’s text illustrates Bruno’s original use of vicissitude, particularly concerning 
religious orthodoxy.   
 Le Roy was a devout Catholic humanist, and unlike Bruno, he takes great pains to 
ensure that his concept of vicissitude firmly adheres to a Christian framework. For 
example, following a tradition set forth by Saint Augustine and Thomas of Aquinas, Le 
Roy believes that divine providence is ultimately responsible for all of the changes he 
describes.  Providence appears to have control over natural events that might be 100
interpreted as God’s justice on Earth such as natural disasters, epidemics, and famine.  Le 101
Roy himself states that ‘je recognois treshumblement la providence divine estre par 
dessus, croyant certainement que Dieu tout puissant facteur et gouverneur de ce grand 
ouvrage excellent’.  Bruno offers no such theory and is content to describe physical and 102
historical vicissitude without reference to a divine providential plan. However, the most 
significant difference between Bruno and Le Roy is cosmological. Influenced by Aristotle 
and Proclus, Le Roy maintains a strict divide between the natural world and the celestial 
world with its fixed stars and planets: ‘Brief tout ce monde inferieur obeïr au superieur et 
par luy estre gouverné’.  Naturally, Le Roy’s notion of time mirrors this cosmology - he 103
follows Aristotle in maintaining a division between time on Earth (which is defined by 
 Ibid., p. 167.97
 Ibid. 98
 Le Roy, Loys, De la vicissitude ou Variete des choses en l’univers, et concurrence des armes (Éd. 1575), (Paris: Pierre 99
L’Huillier, 1575), p. 5.
 Philippe de Lajarte, ‘Entre logique naturelle et logique providentielle: les ressorts de l’histoire d’après le traité “De la 100
vicissitude ou variété des choses en l’univers” de Loys Le Roy’, Seizième Siècle, 10 (2014), pp. 245-260 (p. 251). ‘Les lois 
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multiplicity, becoming and change) and eternity (which confines itself to the celestial 
realm).  As we have seen, Bruno’s cosmology completely denies the existence of an outer 104
sphere and instead, God resides within the universe itself through the World Soul. As I 
discuss further in Chapter Three, time and eternity are merely two types of duration and 
the eternal World Soul actually binds together vicissitudinal objects. Furthermore, 
vicissitude occurs everywhere in Bruno’s universe - including the planets and stars - which 
takes the concept in a far more radical direction than Le Roy’s Christianised version of 
vicissitude. 
 Lastly, one must note that a stark difference arises between Bruno and Montaigne 
when we consider the status of death within Bruno’s notion of temporality. Bruno 
devotes little attention to the significance of death and dying within the Italian dialogues; 
in the De la causa Bruno states explicitly that once one understands vicissitude, there is 
little reason to fear death - ‘non teme la morte ma aspetta la mutazione’ (Causa I.729). 
There is no drama or fascination with how exactly this might occur, it merely happens to 
everyone and everything - death becomes a change of state amongst many other possible 
states. The next chapter explores how and why this response to death was so unusual 
within late 16th-century conceptions of time. However, to conclude this section, it 
appears that for Bruno time engenders a series of changing states - mutability is a key 
characteristic of all bodies in time. The body cannot travel back or forth in time; rather it 
is subject to a series of continually changing conditions, of which death happens to be one 
part. Ironically this process over time constitutes a form of permanence in itself - 
vicissitude never deviates and thus endures forever: ‘Tale continuo mutamento comporta 
un perenne flusso e allontanarsi degli atomi da e verso di noi’.  Vicissitude is the essence 105
of objective time in the Italian dialogues. Moreover, it is a natural phenomenon that 
affects everyone and everything - human beings have no control over time and instead 
exist within a process of constant change and renewal. 
 ‘La definizione del tempo rispecchia quella aristotelica, che rafforza, sul piano teorico, l’associazione delle categorie di 104
temporalità, molteplicità, divenire, movimento e contingenza cone la dimensione umana e terrena, in opposizione 
all’eternità, staticità, necessità e immutabilità della dimensione divina’ (Severini, ‘«Italian accorti» e «francesi arditi»’, 
p. 322).
 Ibid.105
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Time and the Mind 
Time and the mind in the 16th century 
 Bodies, matter, the corporeal - devoting such a degree of attention to the existence 
of bodies in time is arguably one way in which Montaigne and Bruno stand apart from 
many of their contemporaries. These discussions, which emphasise the corruptible 
substances that constitute not only the human body but all bodies in time, appear to run 
counter to the general 16th-century perception of bodily matter as something largely 
unworthy of proper study to philosophers and theologians. At that time, human beings 
were generally believed to be composed of a body and a soul. However, from the 14th to 
the 16th century, the human body was often considered to be an entity of the lowest 
order. 
 Despite the advances that were made by anatomists such as Vesalius, the body still 
did not receive the same attention from theologians and philosophers as the soul. Writing 
on life and death in the Renaissance, Italian historian Alberto Tenenti has suggested that 
religious and philosophical thinkers had sneered at the body’s weakness ever since the 
Plague wreaked devastation across Europe in the 14th century.  The body was weak and 106
frail compared to the soul and it was only to be regarded as something that human beings 
would shed in the life to come. A typical view appears in Predica dell’arte del ben morire 
(1496), in which the radical Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498) preached to 
his Christian followers that the body was ‘una parte non essenziale dell’uomo’.  Indeed, 107
as well as the consequences of the Black Death, the idea that the body was merely a shell 
housing the soul was enshrined in various Christian and Neoplatonist currents of thought 
during the Renaissance. As M.A. Screech has demonstrated, these ideas were clearly 
influenced by Platonism and its amalgamation with Christian doctrine: ‘Platonising 
Christianity gave the body a low place in the union’ between body and soul.  Plato had 108
attributed the highest status possible to the soul since he believed that the soul did not 
die. This belief led to the idea that ‘a human being was a soul using a body destined to be 
discarded’; the body was defined in light of its temporary, fleeting nature in comparison to 
the supposedly eternal entity that it housed.   109
 Alberto Tenenti, Il senso della morte e l’amore della vita nel Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1957), p. 73.106
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 However, not everyone considered the body in such negative terms. Erasmus was 
one of the few 16th-century thinkers to question the idea of the body as ‘no more than the 
soul’s tool, dwelling-place or prison’.  Montaigne and Bruno have already demonstrated 110
a great deal of interest in bodies, and this interest precludes them from solely defining the 
body through its relationship to the soul. This refusal to dismiss the body may in fact be 
influenced by Aristotle, who said that there was ‘a natural union between body and 
soul’.  Ian Maclean also suggests that devoting attention to the body is a reflection of 111
Aristotelian, rather than Platonic, values: ‘Selon Montaigne (qui en ceci suit encore une 
fois Aristote plutôt que Platon), le corps, c’est le principe d’individuation’.  Thus far, 112
bodies are an important and visible marker of human existence in time. However, both 
Montaigne and Bruno also understand that it is impossible to possess a consciousness of 
mutation and change to bodies without also possessing an internal capability - frequently 
referred to as the soul or mind - that can reflect on this process.   113
 Indeed, it is obvious that ‘time’ carries much more significance for human beings 
than simply an empty, natural process from birth to death. In ‘De la Vanité’ (III.IX) 
Montaigne describes life as ‘un mouvement materiel et corporel’ (III.IX.988). However, 
there must be a way in which humans become conscious of this movement; Montaigne 
expresses a desire to live according to this movement - ‘je m’emploie à la servir selon 
elle’ (III.IX.988) - but how is he able to reflect on this idea in the first place? Bruno already 
reveals his awareness of this problem at the beginning of the second part of the Eroici 
Furori; after introducing a description of vicissitude in its most basic form, Bruno clearly 
states that humans cannot stop at contemplating time in this manner. Maricondo 
observes that despite the certainty of vicissitude, ‘al nostro riguardo sempre, in 
qualsivoglia stato ordinario, il presente più ne affligge che il passato, et ambi doi insieme 
manco possono appagarne che il futuro’ (Furori II.644). In other words, humans possess 
a consciousness of past, present and future that renders it impossible to exist in time 
without any thought for events that have already occurred or might occur again. It seems 
clear that human understanding of time entails something more than merely a transition 
 Ibid., p. 115.110
 Ibid., p. 114.111
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from birth, through ageing (or otherwise) to death. How is it that philosophers such as 
Bruno (or indeed anybody) can perceive a change in matter? How is Montaigne able to 
compare the current changes in his body to his physical health as a young man? Human 
beings are not composed solely of an unconscious material body, we are aware of a certain 
‘flow’ to time, of changes in our surroundings - we can remember our past or project 
hopes and fears onto our future.  114
 I believe that a significant aspect of temporality in the Essais and the Italian 
dialogues stems from the relationship between the body in time and the mind, and it is 
this aspect of time that Chapters One and Two will now discuss. First it will be necessary 
to justify the use of certain terms in this analysis. In the Introduction, I alluded to a 
difference between mental perceptions of time and physical time. This notion possesses a 
long and fascinating history within Western thought.  In contemporary European 115
society, we consider the self through a distinct Cartesian mind-body duality. However, for 
a period roughly spanning from the Late Antique into the 16th century, the mind was 
traditionally considered to be a part of the soul, and it was often the soul that was believed 
to be the main counterpart to the body.  However, the rigid distinction between body, 116
soul and the mind as the intellectus or intellective part of the soul was starting to be 
questioned even in the late 1500s. Michael Edwards has already highlighted the ambiguity 
of the terms ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ as they were employed by late Renaissance commentators. 
While in the Aristotelian tradition ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ were not interchangeable, later 
translations of the Physics and De anima ‘referred both to time’s relationship to anima, 
meaning the soul in general, and to intellectus, meaning the rational part of that soul, 
which was peculiar to humans and equated roughly (but not exactly) to the modern term 
‘mind’, or ‘human understanding’.  Emily Michael discusses the Italian humanist 117
Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-1579) and his efforts to prove the immortality of the soul; in 
doing so Piccolomini described how the human mind ‘has an activity that is wholly 
 Conche neatly describes this awareness of time thus: ‘Or, dans la temporalité, ils surgissent et sont pensés ensemble: 114
au-delà de mon passé, en fonction de mon présent, je projette mon avenir’ (p. 16). 
 For a comprehensive study of the history surrounding issues of time and the mind in Western philosophy, see J.J.A 115
Mooij, Time and Mind: the History of a Philosophical Problem, trans. by P.  Mason (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 
 See Robert Pasnau, ‘The Mind-Soul Problem’, in Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of 116
Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. by P. J.J.M. Bakker & J.M.M.H. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 
3-19; Emily Michael, ‘Renaissance Theories of Body, Soul, and Mind’, in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and 
Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, ed. by J.P. Wright & P.  Potter 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 72-148.
 Edwards, p. 18. See also John Sutton, ‘Soul and Body’, in The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the 117
Seventeenth Century, ed. by Peter R. Anstey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 285-310. Sutton claims that by 
the 17th century ‘the proper usage of key terms such as ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ and ‘mind’ was always under negotiation’ (p. 286). 
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independent of the body - namely, it reflects upon itself’.  Throughout this discussion, I 118
use the terms ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ in reference to this idea, and when I analyse the mind, I 
always consider it to be a part of the soul, just as the soul is the entity that contains the 
intellectus or mind.  119
 The idea that human beings become conscious of time through the mind, and 
consequently that time may not even exist without the mind, has a long history within 
the development of Western philosophy. Plotinus argues against Aristotle and asserts that 
time is not movement; nor is it a measure of movement. Instead, he suggests that time is a 
‘power of the soul’.  Plotinus believes the world is contained within the ‘mutable 120
succession of time’; it is not a perfect eternal state, which echoes the idea of vicissitude 
that we have already encountered.  However, Plotinus extends this discussion by 121
emphasising the role of what he terms the ‘soul’ in perceiving time: 
 Plotinus departs radically from Plato when he argues that time, rather than being  
 an attribute of physical motion, is an attribute of Soul […]. Time, then, is a   
 psychological reality; and from this correlation of mind and time, what follows   
 logically of course is that without soul (at least in a rudimentary form) there can  
 be no time.  122
 Plotinus is, therefore, the first thinker to suggest that in order to understand time, 
‘we must turn inward’.  A few centuries later, St. Augustine of Hippo (354 AD-430 AD) 123
famously developed this idea through his idea of distentio animi or the ‘stretching out’ of 
consciousness.  Indeed, Augustine’s thoughts on time are certainly amongst the most 124
well-known definitions of time; he eloquently expresses the difficulty of defining time in 
Chapter XI of his Confessions (c. 400), ‘Time and Eternity’: 
 What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to 
 an inquirer, I do not know. But I confidently affirm myself to know that if   
 Michael, p. 161.118
 While every effort will be made to highlight when one particular concept is being used in a very traditional context, in 119
the case of Montaigne and Bruno it is often unnecessary to do so since their interest always lies in the capacity of human 
beings to contemplate time rather than which faculty is responsible for this ability. 
 Hill, p. 78.120
 Ibid.121
 Ibid., p. 79.122
 Duncan Kennedy, Antiquity and the Meanings of Time: a Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Literature (London: 123
I.B. Tauris, 2013), p. x.
 Ibid.124
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 nothing passes away, there is no past time, and if nothing arrives, there is no   
 future time, and if nothing existed there would be no present time.  125
 He expresses both the impossibility of articulating what exactly time is, as well as 
the idea that it is only within ourselves that we can confirm the presence of time - ‘I 
know’, ‘I affirm myself to know’. In his works on narrative and time, the French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur suggested that considering time in philosophical terms always 
leads to irresolvable aporias - Augustine’s remarks are an excellent example of this.  As 126
Duncan Kennedy explains, ‘that is not to rule out, even if we could, the question of the 
nature of time; however, what we should not expect to come upon is a definitive 
answer’.  Augustine does not search for an exact answer himself; rather he is content to 127
emphasise the subjective nature of time i.e. that time is something humans perceive in 
their own mind. As he goes on to explain in the same chapter: ‘So it is in you, my mind, 
that I measure periods of time’.  It is through the mind, and not the body, that we 128
become conscious of what has happened, is happening and will happen, and Augustine 
has developed Plotinus’ original definition by emphasising that this process occurs within 
the mind (animus), not the soul (anima). The three temporal divisions of past, present 
and future are treated as mental states by Augustine, ‘for then they could all exist at one 
and the same instant within the mind’.  He then goes on to say that time is an extension 129
of something ‘and that it would be surprising if it were not (mirum si non) an extension 
of the mind’.  130
 Such theories on time and the mind would eventually go on to influence centuries 
of philosophy on time. Pascal, Leibniz and phenomenological proponents of time-
consciousness - such as Husserl and Bergson - would all proceed to draw upon 
Augustine’s observations as a starting point (with Descartes’ firm distinction between 
body and mind acting as another influencing factor).  However, the extent to which 131
 Augustine of Hippo, p. 231. 125
 Kennedy, p. x.126
 Ibid.127
 Augustine of Hippo, p. 242.128
 Sorabji, p. 29.129
 Ibid.130
 Hutton highlights Augustine’s influence on Pascal in the 17th century. Quoted by Hutton, in the Opuscules Pascal 131
remarks: ‘Thus, for instance, time is of this kind. Who can define it? And why undertake to do so, since all men 
understand what one means when speaking of time, without one having to explain it beforehand’ (p. 345). Sorabji is 
unconvinced that Augustine considers his own definition seriously in later works, and it is not wholeheartedly adopted 
by his immediate successors (p. 30). He continues: ‘In modern philosophy, the view that time is somehow dependent on 
consciousness still reappears in very diverse forms, for example, in Berkeley, in Kant, and in Bergson’ (p. 97).
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16th-century thinkers accepted these ideas is questionable. There is disagreement amongst 
critics as to whether the ideas above actually originated in Aristotle’s work. Kennedy 
describes a ‘tortuous’ attempt at a distinction between so-called inner and outer time in 
Aristotle’s Physics, while Edwards argues that it was this same definition, alongside 
comments found in the De Anima, that first prompted discussion about the relationship 
between time and the soul.  In any case, this thesis explores how Montaigne and Bruno 132
confirm a more fractured view of 16th century time than has previously been suggested. 
While it is not the intention of this thesis to fit either thinker within a narrative in which 
they whole-heartedly adopt Augustine’s definition of time or anticipate Husserl’s time-
consciousness, Montaigne and Bruno were certainly treating time differently by appearing 
to reject Aristotle’s definition of time as movement in the Physics. Instead, they forged 
their own concerns around an inner and outer awareness of time that had already been 
explored by thinkers before Aristotelianism dominated the intellectual establishment in 
the late 16th century.  
Montaigne, Bruno and the power of the mind 
 If the body appears to be a passive entity in time, then the mind is arguably the 
opposite in nature. There is something inside human beings, within their body, that (as 
Montaigne concludes in ‘Que le Goust’) brings with it a consciousness of death, and not 
only death but a myriad of other things that have existed, exist or will exist. Referring here 
to the soul, Montaigne identifies the part of our being that is capable of contemplation 
and reflection outside the train and pli of the human body.  ‘Elle [l’ame] est variable en 133
toute sorte de formes, et renge à soy, et à son estat, quel qu’il soit, les sentiments du corps, 
et tous autres accidents. Pourtant le faut-il estudier et enquerir, et esveiller en elle ses 
ressors tout-puissants’ (I.XIV.266). Although the soul is a part of the body, it is a 
powerful part of the body, being aware of itself and ‘son estat’. Bruno’s understanding of 
human potential is extremely similar. In the Eroici Furori he too highlights the ability of 
the soul to transcend bodily concerns, and also discusses how the virtue of contemplation 
triggers this phenomenon:  
 Edwards, p. 29.132
 In these extracts, Montaigne and Bruno consider the mind to be a part of the soul. The mind possesses faculties such 133
as intuition and imagination which contribute to the overall ‘power’ of the soul. In these chapters the soul is mentioned 
most frequently as the root of human power, but the mind forms an integrated part of this power, and is often referred 
to directly as l’esprit or la mente in examples where l’anima or l’ame may also have been appropriate.
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 il senso di cose basse è attenuato et annullato dove le potenze superiori sono   
 gagliardamente  intente ad oggetto più magnifico et eroico. È tanta la virtù della  
 contemplazione (come nota Iamblico) che accade tal volta non solo che l’anima  
 ripose da gli atti inferiori, ma et oltre lascie il corpo a fatto. (Furori II.663) 
 Drawing upon Neoplatonic distinctions between ‘cose basse’ and an ‘oggetto più 
magnifico’, it appears that the soul may exist within the body but also possesses the ability 
to leave the body behind. In both cases, humans bring with them not just a body, but also 
a powerful reflective capability that both Montaigne and Bruno feel individuals should 
utilise more carefully, focusing attention on cultivating its ‘potenze superiori’ or ‘ressors 
tout-puissants’. 
 Of course, taken on its own, this was a relatively common assumption for 
Renaissance thinkers to make. However, arguably Montaigne and Bruno recognise that 
these functions have important consequences for human existence in time. Bruno notes 
in the Eroici Furori that humans are able to ‘make present’ what hasn’t even happened 
yet: ‘si fa presente quel che non gli è sopragionto ancora’ (Furori II.681). One of the 
sonnets that Cesarino and Maricondo analyse individuates the three traditional temporal 
distinctions between past, present and future: ‘Per quel che feci, faccio et ho da fare/al 
passat’, al presente et al futuro,/mi pento, mi tormento, m’assicuro,/nel perso, nel soffrir, 
nell’aspettare’ (Furori II.644-645). A consciousness of not only what is, but also what has 
been and what will be, can lead someone (in this case a tormented lover) to hope and 
despair, lost in memories of the past or imagined thoughts about the future. Montaigne 
attributes the ability to reflect on the ageing body to the mind: ‘c’est le privilege de l’esprit 
de se r’avoir de la vieillesse’ (III.V.844). Montaigne’s reflections on his changing body in 
‘De l’experience’ are only possible thanks to the mind and its capacity to remember and 
reflect. 
 Why then should one confine oneself to letting one’s actions be entirely dictated 
by the body? In ‘Que le Goust’ and the Eroici Furori, this point is emphasised by a 
consideration of bodily needs. Both thinkers acknowledge that the body experiences 
certain needs over time, such as hunger, thirst, and sexual desire - Montaigne refers to 
such impulses above as ‘les sentiments du corps’ (I.XIV.57). The Eroici Furori is a text 
which explores the possibility of transforming sexual urges and lust into something 
higher, into a productive quest for divine knowledge. Thus there are many references to 
the senses and bodily responses to physical beauty. Maricondo explains to Cesarino that 
an individual risks becoming imprisoned by feelings of lust, and walking around as if the 
body were ‘carcere che tien rinchiusa la sua libertade…catena che tien strette le sue mani, 
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ceppe che han fissi gli suoi piedi, velo che gli tien abbagliata la vista’ (Furori II.660). The 
body can imprison the soul’s freedom; one who is tied solely to the bodily senses in this 
way, allowing their actions to be determined by what they feel in the present, is ‘servo, 
cattivo, inveschiato, incatenato, discioperato, saldo e cieco’ (Furori II.660).  As such an 134
animal is ‘servo e schiavo del suo corpo’ (Furori II.660) - a slave to one’s body, letting it act 
without regard for future consequences.  
 Montaigne echoes these sentiments in the Essais. He describes how animals are 
entirely overwhelmed by their bodily needs: ‘Les bestes…laissent aux corps leurs 
sentiments, libres et naïfs’ (I.XIV.58) and that this is evident in the behaviour of all 
species, ‘qu’elles montrent par la semblable application de leurs mouvements’ (I.XIV.
58).  For humans, on the other hand, ‘la pointe de nostre esprit’ (I.XIV.58) infuses us 135
with choice and the possibility to think and act outside of the whims of the body. Since 
human beings possess such potentiality within themselves, ‘nous sommes emancipez de 
ses reigles’ (I.XIV.58), i.e. the rule of Nature, ‘pour nous abandonner à la vagabonde 
liberté de noz fantasies’ (I.XIV.58). The freedom of the mind strangely subverts the 
natural order of time. Rather than existing passively within time as the body does, the 
mind actively searches for ways of overcoming the natural order of time.  
 However, in ‘Que le Goust’ this degree of cognitive power comes with a mildly 
sceptical warning regarding mental wellbeing and the risk that utilising such intelligence 
could potentially sever one’s relationship to Nature. In the quotation below, Montaigne 
makes the case that too much knowledge can also be a bad thing:  
  
 A quoy faire la cognoissance des choses, si nous en devenons plus lasches? si nous  
 en perdons le repos et la tranquillité, où nous serions sans cela? et si elle nous rend 
 de pire condition que le pourceau de Pyrrho? L’intelligence qui nous a esté   
 donnée pour nostre plus grand bien, l’employerons nous à nostre ruine;   
 combatans le dessein de nature, et l’universel ordre des choses, qui porte que   
 chacun use de ses utils et moyens pour sa commodité? (I.XIV.55) 
  
 Montaigne is keenly aware that the gift of intelligence can transport human beings 
far outside ‘l’universel ordre des choses’ - he understands that this can be potentially 
ruinous as well as enlightening, since we may lose a sense of inner tranquillity and replace 
it with thoughts that overwhelm us. Bruno is similarly aware of this danger in his 
 Ironically in ‘Que le Goust des biens et des maux’, Montaigne also explores the other side of the argument on sexual 134
desire, questioning why some people despise the most pleasing and useful organs of all i.e. those which ‘servent à nous 
engendrer’ (I.XIV.62). 
 Of course, Montaigne does admit that there may be a degree of happiness to be found in this naivety. In this chapter 135
Montaigne briefly questions whether relinquishing oneself to the senses is actually a blessing and that if human beings 
were able to live solely according to the body, the torment provoked by the soul might be placated. 
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observations on the degree of power that human intellect can wield; the soul is ‘esposta 
alla recepzion de doni superiori’ (Furori II.665), it has potential far beyond that of other 
beings in Nature such as the animals mentioned above. One of the first sonnets that 
Maricondo and Cesarino analyse describes a typical example of the tormento experienced 
by the lover. As Maricondo points out, it is possible for an individual to transform the 
desire and passion for the object into divine beauty:  
 perché son certo che la natura che mi ha messa questa bellezza avanti gli occhi, e  
 mi ha dotato di senso interiore, per cui posso argumentar bellezza più profonda et  
 incomparabilmente maggiore, voglia ch’io da qua basso vegna promosso a l’altezza 
 et eminenza di specie più eccellenti.  (Furori II.647-648) 136
 The intellectual capabilities of ‘senso interiore’ are fundamental in allowing 
Montaigne and Bruno to escape the restrictions of the body in time. They both 
understand quite clearly that there is a conflict between a body that is destined to die, a 
slave to its wants and needs, and an inner power which inspires the possibility to ascribe 
more meaning and complexity to time. 
 Montaigne and Bruno arguably fashion their literary aims around this conflict. At 
the start of the ‘Isle de Cea’ Montaigne ironically claims that in the Essais all he has done 
has been to indulge idle thoughts, to ‘niaiser et fantastiquer’: ‘Si Philosopher c’est douter, 
comme ils disent, à plus forte raison niaiser et fantastiquer, comme je fais, doit estre 
doubter’ (II.III.350). However, with these words he immediately summons the role of the 
imagination in his writing and underlines his perception of the freedom that the human 
mind possesses in order to experiment beyond the laws of Nature. In the late 16th century, 
imagination was considered to be a speculative instrument, used to try and mentally 
replicate things in order to meditate or philosophise more effectively.  Although 137
Montaigne claims to be a mere apprentice, contemplating ‘humaines et vaines 
contestations’ (II.III.350), the imaginative functions that he asserts here allow him to 
subvert the notion of time itself, through a radical discussion of suicide (see Chapter Two, 
‘Montaigne, suicide and near-death experience’). Bruno demonstrates a similar aim but 
emphasises that his ultimate goal is to attain divine knowledge. He understands that 
bodily senses can only provide limited knowledge of the world; the mind is capable of 
reaching past the surface, perhaps one day even penetrating the divine. Cesarino asks 
 Emphasis own.136
 For an excellent study of the role of the imagination in the 16th and 17th centuries, see John D. Lyons, Before 137
Imagination: Embodied Thought from Montaigne to Rousseau (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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Maricondo what he can mean by stating that la mente aspires towards something higher. 
Is it not possible to look up towards the stars instead? Maricondo responds thus: 
 Non certo, ma procedendo al profondo della mente per cui non fia mistiero   
 massime aprir gli occhi al cielo, alzar alto le mani, menar i passi al tempio, intonar  
 l’orecchie de simulacri, onde più si vegna exaudito: ma venir al più intimo di sé,   
 considerando che Dio è vicino, con sé e dentro di sé, più ch’egli medesimo esser   
 non si possa […]. (Furori II.658) 
 An individual can engage their mind towards reaching for higher knowledge, 
which cannot be seen or heard, but instead exists deep within us. Only the greatness of a 
soul unconquered, ‘la grandezza d’un animo invitto’ (Furori II.659), is capable of 
achieving this. Hélène Védrine has previously described the tension arising from such a 
divide between the freedom of the mind and the existence of the body; the Eroici Furori 
presents the human condition in all of its contradictions as something tied to mortality 
but also searching for the divine.  Similarly, Ordine has stated that Bruno understands 138
the imbalance between a finite being and the possibility of infinite knowledge.  Through 139
the original concept of embodied time, I have gone further than previous scholars by 
demonstrating how bodies themselves are an integral part of how Montaigne and Bruno 
develop their conceptions of time.  
 Time in both the Essais and the Italian dialogues is primarily understood through 
the mutation of bodies, corporeal matter, and the certainty of death. These are basic 
realities of human existence in time (bodies are said to be ‘in’ time since they cannot 
appear to escape it). However, for human beings at least, their mind adds another 
dimension to this relatively simple idea of time, since it exhibits a much greater degree of 
freedom in time. I have also highlighted potential reasons as to why Montaigne and 
Bruno understand time in this way, by presenting context relating to how and why they 
started writing, as well as their very limited interaction with - and in some cases outright 
criticism of - supposedly traditional 16th-century notions of time. Chapter Two continues 
this discussion with a distinct focus on the future and how this reveals further tensions 
between the body in time and the mind in (and out of) time. I hope to show that once 
again both thinkers are approaching the question of time in new and exciting ways which 
 Hélène Védrine, La conception de la nature chez Giordano Bruno (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), p. 47. ‘[L]es Fureurs héroiques 138
présentent le drame de la condition humaine, limitée par nature, souffrant des pires contradictions, incapable de trouver 
le repos et cherchant désespérément à se fondre dans l’Un’. The reference to ‘l’Un’ symbolises the unity and oneness of 
the divine spirit. This is a central aspect of Bruno’s philosophy; see also Védrine pp. 47-58. 
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane, p. 135. 139
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often clash with the traditional 16th-century responses to time that are usually identified 
by modern scholars.  
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Chapter Two: Experiments with Time - Rethinking the Future 
 Towards the end of Chapter One, I proposed that the human mind complicates 
time due to its ability to move beyond the reality of the present moment. Indeed, one 
particular result of this capability sees humans drawn to contemplating the future.  In the 1
early modern period, many thinkers considered the ability to reflect on the future to be a 
clear sign of Man’s intelligence over other beings. The English poet John Donne 
(1572-1631) once stated that ‘creatures of an inferiour nature, are possest with the present; 
Man is a future Creature’.  The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) also 2
described the future as a specifically human concern; while the ‘beasts’ possess ‘little, or no 
foresight of the time to come […] Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by 
another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence’.  As a result, Hobbes 3
felt that humans were naturally concerned with predicting all manner of possible future 
events.  Unlike animals, human beings were considered to possess a more meaningful 4
consciousness of time that led them to contemplate not only the immediacy of the 
present but also time that had not yet occurred (albeit with a large degree of uncertainty). 
 Montaigne and Bruno were also fascinated by the unique ability of human beings 
to generate a variety of responses to the future. At the beginning of the second part of the 
Eroici Furori, Maricondo explains to his fellow interlocutor Cesarino that despite the 
relatively simple nature of vicissitude, humans also mentally divide time into past, present 
and future. As per Bruno’s literary convention in the Furori, the interlocutors discuss this 
 Elements of past time do appear in this chapter, particularly Bruno’s self-styled ‘renewal’ of pre-Socratic thought and 1
Montaigne’s response to various classical traditions concerning death. However, while the Renaissance is a period 
saturated with scholarly criticism concerning its cultural and artistic engagement with the past, this chapter includes 
examples of past time where they relate directly to the future. For a critical introduction to ‘the past’ and what this 
might mean in Renaissance literature, see selected works: David Quint, Origins and Originality in Renaissance 
Literature: Versions of the Source (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), Quint includes a chapter on Bruno; Terence 
Cave, The Cornucopian Text (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Zachary Sayre Schiffman, The Birth of the Past 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011); Timothy Hampton, Writing from History: the Rhetoric of 
Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), Hampton includes a useful chapter 
on Montaigne.
 John Spencer Hill,  Inﬁnity, Faith and Time (Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University, 1997), p. 98. 2
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by W.G. Pogson Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), p. 82. See also Michael Edwards, 3
Time and Science of the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 202. Hobbes also warns that this may lead to mental distress: ‘for, 
although considering the future is a natural human activity, our ability to do so with any certainty is limited’ (p. 202).
 Hobbes describes this process thus: ‘and, when he [Man] cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the 4
causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy 
suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe’ (p. 
82). 
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idea using a specific image - the statue of the Graeco-Egyptian god Serapis in the temple at 
Alexandria. Next to Serapis stands a three-headed animal; the central head is a lion, 
representing present time; to the left is the head of a wolf symbolising the past, while the 
head on the right-hand side is a dog, which represents the future.  As Maricondo states, 5
these three animals represent past, present and future - ‘son dizzioni che significano le tre 
parti del tempo’ (Furori II.644). This delineation brings with it certain complications. 
Leaving aside the fleeting nature of the present, Maricondo describes how contemplating 
the past can torment an individual through memories of what has already happened, 
while the future remains ‘sempre in aspettazione e speranza’ (Furori II.644). The future 
refers to time that neither exists nor has ever existed, and as such it is primarily defined by 
uncertainty, leaving individuals free to imprint their hopes or fears onto it.  
 Indeed, uncertainty is arguably one reason as to why humans are drawn to the 
future; the thought of what might occur often leads to a preoccupation with ‘guessing’ 
future time. However, there is one distinct element of the future which is certain, and 
which also attracts a large degree of contemplation from human beings: ‘La crainte, le 
desir, l’esperance nous eslancent vers l’advenir, et nous desrobent le sentiment et la 
consideration de ce qui est, pour nous amuser à ce qui sera, voire quand nous ne serons 
plus’ (I.III.15). Montaigne suggests through his use of the verb ‘amuser’ that there is a 
certain allure to contemplating the future, one that - as Bruno also remarks - feeds on 
hopes or anxieties over what may occur. However, Montaigne also humorously equates 
‘ce qui sera’ directly with ‘quand nous ne serons plus’. Echoing remarks by Lucretius in 
Book Three of the De rerum natura, Montaigne suggests that all thoughts of the future 
after we die are pointless - we will be dead, so what else is there to think about?  6
Unfortunately, death is the only certain event in the future, and as a result, it receives a 
significant amount of attention from human beings. Unlike animals, humans may well be 
inquisitive into future events, yet they remain simultaneously (and somewhat cruelly) 
conscious of the one future event which will end their entire existence in time. 
 Future time engenders a mixture of different responses from human beings, 
whether they are thinking about what might happen, or indeed what will happen. 
Chapter Two explores the mind and time ‘outside’ of the present moment by analysing 
 For more on the statue of Serapis, see M.A. Granada, ‘Giordano Bruno et “le banquet de Zeus chez les éthiopiens”: la 5
transformation de la doctrine stoïcienne des exhalaisons humides de la terre’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 3 (1997), pp. 
185-207; Pasquale Sabbatino, Giordano Bruno e la“mutazione” del Rinascimento (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1993). In 
Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Ingrid D. Rowland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 
Rowland notes that Bruno probably derived his description of this statue from Macrobius’ Saturnalia (p. 377). 
 See Lucretius, De rerum natura, trans. by Alicia Stallings (Penguin: London, 2007), Book Three - ‘The Folly of the 6
Fear of Death’.
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how Montaigne and Bruno perceive the future, specifically their radical responses to the 
one certainty of the future - death.  First I outline the 16th-century conceptions of the 7
future that are most often identified by scholars, particularly Christian ideas of the 
Afterlife and Last Judgement. I suggest that despite these critical trends, which appear to 
undermine the significance of fear of death during the 16th century, Montaigne and 
Bruno often approach future time through this very phenomenon. Fear of death serves as 
a platform for both thinkers to contemplate the future in ways that infuse it with 
complex new meanings. In the Essais the taboo act of suicide questions the body’s 
‘passive’ existence within the natural order of time, while Bruno - who develops his own 
theories on matter and draws largely on pre-Socratic sources - actually denies that the 
death of the body occurs at all. The last chapter presented time as an uncontrollable force 
that simply happened to the body; the passage of time was observed and theorised about, 
but it was also accepted as universal and unchanging. However, a degree of 
‘experimentation’ with time occurs when both thinkers accept the basic foundations of 
human existence in time - mortality, change, ageing - then attempt to manipulate them 
anyway. The mind can think ‘outside’ the bounds of bodily time, moving at will between 
past, present and future, and reflecting on itself in time. This unique capability allows 
Montaigne and Bruno to experiment with traditional conceptions of the future. 
Context: 16th-Century Futures 
 One might assume that conceptions of the future in the 16th century would 
centre around Aristotle and his definitions of time in the Physics. However, many scholars 
in the field of time studies have repeatedly associated Renaissance ideas of the future - and 
often time more generally - with the Christian eschatology first detailed in the 
Introduction, as well as artistic and cultural practices surrounding death.  I hope to show 8
that while these trends are well-supported, they are often far from representative of how 
future time is presented in the Essais and the Italian dialogues. J.K. Barret has already 
highlighted how problematic this fairly narrow approach to 16th and 17th-century 
‘futures’ has become; she claims that ‘religious paradigms are repeatedly reinforced as the 
 See Introduction, ‘Delineations and Limitations’ for scholarly work on Renaissance ideas of what ‘might’ happen e.g. 7
fortune, providence. 
 See Georges Poulet, Études sur le temps humain I (Paris: Plon et Éditions Du Rocher, 1952); Anthony Aveni, Empires 8
of Time: Calendars, Clocks and Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Donald J. Wilcox, The Measure of Times Past: 
Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric of Relative Time, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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most important component’ of early modern future time.  Critical studies tend to over-9
focus on Christian time and apocalyptic end times without acknowledging where 
Renaissance thinkers have deviated from these models. Many studies also generalise 
‘Christian time’ without reference to the few instances where the Reformation did impact 
on ideas of end time, i.e. the removal of Purgatory from some branches of Christianity. 
Here I outline some fundamental aspects of future time in the 16th century, paying 
careful attention to differentiate between religious sects where appropriate. 
 The most common early modern understanding of the future that has been 
continually identified by present-day scholars is rooted in Christian conceptions of time. I 
have already stated that the Bible delineates a clear beginning to time in the Book of 
Genesis and that it is equally clear regarding the end of time. This characteristic of time 
also applied to human beings on an individual level, i.e. a person was born, lived and then 
their body would die, leaving their soul to travel on to the eternal Afterlife, where it 
would be sorted into either Heaven or Hell.  Of course, the future was also a collective 10
phenomenon. While the Reformation had sent shockwaves through Europe by 
questioning key aspects of faith such as indulgences and the merits of the saints, Christian 
sects both old and new still believed in an imminent end time (even if Protestants no 
longer believed that Purgatory was a possibility after death). The Gospel of Matthew 
states that the Final Judgement will swiftly follow the Second Coming of Jesus Christ: 
 When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will 
 sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations, and he will  
 separate people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the   
 goats.  11
 In the Renaissance, Christians still believed that the Second Coming - and 
consequently the end of the world - was imminent. This general attitude did not alter 
significantly even despite Luther and his schism with Rome; Luther himself believed that 
‘the age of the Pope’ in the 16th century was a direct manifestation of the final age of 
 J.K. Barret, Untold Futures: Time and Literary Culture in Renaissance England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 9
2016), p. 7. See also pp. 7-8 for a useful discussion concerning the term ‘early modern’ and its implications for 
secularisation as an overriding characteristic of modernity. 
 This has been identified as another continuation from the Middle Ages - see Krzysztof Pomian, L’ordre du temps 10
(Paris: Gallimard, 1984). ‘Dans la chronosophie chrétienne du haut Moyen Âge, le temps linéaire et irréversible ne 
caractérise que l’histoire sacrée où l’acteur unique est Dieu, histoire de l’Église: institution visible tout en étant 
surnaturelle, et dont la durée montre qu’elle est soustraite à l’action destructrice du temps profane’ (p. 39). While the 
vast majority of 16th-century Christians believed in this progression, there were exceptions too. For a different thesis 
regarding the attitudes of Protestant reformers towards the future, please see Max Engammare, On Time, Punctuality 
and Discipline in Early Modern Calvinism, trans. by Karin Maag (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
 Matthew 25.31-32.11
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Man.  This sense of an impending ‘end’ to all time was particularly acute in the latter half 12
of the 16th century. As I discussed previously, celestial events were interpreted as signs of 
the world’s end, while the eight Wars of Religion which occurred between 1563 and 1594 
were just one example of a bloody conflict which led to widespread pessimism concerning 
the future of humanity.  As a result of these beliefs, time in the 16th century is often 13
referred to as a ‘transient’ phenomenon. This transience is a clear continuation from 
common attitudes towards time in the Middle Ages; Matoré suggests that in the Medieval 
period people were prone to view human life as a transitory phenomenon tied to 
eternity.  Much the same can be said for subsequent centuries; the average human being 14
in the 16th century would still have considered their existence to be fleeting in comparison 
to God’s eternity in the Afterlife. 
 Furthermore, Christian eschatology is often described as distinctly ‘linear’ in 
comparison to the so-called ‘Hellenic time’ favoured by various Greek astronomers. 
Ancient stargazers observed that the motions of heavenly bodies were periodic, and they 
consequently proposed cyclical, rather than linear, temporal theories ranging from the 
idea of endlessly recurring worlds to metempsychosis.  In stark comparison to these ideas, 15
Christian time looked firmly towards the future: 
 While the Greeks, fascinated by the past and its endless cyclical repetition, denied  
 the future a meaningful dimension of its own, Hebrews and Christians made the  
 significance of both past and present, conditioned by promise and expectation,   
 dependent for their meaning largely on the future.  16
 People were always mindful of the future and thus viewed their actions in life 
under the perpetual shadow of the Final Judgement. In a study of attitudes towards death 
in the Renaissance, Alberto Tenenti argues that from the 14th century onwards, most 
Christian Europeans of all sects became even more preoccupied with the degeneration of 
 Stephen E. Toulmin & June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 76.12
 See also Giordano Bruno, Des fureurs héroïques, ed. by Miguel A. Granada (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999); Dario 13
Tessicini, I dintorni dell’inﬁnito: Giordano Bruno e l’astronomia del cinquecento (Pisa: F. Serra, 2007). This raised 
awkward questions over the validity of Aristotelian cosmology, see Hill, p. 31.
 Georges Matoré, ‘Le temps au XVIe siècle’, L’Information Grammaticale, 32 (1987), pp.  3-8 (p. 5). See also Ricardo J. 14
Quinones, The Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), Chapter 6 
‘Montaigne’: ‘For the Christian Middle Ages, “Everything in the world was an effect of something beyond the world; 
everything in life was a step to something beyond life”’ (p. 205).
 Please see Hill, Chapter 6 ‘Chronos and Kairos’; Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in 15
Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), Chapter 12 ‘Fear of death and Endless 
recurrence’; Pietro Redondi, Storie del tempo (Rome: Laterza, 2007), Parte Prima ‘Natura e cultura del tempo; G.J. 
Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), ‘The Origins of Time’. See also Chapter 
Three, ‘Eternity in the 16th century’. 
 Hill, p. 75.16
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the body and their possible salvation in the next life. How to live morally in order to reach 
Heaven became a pressing question (although the general answer was always virtuously 
i.e., in accordance with Christian doctrine).  Arguably any horror surrounding the actual 17
death of the body was undermined since Christians also believed in the soul’s eternal 
existence. Indeed, in light of Christian linear time, the idea of death as annihilation that 
Richard Sorabji associates with both classical philosophers and a modern, secular society 
disappears: ‘the horror which some people feel just at the thought that they may exist no 
more’.  Christian notions of time certainly inspired fear, but this was a fear stemming 18
largely from the idea that an individual’s sins may lead to an eternal Afterlife of fire and 
brimstone.   19
 Interestingly, Montaigne’s commitment to the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul has been seriously thrown into question within the last few decades. Ian Maclean 
emphasises that Montaigne insists on the importance of the body to the self, an idea 
which is clearly at odds with Platonism and instead links Montaigne more closely to 
Aristotelian hylomorphism.  In her recent essay ‘Montaigne’s Soul’, Felicity Green 20
demonstrates the true complexity of this issue in the Essais with reference to Montaigne’s 
annotations of Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Green suggests that for Lucretius, the soul 
was susceptible to physical disorders and was thus a material entity; Montaigne 
highlighted this assessment in the margins of his copy.  While his rejection of the soul’s 21
immortality is not entirely clear, he was certainly interested in theories that were 
incompatible with Christian theology. 
 Modern scholars have also displayed a continued interest in 16th-century practices 
related to death and the future. In the 1500s, Europeans died more often from minor 
 Alberto Tenenti, Il senso della morte e l’amore della vita nel Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1957), p. 73. See also 17
Quinones, Discovery of Time, Chapter One - ‘The Setting’ for idleness as a Christian sin and the importance of acting in 
response to the future. In Malcolm Bull, Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), Bull 
emphasises the link between impending apocalypse and the need for early modern peoples to repent: ‘For them, like 
their precursors in almost every century of the Christian era, each newsworthy development is a portent of the end 
giving fresh urgency to the call for repentance’ (p. 4).
 Sorabji, p. 174.18
 See also Conche, p. 9; Michel Jeanneret, Perpetual Motion. Transforming Shapes in the Renaissance from Da Vinci to 19
Montaigne, trans. by Nidra Poller (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), ‘Du Bartas’ for an interesting 
discussion on Christian time and the early modern philosophies that conflicted with this.
 Ian Maclean, Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), p. 70.20
 Felicity Green, ‘Montaigne’s Soul’, in Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture, ed. by Brian Cummings & 21
Freya Sierhuis (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 99-112 (p. 106). In a B text addition to the ‘Apologie’ (II.XII), Montaigne 
includes a quotation from Lucretius ‘that makes the inference from the soul’s corporeal subjection to its corporeal 
nature plain’ (p. 106). Green also highlights passages from ‘De l’aage’ (I.LVII) in which Montaigne again quotes 
Lucretius ‘to the effect that the powers of the soul decline with the passing of years, alongside those of the body’ (p. 
107).
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illnesses, usually with little warning. Philippe Ariès claims that the early modern period 
was a time when even the slightest illness could kill somebody within days.  In his 22
seminal study of historical attitudes towards death, Ariès argues that it was normal for the 
living to ‘coexist’ with the dead in the Renaissance due to certain cultural practices 
surrounding death. For example, the growing fashion amongst European nobility for 
picking out and choosing grand-looking sepultures, and constructing graves that 
emulated the dead, assimilated the average 16th-century individual to the physical 
embodiment of death (such graves would be on display inside churches for all to see). 
Indeed, Montaigne refers favourably to this practice in the Essais; in ‘Nos affections 
s’emportent au delà de nous’ (I.III) he praises those people who take the time to prepare 
their sepultures - such preparations allow them to confront fear of death, since they can 
‘voir en marbre leur morte contenance’ (I.III.52); in other words they should grow 
accustomed to looking upon a physical rendering of their death without becoming 
anxious. Furthermore, poorly-constructed mass graves for peasants were a common sight 
outside church buildings across Europe:  
 Le spectacle des morts, dont les os affleuraient à la surface des cimetières, comme  
 le crâne de Hamlet, n’impressionnait pas plus les vivant que l’idée de leur propre  
 mort. Ils étaient aussi familiers avec les morts que familiarisés avec leur mort.  23
 Death and decay were highly visible in everyday life, and modern scholars have 
used these examples to suggest that in the Renaissance, people were more familiarised 
(familiarisés) to the idea of death.  This view is particularly popular amongst art 24
historians; in what has been described as a distinct break with the Medieval period, 
Renaissance art revealed a direct equivocation of the individual’s future with death. 
Simona Cohen argues that it was only after the Black Death had wrought deadly havoc 
across Europe in the 14th century that artists reflected a changing interest in images of the 
 Philippe Ariès, Essais sur l’histoire de la mort en Occident du Moyen Age à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 180. In ‘La 22
mort inversée’ Ariès explains how and why sudden death was more common in the 15th and 16th centuries. For a more 
recent study on sudden death in the early modern period see Maria Pia Donato, Sudden Death: Medicine and Religion 
in Eighteenth-Century Rome, trans. by Valentina Mazzei (London: Routledge, 2016). 
 Ariès, p. 35.23
 See Albert Ahmeti, De la peinture du temps dans les ‘Essais’ de Montaigne (Paris: Books On Demand, 2014). Ahmeti 24
has suggested a break with time in the Middle Ages, and argues that the Wars of Religion contributed to a sense that ‘la 
vie humaine est perçue, plus que jamais, dans toute sa fragilité’ (‘Introduction’). If humans in the Middle Ages 
considered themselves beings that endured, then ‘le chrétien du 16ème siècle “sentait …le caractère précaire et fugitif de 
chaque moment vécu”’ (‘Introduction’). This hypothesis still only suggests a heightened awareness of the fragility of life 
rather than a fearful response to it.
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decaying body alongside the living.  One example of this phenomenon is the so-called 25
‘transi-tomb’ in which the decaying corpse of the deceased contrasts with his or her living 
effigy on the same tomb. Again, funerary practices rendered death an increasingly visible 
concept and contributed to a heightened association between an individual’s future and 
the death of the body: ‘the sense of temporal passage was inevitably linked to the idea of 
death and, whether the approach was mystical, religious or epicurean, the association was 
ostensible’.  Many critics consider future time and death as inevitably becoming 26
confused with each other in the early modern period. Whitrow states that time, rather 
than death, was often depicted by a particularly morbid iconography involving time the 
destroyer with its hour-glass, scythe or sickle; in fact the sickle was a popular attribute of 
both death and time.  While philosophical and theological interest in the body was 27
comparatively low compared to the soul, it is clear that the reality of life in the 1500s led to 
an open acknowledgement of human mortality which was underpinned by certain 
cultural and funerary practices. 
 Neither Montaigne nor Bruno appears to seriously engage with either of the 
critical trends above in their approach to the future. For example, Bruno mentions fear in 
relation to death more than any other concept; in De la causa, principio e uno (1584), the 
term morte appears only 11 times, but 7 of those occurrences relate to fear of death. The 
other examples discuss death in relation to substance and matter, and once again it is the 
unconventional nature of his theories that not only leads him away from the religious 
ideas of the future identified above but often to actively reject them. In the Essais a similar 
tendency occurs, in which Montaigne appears to be much more interested in classical 
responses to death, and how practical philosophical advice can be in this regard, rather 
than focusing on theological considerations which - as I will further demonstrate in 
Chapter Three - he prefers to avoid altogether. Thus religious time bears much less on 
Montaigne’s discussions of death than one might imagine, despite Montaigne identifying 
as a member of the Catholic faith.   28
 Simona Cohen, Transformations of Time and Temporality in Medieval and Renaissance Art, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p.25
85.
 Cohen, p. 85.26
 Whitrow, Time in History, p. 132. See also Cohen, p. 79.27
 On Montaigne’s Catholicism see Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. by M.A. Screech (London: 28
Penguin, 2003), pp. xxx-xxxix; Michel de Montaigne, Essais, ed. by Alexandre Micha (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), p. 22; 
Ullrich Langer, ‘Montaigne’s political and religious context’ in Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, ed. by Ullrich 
Langer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 9-26. Kenny briefly mentions the issue of Catholicism in 
the Essais as ‘the religious question upon which the Essais remains elusive’ (p. 247). 
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 Why were they less influenced by the cultural and religious practices of their age 
in this respect? Neil Kenny is one of the few recent critics to elucidate the true 
complexities of attitudes towards the future in the early modern period, with a more 
nuanced view in Death and Tenses: Posthumous Presence in Early Modern France 
(2015).  In his chapter on Montaigne, Kenny acknowledges that many different 29
conceptions of time were floating about that were not solely attached to theological 
concerns, due to ‘a war-torn, late humanist culture that was saturated in various Christian 
and non-Christian understandings of posthumous survival’.  Here Kenny is discussing 30
ideas of the future centring around posthumous existence and he alludes to a growing 
‘experimentation’ with such ideas. Similarly, J.K. Barret responds to what she considers to 
be the same conventional descriptions of 16th-century futures by claiming that early 
modern literature ‘regularly and notoriously manipulates linear time’.  In light of these 31
recent views, I wish to examine experimental conceptions of the future that were closely 
linked both to Bruno’s unique philosophy and Montaigne’s attempts to write himself 
over time. 
 This section examines a range of source material from both authors. Even a 
cursory glance at Bruno’s references to fear of death reveal a continual interest in this 
phenomenon. It is mentioned frequently across many of the Italian dialogues and 
beyond; thus I examine passages from several of his works including De la causa, De 
l’inﬁnito, universo e mondi (1584) and Spaccio de la bestia trionfante (1584). The first two 
texts are particularly well-known for developing Bruno’s monism; in both De la causa and 
particularly De l’inﬁnito, Bruno expounds the physical and cosmological structure of the 
infinite universe that was introduced in the Cena de le Ceneri. Throughout these texts, 
Bruno continues his invective against Aristotle and instead adapts pre-Socratic theories 
that he claims to have ‘renewed’ with his philosophy. The idea of renewal also features 
heavily in the Spaccio with Bruno’s criticism of religion and his desire to restore older, i.e. 
pre-Christian values onto civilisation.  It would appear that the overall aim of these texts 32
has little to do with future time, or fear of death for that matter. Yet Bruno’s conception 
 Neil Kenny, Death and Tenses: Posthumous Presence in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29
2015). See also Françoise Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps (Paris: Nizet, 1972), p. 123 for Joukovsky’s claims 
regarding the contradictory views on death in Montaigne’s age.
 Neil Kenny, An Introduction to Sixteenth-Century French Literature and Thought: Other Times, Other Places 30
(London: Duckworth, 2008), p. 231.
 Barret, p. 4.31
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane, 2 vols, ed. by Nuccio Ordine (Turin, UTET 2002). ‘Le dottrine di Aristotele e i 32
princìpi del cristianesimo hanno spezzato il rapporto autentico tra l’umanità e la vita, tra gli esseri viventi e la natura. Un 
rapporto, invece, che era stato salvaguardato dalle teorie presocratiche, dalla “antiqua vera filosofia”’ (p. 75).
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of time is heavily engrained within his philosophy on the unity of matter, and as a result, 
he envisions a radically different future laid out before him. Montaigne’s method of 
drawing on a mixture of preferred classical sources, historical examples, and personal 
experience yields fascinating experiments with the natural order of time attributed to the 
body. In this chapter, Montaigne the Catholic is conspicuously absent, and instead this 
thesis concerns itself with the conclusions that he reaches through his memories (‘De 
l’exercitation’ II.VI) and his assessment of classical sources. Employing a range of excerpts 
from the first volume (‘De la peur’ (I.XVIII), ‘Que philosopher’ (I.XX)) to the third 
volume (‘De la Phisionomie’ (III.XII)), I show how fear of death, and subsequently the 
future, acquire new meanings that do not correlate to Christian conceptions of time and 
instead engage further with the natural order of time.   33
Rethinking the Future 
Bruno, death and the future 
 In Chapter One I stated that death holds little interest for Bruno. And yet, at the 
same time, he is clearly fascinated by the anxiety that death inspires. Rather than being an 
insignificant response to the future, across Bruno’s works ‘il cieco spavento de la 
morte’ (Spaccio II.386) is in fact a major time-related concern. Death is one of two 
elements in the future that one would fear in a sonnet at the start of De l’inﬁnito, a text 
which repeatedly links fear with death: ‘E chi mi impenna, e chi mi scald’il core?/Chi non 
mi fa temer fortuna o morte?’ (Inﬁnito II.31).  Moreover, in nearly every instance in 34
which death appears in the Spaccio, words that express terror, horror or fear are also 
present. Mercurio worries that to human beings, he and the other gods may become ‘più 
abominati che la morte’ (Spaccio II.238); amongst the constellations, ‘la Lepre’ (the hare) 
is included as ‘tipo del timore per la Contemplazion de la morte’ (Spaccio II.385-386). 
Bruno blurs the division between the two concepts when he lists death alongside three 
emotions related to fear and torment: ‘quai sono Oppressione, Usurpazione, Dolore, 
Tormento, Timore e Morte’ (Spaccio II.319) - death is presented as an emotion and not a 
significant temporal state in its own right, an approach that already begins to undermine 
 In this chapter I mention ‘Christian time’ on several occasions despite having discussed the fractured state of 33
Christianity in the late 16th century. In doing so I refer back to the discussion in ‘Context: 16th Century Futures’ 
concerning Christian notions of end-time, which were not as polemical in the late 1500s. However, I will be careful to 
differentiate between the views of 16th-century branches of Christianity where appropriate. 
 See also Bruno, Opere Italiane. Jean Seidengart notes that sections of the sonnet are partially repeated in the Eroici 34
Furori and ‘i concetti che esprime saranno ripresi in De immenso’ (p. 31).
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the reality of death itself. Rather than time and death becoming confused in the 16th 
century, for Bruno it is fear and death that have overlapped. Furthermore, the interlocutor 
Saulino states that fear of death or the ‘importuno terror de la morte’ afflicts human 
beings as soon they have ‘uso di sensi’, i.e. as soon as humans possess a consciousness of 
the future then death tyrannises ‘il spirto de gli animanti’.  
 This mental anguish is only exacerbated by our complete lack of control over 
time. The second verse of the De l’inﬁnito sonnet above refers to time and the chronology 
into which humans divide it: ‘L’etadi, gli anni, i mesi, i giorni e l’ore’ are the ‘figlie et armi 
del tempo’ (Inﬁnito II.31). Time is ‘quella corte/a cui né ferro né diamante è 
forte’ (Inﬁnito II.31) - in other words, humans are unable to control it and can only 
measure its passing in years, hours, and months. For obvious reasons, the natural order of 
time dictates that fear of death is even more acute amongst the elderly, who have already 
observed the passing of many such years. In a passage from the Spaccio, Saulino directly 
equates ‘la matura etade’ with feelings of ‘tristizia e dolor’; admittedly time and death are 
bound together more closely when Jove express concerns about what he does with the rest 
of his life before old age - and by extension, death - takes him away: ‘la senettute e la morte 
prima mi tolga’ (Spaccio II.312); ‘la vecchiaia e morte’ (Spaccio II.312).  Bruno is interested 35
in fear of death as a response to the future, but he emphasises its connection to our 
inability to halt the ‘figlie et armi del tempo’ rather than portraying it as an emotion 
inherently related to Christian ideas of fire and brimstone in the Afterlife. 
 At first glance, these observations are not particularly radical. Yet Bruno 
persistently returns to fear of death in his works, and he arguably does so in order to 
strengthen the validity of his unique philosophy. In particular, Bruno is extremely 
concerned about why people fear death. He portrays this response to the future as being 
widespread because he believes that it exists in the mind of anyone who does not follow 
the ‘unica vera filosofia’, i.e. his philosophy. Bruno strengthens the validity of his theories 
by depicting himself as free from anxiety over death, while continually linking fear of 
death to anyone who does not accept his philosophical stance regarding substance, form 
and matter. In fact, it will become clear that death holds little interest for Bruno because 
he flatly denies that it affects either body or soul. In some cases, he aggressively rejects 
more conventional 16th-century conceptions of time as suitable remedies for fear of death 
and instead draws on a combination of pre-Socratic sources, his theories on vicissitude 
 The reference to ‘la senettute’ draws on the original Latin name of Cicero’s text De senectute (On Old Age).35
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and even Nature itself in order to convey a very different idea of the future which destroys 
the entire concept of death. 
 Contrary to the critical trends discussed in ‘Context: 16th-Century Futures’, 
Bruno proposes that people are only fearful of the future either because they believe in a 
flawed philosophy or an equally flawed religion (or both). Bruno’s curiosity with fear of 
death stems directly from his theories concerning matter, which run counter to 16th-
century Scholasticism; in turn, this curiosity becomes a way of separating Bruno’s ‘true’ 
philosophy from the views of those who follow Aristotle. Bruno devotes a fairly short yet 
illuminating chapter to discussing death in one of his Latin works - although it was 
published a couple of years after the Italian dialogues, it is a useful starting point since it 
gathers together many of his comments on fear of death across the Italian works into one 
place. The third chapter of the first of five books comprising De triplici minimo et 
mensura is entitled ‘Da quanto stiamo per dire, si potrà concludere che la morte non 
riguarda la sostanza corporea e tanto meno l’anima’.  As we saw briefly in Chapter One, 36
according to Bruno’s philosophy concerning substance, matter and form, death is not 
something that affects the soul. In De triplici minimo he goes even further and argues that 
it does not pertain to the ‘sostanza corporea’ of the body either. Furthermore, the 
continued existence of the soul is not due to a Platonising-Christian belief in the 
immortality of the soul, rather Bruno attributes this phenomenon to vicissitude and its 
constant renewal of matter. He states that matter never truly ‘dies’, it merely mutates into 
a different form: ‘la stessa materia…muta variamente nel tempo’.  Thus writing on fear of 37
death, Bruno belittles it: 
 Se considererai ciò che è composto di parti come espressione della vera sostanza,  
 allora stoltamente temerai le minacce della morte e il fato, ignorando le sante   
 parole del filosofo di Samo, tremerai dinanzi alle parole degli sciocchi e i deliri del  
 volgo ti incuteranno un fatale terrore.  38
 Bruno holds Aristotle’s theory of matter - beholden by the Scholastics of his age - 
to account for the ‘fatale terrore’ that death inspires since it proposes that substance is 
corruptible. As Dario Tessicini and other Bruno scholars have previously identified, it is 
this ‘credenza nella corruzione delle sostanza particolari’ that Bruno blames for fear of 
death; if substance is ‘ciò che è composto di parti’ then of course it will inspire fear, since 
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Latine, trans. by Carlo Monti (Turin: UTET, 2013), p. 77.36
 Ibid.37
 Ibid.38
'91
all of the parts of substance will eventually corrode and nothing will be left over.  Instead, 39
in the Latin works Bruno delineates his version of atomism in more detail.  The 40
‘minimo’ of the work’s title - De triplici minimo et mensura - is a philosophical term 
roughly equivalent to what modern science would refer to as an atom i.e., it is the smallest 
part of substance, and one that cannot be destroyed: ‘è una sostanza che il potere della 
natura non può affatto disgregare’.  Therefore one can never really be said to have ‘died’ 41
in the broader Christian sense since both body and soul continue to be renewed.  
 Although ancient atomic theories were not unheard of in the 16th century, 
Bruno’s ‘atomistic conception of matter’ was a radical and direct response to Christian 
and Aristotelian traditions.  Note that stoltamente the reader will fear the ‘minacce della 42
morte’ if they continue to adhere to Scholastic philosophy, i.e. the ‘parole degli sciocchi’ - 
such beliefs will only continue to provoke ‘fatale terrore’ at the thought of death. On the 
other hand, Bruno deliberately separates himself not only from the Scholastics but also 
his readers by addressing them directly using ‘tu’ forms of the verb, e.g. ‘considererai’, 
‘tremerai’. He is naturally eager to distance himself from fear of death since it is a 
symptom of people who do not follow the ‘vera filosofia’, and as such his use of pronouns 
and verb forms is deliberately divisive. Indeed, throughout this section, it will be noted 
that Bruno continuously employs the third-person plural form of the verb, i.e. ‘temeno’, 
‘se fanno’, ‘prendeno’. The idea that it is those people who do not follow the ‘true 
philosophy’ who suffer from fear of death appears again in De l’inﬁnito: ‘…e massime 
temeno il morire coloro, che non han lume di filosofia vera, e non apprendeno altro esser 
ch’il presente, e pensano che non possa succedere altro che appartegna a essi’ (Inﬁnito II.
125). Ironically, Bruno suggests here that those who fear death are too focused on the 
reality of the present moment and possess no real understanding about what happens 
after body and soul undergo vicissitude. 
 Dario Tessicini, ‘“Attoniti […] quia sic Stagyrita docebat”. Bruno in polemica con Digges’, Bruniana & 39
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Hermann, 1962), Chapter 5 ‘La matière’ and Giordano Bruno, De la cause, du principe et de l’un, ed. by Giovanni 
Aquilecchia, Thomas Leinkauf & Zaira Sorrenti, trans. by Luc Hersant (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2016), ‘Introduction’. 
 Please see Hilary Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), Chapter 3 40
‘Bruno and the new atomism’; Stephen Clucas, ‘“The Infinite Variety of Formes and Magnitudes”: 16th- and 17th-
Century English Corpuscular Philosophy and Aristotelian Theories of Matter and Form’, Early Science and Medicine, 
2.3 (1997), pp. 251-271 (pp. 253-254); Jeanneret, ‘Du Bartas’ on French Renaissance atomism; Enrico Giannetto, 
‘Giordano Bruno and the Relativity of Time’, in Turning Traditions Upside Down: Rethinking Giordano Bruno’s 
Enlightenment, ed. by Henning Hufnagel & Anne Eusterschulte (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 
pp. 121-130.
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Latine, trans. by Carlo Monti (Turin: UTET, 2013), p. 78.41
 Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, p. 70. 42
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 In the Spaccio, an allegorical text which was intended as a polemic against 
Protestantism,  Bruno repeats his conviction that fear of death is linked to the wrong kind 
of thought, this time regarding religion and faith. ‘[…] Il cieco Spavento de la morte’ is a 
‘falsa suspettazione’ that ‘la stolta Fede et orba Credulitade parturisce, nutrisce et allieva…’ 
(Spaccio II.386). Again ‘spavento de la morte’ is a problem that other people suffer from, 
and again Bruno labels it foolish. However, in this example Bruno accuses ‘la stolta Fede’ 
of feeding off this fear. Fear of death is ‘blind’ and can’t see ahead (‘cieco’ is an adjective 
Bruno often uses to talk about not seeing the truth). In a direct attack on religious faith, 
Bruno criticises wider Christian conceptions of time as ‘falsi pensieri’, holding them 
directly responsible for the idea of death as something to be feared. Instead, drawing 
heavily on passages from Averroes’ commentaries of Aristotle’s Physics, Bruno aligns the 
truth of nature, not the teachings of religion, with moral goodness; the road to human 
perfection and self-improvement ‘consiste nella conformità della natura superiore e non 
errante’ (Spaccio II.386). His criticism is also apparent in the epistola dedicatoria of the De 
l’inﬁnito, with an overtly sacrilegious passage that completely dismantles the accepted 
eschatological timeline in place in the 16th century: 
  
 Non temiamo che quello che è accumulato in questo mondo, per la vehemenza di  
 qualche spirto errante, o per il degno di qualche fulmineo Giove, si disperga fuor  
 di questa tomba o cupola del cielo, o si scuota et effluisca come in polvere fuor di  
 questo manto stellifero.  (Inﬁnito II.26) 
 The ‘cupola del cielo’ and ‘manto stellifero’ clearly refer to the closed, finite 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology of the 16th century. Of course, Bruno’s theories 
completely dismantled this dated system, which relies on the existence of a supercelestial 
realm.  Bruno discards this cosmology and states that human beings should not be 43
concerned about their actions ‘in questo mondo’, because there is no heavenly existence 
outside of the ‘cupola del cielo’ - therefore it is impossible for any soul or ‘spirto errante’ 
to survive death and transport itself outside ‘questo manto stellifero’, since within 
Bruno’s universe ‘non sono fini, termini, margini, muraglia’ (Inﬁnito II.26). He 
demonstrates here that as well as a spatially infinite universe or ‘infinito spacio’, his 
universe is temporally infinite too; in this passage, Bruno’s cosmology more closely 
resembles the opinions of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, ‘che vogliono tutto per 
infinito rinovarsi e restituirsi’ (Inﬁnito II.26). In both spatial and temporal terms, Bruno’s 
 Sergius Kodera, ‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, Literary Self-43
Fashioning and De revolutionibus orbium coelestium’, in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern Transformations of 
the Scientist and his Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn & Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 229-250 (p. 
238). 
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‘vera filosofia’ postulates an infinite universe, and this lies in complete opposition to 
acceptable religious doctrine.  In his spatially infinite universe, there is simply no room 44
either physically or temporally for souls to travel to a heavenly Afterlife beyond the 
firmament. This idea runs counter to the general perception that people were imminently 
going to be judged on their actions in life and sorted into Heaven or Hell. Instead, the 
infinite universe is the realisation of all possible forms in both time and space. Since each 
part of the universe is subject to the vicissitude of forms, no part of it ‘dies’ and then 
transcends this process; instead, once matter dissolves it becomes part of another 
substance, and so on forever. 
 Bruno attacks Christian ideas of time, particularly the nature of death and the 
Afterlife, and instead he draws inspiration from pre-Christian sources for his radical 
reimagining of the future. As well as his interest in atomism and the philosophy of 
Lucretius,  the ‘filosofo di Samo’ from the quotation on page seventy-five above is 45
ostensibly a reference to Pythagoras of Samos (c.570 BC - c.500 BC), a source that Bruno 
will return to repeatedly when discussing fear of death.  In the Renaissance, Pythagoras 46
was part of ‘an ancient philosophical tradition alternative to Aristotle’ that embraced 
theories on the earth’s movement and heliocentrism.  Bruno makes several references to 47
Pythagoras in the Italian dialogues; he cites the Greek philosopher in several passages 
from De la causa that discuss Pythagoras’ views on the transmigration of the soul into 
different bodies.  Bruno often refers to a passage from Book XV of Ovid’s 48
Metamorphoses which examines Pythagoras’ teachings on metempsychosis; Numa 
Pompilius, a legendary King of Rome, learns about the nature of the universe directly 
from the great philosopher. I have included the most relevant passage in full: 
 Tessicini, I dintorni dell’inﬁnito, p. 144. See also Pasquale Sabbatino, A l’inﬁnito m’ergo: Giordano Bruno e il volo del 44
moderno Ulisse (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), ‘Il moderno Ulisse e la nascita de Amleto’; Eugenio Canone, ‘Bruno e la 
fine di tutte le cose. Sui motivi apocalittici dello “Spaccio”’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 2 (2004), pp. 269-282.
 ‘Lucretius announces the scope and aims of his poem: an account of the true “nature of things”, according to 45
Epicurean principles, capable of freeing human beings from the fear of death and of everlasting punishment. It is the 
common man’s ignorance concerning the soul, and specifically its materiality and mortality, that sustains “the 
superstitions and threatenings of priests” (religionibus atque minis…uatum)’ (Green, p. 102).
 See Tessicini, I dintorni dell’inﬁnito, pp. 24-42; Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: 46
Routledge, 1964) (p. 146, p. 185 & p. 350); Michael J.B. Allen, ‘Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance’, in A History of 
Pythagoreanism, ed. by Carl A. Huffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 435-453. 
 Dario Tessicini, ‘Giordano Bruno on Copernican Harmony, Circular Uniformity and Spiral Motions’, in Unifying 47
Heaven and Earth: Essays in the History of Early Modern Cosmology, ed. by Miguel A. Granada, Patrick J. Boner & 
Dario Tessicini (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2016), p. 145. 
 See also Sorabji, p. 189. 48
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 O people stunned with the icy terror of dying,/why do you fear the Styx? Why are 
 you frightened of phantoms/and names that mean nothing, the empty blabber of 
 poets,/foolish hobgoblins of a world that never existed?/Here is what happens   
 after you die: your body,/whether consumed on the pyre or slowly decaying,/  
 suffers no evil; souls cannot perish, and always,/on leaving their prior abodes, they 
 come to new ones,/living on, dwelling again in receptive bodies. […] Everything  
 changes and nothing can die, for the spirit/wanders wherever it wishes to, now   
 here and now there, living with whatever body it chooses, and passing/from feral  
 to human and then back from human to feral,/and at no time does it ever cease its 
 existence,/and just as soft wax easily takes on a new shape,/unable to stay as it was  
 or keep the same form,/and yet is still wax, I preach that the spirit is always/the   
 same even though it migrates to various bodies.  49
  
 The transmigration of souls was a distinctly cyclical phenomenon in which 
individual souls continuously passed from body to body. Bruno adapts metempsychosis 
described here to his atomic theories, and the influence on his philosophy of substance, 
form, and matter in the Italian dialogues is evident. Drawing on this passage from Ovid 
(and by extension, Pythagoras), the soul is arguably the substance and the body is just one 
of many ‘different forms’. Like many of his peers in the Renaissance, Bruno believes that 
the soul does not die - and yet in this case, neither does the body.  Both soul and body 50
exist in an infinite universe, undergoing an infinite number of different forms. The death 
of a human being - previously considered to be the one ‘certainty’ of the future - is 
impossible. Instead ‘everything changes, nothing dies’ - death is not possible because 
substance (consisting of the smallest part, the minimo) never dies: ‘e però né per sé né per 
accidente alcuno può esser detta morire; perché morte non è altro che divorzio de parti 
congionte nel posto’ (Causa II.181). Pythagoras believed that all matter flowed endlessly; 
this is the essence of Bruno’s vicissitudine, and it is only from ‘la cognizion de la vera 
forma’ (Causa I.599) i.e. knowledge of this philosophy that one may infer ‘la vera notizia 
di quel che sia vita, e di quel che sia morte’ (Causa I.599).  
 Bruno considers fear of death to be a symptom afflicting anyone who does not 
believe in the truth of what Pythagoras and by extension, he himself teaches about the 
cyclical nature of time. Bruno calmly accepts his transience because he flatly denies that 
death exists. A passage from De l’inﬁnito reads thus:  
 Ma mentre consideramo più profondamente l’essere e sustanza di quello in cui   
 siamo inmutabili, trovaremo non esser morte, non solo per noi, ma né per veruna  
 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. by Charles Martin (London: W.W. Norton, 2010), pp. 526-527.49
 See Quint, Origins and Originality, Chapter 5 ‘The Jordan Comes to England’ - Bruno goes against the ‘orthodox 50
tenet that the soul has only one body’ (p. 140);  for early modern context regarding metempsychosis see Malvern van 
Wyk Smith, ‘John Donne’s Metempsychosis’, The Review of English Studies, 24 (1973), pp. 141-152. 
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 sustanza: mentre nulla sustanzialmente si sminuisce, ma tutto per infinito spacio  
 discorrendo cangia il volto. (Inﬁnito II.26) 
 Moving from technical language to the more poetic, he plainly states that instead 
of dying, ‘tutto…cangia il volto.’ For Bruno, death is not a stepping stone that marks the 
soul’s transition into an uncertain Afterlife. Bruno believes that he knows what death 
entails - it is just another facet of mutation. This process will continue ‘per infinito spacio’ 
and thus - one must assume - for an infinite amount of time. Concerning vicissitude, 
Bruno says in the Cena that when we say something dies, ‘non doviamo tanto credere 
quella morire, quanto che la si muta, e cessa quella accidentale composizione e concordia, 
rimanendono le cose che quella incorreno, sempre inmortali’ (Cena I.513). This process is 
the essence of what Granada has also identified as Bruno’s infinite duration - although the 
separate parts of a whole are finite, the process that occurs to each separate part makes up 
a self-perpetuating whole.  
 Consequently, human beings are not only part of an infinite universe but also an 
infinitely enduring universe; they exist as part of something much bigger, not only 
spatially but temporally too. This leaves little room for elements of Christian time to 
thrive, since there is no room for the absolute death of the body and the soul’s journey to 
the Afterlife.  If one invests in Bruno’s philosophy, then the future ahead is far less 51
ominous - the cyclical nature of time that emerges here is one of repetition and renewal 
which ensures the continued survival of both the material body and the soul.  
 Furthermore, the Nolan reinforces the supposed truth of this philosophy by 
aligning it with the truth of Nature. In De la causa, Teofilo is criticising the Peripatetic 
mode of considering substance and matters. Once more, Bruno employs his literary 
mouthpiece Teofilo to argue that those who follow this philosophy are (unsurprisingly) 
scared of death: 
 onde non è maravaglia se fanno tanto, e prendeno tanto spavento per la morte e  
 dissoluzione: come quelli a’ quali è imminente la iattura [disgrazia, danno] de   
 M.A. Granada, ‘El concepto de tiempo en Bruno: tiempos cósmicos y eternidad’, in La ﬁlosoﬁa di Giordano Bruno: 51
Problemi ermeneutici e storiograﬁci, ed. by Eugenio Canone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2003), pp. 85-113. ‘In this sense, we 
may say that in Bruno’s works we are witnessing a conscious “de-Christianisation and de-eschatologisation of the 
universe” which is achieved by establishing its eternity’ (p. 88). Translation own. Original Spanish quotation as follows: 
‘En este sentido, creemos que se puede decir que en Bruno asistimos a una consciente “descristianización y 
desescatologización del universo” llevada a cabo mediante el establecimiento de la eternidad del mismo’. See also 
Granada, Fureurs héroïques: ‘Par la suite le De la causa, principio e uno établissait le fondement ontologique de la 
cosmologie infinitiste de Bruno: l’unité de la substance infinie, qui permet de rejeter comme une illusion infantile la 
crainte de la mort qui - à partier de la conception aristotélicienne erronée de la substance comme composé 
hylémorphique individuel, sujet de la génération et de la corruption - avait servi de base à l’erreur chrétienne, au 
triomphe historique de la foi dans le Christ comme voi unique et garant unique du triomphe sur la mort’ (pp. xlviii-
xlix).
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 l’essere. Contra la qual pazzia crida ad alte voci la natura, assicurandoci che non gli  
 corpi né l’anima deve temer la morte, perché tanto la materia quanto la forma   
 sono principii constantissimi. (Causa I.664-665) 
 Bruno now positions his philosophy on the side of Nature, which he believes is 
crying out  - ‘crida ad alte voci’ - the same truth as Pythagoras’ teachings, i.e. that neither 
the body nor the soul can truly be said to die. Now even Nature is pitted against the 
pazzia of a philosophy which denies that matter and form are ‘principii constantissimi’. 
In the Cena de le Ceneri Nundinio, one of the Oxford scholars, is scolded by the Nolan 
for laughing at these ideas. The idea that body and soul do not die at all but rather ‘change 
form’ is ridiculous to Christian-Scholastic thinkers. The Cena’s dialogical form allows 
Bruno to present an opinion he disagrees with before the other characters argue against 
this position and undermine its credibility. In this case, Nundinio’s response appears to 
confirm that precise notions of future time were firmly embedded in 16th-century culture, 
shaped by the Christian idea of the soul’s survival compared to the destruction of the 
body. On the other hand Smitho, the Nolan’s ally, twice refers to the findings of this 
dialogue as ‘secreti della natura’ that were previously held under lock and key, 
emphasising the innovation of Bruno’s theories and their break with tradition.  
 In a twist of irony, Bruno’s original philosophy is responsible for restoring the 
truth of Nature. Nuccio Ordine claims that Bruno’s achievement across the De la causa 
was to promote a monism which liberated matter from form.  He then argues that this 52
change to the notion of matter is a central tenet of Brunian views of Nature: ‘Il De la 
causa, insomma, punta sopratutto a restituire alla “materia” una dignità che le era stata 
negata da Aristotele’.  Whereas the Scholastics believe that all matter is made up of 53
corruptible parts, Bruno puts forward an atomistic theory that emphasises the infinite 
duration of matter. I believe that this has important repercussions for Bruno’s 
understanding of the future. Bruno - influenced by Pythagoras - throws into question 
whether the death of the body and the soul is even real while rejecting Christian linear 
time in favour of a vicissitudinal time that aligns with metempsychosis and consequently 
has more in common with so-called Hellenic time.  54
 Ordine, p. 77. ‘[Bruno] arriva a ridurre il dualismo in monismo, liberando la materia dalla schiavitù della forma’ (p. 52
77). 
 Ibid., p. 79.53
 For a detailed examination of Bruno’s adoption of Pythagoras see Hilary Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance 54
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), Chapter One, ‘“The Pythagorean School and Our Own”: Bruno and 
the Philosopher from Samos’. 
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 However, the Bible remains a source of inspiration for Bruno despite his 
refutation of Scholastic philosophy and Christian theology. In particular, Bruno’s cyclical 
conception of time is cemented by another repeated reference - this time to a Biblical 
verse. The verse appears in Ecclesiastes, and Bruno attributes it to Solomon, ‘che dice non 
esser cosa nova sotto il sole: ma quel che è fu già prima’ (Causa I.729).  The full Bible 55
verse reads: ‘What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is 
nothing new under the sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Much like his appropriation of Ovid, this is 
a verse that clearly influenced Bruno’s perception of time; in fact, in the De la causa, 
Bruno repeats this dictum directly after quoting from chapter XV of the Metamorphoses: 
‘Conforme a questo mi par che dica il sapientissimo stimato tra gli Ebrei Salomone: 
“Quid est quod est? ipsum quod fuit. Quid est quod fuit? ipsum quod est. Nihil sub sole 
novum”’ (Causa I.665). However, although it is a Biblical phrase, unlike traditional 
conceptions of Christian time it is a distinctly cyclical phenomenon, more akin to 
Hellenic ideas of time.  Nothing can be new since everything has already been before, the 56
same substance reforms an endless amount of times. Nicola Badaloni points out that 
within this idea of time the present will also be the future: ‘mentre lo erit si riferisce ora a 
un presente che sarà anche futuro’.  I would argue further and suggest that within the 57
reality of infinite duration, all of the traditional tenses of past, present and future will 
eventually become one another. Bruno finds a great degree of comfort in this idea: ‘cossì 
tutto concorre in una perfetta unità’ (Causa I.730), there is a neatness to time, a rhythm 
that cannot be disturbed: ‘questa unità è sola e stabile, e sempre rimane’ (Causa I.730). 
Instead of fire and brimstone, life after death is repetitive and thus familiar.  Relating to 58
the discussion from Chapter One, linear Christian time has arguably been replaced by 
Bruno’s image of the ‘ruota del tempo’ spinning endlessly on its axis.   59
 See Nicola Badaloni, ‘Sulla struttura del tempo in Giordano Bruno’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 3.1 (1997), pp. 11-45. 55
Badaloni states that Bruno confusedly attributes the ‘nihil sub sole novum’ to both the book of Solomon and also 
Pythagoras throughout his works.
 See the discussion of the ciclo del tempo in Chapter One, ‘Bruno, vicissitude and death’; also Sorabji, pp. 182-183 for 56
pre-Socratic (including Pythagorean) views on cyclical time and Ordine, p. 75 for a discussion of Bruno’s renewal of pre-
Socratic sources. 
 Badaloni, p. 13. 57
 ‘Questa trasfigurazione del passo scritturale spiega, perché il Nolano tragga dal motto la conseguenza che non si debba 58
temere la morte, intesa come futuro ultrasensibile, raccordandosi così al classico tema, presentato immediatamente 
prima da Teofilo, della irragionevolezza della paura della morte’ (Ibid., p. 12).
 ‘…dove il moto concorre con la quiete, atteso che nel moto orbiculare sopra il proprio asse e circa il proprio mezzo si 59
comprende la quiete e fermezza secondo il moto retto: over quiete del tutto, e moto secondo le parti; e da le parti che si 
muoveno in circolo si apprendeno due differenze di lazione, in quanto che successivamente altre parti montano alla 
sommità, altre dalla sommità descendono al basso; altre ottengono le differenze medianti, altre tengono l’estremo 
dell’alto e del fondo’ (II.661). 
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 Throughout the discussion above, there is quite literally no space in Bruno’s 
philosophy for Christian end-times. Instead, the physical and cosmological structure of 
the universe expounded in the Italian dialogues is infinite in both time and space.  60
Furthermore, if Bruno is ‘desensitised’ to death, then this is because he does not believe 
death can be said to exist at all. Instead, the certainty of death is replaced by the certainty 
of vicissitude, to such an extent that the future holds little mystique for Bruno. In light of 
Kenny’s hypothesis, we have begun to witness the true complexity of responses to time in 
the 16th century. In this case, Bruno puts forth an understanding of the future that has 
been shaped by a range of classical sources, particularly the work of the pre-Socratics, as 
well as certain Bible verses.  In De la causa, another description of the ‘sameness’ of time 61
emerges that simultaneously embraces all of the repeated references I have highlighted in 
this discussion. In this example Bruno draws on Pythagoras to emphasise his point: 
 Questo lo ha possuto intendere Pitagora, che non teme la morte ma aspetta la   
 mutazione: l’hanno possuto intendere tutti filosofi chiamati volgarmente fisici,   
 che niente dicono generarsi secondo sustanza né corrompersi: se non vogliamo   
 nominar in questo modo la alterazione; questo lo ha inteso Salomone, che dice   
 non esser cosa nova sotto il sole: ma quel che è fu già prima. (Causa I.729) 
 Like Pythagoras, Bruno is content to await the mutation of his body and soul 
rather than exhorting Christian moral action, sincere in the belief of his unique 
philosophy. The future has a different kind of certainty attributed to it, and one that 
Bruno can point to physically in the world around him - one of renewal, plain and simple. 
Life is one stage within the process of vicissitude: ‘non bisogna temere la morte, ma, come 
afferma Pitagora, attenderla come un momento di passaggio’.  Bruno renews ancient 62
Pythagorean theory and consequently the 16th century, Scholastic-Christian definition of 
death is unrecognisable within Bruno’s philosophy; his idea of time is one which favours a 
fullness that can only come with the continual renewal of matter rather than a linear 
perception that embraces death and then eternal Afterlife. Time resembles a more circular 
process because as Bruno states in the Candelaio, ‘il tempo tutto toglie tutto 
da’ (Candelaio I.263).  
 Granada, Fureurs héroïques, p. 1. Bruno describes ‘un univers corporel infini et homogène tant dans l’espace que dans 60
le temps (ce qui, sur le plan temporel, signifiait éternité et identité de l’univers, et excluait toute notion de fin du monde 
et de mutation eschatologique)’. 
 See Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, ‘Introduction’; Kodera, pp. 236-237; Elena Maria Severini, ‘Vicissitudine e 61
tempo nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno’, in La mente di Giordano Bruno, ed. by F. Meroi (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), 
pp. 225-258; Tessicini, ‘Attoniti…’, p. 523.
 Giordano Bruno, Opere Latine, trans. by Carlo Monti (Turin: UTET, 2013), p. 78. 62
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 The benefits of considering time in this manner clear the way for a different 
response to the future rather than fear. In one passage from the Furori Bruno is discussing 
those people who can look beyond the everyday and focus their energies on a higher plane 
of knowledge: 
 De quali alcune vituperosa, altre eroicamente fanno che non s’apprenda téma di  
 morte, non si soffrisca dolor di corpo, non si sentano impedimenti di piaceri:   
 onde la speranza, la gioia, e gli diletti del spirto superiore siano di tal sorte intenti,  
 che faccian spente le passioni tutte che possano  aver origine da dubbio, dolore e  
 tristezza alcuna. (Furori II.263) 
 This quotation is one of many passages in the Eroici Furori - Bruno’s final work in 
the series of Italian dialogues - that replaces death more precisely with a mingling with the 
divine, an idea I examine further in Chapter Three. In light of his firm belief in the truth 
of his philosophy, fear of death is also a waste of time and energy, and one who acts 
‘heroically’ can vanquish these things. Nevertheless, Bruno has already posed a challenge 
to the linear time outlined in Chapter One by replacing it with an idea of future time that 
appears to have more in common with Hellenic time. When we understand that he does 
not believe death exists and that there is no room in his theories for a conception of an 
Afterlife, then Christian end-time truly disappears, even though he occasionally draws on 
Christian source texts. Bruno claims this as the true face of Nature’s time - the natural 
order is circular, one of renewal, and one that should not be feared since there is ‘nothing 
new under the sun.’  
Montaigne, suicide and near-death experience 
 Bruno used fear of death as a platform to promote his philosophy and its unique 
reimagining of future time. Montaigne is equally fascinated by fear of death, albeit for 
different reasons. It is clear that death is a significant theme in the Essais - it is one aspect 
of time that takes up a great deal of Montaigne’s writing. The body was believed to house 
the soul and consequently the mind, which responds to time in different ways. Like 
Bruno, Montaigne understands that fear is one such response. In the Essais fear is marked 
out as a baffling emotion; in the aptly-named Chapter ‘De la peur’ (I.XVIII) fear is ‘une 
estrange passion’ (I.XVIII.75) and one that is particularly potent since it can severely 
impact on human judgement ‘hors de sa deue assiette’ (I.XVIII.75). Furthermore, fear 
exists in the mind but often manifests itself visibly through the body; Montaigne states 
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that ‘elle [la peur] engendre de terribles esblouissmens’ (I.XVIII.75), one of many 
quotations in his writing that describes how fear, and in particular fear of death, affects 
the body physically as well as mentally (Joukovsky has previously argued that fear of death 
in the Essais is not a Christian fear, rather it is ‘purement physique’).  ‘Que philosopher 63
c’est apprendre à mourir’ (I.XX) is one of Montaigne’s best-known chapters, and - as the 
title suggests - it provides some typical reflections on how fear of death affects human 
beings : 64
 Et par consequent, si elle nous faict peur, c’est un subject continuel de tourment,  
 et qui ne se peut aucunement soulager. Il n’est lieu d’où elle ne nous vienne; nous  
 pouvons tourner sans cesse la teste cà et là comme en pays suspect: quae quasi   
 saxum Tantalo semper impendet. (I.XX.83) 
 In ‘Que Philosopher’ Montaigne admits that, while fear can lead humans to 
‘mespriser la douleur, la pauvreté, et autres accidens à quoy la vie humaine est 
subjecte’ (I.XX.83), the quotation above describes the special torment that only death 
inspires: ‘il n’est lieu d’où elle ne nous vienne’ (I.XX.83). Montaigne suggests that death is 
the most frightening aspect of future time because, unlike most other things, it is an 
absolute certainty: ‘quant à la mort, elle est inevitable’ (I.XX.83). As with Bruno, fear of 
death stems from a realisation of human powerlessness in time rather than anxiety over 
sinning and going to Hell; as such it becomes impossible to ‘attendre patiemment la mort, 
quand elle nous vient’ (II.III.368). Equally, ‘nous pouvons tourner sans cesse la teste cà et 
là comme en pays suspect’ (I.XX.83), but unfortunately the ability to think (or not think) 
about death does not change its absolute certainty.  
 Fear of death is ‘pire de toutes les maladies, la plus soudaine, la plus douloureuse, 
la plus mortelle et la plus irremediable’ (II.XXXVII.760). And yet it is this word 
‘irremediable’ that arguably drives Montaigne’s purpose throughout this discussion - is 
fear of death really incurable? How does philosophy traditionally approach death? Can 
these answers be put to any practical use? Whereas Bruno believes that he offers a 
complete solution to fear of death with his radical philosophy, Montaigne challenges the 
advice of existing classical traditions, drawing on examples from Antiquity and 
combining them with personal experience in order to experiment with the natural order 
of time. Montaigne certainly came very close to death after falling from his horse, and in 
 Joukovsky, p. 245. 63
 See Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: 64
Gallimard, 2007), p. 1358 for further discussion on the significance of the chapter title in relation to Seneca’s Letters to 
Lucilius. 
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the process, he becomes another example of how to behave when faced with the 
possibility of death. Ultimately, Montaigne cannot deny the reality of death (in stark 
contrast with Bruno’s approach). However, he does provide a much greater degree of 
choice over time to human beings, influenced in part by classical traditions that were 
largely incompatible with Christian eschatology. In particular, suicide proves to be a 
continual fascination for Montaigne. It is an extreme act and a religious taboo, but one 
that undermines the seeming lack of choice that humans possess over their fate. 
Furthermore, Montaigne’s accident on the horse happened years before he began writing 
the Essais, but the incident that he recounts in ‘De l’exercitation’ discards the rigid natural 
order of time from Chapter One. In both cases, Montaigne rejects the body’s passivity and 
replaces it with an exploration of the extent to which humans might be able to overcome 
their mortality. 
 Like Bruno, Montaigne primarily embraces pre-Christian philosophies to make 
sense of fear of death.  That is not to say that thinkers in the Christian tradition lacked an 65
approach to death preparation. As Pierre Hadot has ably demonstrated, ever since the 
earliest days of Christendom the religion acted as a vessel for ancient philosophical 
approaches to mortality; this rich tradition of Christian philosophy and training for death 
continued well into the 17th century.  However, Montaigne usually quotes directly from 66
the philosophers of Antiquity. Mirroring Bruno and his favoured passages from the 
Metamorphoses, a common source that Montaigne returns to throughout the Essais 
comes in the form of the Stoic philosopher Seneca, whose meditatio mortis (meditation 
on death) would prove to be extremely useful to the French thinker. In ‘Du 
Pedantisme’ (I.XXV) it is Seneca that he names directly as his most important tool in 
combatting fear of death: ‘Me veus-je armer contre la crainte de la mort? c’est aux despens 
de Seneca’ (I.XXV.138). True to his word, in ‘De la Phisionomie’ (III.XII), Montaigne 
adopts a passage from Seneca’s Epistulae morales ad Lucilium (Letters to Lucilius), in 
which Seneca reproaches Lucilius for becoming too absorbed in the future at the expense 
of the present: ‘Que te sert il d’aller recueillant et prevenant ta male fortune, et de perdre 
le present par la crainte du futur? (III.XII.1050).  
 In stark contrast to the critical trends identified in ‘Context: 16th-Century 
Futures’, Montaigne repeats the claims of classical Stoicism that human beings avoid 
 For an introduction to the various classical traditions in the Essais see David Lewis Schaefer, ‘Montaigne and the 65
Classical Tradition’, International Journal of the Classical Tradition, 8.2 (2001), pp. 179-194. 
 See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson 66
and trans. by Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 
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practical preparations for death out of fear or anxiety. He argues that ‘nous nous 
preparons contre les preparations de la mort’ (III.XII.1051); ‘à la plus part la preparation à 
la mort a donné plus de tourment que n’a faict lea souffrance’ (III.XII.1051). Seneca 
decreed that often the fear of something bad occurring is worse than the ‘bad thing’ itself; 
‘Que le Goust des biens et des maux’ expresses this very same idea in both the title and its 
opening line: ‘Les hommes (dit une sentence Grecque ancienne) sont tourmentez par les 
opinions qu’ils ont des choses, non par les choses mesmes’ (I.XIV.50). Later in the ‘Isle de 
Cea’ Montaigne concurs that fear of death (i.e., fear of pain) is often worse than death 
itself: ‘c’est plustost l’impatience de l’imagination de la mort, qui nous rend impatiens de 
la douleur: et que nous la sentons doublement grieve, de ce qu’elle nous menace de 
mourir’ (II.III.264).  Similarly, in ‘Que Nostre Desir S’accroit par la Malaisance’ (II.XV), 67
Montaigne echoes this advice specifically in relation to death, employing a Latin phrase 
directly from the Epistulae morales: ‘In aequo est dolor amissae rei, et timor amittendae; 
voulant gaigner par là que la fruition de la vie ne nous peut estre vrayement plaisante, si 
nous sommes en crainte de la perdre' (II.XV.612). Fear of losing something and actually 
losing it are two sides of the same coin - fear of death can be as painful as death itself. 
Consequently, death may be considered in a positive light, as an escape from the torments 
of life: ‘Or cette mort que les uns appellent des choses horribles la plus horrible, qui ne 
sçait que d’autres la nomment l’unique port des tourmens de ceste vie?’ (I.XIV.259). 
Again in these examples, fear of death is not a fear of sinning and going to Hell, instead it 
is rooted in Stoical concerns over pain and the significance of the present moment. 
Montaigne is clearly fascinated by this fear, but his interest is fuelled by the discussions he 
finds in various classical sources - in this case, Seneca. 
 It must be acknowledged that these conclusions are not particularly radical by 
16th-century standards. First, like many thinkers of his age, Montaigne drew upon a range 
of classical sources to inform himself on a variety of topics. Second, such ideas had been 
explored by Christian philosophers for many centuries; from the earliest Church fathers 
to devout Renaissance thinkers, the Christian philosophical tradition had long preached 
similar preparations to those of Seneca.  The only difference between the ancient 68
philosophers and their Christian counterparts was the idea that training for death was a 
way to embrace God’s love, an idea which is also absent in Montaigne’s work. Instead, 
 Bruno also cites Seneca in order to emphasise that often the fear of something bad occurring is worse than the ‘bad 67
thing’ itself: ‘vede gli effetti del timor del male, il quale è peggio ch’il male istesso’ (II.681).
 ‘Thus, for example, Evagrius Ponticus used to invite his disciples to imagine their own death, the decomposition of 68
their bodies, the terrors and sufferings of their souls in Hell, and eternal fire; then, by way of contrast, they were to 
picture the happiness of the just’ (Hadot, p. 133).
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Montaigne’s radical experimentation with the future arguably stems from his desire to try 
and put the advice on death that he reads about in books to practical use. He pursues this 
objective through ‘practising’ what is probably the most challenging philosophical 
conundrum of all - death: ‘L’avenir signifiant la mort, il [Montaigne] s’y projette afin de 
s’y préparer au mieux’.  In ‘De l’exercitation’ (II.VI) Montaigne once again expresses his 69
desire to focus primarily on the ‘moy’: ‘Ce ne sont pas mes gestes que j’escris, c’est moy, 
c’est mon essence’ (II.VI.379).  Part of this objective involves working from personal 70
experience, rather than solely immersing himself in books: ‘Il est malaisé que le discours et 
l’instruction….soient assez puissantes pour nous acheminer jusques à l’action’ (II.VI.370). 
As Montaigne writes, the bookish authority of ancient philosophers (e.g., Seneca, as 
above) must be balanced out by personal experience and living, and so Montaigne 
attempts to ‘essai’ death itself.  
 In ‘De l’exercitation’ Montaigne navigates this process by first examining some 
practical attempts by various philosophers to prepare themselves for death. Montaigne 
quickly reaches the conclusion that ‘à mourir, qui est la plus grande besoigne que nous 
ayons à faire, l’exercitation ne nous y peut ayder’ (II.VI.371). However, this fact alone does 
not prevent him from trying to practice death anyway, and the true purpose of ‘De 
l’exercitation’ reveals itself thus: ‘si l’expérience de la mort n’est pas possible, nous pouvons 
du moins connaître des états voisins de la mort’.  How does one go about practising 71
death, the one entity that ends all future time? Is it really possible to practice it at all? As 
the chapter titles suggest, in ‘Que philosopher’ Montaigne approaches death from a 
distinctly philosophical angle, while ‘De l’experience’ represents a form of practice too - a 
deeply personal form of practice. ‘De l’exercitation’ lies somewhere in the middle of these 
approaches. Can any of the philosophy that Montaigne reads about death transform itself 
into direct and meaningful action? As we will see, Montaigne is not content to dwell on 
how and why people may fear death and instead tests the boundaries of temporality. ‘De 
l’exercitation’ (II.VI) has already received attention from a number of Montaigne scholars 
who have managed to dissect various philosophical concerns borne out in Montaigne’s 
 Albert Ahmeti, De la peinture du temps dans les ‘Essais’ de Montaigne (Paris: Books On Demand, 2014), ‘2.2. Le 69
temps prospectif’. 
 ‘Il y a plusieurs années que je n’ay que moy pour visée à mes pensées, que je ne contrerolle et estudie que moy’ (II.VI.70
378).
 Montaigne, Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, p. 1519.71
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text, from ideas of the soul to the faculty of imagination.  However, Montaigne’s 72
unconventional attempt to record his death on paper, many years after the original 
incident, also yields a fascinating manipulation of time. It is this willingness to ‘practice’ 
death which once led Hadot to identify Montaigne as one of the last ancient 
philosophers; his Essais arguably represent a breviary on the Stoic approach to life in the 
face of mortality.  As Montaigne recounts his own ‘practice’ of death, several layers of 73
time emerge and overlap in a far cry from the simple progression of time introduced in 
Chapter One.  
 Montaigne commences his account of the accident somewhat abruptly. Only a 
couple of pages in to ‘De l’exercitation’, the reader is quickly immersed in Montaigne’s 
stream of consciousness as he begins to revisit the incident. He believes (since his memory 
is somewhat clouded) that he was thrown ten or twelve paces from his horse, calmly 
stating that - as a result of this - he died: ‘voilà le cheval abbatu et couché tout estourdy, 
moy dix ou douze pas au delà, mort’ (II.VI.373). The perspective of the account is 
immediately unnatural and strange; Montaigne the narrator appears to recount himself 
mort in the present tense ‘n’ayant ny mouvement ny sentiment’ (II.VI.373). Of course, 
Montaigne and his readers know that he did not really die, since he has managed to record 
the episode himself - instead the author acquired a state akin to death and calls upon this 
incident years later. However, the narration is confused by the actual account itself; 
Montaigne’s consciousness narrates and reflects on the incident step-by-step as it 
happened to his ‘dead’ body. The reader’s uneasiness with all of these perspectives is 
compounded when Montaigne describes how the rest of his party believed him to be 
dead: ‘ceux qui estoient avec moy, apres avoir essayé par tous les moyens qu’ils peurent, de 
me faire revenir, me tenans pour mort’ (II.VI.373). An uncanny temporality invades the 
chapter, especially in light of the supposed linearity of time in the Essais - his companions 
attempt to ‘bring him back’ and yet he already appears to have died.  However, 74
Montaigne calmly recounts how he was carried into his house, taken for dead, as his 
consciousness appears to float outside of his body and recall the scene around himself.  
 See Felicity Green, ‘Montaigne’s Soul’; Georges Hoffman, ‘Portrayal from Life, or to Life. The Essais’s Living Effigy’, 72
French Forum, 25.2 (2000), pp. 145-163; Alain Legros, ‘Pour illustrer Montaigne. Trois gravures à l’essai’, Journal de la 
Renaissance, 4 (2006), pp. 249-264; John O’Brien, ‘Reasoning with the Senses: The Humanist Imagination’, South 
Central Review, 10.2 (1993), pp. 3-19.
 Hadot, p. 33. 73
 Felicity Green highlights the bizarre nature of the account, referring to Montaigne’s accident as his ‘first death, which 74
lasts just a few hours’ (p. 95). 
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 In addition, Montaigne frequently portrays himself as drifting between life and 
death in the text (a death which he is still able to remember and write about years later): 
‘Par là je commençay à reprendre un peu de vie, mais ce fut par les menus et par un si long 
traict de temps que mes premiers sentimens estoient beaucoup plus approchans de la 
mort que de la vie’ (II.VI.373).  Here Montaigne suggests that he has managed to come 75
back from death by recouping ‘un peu de vie’, an idea which plays with the finality of 
death and again reverses the direction of natural, linear time. At one stage, Montaigne 
recalls that he believed himself to be so close to dying that he actively ran towards death: 
‘je fermois les yeux pour ayder…et prenois plaisir à m’alanguir et à me laisser aller’ (II.VI.
374) - he willed himself further on towards the end of life, reversing the direction of time 
once more. Montaigne has suffered what modern audiences would refer to as a near-death 
experience, a true ‘état voisin de la mort’ which blurs the arrow of time itself.  
 The simple depiction of the body in time that I introduced in Chapter One is not 
present in these passages. Instead, Montaigne has achieved a personal - albeit incomplete - 
account of death, one which defines the spirit of the word essai as a trial or attempt. In 
doing so, Montaigne breaks all of the rules dictating the natural order of time. The 
finality of death is completely undermined. It becomes a state that may be freely 
manipulated in Montaigne’s writing and even physically practised to a certain extent; one 
can run toward death or pull away from it - in either case, individuals are no longer 
inexorably drawn towards death. Admittedly, the fact is always in the back of our minds - 
and Montaigne himself knows - that death cannot be avoided. However, ‘De 
l’exercitation’ represents his best effort at exerting his mental freedom by revisiting a past 
near-death experience and using his memory of it to undermine the seemingly rigid 
foundations of linear time.  
 If his near-death experience is Montaigne’s own attempt at practical philosophy, 
then he is equally if not more fascinated by philosophers who have purposely ended their 
own life. In the Essais Montaigne does not hide his interest in extreme forms of human 
behaviour, and suicide is no different - in fact, it represents another way of experimenting 
with future time.  Suicide was a popular Stoic theme, but in the late 1500s, it was a 76
 Previous criticism has discussed in more detail this jarring between body and soul in ‘De l’exercitation’ particularly 75
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dangerous concept to write about if the author did not condemn the act outright.  77
However, Montaigne does not condemn it at all. In the Essais suicide arguably appears in 
a positive and empowering light - it destroys the preeminence of the natural order of time 
and undermines the idea that we are all destined to succumb to our mortal fate. Suicide 
does more than ‘rethink’ time - it hands over direct control of death to the individual. 
Rather than ‘waiting’ for death to occur, the body destroys itself. In Chapter One, I 
examined graphic images of the body dying due to disease, accident or the violence of 
others; in both the ‘Isle de Cea’ and ‘Que le Goust des biens et des maux’, Montaigne also 
lists countless examples of people actively dying by their own hand.  A young woman 78
throws herself in the river with her mother and sisters; villagers who are about to be 
captured fling themselves into a fire; Nicanor chooses to die rather than fall into the hands 
of enemies, and stabs himself, bangs his head against a rock and finally pulls out his own 
entrails. These shocking examples reveal a deeply heightened sense of control over time. 
Montaigne is quick to emphasise that suicide allows the young woman to escape from 
being gang-raped by soldiers, while the villagers who burn in the fire have escaped 
enslavement, just like Nicanor. Linking back to Seneca and the idea that there are worse 
things in life than death, it appears that on an individual level, humans are capable of 
destroying the natural order of time, and why not?  Montaigne makes a convincing 79
argument in favour of the idea that sometimes human life is bleak - suicide is an 
individual choice that can end a potentially miserable existence. 
 Despite the moral objections it would have raised in the 16th century,  this 80
admiration of suicide continues to manifest itself through Montaigne’s discussion of the 
deaths of Cato the Younger (95 BC-46 BC) and Socrates (c.470 BC-399 BC) - two 
examples of pre-Christian figures engaging in an act that the Catholic Church would have 
considered to be a cardinal sin. In order to try and combat ‘an increase in the per capita 
ratio of suicide’ in the late 16th century, the Church had clamped down on it as a morally 
 Henry, p. 278. The Church’s stance was very clear in this respect - all suicides were morally unjustifiable. See MacPhail, 77
‘Montaigne and the Praise of Sparta’, p. 205. 
 See Henry for context on Montaigne’s title choice concerning ‘Isle de Cea’: ‘As regards ‘actual’ subject-matter, 78
however, no essay is more straightforward, particularly in its 1580 form. After a short preface, it deals withs suicide from 
beginning to end’ (p. 279). 
 See Henry on Seneca and suicide: ‘On the one hand, Seneca’s aim was to help men to conduct their lives in accordance 79
with divine will and, on the other, he normally permitted suicide when the advantages of living were outweighed by the 
disadvantages of living’ (p. 281).
 For wider context, see also Michael MacDonald & Terence R. Murphy, Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modern 80
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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reprehensible act, no matter the circumstances surrounding it.  Nevertheless, Montaigne 81
repeatedly returns to examples of self-murder and emphasises the control over time that 
this act implies.  
 The death of Socrates was a well-known story in the Renaissance, and the Socratic 
precept to ‘Know thyself’ clearly had a huge impact on Montaigne’s thought.  Two major 82
sources utilised by Montaigne are Plato and Xenophon, who had both written lengthy 
accounts of Socrates and his trial; somewhat tellingly Montaigne favoured Xenophon’s 
narration due to his emphasis on Socrates ‘practical morality’.  At the start of ‘De 83
l’exercitation’ Montaigne states that some philosophers, even though ‘[ils] ont voulu 
atteindre à quelque plus grande excellence’ (II.VI.370), wildly threw themselves into 
predicaments so it would not seem as though they were incapable of combatting 
fortuitous events. An emphasis on meaningful action continues, as Montaigne suggests 
that philosophers have previously refused to ‘wait out’ bad times: ‘[ils] ne se sont pas 
contentez d’attendre à couvert et en repos les rigueurs de la fortune, de peur qu’elle ne les 
surprint inexperimentez et nouveaux au combat’ (II.VI.370). But how does one practically 
prepare for death? Montaigne’s admiration for philosophy in practice arguably reaches its 
apotheosis in the deaths of both Socrates and Cato. For example, in ‘De Juger de la Mort 
d’Autruy’ (II.XIII), Montaigne praises Socrates for devoting the time before his death to 
productive thoughts and actions that refused to submit to fear: 
 L’estre mort ne les fache pas, mais ouy bien le mourir, Emori nolo, sed me esse   
 mortuum nihili aestimo. C’est un degré de fermeté auquel j’ay experimenté que je  
 pourrois arriver, ainsi que ceux qui se jettent dans les dangers comme dans la mer,  
 à yeux clos. Il n’y a rien, selon moy, plus illustre en la vie de Socrates que d’avoir eu 
 trente jours entiers à ruminer le decret de sa mort; de l’avoir digerée tout ce temps  
 là d’une tres certaine esperance, sans esmoy, sans alteration, et d’un train d’actions  
 et de parolles ravallé plustost et anonchali que tendu et relevé par le poids d’une  
 telle cogitation. (II.XIII.608-609)  
 ‘Un degré de fermeté’ is the exact opposite of the bodily and mental responses to 
death that fear often incites. Rather than fear transmitting to the body, Socrates’ actions 
‘ravallé….anonchali’ are in tune with the thoughts of his mind ‘sans esmoy, sans 
 Henry, p. 279.81
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alteration’. Following his trial, Socrates was found guilty of corruption and impiety; he 
was sentenced to death by swallowing poison hemlock and would have to act as his own 
executioner. Faced with this dilemma, Socrates did not succumb to blind panic or fear; 
rather he contemplated it calmly: ‘un train d’actions et de parolles ravallé’. In doing so, 
Socrates reaps the benefits of his meditatio mortis which was shaped by a firm belief in the 
idea that death’s uncertainty was not necessarily a bad thing.  Inspired by this 84
commitment to responding to ‘le poids d’une telle cogitation’ in such a way, Montaigne 
admits that he himself has attempted to emulate this mindset: ‘C’est un degré de fermeté 
auquel j’ay experimenté que je pourrois arriver’.  
 In the Essais, Cato’s death is held up in a slightly different light to Socrates.  85
Cato’s suicide is much bloodier and more dramatic than that of Socrates; it is a voluntary 
act that Montaigne himself would never be able to imitate. In Chapter One I repeatedly 
described the definition of a ‘natural’ death in the Essais - Cato’s philosophical suicide is 
perhaps the most dramatic example of a completely unnatural death: 
 L’extreme degré de traicter courageusement la mort, et le plus naturel, c’est la voir  
 non seulement sans estonnement, mais sans soin, continuant libre le train de la vie 
 jusques dans elle. Comme Caton qui s’amusoit à dormir et à estudier, en ayant   
 une, violente et sanglante, presente en sa teste et en son coeur, et la tenant en sa  
 main. (II.XXI.679) 
 He describes Cato’s death as an ‘extreme’ act of courage. He is a philosopher 
‘whose virtue “climbed so high” as not merely to despise pain but to “rejoice” in it’. 
Therefore his bloody and violent suicide - in which Cato disembowels himself - is a 
deliberate attempt to seek out pain and guaranteed death.  David Schaefer has linked this 86
extreme act to Montaigne’s direct attack on popular religious attitudes towards death in 
the Essais. Dying ‘insensibly’ in the manner of Cato is preferable to a lifetime spent 
worrying about one’s actions and repenting of one’s sins on a daily basis. In other 
chapters, Montaigne praises those philosophers whose words and actions go together, in 
comparison to Church prelates whose own version of the future holds their clergy up to a 
lifetime of impossible standards: ‘Je voy souvent qu’on nous propose des images de vie, 
 See Gareth B. Matthews, ‘Death in Socrates, Aristotle and Plato’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, ed. 84
by Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman and Jens Johansson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 186-199. Socrates echoes 
Stoic advice in the Apology: ‘No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of blessings for a man, yet men fear 
it as if they knew it is the greatest of evils’ (p. 187). 
 See Limbrick, ‘Montaigne and Socrates’, p. 51 for more on Cato, Socrates and Crito in the Essais.85
 Schaefer, p. 185. See also David Quint, Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 86
2014), Chapter Two, ‘Cruelty and Noblesse: “De la cruauté” and “Couardise mere de la cruauté”’. Quint discusses 
Cato’s calm manner in the face of death with reference to passages from ‘Toutes choses ont leur saison’ (II.XXVIII). 
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lesquelles ny le proposant ny les auditeurs n’ont aucune esperance de suyvre’ (III.IX.
989).  Cato’s suicide was enacted on his terms rather than those of an almighty Godhead.  87
 Furthermore, time’s ‘natural order’ is thrown into confusion after Montaigne 
labels Cato’s self-inflicted death ‘le plus naturel’ of all. Elsewhere in the Essais, examples of 
death by stabbing and other weaponry are considered to be highly unnatural. However, 
Cato has been so diligent in his study of death that not only is he unafraid to meet it, the 
philosopher cannot wait for death any longer and thus brings the moment of death 
forward himself. He achieves this state of mind through the practice of Stoicism. As a 
follower of Stoic philosophy, Cato would have used a heightened awareness of the present 
to try and improve himself and understand what he really was - a human being.  Marcus 88
Aurelius embodies this meditatio mortis thus: ‘Let your every deed and word and thought 
be those of one who might depart from this life this very moment’.  Cato follows this 89
advice to the extreme - his preparation is so meticulous that he seeks out death in a calm 
and indifferent state, seemingly ‘sans soin’ in the manner of Socrates. Arguably Cato’s 
death is natural because he has achieved a state akin to that of an animal that is blissfully 
unaware of its mortality. As described in Chapter One, animals do not have the same 
consciousness of time and act only according to the present needs of their body (‘Les 
bestes…laissent aux corps leurs sentiments, libres et naïfs’ (I.XIV.58)). Ironically, Cato’s 
preparation for the future at every present moment leaves him untroubled by death in the 
same manner as ‘les bestes’ which do not need to prepare for death at all. If the future is a 
human concern, as so many 16th-century thinkers felt it was (and Montaigne himself 
admitted), then thinking about death in the Stoic manner frees one of fear over the future 
and arguably puts humans back on the same level as animals.  
 Another particularly interesting illustration of an individual actively taking death 
into their own hands features in ‘De Juger de la Mort d’Autruy’ (II.XIII). Montaigne 
relates the story of Marcellinus: ‘Au reste, il n’y eust besoing de fer ny de sang: il 
[Marcellinus] entreprit de s’en aller de cette vie, non de s’en fuir; non d’eschapper à la 
mort, mais de l’essayer’ (II.XIII.610). The contrasting couplets of verbs at the end of this 
sentence emphasise how suicide marks a radical difference between control and lack of 
control over time. In this example, Marcellinus chose to die: ‘il entreprit de s’en aller’. 
Rather than being forced to escape (eschapper) he chose to essayer - to ‘try’ death. The 
 Schaefer, pp. 184-185; pp. 190-191. 87
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choice of the verb essayer takes on a completely new meaning in relation to death - usually 
trying or attempting something suggests that one may be able to try it over and over 
again, as Montaigne often does in his writing when he attacks an issue from several 
different angles. However, the idea that one may be able to ‘try’ death poses a serious 
challenge to how this thesis has considered human existence in time so far. This is partly 
why Montaigne admires these examples so much, despite the serious moral objections 
they would have raised in the 16th century. ‘De l’exercitation’ began to hint at this 
possibility when Montaigne recalled his own attempt to run towards death rather than 
avoid it. Furthermore, rather than fleeing death, Marcellinus died of his own accord, not 
Nature’s accord - the natural order of time has deliberately been trumped. Marcellinus’ 
death arrives ‘avant le temps et l’occasion’ (II.III.355), but it is radical because Marcellinus 
has extended a degree of control over time, dictating the timing and circumstances of his 
own death, even if death itself cannot be avoided.  
 Finally, Montaigne even queries whether it might be possible to die, or experience 
something like death, before returning to a normal existence in time. In ‘De l’exercitation’, 
the idea of trying death once again appears to be a futile task: ‘quant à la mort, nous ne la 
pouvons essayer qu’une fois…’ (II.VI.371). Unfortunately, it is impossible for human 
beings to ‘remember’ death or infer the true nature of it from past sources; as Montaigne 
humorously reminds his readers, there is no philosopher who can say ‘this happened to 
me when I died’: ‘mais ils ne sont pas revenus nous en dire les nouvelles’ (II.VI.371). 
However, this basic fact does not stop Montaigne from first attempting in ‘De 
l’exercitation’ to draw upon real-life historical examples in order to ‘practice’ death 
anyway - the accident that he suffered clearly made a lasting impression and remained in 
his memory several years later. Indeed, Montaigne concludes that he feels it is possible to 
approach death or practice it, albeit in an incomplete way: ‘nous la pouvons joindre, nous 
la pouvons approcher, nous la pouvons reconnoistre’ (II.VI.372). In much the same vein 
as his praise of Cato and Socrates, Montaigne is impressed by how Julius Canius was a 
philosopher right until the very end of his life, emphasising how courageous he was ‘de 
vouloir que sa mort luy servit de leçon’ (II.VI.371). Canius’ friend asks him: ‘en quelle 
démarche est à cette heure vostre ame? que fait elle? en quels pensemens estes 
vous?’ (II.VI.371). Canius replies: ‘Je pensois…à me tenir prest et bandé de toute ma force, 
pour voir si, en cet instant de la mort, si court et si brief, je pourray appercevoir quelque 
deslogement de l’ame’ (II.VI.371). Here the paradox of a finite body and a consciously 
finite mind reaches its apotheosis - Canius attempts to defy this situation and suggests the 
possibility of coming back to life and telling his friends about death: ‘en revenir donner 
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apres, si je puis, advertissement à mes amis’ (II.VI.371). As a result, Montaigne labels 
Canius a man ‘de vertu et fermeté singuliere’ (II.VI.371). Although Canius was at the 
mercy of objective time, ‘practising’ death in this way signified a last act of control. 
Montaigne was fascinated by the extent to which someone can live their philosophy, and 
concludes in admiring terms: ‘Cettuy-cy philosophe non seulement jusqu’à la mort, mais 
en la mort mesme’ (II.VI.371). While it may never be physically possible to return from 
death, humans can test the boundaries of their temporal condition in ways that 
undermine the power of the natural order of time. 
 In the examples above, Montaigne provides his readers with something that was 
absent in Chapter One: control. Of course, in the Essais humans cannot choose not to 
die. However, Montaigne demonstrates that there are - albeit some very extreme - choices 
with regard to when and how humans die, choices that completely undermine the fixed 
natural order of time. When humans contemplate time outside of the body’s present 
existence, freedom exists to experiment with what the future means: 
 Voicy les mots de la loy sur ce subject: Si d’aventure il survient quelque grand   
 inconvenient qui ne se puisse remedier, le port est prochain; et se peut on sauver à  
 nage hors du corps comme hors d’un esquif qui faict eau: car c’est la crainte de   
 mourir, non pas le desir de vivre, qui tient le fol attaché  au corps. (II.XII.497) 
 Focusing only on objective time, i.e. what time does to the body, causes one to 
fear death. However, humans do have the power to exploit their own mortality - as in the 
example above, death can be used in an empowering way, in order to end suffering or 
pain: ‘le port est prochain’. The soul has the power to subvert fear of death: ‘c’est chez 
nous, au dedans, où nuls yeux ne donnent que les nostres: là elle nous couvre de la crainte 
de la mort, des douleurs et de la honte mesme’ (II.XVI.623). Montaigne is fascinated by 
the extreme examples he knows from history, such as that of Cato, and openly admires the 
death of Socrates. In ‘De l’exercitation’, his purpose in the Essais continues resolutely even 
in the face of death; it is a chapter which blurs the lines between life and death and 
questions the true ‘linearity’ of time.  
 In Chapter One, time flowed relentlessly in one direction, whereas in ‘De 
l’exercitation’ Montaigne has - almost - reversed the arrow of time himself. Furthermore, 
Montaigne displays a distinct ‘estrangement from institutional responses to the problem 
of death’ that were highlighted in ‘Context: 16th-Century Futures’.  Religious ideas of 90
the future are notably absent, and I have purposely avoided repeatedly trying to relate 
 Hoffman, p. 157. 90
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examples of suicide and near-death to a 16th-century Christian context. Montaigne 
certainly does not attempt this, and shows little interest in actively engaging with religious 
ideas of the future.  Instead, I argue that Montaigne is interested in how philosophy 91
reconciles one to death, and whether such advice can in fact be put to good use. In doing 
so, he shows his readers that while the death of the body cannot be avoided, humans can 
generate meaningful approaches to temporality that undermine the idea of the passive 
body in time.  
  
Conclusion 
 My initial discussion of conceptions of time in Montaigne and Bruno has evolved 
a long way since focusing on the basic ‘train’ of the body in Chapter One. In this chapter, 
I have attempted to demonstrate how human beings possess the ability to subvert the 
natural order of time. Montaigne and Bruno clearly demonstrate that they are capable of 
envisioning different ideas of future time - after all, as both thinkers remind their readers, 
the power to change this conception of the future ‘se loger en nous’, it is inside us, ‘dentro 
di sé’; ‘il est en nous de la changer: et en ayant le choix, si nul ne nous force, nous sommes 
estrangement fols de nous bander pour le party qui nous est le plus ennuyeux’ (I.XIV.50). 
Both Montaigne and Bruno focus on a response to time - fear of death - that previous 
scholars tend to have undervalued in the 16th century, and they do this in order to 
generate new responses to time that redefine the future and complicate traditional 
conceptions of time in the early modern period. 
 Why do they do this? Bruno partly seizes on fear of death in order to promote his 
philosophical aims and admiration for pre-Socratic philosophers, while Montaigne 
continues his quest to write his own being in time, shaped by a dramatic near-death 
experience, while putting the advice of classical philosophers to the test. As a result, 
Christian end-time offers little insight to either of them and in rejecting the temporal 
norms of their age, they propose new responses to time - in this case, future time. Both 
Montaigne’s examination of suicide, and Bruno’s commitment to vicissitude’s infinite 
duration are further examples of how they attribute a more positive characteristic to the 
 Kenny, Death and Tenses, p. 231. ‘Ways of surviving into or beyond death are persistently mulled over in the Essais, but 91
without evocation of Heaven, Hell or Purgatory, and with only occasional, vague allusions to the ‘other world’. From 
the Essais: ‘Il n’y a point de fin en nos inquisitions: Notre fin est en l’autre monde’ (III.13.1068). In Montaigne 
philosophe Maclean argues that one of the few Christian dogmas Montaigne engages with is the idea of resurrection 
because of his interest in the body (p. 70). 
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future through their emphasis on human action. They both achieve this by diminishing 
the importance of objective time and their supposedly finite existence within it. 
 For now, it seems that despite the Christian time discussed at the start of this 
chapter, the Essais and Italian dialogues reveal a fascination with humans and time that 
has continued from Chapter One - ‘c’est tousjours à l’homme que nous avons 
affaire’ (III.VIII.930). What are human beings capable of? What is it within our power to 
do? We have now established that human beings are in a curious position with regards to 
time - at least, this is how Montaigne and Bruno appear to understand it. The body is 
destined to die, and the mind recognises this fact but also exerts a degree of freedom in 
time that the corporeal body (of which it is a part) does not possess. Furthermore, they do 
not respond to apocalyptic end-times such as the Last Judgement. I have attempted to 
explain this pattern with a focus on their engagement with philosophers who would have 
had no understanding of Christian linear time. In Chapter Three I argue that their 
primary response to the future is defined by a desire to seek knowledge about the world. 
They want to exploit the possibilities that the future holds rather than just redefining it. I 
consider these ideas in light of another aspect of time - eternity, or ‘non-time’ as it is often 
referred to - and exploring vicissitude in more detail. 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Chapter Three: Eternity, Time and Truth 
 Past, present, and future - both Chapters One and Two delineate a conception of 
time that easily divides into such distinctions. As St. Augustine famously remarked, it is 
through these three divisions that human beings perceive how a time in kind has passed; 
‘if nothing passes away, there is no past time, and if nothing arrives, there is no future 
time, and if nothing existed there would be no present time’.  Time moves incessantly 1
from future to past and humans move with it; all references to our experience of time on 
Earth are deeply embedded in the idea that events in time exist either in the past, present 
or future. Montaigne and Bruno are no different in their understanding of time. Over the 
last two chapters, their concerns and theories regarding nearly all of the themes discussed 
so far, including vicissitude, birth, death, fear, and ageing, can only exist in a temporal 
world - or indeed a universe - in which time is constantly flowing from future to past.  At 2
first glance, this may seem to be a rather obvious characteristic of time, with little need for 
extended commentary within the context of this thesis. However, in the 16th century time 
co-existed alongside an extremely important concept that arguably represented the 
opposite of temporal succession, and this concept was known as eternity.  
 Eternity was a numberless, shapeless and timeless state, utterly devoid of 
mutability. Time was defined in terms of change, impermanence or ‘flow’ due to the 
influence of various ancient Greek thinkers such as Pythagoras, who believed that time 
derived from this immutable eternity.  Furthermore, Christianity appropriated the 3
concept and labelled eternity ‘God’s time’, an extra-temporal state with neither beginning 
nor end which symbolised the utter perfection of God. Many 16th-century Scholastics 
were directly influenced by the definition of eternity found in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae: ‘[So] just as numbering before and after in change produces the notion of 
time, so awareness of invariability in something altogether free from change produces the 
 Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 231. 1
 This term is used with caution since there is a long debate surrounding whether time can truly be said to ‘flow’. 2
Heraclitus compared time to the act of putting his foot in a river and the stream still passing, an image Montaigne refers 
to directly in the Apologie (II.12.602). For more on the background to this debate see Patrick Henry, ‘Montaigne and 
Heraclitus: Pattern and Flux, Continuity and Change in “Du repentir”’, Montaigne Studies, 4.1-2 (1992), pp. 7-18; also 
Françoise Joukovsky, Le Feu et le Fleuve. Héraclite et la Renaissance française (Geneva: Droz, 1991). 
 For an introduction to Pythagorean thought (including time and eternity) see G.S. Kirk, The Presocratic Philosophers 3
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Charles H. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006). 
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notion of eternity’.  By comparison, time was considered to be merely a reflection of the 4
eternal, a ‘ceaseless lackey to eternity’ which belonged to the realm of created, mortal 
beings.  I hope to illustrate that in the 16th century, to discuss eternity was also to discuss 5
God, divinity, and perfection; it was a state of timelessness that contrasted sharply with 
the impermanence and fluctuation of time itself. This careful distinction between eternity 
and time helped to define the ontological difference between God the creator and the 
beings that he created. Consequently, most early modern thinkers were not solely 
concerned with the measurable, human-oriented time of the past two chapters. Eternity 
held a significant relationship to time, and any study attempting to understand 
conceptions of time in the 16th century would be naturally compelled to analyse its 
timeless counterpart in more detail. 
 Unlike time itself, eternity was a relatively uncontroversial and unchanging 
concept within the history of philosophy of time; thus it might appear that Montaigne 
and Bruno would have had little difficulty in absorbing it into their own conceptions of 
time. However, eternity occupies an awkward position in the Essais. Any attempt to 
seriously and consistently address a perfect, eternal ‘God’s time’ would undoubtedly have 
interfered with Montaigne’s preferred focus on writing himself, his observations on the 
passage of time (Chapter One) and his responses to this passage (Chapter Two). Therefore 
eternity is largely absent from the Essais and in the few notable references Montaigne 
makes to it, he appears to justify his fascination with time’s impermanence instead. His 
deep-seated interest in human time precludes any interest in a key temporal concept of 
the 16th century. Eternity in the Italian dialogues is arguably more straightforward in 
some respects since Bruno employs familiar Neoplatonic terms to describe an eternal 
God. Nevertheless, this God is infused directly into a monist, infinite universe through 
the World Soul or anima del mondo, an idea which is further complicated by Bruno’s 
notion of the infinite duration of vicissitude, an eternal process of its own that contains 
innumerable temporal parts. 
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by Timothy McDermott (Oxford: Oxford 4
University Press, 1998), p. 210. In Question 10, ‘The Eternity of God’, Aquinas affirms that ‘eternity itself exists as a 
simultaneous whole, lacking successiveness’ (p. 211). See also Michael Edwards, Time and Science of the Soul (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), ‘Chapter One: Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy’. Edwards states that Aquinas’ account was ‘influential 
amongst late renaissance commentators, and was read with particular attention by Jesuit authors’ (p. 22). For a similar 
view of eternity in Augustine’s works, see Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), Book XI ‘Time and Eternity’. Augustine states that ‘in the eternal, nothing is transient, 
but the whole is present’ (p. 228). He also describes the Word of the Lord as being coeternal with God, ‘you say all that 
you say in simultaneity and eternity’ (p. 226).
 William Shakespeare, Lucrece, ed. by Barbara A. Mowat & Paul Werstine (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 5
n.d.), in Folger Shakespeare Library <www.folgerdigitaltexts.org> [accessed 21 August 2017].
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Time and Eternity 
Eternity in the 16th century  
 Early modern discussions concerning the nature of time were inextricably linked 
to eternity. This phenomenon was partly due to the longstanding influence of the 
Ancient Greeks, whose understanding of eternity lingered well into the 16th century and 
influenced philosophers and theologians alike. Various Greek philosophers considered 
time or chronos in terms of temporal flux, and this notion was inseparable from eternity. 
The Pythagorean school of philosophers originated in the 6th century BC; they 
considered eternity to be ‘a boundless “space” from which chronos was drawn and on 
which it depended for its continuing existence’.  Time was an auxiliary of eternity (or ‘the 6
Unlimited’ as it was also known) since the Pythagoreans believed that time derived its 
existence from this eternal, infinite space. While the Unlimited was ‘shapeless, 
numberless, and unformed raw material’ with no beginning, end or temporal division in-
between, chronos was characterised by its clear and continuous passage from future 
through to past. By the beginning of the 5th century BC, the distinction between time 
and eternity was already well-established, and it would go on to influence later definitions 
of time for well over a millennium:  
 From the beginning, two radically different conceptions - one Hellenistic, the   
 other Hebraic - have dominated the history of Western thought on the subject of  
 time. For the Greeks, time was an essentially quantitative phenomenon, opposed  
 to eternity and conceived as a derivative of physical space. For the Hebrews, on the 
 other hand, time, whose ontological status was of no speculative interest, was   
 preeminently qualitative: an historical consciousness of individual events as parts  
 of a providential continuum.   7
 In this section, I will briefly assess the repercussions of this early Hellenistic view 
of time on later Western thought, first by introducing one of its most famous proponents 
and secondly by describing its influence on Christian thinkers throughout the Middle 
Ages and into the late 16th century.  
  John Spencer Hill, Inﬁnity, Faith and Time (Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University, 1997), p. 69. For a thorough 6
survey of Pythagoras’ reception in the Renaissance, which includes discussion on the adoption of Pythagorean notions 
of the eternal, see Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier, Pythagoras and Renaissance Europe: Finding Heaven (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 Hill, p. 69. Emphasis own. See also Simona Cohen, Transformations of Time and Temporality in Medieval and 7
Renaissance Art (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 14-15. 
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 Perhaps one of the most well-known definitions of time in Western philosophy 
appears in Plato’s Timaeus (c.360 BC), a text which was widely diffused in the 16th 
century. It was this text that helped to firmly establish Pythagoras’ original belief that time 
and eternity were closely intertwined (see also Chapter One, ‘Popular definitions of time 
in the 16th century’).  Plato was heavily influenced by these ideas and developed them 8
further in his well-known philosophical dialogue, in which four interlocutors (Timaeus, 
Socrates, Hermocrates and Critias) are discussing how a Demiurge (dêmiourgos) or ‘divine 
Craftsman’ originally formed the entire universe.  Time is an important aspect of the 9
creation story in the Timaeus, and Plato famously defined it as ‘a moving image of 
eternity’: 
 Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow  
 eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he [the Demiurge] began to 
 think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order  
 to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of 
 eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call 
 “time”.  10
 Eternity is unity, oneness, or - as Plato also referred to it - a characteristic of the 
highest immutable form of ‘Being’ which is ‘indivisible and always changeless’.  In line 11
with Pythagoras, Plato reduces time to a form of ‘becoming’ since it exists solely due to a 
higher, eternal form which it attempts to mirror through constant movement ‘according 
to number’. Time is thus ‘the number or measure of change, the condition of all coming-
to-be and passing-away’.  Plotinus later echoes these ideas in the third book of his 12
Enneads (c. 270 AD), in which he states that ‘Eternity and Time, we say, are two different 
things, the one belonging to the sphere of the nature which lasts forever, the other to that 
 The Timaeus first gained widespread popularity amongst European readers in the 14th century thanks to a 8
commentary by the 4th century philosopher Calcidius; after a brief lull, from the mid 16th century onwards, secular 
rulers pressured university scholars into reentering Plato’s dialogues into the curriculum. See James Hankins, ‘The 
Study of the Timaeus in Early Renaissance Italy’, in Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in Renaissance 
Europe, ed. by A. Grafton & N.G. Siraisi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 77-119.
 Cohen highlights this connection between Plato and Pythagoras: ‘Plato, in differentiating between the concepts of 9
time and eternity and establishing their relationship, drew upon Pythagorean precepts’ (p. 10). 
 Plato, Complete Works, trans. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 1241. In this quotation the ‘Living 10
Thing’ refers to the created universe.
 Ibid., p. 1239.11
 Hill, p. 70. See Cohen, p. 44; Cohen argues that time was more closely linked to motion and was itself ‘an image 12
perceived of something beyond perception - eternity’ (p. 44). See also Hélène Védrine, La conception de la nature chez 
Giordano Bruno (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), p. 67. 
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of becoming and of this universe’.  It is also important to note that Plotinus was 13
responsible for developing the concept of the World Soul; as this chapter will 
demonstrate, the World Soul greatly influenced Bruno and became an integral part of his 
cosmology. The anima mundi was an emanation of the eternal One, and it was through 
this emanation, which contained all of the individual souls on Earth, that time was 
supposedly born; ‘it is the activity of the World Soul that generates time, and the resulting 
universe therefore exists, not in that static perfection eternity, but in the mutable 
succession of time’.   14
 Throughout the definitions above, time is different to eternity, and yet it is 
simultaneously bound to eternity for its very existence as a temporal ‘other’, an image or 
reflection of the eternal. Various present-day scholars working in the field of time studies 
have already recognised that the Roman philosopher Boethius (c.475-524AD) was 
instrumental in ensuring that the Platonic/Neoplatonic divide between time and eternity 
existed well into Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages.  The philosopher and theologian 15
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) continued to express time in distinctly Platonic terms as ‘the 
unfolding of eternity’ ; his contemporary Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) ensured that this 16
distinction survived into the 16th century, due in large part to his popular translations and 
commentaries of Plato and Plotinus (Ficino heavily influenced Bruno's views on the 
World Soul).  By the late 1500s, the core relationship between time and eternity remained 17
highly influential: eternity was believed to be one whole instant in comparison to its 
 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, n.d.) in Loeb Classical 13
Library <www.loebclassics.com> [accessed 22 August 2017]. For more on Plotinus and the Essais, see Françoise 
Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps (Paris: Nizet, 1972). Plotinus regards time as ‘une imitation de l’éternité, 
et il [temps] est à l’éternité comme l’univers sensible est au monde intelligible’ (p. 28). Previous scholars have suggested 
that Plato’s eternity is a state of non-time, the ‘absence of time’ - Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work and Culture in the 
Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 31. This debate has raged for many centuries; see Richard 
Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983), ‘8 - Is Eternity Timelessness?’. Of course, aside from the Timaeus and the Enneads, other ancient sources 
also influenced later debates on the nature of eternity. In the De caelo Aristotle came close to defining eternity in spatial 
terms very similar to the Pythagorean definitions above when he described an extra-temporal sphere situated outside of 
the heavens, which he referred to as aeon. See Book 1 chapter 9 of Aristotle’s De caelo for the definition of aeon that 
would have been familiar to 16th century thinkers. 
 Hill, p. 78.14
 ‘Boethius…sought to define divine eternity by contrast to temporality’ (Cohen, p. 44). See also Miguel A. Granada, ‘El 15
concepto de tiempo en Bruno: tiempos cósmicos y eternidad’, in La ﬁlosoﬁa di Giordano Bruno: Problemi ermeneutici e 
storiograﬁci, ed. by Eugenio Canone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2003), pp. 85-113 (pp. 94-95). For an excellent study of early 
modern conceptions of eternity see Luca Bianchi, ‘Abiding Then: Eternity of God and Eternity of the World from 
Hobbes to the Enciclopédie’, in The Medieval Concept of Time, ed. by Pasquale Porro (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 543-560.
 Hill, p. 25. 16
 Leen Spruit, Il problema della conoscenza in Giordano Bruno (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988), p. 189. For the influence of 17
Ficino’s commentaries in the Essais see Frederick Kellermann, ‘Montaigne, Reader of Plato’, Comparative Literature, 8.4 
(1956), pp. 307-322.
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auxiliary time, which was characterised as a series of constantly changing instants. Bianchi 
has recently emphasised that the idea of eternity as ‘timelessness’ was supported well into 
the late 1500s by extremely diverse groups of philosophers: ‘thinkers belonging to 
different, often rival, philosophical traditions were prepared to maintain that God does 
not exist in time and his eternity is a kind of timelessness’.  Various late Scholastic 18
thinkers shared this view, as did the Italian Dominican friar Tommaso Campanella 
(1568-1639), and even Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677); Bianchi also identifies Bruno as another 
Renaissance thinker who helped to sustain an interest in the distinction between time and 
timeless eternity.   19
 As well as the common distinction between time and eternity, 16th-century 
thinkers were also interested in several religious and philosophical concepts that were 
closely related to eternity. While not all of the theories below are strictly eternal in nature, 
they do describe infinite time or extremely long durations of time. For example, the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages and early modern period posited a third temporal division 
between time and eternity, entitled aevum. Aevum, sometimes referred to by present-day 
scholars as ‘angelic time’ was ‘the duration of celestial beings, angels and the rational part 
of the soul’.  Although it was different from eternity since it had a beginning, aevum was 20
also distinct from time since it lacked an ending and was the time of other intelligent and 
immortal beings. Admittedly, Luther and other reformers cast a suspicious eye over the 
creation of aevum since the testimony of Biblical scripture is scant, but he ultimately 
accepted that angels were in service to God’s divine will for eternity.  Other 21
commonplaces of the Christian/Neoplatonic tradition in the early modern period 
included the immortality of the soul; as I discussed in Chapter One, the soul endured 
forever and was thus the most divine property of human beings. However, much like 
aevum, many Medieval and Renaissance Christians believed that individual souls were not 
truly ‘eternal’ since they were also created. This process occurred either through the soul’s 
transference from parents to their children - just as God breathed life into Adam - or 
through God himself, whom some Medieval and Renaissance Christians believed was 
 Bianchi, p. 555. 18
 Ibid., p. 548.19
 For an introduction see Paolo Ponzio, ‘Tempus, aevum, aeternitas in the Philosophy of Tommaso Campanella’, in 20
The Medieval Concept of Time, ed. by Pasquale Porro (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 543-560.
 See Philip M. Soergel, ‘Luther on the Angels’ in Angels in the Early Modern World, ed. by Peter Marshall and 21
Alexandra Walsham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 64-82. 
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responsible for creating new souls daily.  The Hellenic concept of metempsychosis, 22
which Bruno explored in his Cabala del cavallo pegaseo, was considered to be heretical by 
most Christian theologians since it implied the transmigration of souls after death.  
 Hellenic ideas of cyclical time and eternity were linked through the concept of 
endless recurrence. In Antiquity, some philosophers had believed that the whole universe 
was cyclical - in other words, the universe had a finite lifespan and would eventually end, 
to be forever replaced by a new universe afterwards. Sorabji describes how ‘not just 
individual persons, but whole worlds will be repeated’ and that ‘such views are attested 
for Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Empedocles’.  This concept naturally led 23
to the idea of a ‘Great Year’, which was the date in which the universe would end its 
current cycle - it is mentioned in Plato’s Republic (c. 380 BC), and was also postulated by 
Heraclitus, and it grew to be very popular in the Renaissance.  Bruno directly references 24
the ‘grande anno’ in the Italian dialogues several times, while in ‘Des Boyteux’ (III.XI) 
Montaigne describes a similar process to endless recurrence with reference to the leap year, 
or as he refers to it ‘la revolution de tel ou tel nombre d’années’ (III.XI.1026) after which 
‘ce jour extraordinaire seroit tousjours eclipsé’ (III.XI.1026).  As well as the more 25
straightforward relationship between time and eternity, early modern thinkers were 
clearly fascinated by near-eternal concepts too.  It is important to be aware of all of these 26
 Of course, Medieval and Renaissance theologians wrestled with certain difficulties attached to the idea of the soul’s 22
creation. See Lodi Nauta, ‘The Preexistence of the Soul in Medieval Thought’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et 
médiévale, 63 (1996), pp. 93-135; also R.J. O’Connell, The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine’s Later Works (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1987). 
 Sorabji, p. 182. See Ada Palmer, Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 23
2014). Palmer demonstrates how such thinkers were widely read by commentators and philosophers in the Renaissance, 
mainly through Lucretius’ De rerum natura which preserved many of their ideas. For more on the wider transmission 
of Heraclitus, Anaximander and other pre-Socratics in the ancient world, see Victor Caston & Daniel W. Graham, eds., 
Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos (New York: Routledge, 2016), ‘Part 5 - Transmissions, 
Traditions and Reactions’. 
 Ibid. In the Italian dialogues, Bruno makes explicit reference to the Great Year three times - in the Cena, Spaccio and 24
the Furori. See Paul-Henri Michel, La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno (Paris: Hermann, 1962), p. 297. For the heretical 
implications of this doctrine see Steven Epstein, The Medieval Discovery of Nature (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012). ‘The monotheists could live with the theme of decay because it was congenial to the doctrine of original sin 
leading to an end however conceived, but the eternity of the world was for them a nonstarter that Medieval authorities 
branded as pagan and/or heretical’ (p. 13).
 Montaigne also names Heraclitus as a proponent of endless recurrence: ‘Heraclitus establissoit le monde estre 25
composé par feu et, par l'ordre des destinées, se devoir enflammer et resoudre en feu quelque jour, et quelque jour 
encore renaistre’ (II.XII.572).
 Debates emerged concerning how humans might practically be remembered on Earth after their death. A rare 26
instance of the term ‘eternité’ in the Essais sees Montaigne discussing those philosophers who promise ‘eternité aux 
lettres qu'ils escrivent à leurs amis’ (I.XL.251). In the Eroici Furori Bruno mocks the Petrarchan poets and their quest for 
immortality: ‘destinatemi immortale, fatemi poeta, rendetemi illustre, mentre canto di morte, cipressi et inferni’ (Furori 
II.531). Of course, Bruno also complies with the traditions of his age when communicating with his benefactors. For 
example, in the ‘Proemiale epistola’ to Michel de Castelnau, Bruno promises that his writing will render ‘eterna 
testimonianza dell’invitto favor vostro’ (De la causa I.596-597).
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interpretations since Montaigne uses them to cast doubt on philosophy’s ability to claim 
truth, while Bruno reveals a fascination with those temporal concepts that were 
introduced by the pre-Socratics, as opposed to a more conventional interest in Aristotle.  
 Finally, the longevity attributed to the distinction between time and eternity 
partly occurred because Christian thinkers managed to easily appropriate aspects of the 
divide between eternal and temporal to their religion, firmly anchoring eternity to the 
idea of ‘God’s time’. Before Ficino, Cusa and even Boethius, St. Augustine had made it 
very clear that the God of Christianity was an eternal God residing ‘outside’ Earthly time: 
‘Lord, eternity is yours’.  In the aptly-titled Book XI of his Confessions, ‘Time and 27
Eternity’, Augustine adapts the Platonic conception of eternity and time to his own 
beliefs. He compares the ‘drops of time’ that he perceives in everyday life (the ‘drops’ in 
question refer to the water clock, steadily counting time) to God’s eternity, in which 
‘nothing is transient, but the whole is present’, i.e. there is no such thing as transition 
from past to present to future; rather eternity is one whole present moment.  28
Furthermore, where Christianity is concerned, eternity is a state of time (or non-time) 
firmly outside the realm of human knowledge:  
 Who will lay hold on the human heart to make it still, so that I can see how   
 eternity, in which there is neither future nor past, stands still and dictates future  
 and past times? Can my mind have the strength for this? Can the hand of my   
 mouth by mere speech achieve so great a thing?  29
  
 Eternity is considered to be a state of time that human beings cannot understand - 
Augustine desires to ‘see’ eternity but questions whether his mind possesses the strength 
to comprehend such a radically different state of time, which knows no difference at all 
between past, present and future.  The time that human beings perceive is characterised 30
by a constant flowing between the three temporal divisions, whereas eternity in the 
Confessions is permanent, stable and perhaps most importantly, it is God’s time: ‘The 
 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, p. 221. On the continuation of these beliefs into the Middle Ages see Le Goff, 27
‘Merchant’s Time and Church’s Time in the Middle Ages’; also Christopher S. Celenza, ‘The Revival of Platonic 
Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 72-96. According to Celenza, ‘It was ‘a medieval commonplace, inherited from St. 
Augustine (354-430): that of all the ancient pagan philosophies, Platonism came the closest to Christian truth’ (p. 72).
 Ibid., p. 228.28
 Ibid., p. 229. 29
 For more on this aspect of time in Augustine, see Duncan Kennedy, Antiquity and the Meanings of Time: a 30
Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Literature (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). Kennedy suggests that Augustine is 
explicitly writing in order to make sense of his relationship with God, who exists outside of time: ‘Time, then, is 
inescapably part of his attempt to know himself and know God, but famously, it is something that bewilders him’ (p. 
22).
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eternal nature of God was incomparable to the nature of man’.  Following the 31
publication of the Confessions these descriptions only became further entrenched within 
Christian belief and remained influential well into the 1500s.  
 Overall, eternity attributed a deeper meaning to human time on Earth; the sense 
of ‘transient’ human life, i.e. of life as a temporary way station on the way to heaven and 
the eternal, was still prevalent well into the 16th century and beyond.  However, in his 32
brief article on early modern time, G.F. Waller also identified eternity as the cliché modern 
scholars often relied upon in order to define Renaissance time: ‘[they] have been content 
to treat the Renaissance philosophy of time as a continuation of traditional medieval 
ideas, which set time in the context of a transcendent eternity’.  Little has changed in this 33
respect, and eternity is still used by modern scholars of time studies to explain the familiar 
tropes of transience that are frequently attributed to 16th century time, often without any 
reference as to whether different branches of Christianity were discussing eternity in 
opposing ways. Redondi frames the inventions of astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) 
and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) within a dialogue that was reacting primarily to ‘quanto 
era scritto nella Bibbia riguardo alla transitorietà del tutto’.  Exploring the image of time 34
in Shakespeare’s ‘The Winter’s Tale’, Frederick Kiefer introduces Renaissance Time in 
familiar tropes, once more emphasising the personified Father Time and his scythe, which 
represented ‘the destructive effects of transience’.  By analysing the extent to which 35
Montaigne and Bruno engage with the definitions above, I hope to demonstrate that their 
conceptions of time possess a somewhat more complicated relationship to eternity, one 
that defies the scholarly trends I have previously discussed.  
 Cohen, p. 44. See also Ricardo J. Quinones, The Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 31
University Press, 1972). Quinones states that ‘God’s eternity is not merely one of superior duration to the time of man: 
it differs by virtue of the simplicity of its nature. Eternity is totally different from succession’ (p. 14).
 See G.F. Waller, ‘Transition in Renaissance Ideas of Time and the Place of Giordano Bruno’, Neophilologus, 55 (1971), 32
pp. 3-15 (p. 5).
 Ibid., p. 3. 33
 Pietro Redondi, Storie del tempo (Rome: Laterza, 2007), p. 103. 34
 Frederick Kiefer, ‘The Iconography of Time in “The Winter’s Tale”’, Renaissance and Reformation, 23.3 (1999), pp. 35
49-64 (p. 50). Georges Poulet was an early critic of this kind of representation. See Georges Poulet, Études sur le temps 
humain I (Paris: Plon et Éditions Du Rocher, 1952), pp. 11-17. 
'123
Montaigne and eternity 
 Previous scholars have minimised the impact of eternity on Montaigne’s thought. 
As Françoise Joukovsky stated on time in the Essais, there is no chapter by Montaigne 
entitled ‘Du temps’.  In addition, there is certainly no ‘De l’éternité’. However, 36
compared to over 500 occurrences of the word ‘temps’ in the Essais, there are only nine 
occurrences of the word ‘eternité’ and one of its close equivalent ‘éternité’ across the 
whole three books, and the majority of these instances appear in a single chapter - the 
‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’ (II.XII).  Consequently, there are not vast amounts of 37
material for scholars to work with in the first place - in the highly comprehensive 
Dictionnaire de Montaigne (2004) edited by Philippe Desan, there is no entry for 
‘eternité’ or any of its related terms. In Montaigne et le problème du temps (1972) 
Joukovsky argued that Montaigne showed little interest in seriously pursuing 
Neoplatonic ideas of time and eternity, despite owning a copy of Plotinus’ Enneads 
himself.  Furthermore, I briefly highlighted Montaigne’s apparent rejection of the soul’s 38
immortality and the absence in his writing of any consistent references to an eternal 
Afterlife.  Consequently, eternity (or perhaps more precisely the omission of eternity) in 39
the Essais has often been linked to other themes in Montaigne’s work - particularly the 
wider, contentious debate concerning Montaigne’s piety - rather than its relationship to 
time.   40
 In this section, I present how and why eternity seemingly occupies an ambivalent 
position within the Essais, particularly in relation to time. I hope to show that in the 
‘Apologie’ Montaigne frees himself from any preconceived obligation to discuss eternity 
by aligning it firmly and undeniably with God. This strategy simultaneously allows 
Montaigne to display an open recognition of familiar 16th-century conceptions of 
eternity while also justifying his much wider interest in the mutability of time, in what 
 Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps, p. 9.36
 There are also 2 occurrences of another variant, ‘aeternité’ at I.XL.279 and II.XII.549. 37
 Joukovsky, Montaigne et le problème du temps, p. 29. It must be noted that Joukovsky relies heavily on Pierre Villey, 38
Les sources et l’évolution des Essais de Montaigne (New York: B. Franklin, 1968) to inform her monograph.
 Ian Maclean, Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), p. 70; see also Felicity Green, 39
‘Montaigne’s Soul’, in Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture, ed. by Brian Cummings & Freya Sierhuis 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 99-112.
 See Jerry C. Nash, ‘The Christian-Humanist Meditation on Man: Denisot, Montaigne, Rabelais, Ronsard, Scève’, 40
Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 54.2 (1992), pp. 353-371. Nash argues that Montaigne laid the groundwork for 
an affirmation of faith in God and man, navigating a middle ground amidst the debate over Montaigne’s faith. For an 
introduction to the roots of this debate see René Bady, Humanisme chrétien dans les lettres françaises: XIVe-XVIIe 
siècles (Paris: Fayard, 1972); an opposing view is laid out by M.A. Screech in the introduction to his English translation. 
See Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), pp. xiii-xxxix. 
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René Bady has described as a distinctly human-centred approach to temporality: 
‘l’humanisme de l’auteur des Essais évolue ainsi dangereusement vers un humanisme clos, 
enfermant l’homme en lui-même et dans les bornes de son destin temporel’.  If, as 41
previously stated, Montaigne partially writes in order to pin down the flow of his 
thoughts in a (moving) self-portrait, then eternity would naturally appear infrequently in 
the Essais. Bady’s choice of the word ‘dangereusement’ is questionable here - I hope to 
argue that Montaigne’s intention is to examine human beings and their world, while 
avoiding metaphysical questions as much as possible. Attributing eternity to God is one 
way of putting this question firmly to one side, allowing Montaigne to concentrate on 
human time. Montaigne himself states that he cannot possess any direct knowledge of 
eternity and instead his concerns lie primarily with the time he experiences day-to-day, 
minute-to-minute: ‘Je veux representer le progrez de mes humeurs, et qu’on voye chaque 
piece en sa naissance’ (II.XXXVII.758).  
 At the same time, one must acknowledge that eternity appears in some of the 
most significant parts of the ‘Apologie’. Amidst several pages that emphasise the 
mutability of time on Earth, Montaigne suggests that rational knowledge of God is 
impossible for human beings, using the nature of eternity as a clear example of this failure. 
Thus I argue that Montaigne does not reject or attack eternity, but neither does he 
wholeheartedly respond to it without an ulterior motive in mind. I believe that he firmly 
and consistently separates time from eternity in order to focus greater attention on his 
belief - constant throughout much of the Essais - that not only his own body but that of 
everything he sees in Nature, exists in a state of temporal flux. I have already argued that 
scholarship persistently approaches 16th century time with a religious paradigm which 
fails to identify differences between branches of Christianity. Furthermore, eternity has 
often been portrayed by critics as a continuation from the Middle Ages. However, this 
approach proves to be impossible in the Essais since Montaigne’s interest in the human 
perception of time precludes any commentary on central Renaissance conceptions of 
eternity. 
 This section examines evidence primarily taken from two chapters of the Essais - 
‘Que philosopher, c’est apprendre à mourir’ (I.XX) and ‘Apologie de Raimond 
Sebond’ (II.XII) - with additional quotations from ‘De l’experience’ (III.XIII), ‘Du 
repentir’ (III.II) and ‘De l’inconstance de nos actions’ (II.I). The first two chapters are 
perhaps Montaigne’s most well-known pieces of work. An initial draft of ‘Que 
 Nash, p. 355.41
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philosopher, c’est apprendre à mourir’ was probably written around 1572 and the title 
itself refers to a translated line from the 26th letter Seneca wrote to Lucilius.  Montaigne 42
embraces the spirit of this maxim by assembling a wide range of ancient and 
contemporary sources, ‘une mosaïque d’exemples et d’allégations’ that seek to convince 
the reader of the need to confront death at every turn.  The ‘Apologie de Raimond 43
Sebond’ is also well-known as the longest chapter in the Essais: ‘passant de 150 pages dans 
l’édition de 1580 à 120 pages in-folio dans l’édition de 1595’.  While it has proved difficult 44
to pinpoint the exact date of the first draft, the ‘Raimond Sebond’ of the title has been 
rather more easily identified as the Spanish author of the Theologia naturalis (c.1434), a 
Latin work that Montaigne had been asked to translate into French by his father.  
 The ‘Apologie’ was initially written as a response to Sebond’s Theologia, in which 
Sebond attempted to reconcile philosophy and theology by claiming that nature, like the 
Bible, was a form of divine revelation. In reality, the ‘Apologie’ became a much larger 
project, which saw Montaigne systematically question any and all human claims to know 
the truth about nature.  As a result, the ‘Apologie’ has been labelled a sign of a sceptical 45
crisis, the centre of all reflection in the Essais and an account of Pyrrhonism that 
dismantles any human claims to epistemological certainty.  Why did Montaigne write 46
such a chapter? Influenced by Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the 
‘Apologie’ is probably Montaigne’s most profound statement on the overarching problem 
he perceives as he sits in his tower reading and writing.  Human opinion has generated a 47
multitude of philosophies that all claim to know truth - Pythagoreanism, Stoicism, 
Scepticism, Atomism, and many other ‘isms’. Consequently, how can one reliably claim 
to know the ‘real’ truth? Throughout this discussion, Montaigne portrays a restless image 
of humanity, one in a constant search for the truth which only generates further 
 See notes to ‘Que philosopher’ by Jean Balsamo, in Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine 42
Magnien-Simonen (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 1358. 
 Ibid.43
 Ibid.44
 Maclean, Montaigne philosophe, p. 63. ‘Il [Montaigne] juxtapose plusieurs définitions de nature puisées dans les écrits 45
de certains anciens de sorte qu’elles s’infirment mutuellement’ (p. 63). 
 See John O’Brien, ‘Montaigne and Antiquity’, in The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, ed. by Ullrich Langer 46
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 53-73 (p. 60); also Elaine Limbrick, ‘Was Montaigne Really a 
Pyrrhonian?’, Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 39 (1977), pp. 67-80; Ann Hartle, ‘Montaigne and 
Skepticism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, ed. by Ullrich Langer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 183-207. 
 On Montaigne and Sextus Empiricus, see Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of 47
Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), ‘Sextus Empiricus’; Richard E. Flathman, ‘The Self Against 
and for Itself: Montaigne and Sextus Empiricus on Freedom, Discipline and Resistance’, The Monist, 83.4 (2000), pp. 
491-529.
'126
uncertainty. There is time which brings perpetual change, and alongside this there is also 
the perpetual knowledge generated by human beings, evolving and changing and 
conflicting: ‘cette infinie confusion d’opinions qui se void entre les philosophes mesmes, 
et ce debat perpetuel et universel en la connoissance des choses’ (II.XII.562-563). Within 
the final pages of the ‘Apologie’ this state of affairs contrasts heavily with eternity which, 
as we have seen, was supposed to represent the absolute truth of God. 
 I have stated that the vast majority of instances involving the term ‘eternité’ and 
its variants (‘éternité’, ‘eternel’, ‘aeternité’) appear in the ‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’ 
and it is here that Montaigne first broaches the subject of eternity by addressing some of 
the standard associations of his age. A rare example of Montaigne discussing specifically 
Christian ideas of the afterlife appears in his remark that ‘les Chrestiens ont une 
particuliere cognoissance combien la curiosité est un mal naturel et originel en 
l’homme’ (II.XII.498). Consequently Montaigne derides what he perceives as a growing 
interest in science which can only lead to eternal damnation; the author claims that 
Christians view the advancement of sagesse and science as ‘la premiere ruine du genre 
humain; […] la voye par où il [le genre humain] s’est precipité à la damnation 
eternelle’ (II.XII.498). Furthermore, on learning about God through Nature, Montaigne 
alludes to the ‘Book of Nature’ by paraphrasing St. Paul. The ‘Book of Nature’ - a 
popular concept in the Middle Ages - was the idea that Nature makes present God’s 
invisible ways to human beings: ‘Les choses invisibles de Dieu, dit saint Paul, apparoissent 
par la creation du monde, considerant sa sapience eternelle et sa divinité par ses 
oeuvres’ (II.XII.447).  Nature is a created being which acts as an earthly reminder of the 48
divine knowledge of God. In the Essais, it is arguably easiest to begin by listing the few 
instances above in which Montaigne does refer to eternity in a more familiar 16th-century 
context. Through the use of such remarks, Montaigne directly alludes to the standard 
religious framework of the late 1500s - God is eternal and so is his knowledge, while time 
on Earth is a created reflection of his superior being.  
 However, the ‘Apologie’ is a chapter that consistently draws on a wide variety of 
philosophical sources in order to explore the infinite claims to truth endlessly generated 
by human beings. Eternity is not exempt from this pursuit. Alongside the standard 
religious conceptions of his own age, Montaigne relates all of the various ways in which 
philosophers have attempted to express the eternal. In one section, he begins by 
remarking that the Greco-Roman geographer Ptolemy had already claimed to have 
 For background on the idea of the Book of Nature see Epstein, ‘1 - The Discovery of Nature’; also Wesley M. Stevens, 48
Cycles of Time and Scientiﬁc Learning in Medieval Europe (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995).
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mapped the entire world and consequently casts doubt over the claims of his 16th-century 
contemporaries - ‘les Geographes de ce temps’ (II.XII.572) - that the whole world had 
been discovered. Montaigne soon widens his discussion to include not only absolute 
claims about space but also time on Earth. Many familiar eternal concepts emerge here as 
Montaigne briefly refers to ‘la creance d’Aristote sur l’Eternité de l’ame’ (II.XII.504), as 
well as the belief in the sempiternity of the world held by Aristotle, Cicero and others ‘que 
la naissance du monde est indéterminée’ (II.XII.572). Of course, this idea was deeply 
heretical because Christianity believed that the world was created, it was not sempiternal. 
Montaigne also lists ancient ideas of infinite succession concerning the Earth ‘qu’il est, de 
toute eternité, mortel et renaissant à plusieurs vicissitudes’ (II.XII.572); even the idea that 
some Greeks held concerning an eternal God at the centre of the Earth, ‘divin, tres-
heureux, tres-grand, tres-sage, eternel’ (II.XII.572).  In line with Montaigne’s initial 49
criticism of Ptolemy and the 16th-century geographers, the lengthy listing of all of these 
definitions of eternity only serves to completely undermine their validity when they 
appear one after the other - knowledge is open-ended and surpasses an individual’s 
lifetime; after all, it moves towards an inexhaustible future.  
 Montaigne criticises such definitions of eternity when every philosophy from 
Stoicism to Aristotelianism has laid claim to absolute truth: ‘vaut il pas mieux se tenir 
hors de cette meslée?’ (II.XII.504). Surely it is better for humans to avoid such debates 
altogether? Besides, Montaigne complains that human beings cannot even claim to know 
themselves, let alone eternity: ‘l’homme n’est non plus instruit de la connoissance de soy 
en la partie corporelle qu’en la spirituelle’ (II.XII.557). In ‘De l’exercitation’, Montaigne 
wryly observed that philosophers cannot come back from the dead to inform others of 
the nature of death, but thinkers have still tried to describe it anyway.  Much the same 50
might be said of eternity - philosophers cannot experience eternity or witness the stars 
rolling above their heads forever, but they have still tried to articulate this process anyway. 
Yet Montaigne pointedly criticises any human attempt to define the eternal - eternity has 
always been strongly linked to the divine and in the ‘Apologie’ it is not something that 
humans can claim to have any knowledge of, no matter which school of philosophy they 
derive from.  
 ‘Tel estude fut celuy du jeune Caton sentant sa fin prochaine, qui se rencontra au discours de Platon, de l’eternité de 49
l’ame. Non, comme il faut croire, qu’il ne fut de long temps garny de toute sorte de munition pour un tel deslogement; 
d’asseurance, de volonté ferme et d’instruction il en avoit plus que Platon n’en a en ses escrits: sa science et son courage 
estoient, pour ce regard, au dessus de la philosophie’ (II.XXVIII.703).
 ‘Il s'est trouvé anciennement des hommes si excellens mesnagers du temps, qu’ils ont essayé en la mort mesme de la 50
gouster et savourer, et ont bandé leur esprit pour voir que c’estoit de ce passage, mais ils ne sont pas revenus nous en dire 
les nouvelles’ (II.VI.371).
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 This approach underlies much of Montaigne’s subsequent discussion concerning 
the nature of eternity. In many passages, he emphasises his insistence on our inability to 
comprehend eternity by focusing on the limitations of human language. Ascertaining the 
truth of what time is can be difficult enough, because as Montaigne remarks ‘aller selon 
nature, pour nous, ce n’est qu’aller selon nostre intelligence, autant qu’elle peut suyvre et 
autant que nous y voyons’ (II.XII.526). The Pyrrhonian Sceptic Sextus Empiricus 
believed that all discussion of time results in nonsense, nothing certain can be known 
about it since neither future nor past truly exists, while the present eludes human beings.  51
Proceeding from the idea that one must be reliant on one’s senses in order to know a time 
which - according to Empiricus - may not even exist, Montaigne wonders how humans 
can presume to define even a single lifetime. He asks: ‘car pourquoy prenons nous titre 
d’estre, de cet instant qui n’est qu’une eloise dans le cours infini d’une nuict eternelle, et 
une interruption si briefve de nostre perpetuelle et naturelle condition?’ (II.XII.526) 
‘Estre’ is compared to an instant, but it is not the popular Platonic idea of eternity as an 
instant, instead human life is an instant within ‘le cours infini d’une nuict eternelle’. Time 
endures while humans exist for a comparatively brief duration. Death is a ‘durée infinie et 
perpetuelle’ (II.XII.549) and human beings deal in measures of time that pale in 
comparison to this duration: ‘un temps si court, qui est à l’avanture d’une ou de deux 
heures, ou, au pis aller, d’un siecle, qui n’a non plus de proportion à l’infinité qu’un 
instant’ (II.XII.549). In the ‘Apologie’ human lives are reduced to an instant within a 
period of time that it is impossible to imagine. 
 As a result of the difficulties that emerge when humans attempt to express their 
existence in time, Montaigne criticises the way in which people then try and evaluate 
God’s time in such terms:  
 Il m’a tousjours semblé qu’à un homme Chrestien cette sorte de parler est pleine  
 d’indiscretion et d’irreverance: Dieu ne peut mourir, Dieu ne se peut desdire,   
 Dieu ne peut faire cecy ou cela. Je ne trouve pas bon d’enfermer ainsi la puissance  
 divine soubs les loix de nostre parolle. (II.XII.527) 
  
 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, p. 234. The non-existence of past time and future time proves to be a conundrum 51
for Augustine, which leads to issues regarding the nature of the present: ‘If we can think of some bit of time which 
cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call ‘present’. And this time 
flies so quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no duration. If it has duration, it is divisible into past and 
future. But the present occupies no space’ (p. 232). Chadwick notes that this is a summary of older philosophical 
arguments which state that only time’s indivisibility remains. In Albert Ahmeti, De la peinture du temps dans les ‘Essais’ 
de Montaigne (Paris: Books On Demand, 2014), Ahmeti notes that Empiricus ‘soulève le caractère existant et non 
existant du temps’ (‘Résurgences pyrrhoniennes’). 
'129
 At first glance, this may appear to be a fervently devout passage, mirroring St. 
Augustine by deriding our pretension to articulate a state of timelessness that is so utterly 
alien to us. However, unlike Augustine - who suggests that there may be aspects of nature 
we can learn about - Montaigne completely absolves himself of worrying about 
something that his own words cannot and supposedly should not express. Philippe Desan 
has previously stated that Montaigne was well-read in St. Paul and St. Augustine, but his 
response to these traditional Christian works often came in direct conflict with the official 
canonic interpretation.  Here the idea of one’s inability to express God in human terms is 52
further underlined by Montaigne’s attempt at describing the nature of eternity:  
 Quand nous disons que l’infinité des siecles tant passez qu’avenir, n’est à Dieu   
 qu’un instant; que sa bonté, sapience, puissance sont mesme chose avecques son  
 essence, nostre parole le dict, mais nostre intelligence ne l’apprehende point.   
 (II.XII.528) 
 These are just words - human words that cannot comprehend the time that they 
are trying (very poorly) to express: ‘nostre parole le dict, mais nostre intelligence ne 
l’apprehende point’. Again this quotation initially appears to be a fairly traditional 
reference to Christian-Neoplatonic ideas of eternity - ‘l’infinité des siecles…n’est à Dieu 
qu’un instant’ - and yet it is framed by Montaigne’s concern with what is within the 
power of humans to express about temporality. He is arguably creating a pretext in order 
to avoid having to discuss eternity in too much detail; the closing pages of the ‘Apologie’ 
only serve to convince Montaigne of the need to focus on the time that his senses can 
directly apprehend. As Joukovsky has stated, ‘Il (Montaigne) constate ce qui nous est 
donné: non pas l’être éternel, mais le temps, qui est l’élément premier de notre 
expérience’.  I argue that eternity in the Essais inevitably returns to humanity; discussion 53
of the nature of the eternal frequently leads to a reflection on human time and our 
limitations in articulating it. Montaigne often disguises these concerns using traditional 
Christian Neoplatonic images of eternity or adopting familiar language derived from the 
works of St. Augustine. However, his originality lies in using such language to make an 
alternative point regarding the impossibility - and thus futility - of articulating the eternal. 
 Finally, one must note that the very last pages of the ‘Apologie’ are almost ‘a word 
for word translation of a passage from “The E at Delphi,” a chapter in Plutarch’s 
 Philippe Desan, ‘Introduction’ in Dieu à nostre commerce et société: Montaigne et la théologie, ed. by Philippe Desan 52
(Geneva: Droz, 2008), pp. 7-10 (p. 9). 
 Joukovsky, Problème du temps, p. 100. 53
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Moralia’.  In this text Plutarch attempted to define the letter E, the fifth letter of the 54
Greek alphabet which - amongst various other definitions - was also the word for the 
second person singular of the verb ‘to be’. That Montaigne drew extensively upon this 
source alludes to a wider concern with attempting to pin down the essence of human 
being in time. Montaigne first emphasises human temporality and its impermanence: 
‘[Et] nous, et nostre jugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et roulant sans 
cesse’ (II.XII.601). He reiterates his belief in the idea that both our physical bodies and 
also our inner faculties - ‘nostre jugement’ - are in constant flux, along with everything else 
in the world. Montaigne also highlights ways in which classical philosophers have 
expressed human impermanence: ‘Platon disoit que les corps n’avoient jamais existence, 
ouy bien naissance’ (II.XII.601); Pythagoras, as we saw in Chapter Two, believed that 
‘toute matiere est coulante et labile’ (II.XII.602); the Stoics deny that the present moment 
exists and instead view time as ‘la jointure et assemblage du futur et du passé’ (II.XII.602). 
All of these philosophies offer different approaches to the question of time’s seeming 
instability. Consequently, human beings are condemned to a lifetime of futile attempts to 
establish certainty in an uncertain world: ‘Ainsin il ne se peut establir rien de certain de 
l’un à l’autre, et le jugeant et le jugé estans en continuelle mutation et branle’ (II.XII.601). 
Montaigne denies that humans may ever be able to transcend time and access divine 
knowledge, since they face enough difficulties in confronting temporal flux. Instead, he 
employs distinctly Platonic terms in order to refer to God as the ‘estre’ while humans have 
always existed between ‘le naistre et le mourir’:  
 Ainsin, estant toutes choses subjectes à passer d’un changement en autre, la raison, 
 y cherchant une reelle subsistance, se trouve deceue, ne pouvant rien apprehender  
 de subsistant et permanent, par ce que tout ou vient en estre et n’est pas encore du 
 tout, ou commence à mourir avant qu’il soit nay. (II.XII.602) 
 While Montaigne does not explicitly align these particular remarks with Plato, the 
final lines of this quotation echo Platonic ideas of ‘Becoming’ - everything is coming into 
being and yet will never truly be at all, and begins to die before it is even born.  55
Consequently, everything mortal that has a beginning in time cannot reach a state of 
Being in the eternal sense: ‘ce qui commence à naistre ne parvient jamais jusques à 
perfection d’estre’ (II.XII.602). However, Montaigne is untroubled by this concern and 
 Henry, p. 8. See also Plutarch, Moralia. The E at Delphi, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb 54
Classical Library, n.d.) in Loeb Classical Library <www.loebclassics.com> [accessed 31 August]. 
 In this passage Montaigne borrows directly from Plato’s Theaetetus. See Plato, Complete Works, trans. by John M. 55
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), ‘Theaetetus’. 
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instead goes on to describe the idea of temporal flux in terms of its effect on an individual 
human being through birth, ageing, to death:  
 Comme de semence humaine se fait premierement dans le ventre de la mere un  
 fruict sans forme, puis un enfant formé, puis, estant hors du ventre, un enfant de  
 mammelle; apres il devient garson; puis consequemment un jouvenceau; apres un  
 homme faict; puis un homme d’aage; à la fin decrepité vieillard. (II.XII.602) 
 Such is the life of a human being. Recalling the natural order of time from 
Chapter One, Montaigne emphasises that humans divide their time into distinct stages or 
measurements, referring to birth and death as in the above quotation, or indeed minutes 
or hours, and even ‘before’ and ‘after’: ‘Car c’est chose mobile que le temps […] à qui 
appartiennent ces mots: devant et apres, et a esté ou sera’ (II.XII.603). Here Montaigne 
illustrates two of the three temporal divisions - past and future - but omits any mention 
of the present moment. In light of Montaigne’s reference to Stoicism above, this absence 
may well allude to the well-known concerns of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (279 
BC-206 BC) who denied the existence of the present moment; responding to Aristotle’s 
association of time with duration he claimed that ‘if every duration is divisible into an 
infinite number of parts, the present moment will never truly be present’.  Instead, 56
Montaigne prefers to emphasise the continuous movement between things that will be 
and things that were, reinforcing the idea of human temporality in flux. Any attempt by 
Montaigne to explore the nature of eternity merely betrays his fascination with expressing 
the complexity of human time instead. There are no hollow words in the Essais which 
praise the excellence of God’s time; instead, Montaigne uses well-known discussions of 
eternity - in this case, an excerpt from Plutarch’s Moralia - in order to pursue his objective 
of documenting the changing self in time. 
 After devoting many pages within this extraordinarily long chapter to illustrating 
the utter instability of human claims to truth, which has now been exacerbated by a 
lengthy examination of the infinitely divisible, constantly flowing nature of time itself, 
Montaigne finally asks what can we ever reliably say ‘is’? ‘Mais qu’est-ce donc qui est 
veritablement?’ (II.XII.603). He responds with the following definition of eternity: ‘Ce 
qui est eternel, c’est à dire qui n’a jamais eu de naissance, ny n’aura jamais fin; à qui le 
temps n’apporte jamais aucune mutation’ (II.XII.603). Humans try to express what ‘is’ 
with terms such as ‘present, instant, maintenant, par lesquels il semble que 
 Marta Cristiani, ‘Augustine of Hippo and the new Christian culture’ in Ancient Philosophy: Textual Paths and 56
Historical Explorations, ed. by Lorenzo Perilli & Daniela P. Taormina (London: Taylor & Francis, 2017), pp. 677-738 (p. 
693). 
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principalement nous soustenons et fondons l’intelligence du temps’ (II.XII.603) but 
again, like the Stoics and the Sceptics and other philosophers before them, this only 
highlights the impossibly shifting and flowing nature of human time. How does one 
record the flux and flow of their thoughts in the present if it is impossible to define the 
present moment adequately? ‘Montaigne had clearly seen that the characteristic property 
of the creature is impermanence. No creature ever is: a creature is always shifting, 
changing, becoming’.  Montaigne concludes the chapter with a description of God 57
couched once more in human definitions of temporality: 
 Parquoy il faut conclurre que Dieu seul est, non poinct selon aucune mesure du  
 temps,  mais selon une eternité immuable et immobile, non mesurée par temps,  
 ny subjecte à aucune declinaison; devant lequel rien n’est, ny ne sera apres, ny plus  
 nouveau ou plus recent, ains un realement estant, qui, par un seul maintenant   
 emplit le tousjours; et n’y a rien qui veritablement soit que luy seul, sans qu’on   
 puisse dire: Il a esté, ou: Il sera; sans commencement et sans fin. (II.XII.603) 
 Thus the only certain thing and true is what is eternal. God is, and he is in a way 
that humans will never understand or experience, ‘selon aucune mesure du temps’. 
Common time markers do not apply to God’s existence, rather Montaigne returns to the 
idea of God as a present whole, ‘par un seul maintenant emplit le tousjours’. Joukovsky 
rightly argues that with these passages Montaigne severs time from eternity.  It is 58
certainly true that he places eternity outside of human mental capacity: ‘Dieu seul est’, 
‘[il] n’y a rien qui veritablement soit que luy seul’. At the same time, the three tenses that 
are so intimate to our understanding of time clearly do not apply to eternity.    
 Furthermore, Montaigne is not interested in ‘reaching’ eternity in the same way as 
Augustine in the Confessions. As Marie-Madeleine de La Garandière claims, in the 
‘Apologie’ ‘l’éternité est ici tout autre chose qu’un sempiternum ou un inﬁnitum tempus. 
Elle est d’un autre ordre. Elle est à proprement parler la transcendance’.  However, 59
eternity is not something that Montaigne himself wishes to try and experience. Instead he 
repeats the same descriptions of time and the eternal in order to reinforce his conviction 
that human time is characterised by instability and impermanence. Montaigne is content 
 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), p. xxxix. In 57
The Complete Essays Screech interprets this section from a Christian-Platonic point of view: ‘The Platonic background 
to such a conclusion - unlike the purely Pyrrhonian one - enabled Montaigne to pass from the impermanence of the 
ever changing creature to what he presents as a ‘most pious’ concept of the Godhead, accessible to purely human reason: 
the Creator must have those qualities which Man as creature lacks: he must have unity, not diversity; absolute Being, not 
mere ‘becoming’. And since he created Time he must be outside it and beyond it’ (p. xxxix).  
 See Joukovsky, Problème du temps, p. 122. 58
 De La Garandière, p. 195. 59
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to leave eternity to one side since he believes that the most reliable knowledge human 
beings can access is knowledge of oneself and ‘les sens sont le commencement et la fin de 
l’humaine cognoissance’ (II.XII.588).  As Montaigne states towards the end of ‘De 60
l’experience’, ‘Je ne touche pas icy et ne mesle point à cette marmaille d’hommes que nous 
sommes et à cette vanité de desirs et cogitations qui nous divertissent, ces ames venerables, 
eslevées par ardeur de devotion et religion à une constante et conscientieuse meditation 
des choses divines’ (III.XIII.1114). Within a series of lengthy passages that highlight the 
flux and flow of human time, eternity is firmly placed outside of this process and 
presented as a state of timelessness that human beings could not attempt to comprehend. 
If we accept the critical premise that the ‘Apologie’ is the centre of reflection in the Essais 
then eternity - a central concept within Renaissance ideas of time - possesses a strange 
status within Montaigne’s writing. It is a concept that he clearly feels obliged to address, 
since he dwells on its relationship to time extensively in the final pages of the ‘Apologie’, 
but it is simultaneously a concept which has little bearing on his ultimate desire to map 
himself over time. 
 Temporality in the Essais almost always favours a focus on the most immediate 
indicators of time that are easily comprehensible to human beings - nature, the human 
body, our mental and emotional responses to time. In complete opposition to eternity, 
time in the Essais is always referred to in terms of unceasing flux. We have already begun 
to gain a sense of the connection between time and impermanence in the ‘Apologie’ with 
Montaigne’s reference to the stars and sea: ‘la lumiere eternelle de ces flambeaux roulans si 
fierement sur sa teste, les mouvemens espouvantables de cette mer infinie’ (II.XII.450). 
The physical, natural world only serves to confirm the constant change that human 
beings exist within - mutation is a foundation of ‘nostre perpetuelle et naturelle 
condition’ (II.XII.526).  In a poetic image describing the various stages of human life, 61
Montaigne refers to the ‘branle de mes quatre saisons’ (I.XX.94), which further connects 
the human perception of changes to the natural world with their own understanding of 
time. The word ‘branle’ reappears frequently, and in this case, it refers to humans in time 
and their existence between the ‘four seasons’ - ‘l’enfance, l’adolescence, la virilité et la 
vieillesse du monde’ (I.XX.93-94). In the opening lines of ‘Du repentir’ Montaigne 
 ‘Il ne peut fuir que les sens ne soient les souverains maistres de sa cognoissance; mais ils sont incertains et falsibliables à 60
toutes circonstances. C’est là où il se faut battre à outrance, et, si les forces justes nous faillent, comme elles font, y 
employer l’opiniastreté, la temerité, l’impudence’ (II.XII.592).
 Ahmeti notes that Montaigne often uses water imagery when describing human existence. Trying to find constancy 61
becomes very difficult: ‘Tout comme l’eau s’échappe du creux des mains, la constance échappe à toute pensée qui tente 
de la saisir' (‘2.2 L’inconstance humaine et le présent insaisissable’).
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further considers both himself and the world around him to be constantly changing: ‘Le 
monde n’est qu’une branloire perenne. Toutes choses y branlent sans cesse’ (III.II.804). In 
a clear return to the concept of embodied time, Montaigne follows these remarks with 
various descriptions of both natural and man-made phenomena which echo previous 
examples by Bruno in Chapter One: ‘la terre, les rochers du Caucase, les pyramides 
d’Aegypte, et du branle public et du leur’ (III.II.804). Again Montaigne draws upon the 
term ‘branle’ and its variants in order to describe the perpetual movement of all things in 
time; Randle Cotgrave’s 1611 dictionary translates it as ‘a stirring, an uncertain and 
inconstant motion’. Ironically, throughout the Essais temporal impermanence is one of 
the few things one can reliably say does not change about how Montaigne views the 
world: ‘Finalement, il n’y a aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des 
objects’ (II.XII.601).  
 Montaigne’s descriptions of mutation often resound strikingly with Bruno’s 
conception of mutazione, particularly when we consider his discussions of natural 
phenomena in more detail.  Montaigne often employs the term mutation when describing 
the natural world. ‘La mutation des saisons, des vents, des vivres, des humeurs’ (I.XLIII.
270) is a simple fact of life; in ‘De la vanité’ Montaigne remarks that ‘la mutation d’air et 
de climat ne me touche point; tout Ciel m’est un’ (III.IX.974). Furthermore, in ‘De trois 
commerces’ Montaigne states that ‘la vie est un mouvement inégal, irrégulier, et 
multiforme’ (III.III.819). In the ‘Apologie’ ‘la terre, la mer, les astres, qui s’entretiennent 
d’une harmonieuse et perpetuelle agitation et danse divine’ (II.XII.572) are specifically 
defined by their impermanence. In ‘Des Cannibales’ Montaigne makes an explicit 
connection between flux and time with his reference to the ‘succession de temps’ of 
various natural phenomena, a phrase which resounds with Bruno’s belief in the ‘mutazion 
vicissitudinale del tutto’. In the same chapter, Montaigne famously observes a river near 
to his estate - ‘ma riviere de Dordoigne’ (I.XXXI.204) - and the impressions it has made 
on the nearby riverbank over time:  
 Il semble qu’il y aye des mouvemens, naturels les uns, les autres fievreux, en ces   
 grands corps comme aux nostres. Quand je considere l’impression que ma riviere  
 de Dordoigne faict de mon temps vers la rive droicte de sa descente, et qu’en vingt  
 ans elle a tant gaigné, et desrobé le fondement à plusieurs bastimens, je vois bien  
 que c’est une agitation extraordinaire: car, si elle fut tousjours allée ce train, ou   
 deut aller à l’advenir, la figure du monde seroit renversée. Mais il leur prend des   
 changements: tantost elles s’espendent d’un costé, tantost d’un autre; tantost elles  
 se contiennent. (I.XXXI.204) 
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 For twenty years, Montaigne notes the various changes that the river has made to 
the adjoining bank due to its ‘mouvemens, naturels les uns, les autres fievreux’. 
Furthermore, all of these movements balance out over time - as Montaigne states, if the 
river kept eroding the bank in this manner ‘la figure du monde seroit renversée’. However, 
the changes balance one another out ‘tantost elles s’espendent d’un costé, tantost d’un 
autre’. Again this idea resounds with a wider characteristic of vicissitude that Bruno 
explores in more detail in De l’inﬁnito; due to the process of mutation over time, 
everything passes in and out of the vacuum of space, always mutating within a process 
‘per cui cosa non è di male da cui non s’esca, cosa non è di buono a cui non s’incorra, 
mentre per l’infinito campo, per la perpetua mutazione, tutta la sustanza persevera 
medesima ed una’ (Inﬁnito II.24). Recalling the idea of the spinning ‘ruota del tempo’, 
Bruno describes a process of perpetual mutation over time that always balances things 
out, in much the same way that Montaigne’s description of nature ascribes a general order 
and equilibrium to the ever-changing world around us.  
 Impermanence, mutation, flux: these terms are central to Montaigne’s conception 
of time. Eternity remains absent throughout the three books while time is described 
through temporal flux. Indeed, Montaigne arguably gains comfort not from the idea of a 
time after death, but instead that his death is a part of time, and not just of his own time 
but time in the temporal universe: ‘C’est la condition de vostre creation, c’est une partie de 
vous que la mort: vous vous fuyez vous mesmes’ (I.XX.92); ‘vostre mort est une des pieces 
de l’universe’ (I.XX.92). This passage is followed by another quotation from Lucretius, 
who believed in an unceasing flux or clinamen which dictated the existence of all things in 
time. Montaigne modifies the original Latin quotation from De rerum natura in order to 
state the following: ‘Mortals live dependent on one another…and like runners pass on the 
torch of life’.  In Chapters One and Two I argued that Bruno’s conception of time was 62
influenced partly by atomists such as Lucretius. Montaigne is also fascinated by the 
impermanence of time and arguably takes his influence from similar sources; Henri 
Estienne’s translation of Heraclitus’ fragments, followed by Amyot’s translation of the 
Moralia by Plutarch in 1572, led to a widespread interest in Heraclitean flux and similar 
theories. Indeed, Terence Cave attributes temporal flux in the Essais to Heraclitus: ‘His 
vision of the constant flux of the world and of human consciousness is not derived from 
Pyrrhonism, […] but from a tradition of ancient thought associated in particular with 
 Lucretius, De rerum natura, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, n.d.) in Loeb 62
Classical Library <www.loebclassics.com>, Book II, line 75 [accessed 5 September 2017]. The original Latin reads: ‘sic 
rerum summa novatur/semper, et inter se mortales mutua vivunt:/augescunt aliae gentes, aliae minuuntur, inque brevi 
spatio mutantur saecla animantum et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt’ (p. 100). 
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Heraclitus’.  Also referring to the atomists and time, Joukovsky claims that ‘Montaigne 63
est sans doute l’auteur de la Renaissance qui s’abandonne le plus à cette mobilité 
universelle’.  Religious institutions had severely condemned atomism throughout the 64
Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. Despite provocative attempts by Fracastoro and 
Telesio to introduce atomic conceptions of matter into mainstream thought, Hilary Gatti 
argues that it was Bruno’s Italian dialogues which eventually influenced the widespread 
17th-century interest in atomism.  As I hope to have demonstrated above, Montaigne 65
adapts elements of this unique philosophy into his own writing. According to the Essais 
the entire world ‘ce n’est que branle et inconstance’ (II.I.333), which resounds strikingly 
with Bruno’s belief in ‘la vicissitudine delle cose’. Temporal flux affects everything that 
exists in the natural world - the seasons, animals, plants, the tides, the setting and rising of 
the sun. 
 In conclusion, time in both the Essais and the Italian dialogues is defined by 
impermanence, and this impermanence affects not only human beings but all things in 
nature. For Montaigne, eternity is a subject which must remain outside the realms of 
human study.  Simona Cohen states that natural philosophers in the 15th and 16th 66
centuries were debating time and eternity while drawing on a combination of influences 
including Aristotle and ‘the revival of Neoplatonism’.  Cohen also suggests that on an 67
everyday level people were internalising their responses to these debates - I believe that 
Montaigne’s reversal of eternity as a means to understanding human time is one example 
of this. Montaigne is interested in how time connects human beings to the world around 
them; not only human bodies, but everything is in constant flux, from emotions to 
judgement to desires. Embodied time reemerges as central to Montaigne’s understanding 
of time; here it is not only defined by a physical process from birth through ageing to 
death, but its constant change - which in some ways resembles ancient and 
unconventional atomic theories - connects humans directly to the workings of Nature 
 Terence Cave, How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta, 2007), p. 43. Joukovsky has shown that the pre-Socratics 63
and particularly Heraclitus soared in popularity in the final quarter of the 16th century (p. 8). However, Henry disagrees 
with Cave and Joukovsky - see p. 14 for his argument explaining why Montaigne was probably not influenced greatly by 
Heraclitus.
 Joukovsky, p. 9. This statement can certainly be debated considering the discussion on Bruno in Chapters One and 64
Two of this thesis. 
 Hilary Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 70.65
 See Michel Magnien, ‘Un homme un livre’ in Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, p. xix.  Magnien says that Montaigne 66
believes eternity to be ‘un estude privilegé’ thus ‘le divin doit à ses yeux rester hors du champ d’expérimentation du 
sujet’ (p. xix). 
 Cohen, p. 115.67
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and natural bodies in time. Ironically, temporal flux (or discontinuity) emerges as a 
continuous feature of time in the Essais. As we will see, this has serious repercussions for 
his attempts to portray himself and to pin down these perceptions through the medium 
of writing - the Essais are not a still life portrait, they are a moving portrait - they have to 
be due to the nature of time. 
Bruno and eternity 
 In the Essais eternity is not an integral part of Montaigne’s reflection on time since 
it is not something that Montaigne should ever or could ever try and understand. 
However, in the Italian dialogues, eternity occupies a much more centralised position 
within Bruno’s conception of time. In stark comparison to Montaigne, Bruno’s 
understanding of eternity has received a considerable amount of attention from scholars 
working within the field of Bruno studies.  However, he does not define eternity as a 68
single, extra-temporal entity that surrounds the cosmos, because in Bruno’s cosmology 
‘everything was a direct emanation from Him’.  Instead, eternity in Bruno’s texts is 69
composed of several different layers.  
 First, eternity relates to Bruno’s interpretation of endless recurrence, in which he 
believed that throughout human history, entire epochs existed in the light of ‘good’ 
knowledge or the shadows of ‘dark’ Aristotelian-Scholastic knowledge.  Bruno portrayed 70
himself in his writing as a metaphorical prophet of ‘la vera filosofia’ because he wanted to 
convey the idea that time in the 16th century was returning to a period of light in which 
the infinite universe - once postulated by Epicurus, Democritus and various pre-Socratics 
- would be universally accepted once more: ‘ciò che oggi appare “nuovo” non è altro che 
 See Michele Ciliberto, ‘Infinito e tempo nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno’, in Filosoﬁa del tempo, ed. by Luigi Ruggiu 68
(Milan: Mondadori, 1998), pp. 96-111; M.A. Granada, ‘The Concept of Time in Giordano Bruno: Cosmic times and 
Eternity’; Granada, ‘Mersenne’s Critique of Giordano Bruno’s Conception of the Relation between God and the 
Universe: A Reappraisal’, Perspectives on Science, 18.1 (2010), pp. 26-49; Dilwyn Knox, ‘Bruno: Immanence and 
Transcendence in De la causa, principio et uno, Dialogue II’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 19.2 (2003), pp. 463-482.
 Giuseppe Candela, ‘An Overview of the Cosmology, Religion and Philosophical Universe of Giordano Bruno’, 69
Italica, 75.3 (1998), pp. 348-364 (p. 348). 
 This topic has already received ample attention from critics. See Paul-Henri Michel, Chapter Ten, ‘Temps et éternité’; 70
Spruit, Chapter Two, ‘L’anno del mondo e l’anno umano’; Pasquale Sabbatino, Giordano Bruno e la“mutazione” del 
Rinascimento (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1993); Sabbatino, A l’inﬁnito m’ergo: Giordano Bruno e il volo del moderno Ulisse 
(Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004). The following passage explains recurrence in the Italian dialogues: ‘Inoltre dichiara ancora 
una volta la piena consapevolezza del fatto che la civiltà rinascimentale, esaurita ed esautorata, ha toccato il fondo della 
notte, un tempo estremo dopo il quale si può finalmente guardare in avanti: “ora che siamo stati nella feccia delle 
opinioni, le quali son causa della feccia de gli costumi ed opre, possiamo certo aspettare de ritornare a meglior stati”’ (p. 
10). Bruno introduces what Sabbatino calls ‘mutazione epocale’ i.e. a passage to a new age ‘il cui protagonista sarà 
proprio il furioso eroico’ (p. 10).
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l’antico riabilitato e rafforzato dalle conoscenze del presente’.  Humanity was on the cusp 71
of a new period of light which would witness the widespread adoption of Egyptian and 
pre-Socratic theories rather than remain under the shadow of Aristotelianism. 
 Second, as well as the idea of recurring historical cycles, eternity possesses a 
significant position in Bruno’s decidedly untraditional infinite cosmos. The last two 
chapters presented time as vicissitude in the Italian dialogues, focusing on the idea of 
perpetual change and the mutations of matter and form that constitute the passage of 
time. However, vicissitude endures endlessly, a form of infinite duration within an infinite 
universe. I have previously highlighted Bruno’s image of the ruota del tempo turning 
endlessly, as well as his conviction that ‘everything changes, nothing dies’ - it appears that 
time itself endures infinitely, despite consisting of innumerable finite parts.  
 Finally, to complicate matters further, eternity also exists in a slightly more 
conventional sense through the World Soul or anima del mondo. As I highlighted above, 
this is a concept borrowed directly from Plato, which Bruno would have familiarised 
himself with through Ficino’s commentaries, and it infuses the matter we have seen 
defined by change with eternal substance.  God is now within the cosmos itself, rather 72
than surrounding it in a spatial and temporal eternity. Consequently, a set of complex 
layers of time emerges in the Italian dialogues through the idea that vicissitude endures 
infinitely, while matter also contains an eternal substance that connects it to everything 
else in the infinite universe.  
 It is also important to note here that a distinct layer of complexity emerges when 
one considers whether Bruno’s divinity is immanent or transcendent - across the entirety 
of Bruno’s works one finds quotations that appear to support both conceptions of God.  73
This apparent duality may well be explained by the sources Bruno draws on; in this 
matter he was greatly influenced by the German philosopher and theologian Nicholas of 
Cusa (1401-1464), who was modifying ideas taken from Plotinus.  Cusa attempted to 74
adapt Neoplatonic philosophy on the nature of God to Christianity by introducing a 
theory of massimo assoluto and massimo contratto in the first two books of De docta 
 Nuccio Ordine, ‘Introduzione’, in Giordano Bruno, Opere Italiane, 2 vols, ed. by Nuccio Ordine (Turin, UTET 71
2002), p. 76.
 See Spruit, p. 189. ‘Le fonti più dirette di Bruno nel secondo dialogo sono il Timaeus di Platone, Plotino e Ficino’.72
 Interestingly, the same problem also arises in the work of Louis Le Roy. See Philippe de Lajarte, ‘Entre logique 73
naturelle et logique providentielle: les ressorts de l’histoire d’après le traité “De la vicissitude ou variété des choses en 
l’univers” de Loys Le Roy’, Seizième Siècle, 10 (2014), pp. 245-260 (p. 255).
 The Greek philosopher’s theories on the nature of divinity straddle an uneasy line between immanence and 74
transcendence. See Arthur H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus: an 
Analytical and Historical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 42-44. 
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ignorantia (1440).  The massimo assoluto refers to God while the massimo contratto 75
describes the Earth, which operates through mechanisms that imitate (in an imperfect 
manner) the mechanisms of God himself. Cusa sought to transform this rather 
pantheistic-sounding conception of divinity into a more transcendent theory by firmly 
emphasising the distinction between God and his creation, but the Church accused him 
of pantheism despite his best efforts to avoid such a charge. These intricacies reappear in 
Bruno’s work; Hélène Védrine has already noted the confusion that arises from 
attempting to classify God as pantheistic or immanent in Bruno’s thought.  As we will 76
see below, the Eroici Furori firmly describe an all-encompassing God which infuses the 
infinite universe, while the De umbris idearum and other Latin texts put forth the 
opposite viewpoint.  Unfortunately, this thesis is unable to resolve this complex issue 77
once and for all; rather the focus on the Eroici Furori in this discussion will naturally draw 
on Bruno’s immanentist vocabulary with emphasis on the transcendent nature of eternity 
where appropriate.  
 Unsurprisingly, the small number of scholars that have already studied Bruno and 
time admit - either directly or indirectly - that Bruno’s conception of eternity adds a 
distinct layer of complexity to his understanding of time. Furthermore, Gatti has 
previously emphasised its distinct originality; in particular, the nature of soul ‘becomes 
one of the most complex and original aspects of his atomistic philosophy’.  I will examine 78
these layers in more detail and particularly how they relate to Bruno’s cosmology. Thus 
far, Bruno has demonstrated a tendency to attack standard 16th-century conceptions of 
time, due in part to his radical cosmological theories. However, like Montaigne, 
traditional notions of eternity occupy an unusual position in the Italian dialogues. Bruno 
is highly influenced by the more conventional Neoplatonic theories of Ficino and others, 
but he simultaneously integrates these ideas into a heretical cosmology.  
 In this section, I examine a range of texts from the Italian dialogues, including De 
la causa, principio e uno (1584) and De l’inﬁnito, universo e mondi (1584). Both dialogues 
contain several passages which describe time, eternity and the function of the World Soul 
 Elisabetta Scapparone, ‘Un seminario su “fonti e motivi dell’opera di Giordano Bruno”’, Rivista di Storia della 75
Filosoﬁa, 48.2 (1993), pp. 395-400 (p.398). On the connection between Bruno and Nicholas of Cusa see Leo Catana, ‘The 
Coincidence of Opposites: Cusanian and Non-Cusanian Interpretations in the Thought of Bruno’, Bruniana & 
Campanelliana, 17.2 (2011), pp. 381-400. 
 Hélène Védrine, La conception de la nature chez Giordano Bruno (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), pp. 324-325. ‘Tous les lecteurs 76
de Bruno savent qu’on trouve chez lui, en quantités à peu près égales, des textes favorables à la transcendance divine et 
d’autres qui suggèrent un immanentisme total’ (p. 324). 
 Ibid., p. 327. 77
 Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, p. 74.78
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in Bruno’s cosmology; reference to Bruno’s later text Camoeracensis Acrotismus (1588) will 
also be useful in this respect. From De la causa onwards, Bruno’s desire to reconnect 
human beings with nature through a true understanding of its workings is displayed 
through his emphasis on ‘questa ricerca dell’Uno, [in] questa contemplazione della 
natura’.  The World Soul is an integral part of space and time in the infinite universe 79
since it vivifies everything and brings about the joining of matter and form in nature. It is 
also eternal and contains the souls of everything else within it so that the infinite universe 
becomes a simulacrum of God, an image of divine unity.  The repercussions of time, 80
infinite duration and the World Soul for Bruno’s understanding of the best way to live in 
the world will become clear in the final section of this chapter. Here I hope to show that 
Bruno (like Montaigne) adopts an array of traditional references to 16th-century eternity 
alongside his decidedly untraditional objective of delineating a true conception of the 
infinite universe. 
 In a typical passage from De l’inﬁnito Bruno criticises Scholastic definitions of 
eternity. According to Bruno the eternity of the Physics and ‘alcuni teologi’ is severely 
problematic: ‘Da questa dottrina dico avete modo di estricarvi da innumerabili 
labirinti’ (De l’inﬁnito II.80). Instead, Bruno once more sets forth an alternative 
definition of eternity that is itself constituted of several different moving parts. One of the 
clearest explanations of time and eternity in Bruno’s philosophy appears in the 
Camoeracensis Acrotismus, Bruno’s thorough dismantling of Aristotle’s Physics. Although 
the Latin text was written a few years after the Eroici Furori, it discusses time and eternity 
in a concise and technical manner that aligns with longer passages from both De l’inﬁnito 
and De la causa. In Article XXXIX of Camoeracensis, Bruno begins by explaining his 
cosmology in spatial terms. His monistic universe is a vast and infinite space; ‘one single 
place, one single infinity, one infinite space’.  However, these characteristics also apply to 81
Bruno’s understanding of time in this universe: ‘one single time, one single duration, that 
possesses neither end nor beginning’.  As Granada has stated, while there is often a focus 82
on spatial infinitude in Bruno’s works, ‘the universe is infinite along the temporal plane 
 Ordine, p. 81.79
 Ibid., p. 87.80
 Giordano Bruno, Acrotismus camoeracensis, ed. by F. Fiorentino (Naples: Dom. Morano, 1879), p. 146. Translation 81
own. Original text: ‘locus unus, infinitum unum, infinitum spatium commune’. For an excellent foreword and 
historical background to this text, see the Italian translation edited by Barbara Amato in Giordano Bruno, Acrotismo 
cameracense. Le spiegazioni degli articoli di ﬁsica contro i Peripatetici, trans. and ed. by Barbara Amato, Bruniana & 
Campanelliana, 7 (Pisa: Serra, 2009), p. 11-34.
 Ibid. Original text: ‘ita unum tempus commune, una duratione, nec finem neque principium ullum recognoscens’. 82
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too: it is eternal and its eternity is established with the same theological necessity as the 
spacial infinitude’.  In fact, both time and eternity exist under one single duration.  83 84
While eternity is a single duration that possesses neither beginning nor end, time is the 
duration of individual, finite being. Some things - such as the World Soul - endure 
eternally and have neither beginning nor end, while others endure temporally, ‘and of 
these temporal things, some endure for longer while others endure for shorter periods of 
time’.  Time is a form of duration, still firmly anchored to mutation: ‘time is always the 85
measure of some kind of revolution’.  On the other hand, eternity is infinite duration 86
and in De l’inﬁnito Filoteo refers to eternity as ‘tempo infinito’ (De l’inﬁnito II.80). To 
summarise, time is a species of duration, and there is both finite and infinite duration 
(time and eternity, respectively). 
 Nonetheless, the relationship between time and eternity is arguably more 
complicated than a distinction between two different types of duration. As stated above, 
alongside the ‘unica durata’ of eternity is the duration of temporally finite parts i.e., those 
things or beings which endure for different lengths of time. This latter definition 
constitutes the conception of time outlined in Chapters One and Two - a process of 
constant mutation. In the Cena finite beings exist ‘in diversi tempi’: ‘…se non in un 
medesmo tempo ed instante d’eternità, al meno in diversi tempi, in varii instanti d’eternità 
successiva e vicissitudinalmente…’ (Cena I.556). Furthermore, Bruno consistently 
describes time in terms of atoms, which recalls the Heraclitean flux that also permeates 
time in the Essais (although Bruno uses clear philosophical terminology): ‘influiscano 
nuovi atomi e da noi se dipartano li già altre volte accolti’ (De l’inﬁnito II.72).  All bodies 87
are composed of atoms, and these atoms endure infinitely, so that the matter and form of 
beings mutate in an endless process. In the Spaccio de la bestia trionfante Bruno states 
several times that sustanza corporea itself is eterna: ‘è vera sustanza de la cose, eterna 
 M.A. Granada, ‘El concepto de tiempo en Bruno: tiempos cósmicos y eternidad’, in La ﬁlosoﬁa di Giordano Bruno: 83
Problemi ermeneutici e storiograﬁci, ed. by Eugenio Canone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2003), pp. 85-113 (pp. 86-87). 
Translation own. While I have previously stated that Granada believes there is little of importance with regards to time 
in the Italian dialogues, in his valuable study of eternity in Bruno’s works he draws on passages from De l’inﬁnito (as 
well as the first book of De immenso). 
 Bruno, Acrotismus camoeracensis, p. 147.84
 Ibid. Original text: ‘ita sub communi una omnium duratione, diversis diversae duratione atque tempora 85
appropriantur’. See Hutton, pp. 357-358. See also Nicola Badaloni, ‘Sulla struttura del tempo in Giordano Bruno’, 
Bruniana & Campanelliana, 3.1 (1997), pp. 11-45. Badaloni accepts that time is a measure of motor but he says this 
cannot apply to the sky and that there is a time on Earth ‘e tanti tempi quanti sono gli astri’ (p. 35).
 Ibid. Original text: ‘Immo semper tempus alicuius revolutionis quantitas est’.86
 Of course, Bruno will go on to expound atomism in much more detail in his later Latin works, particularly in his epic 87
poem De immenso. 
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ingenerabile, incorrottibile’ (Spaccio II.181). This eternal substance ensures that mutazione 
itself endures infinitely while being simultaneously composed of parts that endure 
temporally: ‘E così oltre et oltre sempre discorrendo per il fato della mutazione, eterno 
verrà incorrendo altre et altre peggiori e megliori specie di vita e di fortuna’ (Spaccio II.
184); ‘percioché questa [vita], senza sperar giamai ritorno, eternamente passa’ (Spaccio II.
310). Matter and form endures temporally while the atoms that constitute matter endure 
infinitely, signifying that the process of vicissitude itself is eternal.  
 If eternity (infinite duration) complicates the question of time in the Italian 
dialogues, Bruno at least remains consistent in his depiction of its relationship to time 
(finite duration). Even in the Candelaio, the character Bartolomeo reflects on the value of 
money and portrays it as an element that embraces all others in much the same way as the 
World Soul: ‘Questo dà la vita temporale e la eterna ancora’ (Candelaio I.324). Life is 
timely and eternal at the same time - matter endures temporally but mutates eternally.  88
Mara Elena Severini identifies vicissitude as a process of temporal opposites while 
employing familiar Platonic terms of being and becoming: ‘la vicissitudine è 
combinazione di essere e divenire, di identità e differenza, di variazione e continuità, gioco 
di alternanze, di andate e ritorni’.  In conclusion, in the Italian dialogues, the process of 89
vicissitude endures eternally but its parts endure temporally, for different lengths of time. 
I have demonstrated that this belief remains constant throughout the entirety of his 
vernacular works and argue that he also manages to integrate common definitions of 
eternity into a decidedly unconventional cosmos.  
 The key to understanding this process lies with another element of eternity. 
Matter never perishes because it contains the World Soul.  This World Soul - known in 90
Latin as the anima mundi and in Bruno’s native Italian as anima del mondo - is the 
eternal substance that connects everything to everything else. In De la causa Bruno 
 Badaloni, p. 35. ‘[Il] tempo è per un lato un “semper” che è anche atomo, per l’altro è un trascorrere che, se da luogo a 88
una continuità diviene durata’.
 Maria Elena Severini, ‘Vicissitudine e tempo nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno’, in La mente di Giordano Bruno, ed. by 89
F. Meroi (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), pp. 225-258 (p. 228). Commenting on Fracastoro and the ontological 
components of the universe (unity and being), Severini claims that they are represented with a ‘moto a spirale’: ‘….esso è 
anche il simbolo sensibile del tempo: un tempo che è rettilineità e circolarità, progresso e ritorno; realtà intermedia, 
come intermedio è il moto spiraliforme, esso è combinazione di eternità e divenire, mobile ed immobile, sintesi del 
medesimo e del diverso, proprio come la vicissitudine è combinazione di essere e divenire, di identità e differenza, di 
variazione e continuità, gioco di alternanze, di andate e ritorni’ (p. 228).
 Knox explains why this theory is so different to Aristotelianism: ‘Though devoid of all qualities and hence 90
imperceptible, matter was discernible by reason. Since, then, it was an object of thought, it existed. It was not, that is, 
the prope nihil of Aristotelian philosophy but instead, no less than the World Soul, a ‘substance’. Both the World Soul 
and universal matter were eternal. Indeed they were the only eternal things of nature. All else, including individual 
souls, was accidental’ (p. 474).
'143
paraphrases various passages from Ficino’s translation of Plotinus’ Enneads in order to 
describe how exactly the eternal substance of the World Soul infuses everything else with 
soul: ‘…quella donando la vita e perfezzione al corpo non riporta da esso imperfezione 
alcuna: e però eternamente è congionta al medesmo soggetto’ (De la causa I.657). The 
anima del mondo imbues and animates every atom in the universe with its divine 
substance: ‘non è minimo corpusculo che non contegna cotal porzione in sé, che non 
inanimi’ (De la causa I.661); ‘…lui ha tutta l’anima in sé, e tutto lo animato comprende, ed 
è tutto quello’ (De la causa I.661); ‘questo spirto empie il tutto’ (De la causa I.668). 
There are countless other passages, not only in the De la causa, that consistently 
emphasise the all-encompassing nature of the World Soul. It infuses everything and 
therefore binds everything together, an immanent form of divinity which forms the basis 
of Bruno’s pantheism. Furthermore, in De l’inﬁnito Bruno explains that there are two 
different motors which cause movement: ‘doi principii attivi di moto’ (De l’inﬁnito II.55). 
One is finite, ‘e questo muove in tempo’ (De l’inﬁnito II.55). The other is infinite, divine 
and it is called the World Soul: 
 l’altro infinito, secondo la raggione dell’anima del mondo, overo della divinità, che 
 è come anima de l’anima, la quale è tutta in tutto e fa esser l’anima tutta in tutto; e  
 questo muove in istante. (De l’inﬁnito II.55) 
   
 The World Soul is the soul of all souls, ‘anima de l’anima’, a divine, all-
encompassing entity which all other souls exist within. Moreover, this World Soul does 
not exist in time; rather it exists in one eternal instant: ‘muove in istante’. If everything is 
mobile, then the source of this movement is due to the emanation of the World Soul. 
Paul-Henri Michel has identified two different kinds of substance in his study of nature in 
Bruno’s work - the World Soul is a substance with the power to shape while matter is the 
substance which is shaped by the anima mundi.  As I have argued, matter is reshaped and 91
reformed along the various instants of time and not the one single instant of eternity, 
since only the World Soul is eternal and thus responsible for generating all movement of 
matter in the universe.  The anima mundi was an eternal, vivifying force that directly 92
infused matter within a pantheistic conception of the universe.  
 Michel, p. 113.91
 In Eugenio Canone, ‘Bruno e la fine di tutte le cose. Sui motivi apocalittici dello “Spaccio”’, Bruniana & 92
Campanelliana, 2 (2004), pp. 269-282, Canone writes on substance and soul in De la causa: ‘Egli considera sostanze 
semplici anche ciò che nel De la causa, principio et uno definisce come i due generi di sostanza: la sostanza spirituale e la 
sostanza corporea, quindi l’anima e l’atomo, che da tale angolazione si configurano come i due contrari fondamentali. 
Questi due generi rinviano alla divinità in quanto essa si comunica nella natura e non alla divinità concepita sub specie 
aeternitatis, cioè assoluta e immutabile’ (p. 273). See also Knox, p. 474. 
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 Furthermore, Bruno is wary of how difficult it is to try and contemplate or even 
articulate such a conception of eternity. Without embracing radical scepticism to the same 
degree as Montaigne, Bruno also acknowledges that humans will never be able to ‘see’ 
eternal substance enduring infinitely: ‘non veggiamo perfettamente questo universo di cui 
la sustanza et il principale è tanto difficile ad essere compreso’ (De la causa I.649). It is 
certainly possible to surmise the finite duration of individual things: ‘le possiamo veder 
tutte, et essaminar parte per parte’ (De la causa I.649). However, one cannot actually 
experience the World Soul animating the entire universe: ‘ma non già il grande et infinito 
effetto della divina potenza: però quella similitudine deve essere intesa senza proporzional 
comparazione’ (De la causa I.649). In consequence, traditional means of counting the 
passage of time once again fail to express eternal oneness. In eternity ‘non differisce la ora 
dal giorno, il giorno da l’anno, l’anno dal secolo, il secolo dal momento’ (De la causa I.
727). Trying to articulate a state in which conventional time markers become utterly and 
completely irrelevant, nonsensical even, is extremely difficult: ‘perché non son più gli 
momenti e le ore, che gli secoli; e non hanno minor proporzione quelli che questi a la 
eternità’ (De la causa I.727); ‘dumque infinite ore non sono più che infinite secoli…’ (De 
la causa I.727). All of these elements - finite duration, infinite duration, the World Soul - 
combine in a passage from De l’inﬁnito that begins by denying our ability to measure 
eternity: 
 …ne l’infinita durazione, che è l’eternità, non sono più le ore che gli secoli; di sorte  
 che ogni cosa che si dice parte de l’infinito, in quanto che è parte de l’infinito, è   
 infinita cossì nell’infinita durazione come ne l’infinita mole. (De l’inﬁnito II.80) 
 However, even though time markers are inapplicable to eternity, the two concepts 
of time and eternity are united under the umbrella term of ‘duration’ and are physically 
incorporated into a temporally and spatially infinite universe. As Severini has 
commented: ‘Nel pensiero bruniano, infatti, l’unità a tutti i livelli è intessuta di differenze 
spazio-temporali; ed è proprio da questo scarto e da questa possibilità di variazione che 
deriva ogni possibile libertà’.  I have demonstrated that Montaigne shares many 93
similarities with Bruno when we consider their depiction of vicissitude. However, their 
views on eternity are different. As we will see in the final section of this chapter, Bruno’s 
clear and consistent integration of the immanent World Soul into his cosmology 
ironically suggests the faint possibility of transcendence that Montaigne paid little 
attention to in his characterisation of eternity. Despite the impermanence of time, the 
 Severini, ‘Vicissitudine e tempo’, p. 230. 93
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eternal presence of the World Soul within Bruno’s conception of time provides a clear if 
arduous path towards divine, eternal knowledge.  
 Bruno’s conception of the eternal was also influenced by a range of traditional 
sources which he proceeded to manipulate in untraditional ways. While we have seen that 
many of Bruno's theories relating to his cosmology were highly controversial, the World 
Soul was a fairly common idea in the late 1500s. From the 12th century onwards Calcidius, 
Macrobius and other commentators ensured that Virgil and Plato’s works were widely 
disseminated, while Bruno himself received these ideas through Ficino’s influential 
commentaries.  The World Soul was easily compatible with the Holy Spirit of 94
Christianity; as Tullio Gregory explains, ‘nel cristianesimo dei primi secoli…è spesso 
ricordata come anticipazione profetica dell’opera ordinatrice di Dio o prefigurazione dello 
Spirito Santo’.  This connection continued well into the later Middle Ages with the 95
return of Platonism in the 12th century.  Christian thinkers had clearly adopted the idea 96
of the World Soul as a force responsible for life and movement for centuries, and thinkers 
from Bruno’s age - such as Patrizi - were merely continuing this tradition by assimilating 
the World Soul into their own philosophies.      
 However, Bruno incorporates this concept into an infinite universe. As Gregory 
states, ‘l’anima del mondo garantisce la vita e l’ordine del cosmo (divinum animal)’.  The 97
cosmo in question arguably becomes a universe in the Italian dialogues; the eternal World 
Soul lies within a temporally and spatially infinite universe, responsible for setting all 
matter into motion.  Consequently eternity is not the supra-temporal eternity of God’s 98
time, placed firmly at the edges of the closed universe, and the World Soul/Holy Spirit 
does not emanate from his being. Rather Bruno’s entire universe is ‘uno, infinito, 
inmobile’ (De la causa I.725) and it endures endlessly, ‘questo uno è eterno…’ (De la causa 
 See Spruit, p. 193. In Tullio Gregory, ‘Anima del Mondo’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 12.2 (2006), pp. 525-535, 94
Gregory provides a useful summary of the World Soul in Ficino’s commentaries and particularly the Theologia 
platonica: ‘Nel sistema della Theologia platonica l’anima razionale occupa una posizione centrale lungo la catena degli 
esseri: inferiore a Dio e agli angeli, superiore al mondo della materia e delle qualità “tam superiores quam inferiores 
connectit in unum”. Ma questa anima si articola in più anime: “mundani huius animalis membra per unam animam 
vinciuntur”, “ab anima superiorum virtute fit motus oepris ordinati”. Al di sotto dell’anima del mondo stanno altre 
anime razionali: le anime delle dodici sfere (otto celesti e quattro elementari), poi le anime di singoli abitanti le varie 
sfere (anime delle stelle, dei demoni, degli eroi, degli uomini)’ (p. 530). Gregory explains that Ficino saw in the World 
Soul the complete convergence of Ancient philosophy and Christian theology. Patrizi aligns the World Soul with 
Hermeticism, Zoroastrianism, ancient mages, Orpheus and Pythagoras - all except Leucippus and Epicurus. 
 Gregory, p. 526.95
 Ibid., p. 528. ‘[…] nello sviluppo del platonismo del secolo XII si farà sempre più netta l’identificazione dell’anima 96
mundi con una forza cosmica principio di vita e di moto’ (p. 528). 
 Ibid., p. 529.97
 See also Bruno (De la causa I.657-658). 98
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I.730). God is within the universe itself, a monistic view of nature which lies in stark 
opposition to a world in the centre, enveloped by the stars and surrounded by God. There 
is no Afterlife, there is no Heaven and Hell, because this universe is already everything 
that is: ‘e cossì tutto concorre in una perfetta unità’ (De la causa I.730). In the Furori the 
‘uno’ of eternity acquires a Platonic sense, eternity is ‘l’istante de l’eternità’ whereas time is 
made up of ‘gl’istanti del tempo’ (Furori II.307). Platonists believed that eternity 
consisted of one whole instant, an instant in which temporal divisions did not exist. 
Furthermore, in De l’inﬁnito Filoteo responds to Elpino’s doubts concerning the 
difference between an Earth at the centre of a finite cosmos and a universe by assuring him 
that many classical sects of philosophy have already proposed this: ‘…è molto divolgata 
fuor della scola peripatetica’ (De l’inﬁnito II.60). Here Bruno may well be referring to the 
Pre-Socratics such as Parmenides who considered God to be one, infinite and immobile, 
situated within nature itself.  He also appears to draw on the Greek biographer Diogenes 99
Laertius to identify the position of the Stoics and Epicureans in this respect; the Stoics, for 
example, ‘dicono il mondo essere finito, ma l’universo infinito’ (De l’inﬁnito II.60).  In 100
any case, Bruno is keen to undermine Aristotelian philosophy in favour of an allegiance to 
those Greek schools whose theories stood in opposition to Aristotle. 
 In conclusion, eternity possesses a highly complex relationship to time and the 
cosmos. As with Bruno’s conception of time, eternity is also intimately linked to his 
theories on substance, matter, and form. Eternity - like time - is a form of duration, and 
yet the parts of time that mutate and change do so for eternity. Furthermore, the ‘forza 
coesiva dell’anima del mondo’ plays an integral role in Bruno’s understanding of the 
composition of nature. Following Plotinus’ conception of anima mundi all souls and 
bodies reside in the ‘anima delle anime’. In comparison to Montaigne’s Essais, the 
relationship between time and eternity is highly complicated, since there is arguably more 
than one type of eternity or eternal ‘thing’ to take account of. In addition to Bruno’s use 
of metempsychosis in the Cabala and his well-documented belief in a kind of 
epistemological eternal recurrence, eternity is incorporated into Bruno’s cosmology in 
several layers. The extent to which these beliefs were acceptable in the 1500s is equally 
complex. Some aspects of eternity, such as the World Soul, resound with those of his 
 Spruit, p. 65. Spruit remarks that Bruno did not actually possess a complete and thorough knowledge of the pre-99
Socratics, and in his works he occasionally gets their names wrong e.g. confusion between Parmenides and Melissus.
 As well as Diogenes Laertius, Jean Seidengart suggests in the footnotes to this particular passage that another 100
potential source may be the Greek doxographer Aetius and his De Placita Philosophorum (p. 60). 
'147
contemporaries such as Patrizi.  However, Bruno integrates such conceptions of eternity 101
into a cosmology that is decidedly untraditional. Humans are physically bound to each 
other and all things in nature through a divine, eternal substance which runs counter to 
the hierarchical Book of Nature that had been popular for centuries and continued to be 
promoted by thinkers such as Raymond Sebond (1385-1436). Eternity complicates time 
and yet, as we will see, it has fascinating repercussions for Bruno’s beliefs concerning the 
best way to use time.  
Eternity, Time, Truth 
 So far this thesis has focused on explaining how Montaigne and Bruno define 
time. I hope to have demonstrated that they are both excellent examples of two thinkers 
who, despite their differences, were opening out new and exciting ideas of temporality in 
the 1500s.  This willingness to go beyond Christian-Scholastic conceptions of time now 102
continues with the introduction of a new line of thought: how do the definitions of time 
presented so far affect certain aspects of Montaigne’s and Bruno’s philosophy? In 
particular, I wish to explore in the latter half of this chapter how both thinkers perceive 
the best way to make use of time, defined as it is by mortality, passage, and flux. Neither 
thinker is content to discuss temporality in purely abstract terms; both Montaigne and 
Bruno also consider time in a practical sense and possess their own opinions concerning 
the best way to utilise the time at one’s disposal.  Much of this thesis has centred around 103
death, but Montaigne and Bruno were also preoccupied with how one might live.  
 Indeed, it appears that the best response to a future constantly defined by human 
mortality is knowledge seeking. But what particular knowledge do both thinkers seek? 
And how does this connect with their understanding of time? In the Essais one of 
Montaigne’s ultimate desires is to write about himself, to know himself, while Bruno 
 Bruno would not have been pleased with this comparison - he referred to Patrizi as ‘sterco di pedanti’ despite the 101
similarities in their thought. For Patrizi’s place within late Renaissance cosmology (with a comparison to Bruno) see 
Gianni Paganini, ‘Les enjeux de la cosmobiologie à la fin de la Renaissance: Juste Lipse et Giordano Bruno’, Revue 
Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 201.2 (2011), pp. 165-185. See also Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the 
Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge, 1964), pp. 181-184.
 As Waller has suggested: ‘from the works of an increasing minority of late sixteenth century writers, it can, however, 102
be seen that time was becoming discussed in terms of ideas other than the received religious ones’ (p. 7). 
 This issue brings to mind the ancient philosophical debate concerning the active versus the contemplative life, which 103
was still being discussed in the Renaissance. Thinkers such as Ficino advocated the marriage of contemplation and 
action, a notion derived from Plato. For an excellent introduction to this debate and its place in the Renaissance, see 
Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Active and the Contemplative Life in Renaissance Humanism’ in Studies in Renaissance 
Thought and Letters, vol. 4 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1996), pp. 197-214.
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devotes his writing to revealing the truth of nature. Making good use of time means 
trying to fulfil these objectives as best they can despite the impermanence of time.  
 In ‘Du repentir’ (III.II) temporal flux poses serious consequences for one of 
Montaigne’s key purposes in writing - it is set within the context of the trouble he has in 
recording himself. The author states that ‘Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va troublant 
et chancelant, d’une yvresse naturelle’ (III.II.805). Then he asserts one of his most famous 
dictums: ‘Je ne peints pas l’estre. Je peints le passage: non un passage d’aage en autre, ou, 
comme dict le peuple, de sept en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de minute en 
minute’ (III.II.805). Montaigne cannot write the ‘estre’ because it is constantly in flux, he 
can only record the ‘passage’ of himself as it changes from day to day, even minute to 
minute. Thus the author of the Essais reflects the nature of time in his shifting and 
changing writing style. Montaigne is determined to try and find truth in an uncertain 
world; as Ian Maclean has stated, humans may well exist in temporal flux, but we still 
possess rational and sensory tools which enable us to live in the world.  Finding truth 104
requires a focus on knowing oneself - in other words, accessing the truth of experience, 
since the one thing that humans can reliably know about is themselves.  
 What kind of truth is Bruno looking for? We have seen that the divine, eternal 
World Soul is within everything and everyone; for Bruno God is thus ‘not above the 
universe, but intimately within it, the matrix that holds all the incessantly active atoms 
that combine and recombine to create different forms of matter’.  To try and find divine 105
truth is to look inwardly at oneself and access the divine spirit coursing through our 
bodies as the whole world mutates endlessly. Although Bruno’s literary form favours an 
approach with multiple interlocutors, the Eroici Furori (which have previously been 
described as the culmination of his project in the Italian dialogues) present a final aim 
which seeks to access the divine spirit coursing through each human being.  
 Quinones has argued that Renaissance thinkers attempted ‘to achieve by means 
of process what eternity possesses in stasis’.  In other words, early modern thinkers used 106
the time at their disposal to try and access the truth of eternity, which is a property of the 
divine.  However, Quinones concludes that ‘as long as man is involved in time this is 107
 Maclean, Montaigne philosophe, p. 157. 104
 Ingrid D. Rowland in Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, ed. by Ingrid D. Rowland (Toronto: University of 105
Toronto Press, 2013), p. xxxi.
 Quinones, Discovery of Time, p. 26.106
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impossible’.  I wish to argue that Montaigne and Bruno are intimately aware of their 108
natural limitations in time and yet still challenge time regardless, pushing the boundaries 
of these limitations to an extreme that we have seen with suicide, recounting one’s own 
‘death’, denying death itself and refusing to approach time solely through the narrow lens 
of religion. Bruno is undoubtedly eager to access divine truth, and while it may be 
impossible he sets out how to use time to further this objective regardless. Montaigne 
does not even appear to hold this lofty aim; instead, his use of time is shaped by a desire to 
try and record truth about himself despite his constantly changing being. Both thinkers 
recognise the obstacles that time raises with regards to knowledge-seeking and continue in 
their pursuits anyway - pursuits which may one day reveal some form of higher truth.  
Montaigne 
 In the aptly-named chapter ‘De l’inconstance de nos actions’ (II.I), Montaigne 
emphasises the various contradictions and incoherencies of human beings. As stated 
above, ‘branle’ is a term often used to describe time in the Essais and in this chapter, 
Montaigne couches his discussion of human emotions and opinions in temporal terms. 
He describes how each day brings new feelings and flights of imagination; ‘nos humeurs’ 
move in line with ‘les mouvemens du temps’ (II.I.333) and consequently ‘nous flottons 
entre divers advis’ (II.I.333). The inconstancy of time is not just reflected in external reality, 
i.e. the changing seasons and the tides; rather it affects the inner essence of our being.  
 In the Essais temporal inconstancy lies at the root of our existence. ‘Nostre façon 
ordinaire, c’est d’aller apres les inclinations de nostre apetit, à gauche, à dextre, contre-
mont, contre-bas, selon que le vent des occasions nous emporte’ (II.I.333). At each instant 
in time humans allow themselves to drift along ‘le vent des occasions’ and our appetites 
and inclinations reflect this (like branle, vent is another term Montaigne regularly employs 
to describe time). One might state an opinion and then change it an hour later, only to 
return to it again at another moment in time, ‘ce n’est que branle et inconstance’ (II.I.333). 
Our changing appetites and desires remain throughout our entire existence: ‘Nous 
recommençons tousjours à vivre. Nous avons le pied à la fosse, et nos appetits et 
poursuites ne font que naistre’ (II.XXVIII.702). Here Montaigne suggests that human 
beings are subject to change, not only due to external factors but also their own actions 
and behaviour: ‘Non seulement le vent des accidens me remue selon son inclination, mais 
 Ibid.108
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en outre je me remue et trouble moy mesme par l’instabilité de ma posture’ (II.I.335). 
Montaigne highlights how little control he has over ‘le vent des accidens’ - instead it 
shapes him and changes him ‘selon son inclination’. Further inconstancy exists due to his 
attempts to pin down a portrait of his impermanence (since ‘nous sommes partout 
vent’ (I.XIII.1107)): ‘Je donne à mon ame tantost un visage, tantost un autre, selon le costé 
où je la couche. Si je parle diversement de moy, c’est que je me regarde diversement’ (II.I.
335). Indeed, the Essais are written amidst this changing and inconstant depiction of each 
human being in time. How then does one begin to navigate such a world if everything is 
in flux?  
 Montaigne is keen to establish practical virtues in response to this question and 
Socrates’ example greatly influences him in this regard.  Many Renaissance humanists 109
(most notably Marsilio Ficino and Erasmus) marvelled at Socrates’ dedication to civic 
virtues, and Montaigne is no different. In ‘De la Phisionomie’ he describes the Greek 
philosopher in glowing terms as ‘le plus digne homme d’estre cogneu et d’estre presenté au 
monde pour exemple’ (III.XII.1038). This quality is exactly what Montaigne searches for 
in the figure of Socrates - an example of how to live well in the world. Philosophy must 
teach people how to use time wisely, to the same degree that it must teach people how to 
think: ‘Quel dommage, si elles ne nous aprenent ny à bien penser, ny à bien 
faire?’ (I.XXV.141). G.F. Waller has claimed that ‘for Montaigne […] the use of time is to 
exploit it, to spend it in the world’.  In ‘Que philosopher’ Montaigne claims that ‘nous 110
sommes nés pour agir. […] Je veux qu’on agisse, et qu’on allonge les offices de la vie tant 
qu’on peut’ (I.XX.89). One should extend ‘les offices de la vie’ as far as humanly possible 
through philosophical endeavour, even dying in the midst of doing so in the manner of 
Socrates; as Ovid (paraphrased by Montaigne) states: ‘cum moriar, medium soluar et inter 
opus’ (I.XX.89).  Finally, a quotation from ‘De la solitude’ (I.XXXIX) summarises 111
Montaigne’s interest in the learning he acquires from books: ‘Je n’ayme, pour moy, que 
des livres ou plaisans et faciles, qui me chatouillent, ou ceux qui me consolent et 
conseillent à regler ma vie et ma mort’ (I.XXXIX.246).  Philosophy not only teaches one 112
how to die, it also teaches one how to live. 
 See Elaine Limbrick, ‘Montaigne and Socrates’, Renaissance and Reformation/Renaissance et Réforme, 9.2 (1973), pp. 109
46-57. ‘Socrates taught Montaigne that man’s first duty was to learn how to live and then how to act.’ (p. 55). See also p. 
51 for a discussion of Socrates and the importance of ‘ars vivendi’ in the Essais. 
 Waller, ‘Renaissance Ideas of Time’, p. 9.110
 See Chapter Two, ‘Montaigne, suicide and near-death experience’ for more on the importance of Socrates’ death in 111
the Essais.
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 Learning, philosophising, attempting to find truth - this is often portrayed as the 
most distinguished and honourable way to spend one’s time: ‘Car nous sommes nais à 
quester la verité; il appartient de la posseder à une plus grande puissance…le monde n’est 
qu’une escole d’inquisition’ (III.VIII.928). Here Montaigne approaches the search for 
truth in distinct terms - ‘quester’, ‘posseder’, ‘escole d’inquisition’. Such vocabulary 
describes a need to search something out and suggests that humans possess a strong desire 
to fulfil curiosity; the world is a resource and it requires an individual to actively enquire 
about its workings in order to possess its truths. The verb ‘quester’ alludes to an open-
ended search for knowledge, particularly since Montaigne states that the actual 
acquisition of truth belongs only to ‘une plus grande puissance’. Instead, the human 
quest for truth is arguably reflected in the fate of the Essais themselves  - they were edited 
and re-edited countless times before spurning a long and fruitful tradition of scholarship. 
Harking back to the sentiment of the ‘Apologie’ - when Montaigne stripped human 
beings down to their senses - at the start of ‘De l’experience’ he reveals a similar desire to 
find truth using the haphazard tools of human beings: ‘la verité est chose si grande, que 
nous ne devons desdaigner aucune entremise qui nous y conduise’ (III.XIII.1065). 
However, in light of Montaigne’s depiction of time, the essayist clearly understands that 
the practical activity of learning and accessing truth in a temporal world is challenging.  
 The purpose of philosophy is to try and find ‘un certain et asseuré train’ but only 
a few great philosophers have achieved this feat.  In ‘De l’inconstance’ Montaigne 113
believes that in the whole of Greek and Roman antiquity, it is difficult to select even a 
dozen men who managed to adhere to a constant mode of living: ‘En toute l’ancienneté, il 
est malaisé de choisir une douzaine d’hommes qui ayent dressé leur vie à un certain et 
asseuré train, qui est le principal but de la sagesse’ (I.II.332). Instead, according to the 
‘Apologie’ human beings are dealt a lifetime of inconstancy:  
 Nous avons pour nostre part l’inconstance, l’irresolution, l’incertitude, le deuil, la  
 superstition, la solicitude des choses à venir, voire, apres nostre vie, l’ambition,   
 l’avarice, la jalousie, l’envie, les appetits desreglez, forcenez et indomptables, la   
 guerre, la mensonge, la desloyauté, la detraction et la curiosité. (II.XII.486) 
 In the passage above Montaigne presents a long list of encumbrances that the 
winds of time bring with it - death, uncertainty, changing tastes and emotions, the 
knowledge or concern of things to come ‘voire, apres nostre vie’. Furthermore, in ‘Que 
philosopher’, before Montaigne discusses the tiny day flies of the Hypanis river, he 
 For Montaigne’s portrayal of the Greeks and their devotion to acting on their philosophy, see Marcel Conche, ‘Temps, 113
temporalité, temporalisation’, L’enseignement philosophique, 6 (2009), pp. 9-20.
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remarks on the body and the soul, and the troubles one must contend with both inwardly 
and outwardly as part of living in a state of temporal flux: e.g. ‘passions et 
concupiscences’, ‘injures de fortune’. He states the following:  
 Le corps, courbé et plié, a moins de force à soustenir un fais; aussi a nostre ame: il  
 la faut dresser et eslever contre l’effort de cet adversaire. Car, comme il est   
 impossible qu’elle se mette en repos, pendant qu’elle le craint: si elle s’en asseure  
 aussi, elle se peut venter, qui est chose comme surpassant l’humaine condition,   
 qu’il est impossible que l’inquietude, le tourment, la peur, non le moindre   
 desplaisir loge en elle. (I.XX.91) 
 One must learn to live with change, and at least to form one’s soul if one cannot 
readily form one’s body too - this would be a state ‘surpassant l’humaine condition’, to 
tame ‘la maladie naturelle de leur esprit: il ne faict que fureter et quester, et va sans cesse 
tournoiant, bastissant et s’empestrant en sa besongne’ (III.XIII.1068). The ability to rise 
above the passage of time - despite its vicissitudes - is the sign of an ability to surpass the 
human condition itself. However, this appears to be a fruitless objective, one that is 
reflected in the human need to try and establish real and absolute truth about the world -
Montaigne employs the verb ‘quester’ again to illustrate the restless and exploratory 
nature of this process.  
 The passage below contains a lengthy poetic quotation by Étienne De La Boétie, 
whose famously close friendship with Montaigne supposedly led to the creation of the 
Essais themselves.  Bearing in mind the description of time that we have encountered in 114
Montaigne’s work so far, at first glance the passage may well be misinterpreted as a 
representation of time itself:  
 C’est un mouvement irregulier, perpetuel, sans patron, et sans but. Ses inventions  
 s’eschauffent, se suyvent, et s’entreproduisent l’une l’autre. Ainsi voit l’on, en un  
 ruisseau coulant,/Sans fin l’une? eau apres l’autre roulant,/Et tout de rang, d’un  
 eternel conduict,/L’une suit l’autre, et l’une l’autre fuyt./Par cette-cy celle-là est   
 poussée,/Et cette-cy par l’autre est devancée:/Tousjours l’eau va dans l’eau, et   
 tousjours est-ce/Mesme ruisseau, et tousjours eau diverse. (III.XIII.1068-1069) 
 In an image that is strongly reminiscent of Bruno’s ‘ruota del tempo’, the ‘ruisseau 
coulant’ appears to represent the inconstancy of time, flowing endlessly like a stream of 
water, while reference to a ‘mouvement irregulier’ echoes the term branle which 
Montaigne frequently employed to describe the nature of time. However, the verse 
actually describes the flow of knowledge, and the consequences for both thought and 
 Philippe Desan, Montaigne: A Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 117. See ‘Chapter Three - 114
La Boétie and Montaigne: Discourse on Servitude and Essay of Allegiance’ for an excellent account of their friendship 
and the effect of La Boétie’s death on Montaigne. 
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time are twofold in this instance. According to this paragraph, knowledge is always 
changing. That which human beings believe to be true at one moment in time is always 
going to be replaced by something that contradicts it: ‘tousjours l’eau va dans l’eau…et 
tousjours eau diverse.’ In this way, the search for absolute truth reflects the nature of time, 
which is always changing - neither one can ever be truly grasped, and what is more, neither 
one appears to have a fixed end. Rather they both exist in this shifting and swarming 
manner ‘d’un eternel conduict’.  
 Montaigne’s decision to quote La Boétie also provides an excellent insight into the 
composition and style of the Essais in general. Upon his death, La Boétie bequeathed a 
copy of his now-famous Discours de la servitude volontaire ou le Contr’un to Montaigne, a 
text which was originally intended to appear at the heart of the Essais.  Instead, 115
Montaigne’s three-volume work became a sprawling testament to the author’s thought in 
action, and the loss that Montaigne felt upon his friend’s death arguably led to the 
purposeful omission of the Discours from any significant place within the work. La 
Boétie’s missing text represents the symbiotic relationship between Montaigne and his 
writing - it symbolises Montaigne’s pain at the loss of his friend and the manner in which 
his own writing changed as a result of this pain.  
 In one final testament to the continual writing process, Montaigne even alters 
part of La Boétie’s original quotation. ‘Et cette-cy, par l’autre est devancée’ originally read 
‘Et ceste cy, par un autre avancée’. As I have previously stated, Montaigne continually 
edited and re-edited his text, leading to the publication of several different versions of the 
Essais. The stylistic choice to amend La Boétie’s original phrase is just one smaller example 
of a wider process of revision, addition and deletion which arguably represents the nature 
of time itself. Indeed, it is little wonder that various scholars have linked Montaigne’s 
composition and style to his notion of ‘writing the self’ over time; the continual evolution 
of the Essais reflect Montaigne’s ever-changing thoughts and feelings, as well as his shifting 
tastes in philosophy and literature.  Consequently, Terence Cave describes the Essais as a 116
moving self-portrait which has been engendered by time, while André Tournon states 
that the various editions and revisions Montaigne made to the text represent his desire to 
 Patrick Moser, ‘Montaigne’s Literary Patrons: The Case of La Boétie’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 31.2 (2000), pp. 115
381-397 (p. 381). 
 Szabari claims that Montaigne’s project of self-representation can be found ‘at least’ from 1580 onwards until his 116
death. See Antonia Szabari, ‘parler seulement de moi: The Disposition of the Subject in Montaigne’s Essay “De l’art de 
conferer”’, Modern Language Notes, 116.5 (2001), pp. 1001-1024 (p. 1005). 
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write time itself.  In Montaigne’s own age, Louis Le Roy illustrated how the very nature 117
of the human condition was reflected in humanity’s irresistible desire to exchange ideas, 
letters, and texts. Like the river flowing this way and that, the words on the pages of the 
Essais became a living testament to the vicissitudinal nature of human beings. 
 If we continue to examine the idea that neither knowledge or time can ever truly 
be grasped, then in the final chapter of his three-volume work Montaigne discusses the 
chasse de cognoissance at length. He argues that the process is endless because opinions 
always generate more opinions, books have always generated more books. He refers to the 
long tradition of philosophical commentary as a ‘fourmille de commentaires…’. Indeed, 
there are so many commentaries that getting to the root of the original problem is an 
arduous and lengthy process: ‘Il y a plus affaire à interpreter les interpretations qu’à 
interpreter les choses…’ (III.XIII.1069). As a result, for most human beings, the journey to 
true philosophical knowledge about the world never ends: ‘Il y a tousjours place pour un 
suyvant, ouy et pour nous mesmes, et route par ailleurs. Il n’y a point de fin en nos 
inquisitions; nostre fin est en l’autre monde’ (III.XIII.1068). Montaigne resolutely accepts 
the idea that knowledge seeking is an open-ended process and one that will inevitably 
come to an end with the final knowledge of death. He continues to express this idea of a 
self-perpetuating chasse de cognoissance thus: ‘En semant les questions et les retaillant, on 
faict fructifier et foisonner le monde en incertitude et en querelles’ (III.XIII.1067). He 
then reiterates these ideas for much of the following paragraph; the Heraclitean temporal 
flux that underlies the Essais bears witness to a similarly endless search for knowledge 
comparable to the infinite number of atoms in the universe: ‘d’un subject nous en faisons 
mille, et retombons, en multipliant et subdivisant, à l’infinité des atomes 
d’Epicurus’ (III.XIII.1067). Throughout all of these examples, Montaigne is discussing 
the particular problems concerning the knowledge to be acquired through the study of 
books, philosophies, histories. ‘Ainsi vu que toutes choses sont sujettes à passer d’un 
changement en autre, la raison qui y cherche une réelle substance, se trouve déçue, ne 
pouvant rien appréhender de subsistant et permanent’ (II.XII.601). The authority of 
books has always generated more opinions. The ‘Apologie’ was concerned with how 
human beings can ascertain the ‘right’ opinion, yet time is always changing, and 
throughout the passage of time knowledge only generates more and more knowledge of 
different kinds. 
 See Terence Cave, How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta, 2007) , ‘Chapter 7 - Documenting The Self’; also 117
André Tournon, Route par Ailleurs: le ‘nouveau langage’ des Essais (Paris: Champion, 2006).
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 How is it possible for an individual to take hold of the passage of time and make 
something of it if everything - even opinions - are constantly mutating and changing and 
reaching out endlessly? The divine being is one, the same, eternal, whereas Man is ‘cette 
créature indécise, instable et flottante’.  To remedy this temporal existence, bound to 118
change at all times, Montaigne exhorts his readers to look inwardly to themselves: 
 En outre, c’est icy, chez nous, et non ailleurs, que doivent estre considérés les forces 
 et les effects de l’ame; tout le reste de ses perfections luy est vain et inutile: c’est de  
 l’estat present que doit estre payée et reconnue toute son immortalité, et de la vie  
 de l’homme qu’elle est contable seulement. (II.XII.549) 
 ‘C’est de l’estat present que doit estre payée’ - an individual should study and 
reflect upon oneself in each minute of the day; one must focus solely on the present and 
cast away thoughts of any other time so that the individual may accurately record him or 
herself as they exist from moment to moment. Again the influence of Socrates emerges; in 
this instance, Montaigne readily embraces the Socratic maxim to ‘know thyself’, a phrase 
which he will paraphrase directly elsewhere in the Essais.  Of course, due to the 119
mutability of time that I have presented both here and in previous chapters, a distinct 
challenge arises. And yet, although the task ahead is a difficult one, what can anyone do 
except try? This approach to time is arguably the key to understanding why the Essais 
bear such a name. Montaigne’s ‘essais’ or attempts to record himself from moment to 
moment are not definitive, but they are the most reliable record he has and the most 
accurate thing he can use to learn about the world. Cave summarises thus: ‘The Essays 
were designed to record the flux and flow of his ever-changing existence within the totally 
contingent temporal world. If they were sometimes disjointed or contradictory, it was 
because human life itself was composed of discrete and inconsistent moments’.  I have 120
demonstrated that Montaigne was expressing these ideas in a manner which opened out 
the definition of 16th century time to include vicissitude. The author of the Essais 
described this concept in much the same way as Bruno and even hoped to express the 
effects of this phenomenon through his writing.  
 Ahmeti, ‘2.2 L’inconstance humaine et le présent insaisissable’. Joukovsky also discusses the issue of ‘nostre savoir…en 118
perpétuelle modification, parce qu’il n’est pas connaissance de l’Etre’ (p. 125). See Joukovsky, pp. 124-125. 
 ‘Ce grand precepte est souvent allegué en Platon: Fay ton faict et te cognoy’ (I.III.15). 119
 Engster, p. 632.120
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 Furthermore, Montaigne does not express an interest in time organisation or the 
desire to leave earthly life behind, as many of his contemporaries do.  In the Christian 121
Middle Ages and early modern period most people were mindful of how their actions in 
the present would affect their life after death. Yet Montaigne advocates a focus on the 
immediate time at one’s disposal.  After emphasising the diverse and changing opinions 122
of human beings, Montaigne advocates a deep and studied introspection: 
‘L’advertissement à chacun de se cognoistre doibt estre d’un important effect, puisque ce 
Dieu de science et de lumiere le fit planter au front de son temple, comme comprenant 
tout ce qu’il avoit à nous conseiller’ (III.XIII.1075). Montaigne views the Essais as essais 
because he would never be able to fully master the act of recording himself: ‘On peut 
continuer à tout temps l’estude, non pas l’escholage: la sotte chose qu’un vieillard 
abecedaire!’ (II.XXVIII.703). He believed that human existence was so deeply penetrated 
by the vicissitude of time that he could only ever try (essayer) to record the flux of his 
thoughts and feelings. 
 Although this approach seems rather inward-looking, one must acknowledge at 
the end of this discussion that Montaigne was still very mindful of his social 
responsibility. So how does the process of ‘knowing oneself’ resound with the kind of civil 
practicality that Montaigne so admired in figures such as Socrates? Leading figures such as 
David Quint and Philippe Desan have already studied the extent of the essayist’s 
participation in public life, and there is little need to contribute towards that lengthy 
debate in this thesis.  However, one should note that despite Montaigne’s desire to try 123
and express his being in time, it was also challenging for the thinker to extricate himself 
from the political and social upheaval occurring around his estate.  
 Quint states that Montaigne was fully aware of his political obligations to his 
home country.  As a nobleman with ties to the French court, the celebrated author of 124
the Essais was never entirely free from public affairs, even if he wanted to be. For example, 
we have seen that a large part of his writing process in the Essais involved studying and 
paraphrasing the words of other thinkers. Quint has already demonstrated in Montaigne 
 See Quinones, Discovery of Time, p. 204. ‘Montaigne transcends time not by prudentially looking to the future, but 121
by disregarding the future and sinking into the present’ (p. 241).
 Ibid., p. 205. ‘Everything in the world was an effect of something beyond the world; everything in life was a step to 122
something beyond life. […] But Montaigne would have us focus on the thing at hand, in itself, and find our fulfilment 
in its own basic worth’ (p. 205). 
 See the recently published Philippe Desan, Montaigne: A Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017) for 123
a thorough account of Montaigne’s role in active life; also David Quint, Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
 Quint, Quality of Mercy, p. 105.124
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and the Quality of Mercy that many of Montaigne’s examples, anecdotes and quotations 
are used by the author to reflect on his own times, particularly the Wars of Religion.  125
From gladiators to cannibals to religious martyrs, the thinker always had his own troubled 
age in mind as he wrote. More often than not, Montaigne’s practical response to these 
dilemmas is a conservative approach which I will explore in further detail in Chapter 
Four, as the essayist responds to the practicalities of custom. While the Essais are arguably 
a study of a man’s repeated attempts to pin down the essence of his being, Montaigne’s 
writing was not quite so inward-looking as it might appear at first glance and it was often 
heavily coloured by his awareness of the political and social situation in France. 
Bruno 
 Time in the Italian dialogues is equally as impermanent and fluctuating as in the 
Essais. Time is countable and changeable while eternity is oneness, a duration without 
beginning or end. Bruno compares human time, ‘questa frale et incerta vita’ (Cabala II.
424) with eternal duration, ‘quell’altra certissima et eterna’ (Cabala II.424). However, in 
Bruno’s philosophy eternity also resides inside human beings. Humans themselves have 
been infused with divine spirit, which presents a clear possibility for human beings to try 
and access divine truth. As a result, Bruno is similarly keen to explore how one may utilise 
time in order to reach this goal and frequently discusses philosophical objectives in a 
practical light. In the Spaccio Bruno merges action and contemplation so that one may not 
exist without the other: ‘ha determinato la providenza che vegna occupato ne l'azzione per 
le mani, e contemplazione per l’intelletto; de maniera che non contemple senza azzione, e 
non opre senza contemplazione’ (II.324).  However it is in the Eroici Furori, a text which 126
uses the dialogue form as a means of drawing closer to truth (rather than claiming 
absolute truth), that Bruno consistently explores a more practical philosophy, a way to 
live in the world which requires fervent study and a passionate devotion to knowledge 
seeking.  
 ‘In all of the cases he cites, whether the victims are New World cannibals, citizens of defeated cities, indomitable 125
gladiators, or religious martyrs, Montaigne is thinking about the antagonists of the Wars of Religion in France. […] By 
the same token, Montaigne still has France in mind when he advocates the first course of submission, more common if 
less glamorous and heroic’ (Ibid., p. 103). 
 For the significance of the hand in Bruno’s works see Nuccio Ordine, La cabala dell’asino. Asinità e conoscenza in 126
Giordano Bruno (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 45-50; Fulvio Papi, Antropologia e civiltà nel pensiero di 
Giordano Bruno (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1968), pp. 237-247.
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 How does one use time efficiently in order to access divine truth? In the Eroici 
Furori Maricondo classifies the senses as our primary faculties, which are only capable of 
limited knowledge concerning ‘questo universo suggetto alli nostri occhi e comun 
raggione’ (Furori II.669).  What we see are merely ‘fatture simili a questo globo in cui 127
siamo noi’ (Furori II.658). In order to look past what is merely visible and surpass this 
primary understanding of the world, one must attempt to look inwardly. It is not enough 
to worship God: ‘aprir gli occhi al cielo, alzar alto le mani, menar i passi al tempio’ (Furori 
II.658). Rather one must ‘venir al più intimo di sé, considerando che Dio è vicino, con sé e 
dentro di sé’ (Furori II.658). Bruno, borrowing from Seneca, emphasises the ultimate 
form of contemplation as a solitary one, an idea which resonates with Montaigne’s 
conclusion on the reliability of the self. ‘Ecco dumque come bisogna fare primeramente 
de ritrarsi dalla moltitudine in se stesso’ (Furori II.659); ‘se aspira al splendor alto, ritiresi 
quanto può all’unità, contrahasi quanto è possibile in se stesso’ (Furori II.657). Like 
Montaigne, Bruno is consistent in his enthusiasm for encouraging a more practical 
approach to accessing truth in the present moment - Sergius Kodera has already 
emphasised how Bruno views knowledge as something that must be grasped with the 
hands and held tightly, a sentiment which flies in the face of the Platonic contemplative 
gaze.  Indeed, Bruno often emphasises the need to withdraw into oneself in order to 128
access divine truth effectively. Like Montaigne, this represents another form of 
introspection, but Bruno’s introspection derives from a particular philosophical 
standpoint.  
 In the ‘Proemiale Epistola’ of De l’inﬁnito Bruno emphasises the struggle that he 
has already undergone in his efforts to fulfil this objective: ‘per amor della vera sapienza e 
studio della vera contemplazione, m’affatico, mi crucio, mi tormento’ (De l’inﬁnito II.10). 
‘Il camino della verità’ requires strength and energy. Bruno then considers the relationship 
between this pursuit of knowledge and time: ‘al disporsi bisogna tempo, discorso, studio e 
fatica’ (Furori II.729). However, he understands that time on Earth is fleeting and 
consequently one must avoid wasting it at all costs: ‘Questi non denno in cose leggieri e 
vane spendere il tempo, la cui velocità è infinita: essendo che sì mirabilmente precipitoso 
 See Hélène Védrine, La conception de la nature chez Giordano Bruno (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967) for a full and detailed 127
explanation of Bruno’s hierarchy of the soul/mind/body. Bruno often elaborates three degrees of knowledge, ‘sensus, 
ratio, intellectus’ and sometimes also a fourth - ‘mens’. While the intellectus refers to immediate and intuitive 
knowledge, the mens ‘se définit alors comme un “acte parfaictement simple” qui contemple toute chose “sans 
succession, c’est-à-dire sans différence entre passé, présent et future’ (p. 315).
 See Sergius Kodera, ‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, Literary 128
Self-Fashioning and De revolutionibus orbium coelestium’, in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern 
Transformations of the Scientist and his Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn & Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), p. 242. 
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scorra il presente, e con la medesima prestezza s’accoste il futuro’ (Furori II.688). Even in 
the Candelaio - a text which was written just before a period of intense literary activity -
Bruno’s willingness to exploit time is clear: ‘Però fa di mestiero di ben risolversi a tempo. 
Chi tempo aspetta, tempo perde. S’io aspetto il tempo, il tempo non aspettarà 
me’ (Candelaio I.315). Time waits for nobody - it is waiting to be grasped, and Bruno 
believes that the most meaningful way to do this is by seeking the light of truth. In this 
section I briefly explore these ideas in more detail, moving from the truth of nature as 
Bruno’s primary objective towards an analysis of introspection as the most productive use 
of time. 
 Across the Italian dialogues Bruno emphasises his desire to pursue a particular 
kind of truth, and as a result, he despairs at those individuals who have wasted precious 
time on what he considers to be the ‘wrong’ philosophy. In a typical passage from De la 
causa Bruno remarks that in ancient times, and especially the pre-Socratic era, there 
existed ‘quelli filosofi [che] hanno ritrovata la sua amica Sofia, li quali hanno ritrovata 
questa unità’ (De la causa I.730). ‘Questa unità’ refers to the unity of the infinite 
universe, and Bruno believed that those individuals who proposed such theories 
(Anaximander, Democritus and - later - Epicurus) had begun to access real truth about 
the nature of the world. Yet this initial connection to nature was lost for centuries due to 
Aristotle and others ‘[che] non hanno compreso il modo d’intendere di veri sapienti’ (De 
la causa I.730).  In line with Bruno’s notion of endless recurrence and epistemology, the 129
Italian philosopher condemns the manner in which Scholasticism distorted the 
connection between human beings and nature: ‘pervertere le sentenze de gli antichi et 
opporsi a la verità…’ (De la causa I.730). An individual who persists in studying such 
philosophy is ‘un che spende il meglior intervallo di tempo, e gli più scelti frutti di sua vita 
corrente, destillando l’elixir del cervello con…que’ gravi tormenti, que’ razionali discorsi, 
que’ faticosi pensieri’ (Furori II.488). Valuable time has been wasted in attempting to 
know the truth about nature from the foundation that Aristotle provided. Instead, 
Bruno believes that his conception of the infinite universe is a renewal of ancient theories 
and thus heralds a new time in history, one that will encourage an enjoyment of existing 
in the present rather than worrying over the future: ‘lo libera dalla sollecita cura di piaceri 
e cieco sentimento di dolori; lo fa godere dell’esser presente, e non piú temere che sperare 
del futuro’ (De l’inﬁnito II.25).  
 Incidentally, Aristotle was also a famous proponent of the contemplative life over the active life - another 129
characteristic of the thinker’s philosophy which may not have endeared him to Bruno. For more on Aristotle and this 
debate see Richard Kraut, ‘Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection and Perception’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aristotle, ed. by Christopher Shields (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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 Bruno’s enthusiasm for his philosophy is consistent throughout the Italian 
dialogues but arguably reaches its apotheosis in the Eroici Furori. One of the major 
themes of the Furori embraces a quest for truth dependent on one’s energy, a concept 
which some critics argue has been carried over from Aristotelian principles.  The future 130
comes to be infused with the possibility of accessing the divine truth of nature; thus 
Bruno devotes himself to knowing the infinite universe as much as possible: ‘A l’infinito 
m’ergo’ (Inﬁnito II.31). Indeed, while Bruno believes that he has already made an 
important step towards revealing the true nature of the world, there is still plenty more to 
discover about nature: ‘Oltre questo, voglio che apprendiate più capi di quest 
importantissima scienza e di questo fondamento solidissimo de la veritadi e secreti di 
natura’ (De la causa I.733). In a very similar manner to the Essais we gain an important 
sense of the open-ended nature of Bruno’s objective in writing; time endures, and within 
it Bruno’s discussions will circulate, ideas will always be replaced by one another: ‘si 
possono ridurre in cenere uomini e libri, senza impedire però che il pensiero continui a 
circolare, che le parole possano trasudare entusiasmo e trasmettere passione’.  How does 131
time affect this objective? Namely, what does Bruno understand to be the most 
productive use of time? The Furori portray a restless Bruno who is searching furiously for 
a discovery that will lead him to know profound truth about the world. This process takes 
the form of a series of symbols, allegories and poetry that attempts to portray the 
limitations of human knowledge - it quickly becomes clear that many of these symbols are 
heavily linked to time. 
 In the Furori Bruno exhorts an inward retreat into oneself, drawing on Platonic 
sources in order to advocate a path to knowledge that offers the slim possibility of leaving 
the mortal body behind and penetrating the divine secrets of nature. Waller states that the 
resulting turmoil signifies the central conundrum of the Eroici Furori: 
 He [Bruno] sees man as being continually challenged to reach out to the future,  
 since his destiny can be achieved only through the passage of time: ‘Man is placed  
 upon the limits of time and eternity, between perfection and its faint imperfect  
 image’. Only by reaching for the infinite within time can man achieve his   
 authentic stature.  132
 Bruno must fully exploit time and ‘reach for the infinite’ in order to gain a chance 
of understanding eternity, but as I briefly suggested above, this requires deep and studied 
 See Canone, p. 275. 130
 Ordine, p. 187.131
 Waller, ‘Renaissance Ideas of Time’, p. 11. 132
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introspection rather than utilising traditional modes of religious worship. Bruno does not 
even look outwards towards the infinite universe; instead, he examines the depths of his 
soul.  Indeed, the divinity that Bruno seeks is effectively one inside himself.  Bruno’s 133 134
incorporation of the myth of Actaeon is central to understanding this process; while he 
consistently expresses this idea in several ways throughout the Furori, the myth of 
Actaeon is his most well-known allegory. Bruno first mentions ‘il mito di Atteone’ in the 
fourth dialogue of the Furori, in a sonnet that describes how Actaeon, the mythical 
huntsman, transforms from ‘cacciator’ to ‘caccia’. Destiny leads Actaeon and his hunting 
dogs to accidentally chance upon the goddess Diana bathing in the forest: ‘il giovan 
Atteon, quand’il destino/gli drizz’il dubio et incauto camino’ (Furori II.575). Diana is 
enraged and transforms Actaeon into a stag; his hounds set upon him, and Actaeon 
becomes the caccia not the cacciatore: ‘e ‘l gran cacciator dovenne caccia’ (Furori II.575) - 
the hunter becomes the hunted. In the dialogue that follows this sonnet, Bruno equates 
the famous myth to his purpose in writing. According to Tansillo: ‘Atteone significa 
l’intelletto intento alla caccia della divina sapienza, all’apprension della beltà 
divina’ (Furori II.576). He suggests that intellect precedes voluntade but that the latter is 
‘più vigorosa et efficace’ (Furori II.576) - only a firm desire to access ‘divina sapienza’ will 
set an individual on the right track.      
 Furthermore, there is a significant meaning behind Bruno’s deliberate 
presentation of the myth in the form of a sonnet. Poetry is like nature - its true meaning 
must be unearthed from behind the surface of the words, which is what Tansillo is 
attempting to do in the text. He explains what Actaeon represents, acknowledging the 
(natural) setting of the forest as symbolic of a place rarely visited by humans: ‘luoghi 
inculti e solitarii’ (Furori II.576).  The road to a deeper understanding of what nature 135
represents requires another level of effort: ‘più spinoso, inculto e deserto il destro et arduo 
camino…’ (Furori II.5756). In the myth, Actaeon the subject and Diana (divinity) the 
object merge, in a ‘death’ that highlights how the divine was always within the subject, 
 ‘True insight comes about not by looking to the infinite skies, but rather by a form of radical introspection.’ Sergius 133
Kodera, ‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, Literary Self-Fashioning 
and De revolutionibus orbium coelestium’,  in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern Transformations of the Scientist 
and his Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn and Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 229-250 (p. 234).
 ‘On en vient à cette conséquence : les Fureurs héroïques répondent psychologiquement au besoin le plus intime de 134
l’âme qui tente de trouver une vérité stable pour se reposer en elle.’ Védrine, p. 49.
 See Rowland, ‘Introduction’. Augustine employs the same forest metaphor in relation to knowledge about the 135
world: ‘From them grant us space for our meditations on the secret recesses of your law, and do not close the gate to us 
as we knock. It is not for nothing that by your will so many pages of scripture are opaque and obscure. These forests are 
not without deer which recover their strength in them and restore themselves be walking and feeding, by resting and 
ruminating’ (p. 222).
'162
‘non era necessario di cercare fuor di sé la divinità’ (Furori II.578). Actaeon is ‘convertito 
in quel che cercava’ (Furori II.578), an idea which symbolises the need to look inwardly 
into oneself and to the World Soul for divine knowledge - ‘qua finisce la sua vita secondo 
il mondo pazzo, sensuale, cieco e fantastico’ (Furori II.579). Human life is over and 
instead Actaeon ‘vive vita de dèi, pascesi d’ambrosia et inebriasi di nettare’ (Furori II.579). 
At the same time, the dialogue form employed here - which involves the presentation of a 
sonnet and a discussion of the poem afterwards - allows Bruno to demonstrate the 
benefits of jointly analysing symbols and allegories to reach deeper meanings (an outward 
perspective I  return to in further detail below).  
  The Furori is a text constantly affirming Bruno’s aspiration to higher knowledge 
and his belief in the idea that human potential should strive towards a more fulfilling 
purpose in life. This series of rich dialogues reconcile several strands rooted in Bruno’s 
vision of time - vicissitude, journeying towards the divine, the role of fate and fortune. 
Furthermore, his perpetual search for truth is one that primarily requires the individual to 
look inside themselves for enlightenment. As in the Essais, this introspective process 
allows one to surpass the vicissitudes of temporal passage. Sergius Kodera has previously 
stated that: 
 …very few, very ingenious individual human beings may attain a more or less   
 concise image of truth by turning to their physical and mental interiors; for it is  
 there that they will find an embodied, sentient mirror of the infinite universe.   
 Although this form of consciousness is subject to fortuna and vicissitude, it   
 remains the only means to obtain (a fragmented) notion of the universe.  136
 Bruno encourages individuals to seek ideal truth and beauty in ecstatic revelation. 
A person will detach his or her soul from its body and send it forth to eternity. In much 
the same way as Montaigne and his attempt to ‘essay’ the flux and flow of human life, if 
he or she cannot actually do this then they should at least strive to do so: ‘L’intention de 
l’ouvrage est précisément de montrer que l’homme, par ses seules forces, est incapable de 
cette ascension métaphysique et que la défaite qu’il subit est glorieuse mais inévitable’.  137
Like the Essais, the Italian dialogues accept that humans will fight a losing battle against 
time in the pursuit of absolute truth, but one that is still necessary since the final goal (i.e., 
divine revelation) represents the worthiest of causes.  
 Thus far it appears that Bruno, like Montaigne, exhorts a largely introspective 
approach to seeking truth. However, the idea of putting knowledge to practical use in the 
 Kodera, p. 235.136
 Michel, p. 57. 137
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world around him also renders Bruno’s epistemological quest slightly more complex than 
simply a form of introspection. This issue becomes most apparent when we consider 
Bruno as a magus or ‘wise man’. Like many of his near contemporaries in the 1500s, such 
as Gerolamo Cardano (1501-1576) and Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535), Bruno was 
deeply interested in magic. Furthermore, his magical works - many of which were written 
several years after the Italian dialogues - are characterised by their highly practical nature. 
At the start of De magia (c. 1590), Bruno describes a magician as ‘a wise man who has the 
power to act’; he believes that magic should be considered as yet another way of revealing 
truth and can be used to benefit the rest of society.  In his other magical essays 138
(particularly De vinculis in genere) Bruno works from a conception of magic founded on 
bonds and bonding that necessitates an outward perspective on the world.  Canone has 139
emphasised that Bruno’s intention in the De magia naturalis is one of praxis over theory; 
his interest in magic lies in ‘la convinzione […] che la conoscenza deve essere anche prassi e 
deve tradursi in un vantaggio per l’uomo e per la società’.  One of the key features of 140
Bruno’s magic is his insistence on the spiritus which flows through everything and thus 
unites everything; human beings are bonded to everything else and these bonds can (and 
should) be manipulated by the magician to reveal more about the true nature of things.  141
Therefore it can be argued that throughout Bruno’s works, his striving for truth actually 
requires a simultaneous act of looking inwardly and outwardly - the spiritus flows through 
human beings themselves but also reveals the connections between humans and the rest 
of the world. Magicians must try and manipulate the spiritus which extends outwards to 
other bodies. Védrine provides one example of this manipulation by emphasising that 
according to Bruno, the true philosopher or magus can project images and signs onto 
other bodies using the force of the spiritus phantasticus.  Clearly magic represents 142
another means towards accessing hidden truth which relies on an outward practicality 
rather than solely advocating introspection and self-study. Like Montaigne, Bruno’s 
entreaty to look inwardly in the Eroici Furori is not the final word on the ‘quest’ for 
 Giordano Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity: and Essays on Magic, trans. and ed. by Richard J. Blackwell & Robert 138
de Lucca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 107.
 Ibid. 139
 Vittoria Perrone Compagni, ‘Le opere magiche di Giordano Bruno. Note di lettura’, Rivista di Storia della Filosoﬁa, 140
57.2 (2002), pp. 201-224 (p. 204).
 ‘[Every]soul and spirit has some degree of continuity with the universal spirit, which is recognized to be located not 141
only where the individual soul lives and perceives, but also to be spread out everywhere in its essence and substance, as 
many Platonists and Pythagoreans have taught’ (Bruno, Essays on Magic, p. 112). 
 See Védrine, p.311. ‘C’est à ce niveau supérieur que le spiritus phantasticus devient pleinement efficace et que l’image, 142
portée par ce corps subtil qu’est le spiritus peut s’imprimer comme un sceau sur l’âme d’autrui’ (p. 311). 
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knowledge - he considers magic to be another valid form of discovering truth about the 
world which requires an awareness of the spiritus that binds us all to nature.  
 Bruno also displays an outward perspective on practicality and the role of religion 
in Spaccio de la bestia trionfante. The philosopher was motivated to write the Spaccio - a 
thinly-veiled criticism of religion - after witnessing the bloody effects of religious 
absolutism across Europe, from forced conversions to wars and public executions.  143
However, the excommunicated Dominican friar did believe that religion had a place in 
society, despite his ‘heretical’ philosophy (which would eventually see him burned at the 
stake by Catholics). Bruno despised the tendency of religions to present themselves as the 
‘one true faith’ and he was convinced that religion should operate in a similar manner to 
the civic religions of the Roman Empire, i.e. it was to be used as a moral and ethical guide, 
rather than possessing absolute power over the population. For the purposes of this 
discussion, Bruno’s criticism of iustitia sola ﬁde is particularly relevant. Sola ﬁde was the 
Protestant belief that an individual’s relationship with God was forged exclusively 
through faith - performing good works no longer guaranteed salvation. Bruno took issue 
with this belief and criticises the manner in which Lutherans and Calvinists had shed 
blood over such a passive approach to salvation: ‘non fanno altra opra che dir male de 
l’opre’ (Spaccio II.238). Naturally this doctrine clashed with Bruno’s views on the best way 
to utilise time; sola ﬁde devalued the notion of good works, but Bruno believed that it also 
risked discouraging human beings from seeking out truth.  As such, he refers to the 144
Reformers in disparaging terms as being worse than ‘li bruchi e le locuste sterili’ (Spaccio 
II.240). Like Bruno’s magical works, it is essential to keep in mind that - despite his 
heartfelt commitment to pursuing introspection as a way to access truth - Bruno was 
simultaneously aware of the role of philosophy in wider society. His critique of sola ﬁde 
demonstrates a desire to criticise anything which might endanger a practical pursuit of 
knowledge. 
 In previous chapters I illustrated the temporally finite body and emphasised that 
even if Bruno does not believe humans truly die, they are guaranteed to change form in 
some way (in his magical works Bruno refers to death as a process of ‘recombination’ in 
 Eugenio Canone, ‘Bruno e la fine di tutte le cose. Sui motivi apocalittici dello “Spaccio”’, Bruniana & 143
Campanelliana, 2 (2004), pp. 269-282 (p. 270). For more on the issue of sola ﬁde in Bruno’s works, see Alberto Ingegno, 
La sommersa nave della religione : studio sulla polemica anticristiana del Bruno (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1985). 
 Ordine, p. 105. 144
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which neither the body nor soul truly perishes).  Eternity presents the possibility of 145
accessing divine knowledge in a similar manner to Actaeon: ‘[Atteone] è rinovato a 
procedere divinamente e più leggermente, cioè con maggior facilità e con una più efficace 
lena a’ luoghi più folti, alli deserti, alla reggion de cose incomprensibili’ (Furori II.579). 
Here divine knowledge is likened to exploring the more mysterious regions of the world - 
‘luoghi più folti…deserti’ - in order to try and understand the most incomprehensible 
things. Bruno admits that time represents an obstacle to this process: ‘Quella ancora ha 
certi termini di lunga vita; ma costui per infinite diferenze di tempo et innumerabilie 
caggioni de circonstanze, ha di breve vita termini incerti’ (Furori II.614). Life is short but 
the length of the journey towards knowledge of ‘cose incomprensibili’ is indeterminable 
and thus remains open-ended. However, while human time is finite and defined by 
constant flux, in the Eroici Furori one can devote one’s efforts in the present moment to 
looking inwardly towards the World Soul: ‘la verità alla quale in ogni tempo, in ogni etade 
et in qualsivoglia stato che si trove l’uomo, sempre aspira, e per cui suol spreggiar 
qualsivoglia fatica, tentar ogni studio’ (Furori II.691). In Giordano Bruno (1990) Michele 
Ciliberto recognises that Bruno considers his existence within the limitations of the 
human body:  
 Nel suo ragionamento Bruno prende le mosse da una considerazione    
 fondamentale: in questa “terrena vita”, l’uomo sta in un doppio limite: e ciò   
 incide, direttamente, nel suo rapporto con le “cose divine”. Anzitutto, è 
 “rinchiuso in questa priggione de la carne, ed avinto da questi nervi, e confirmato  
 da queste ossa”. Sta, cioè, in un limite oggettivo, corporeo.  146
 This ‘limite oggettivo, corporeo’ is only a limit because of its temporal existence - 
the human body exists in this ‘terrena vita’, one that is defined by human mortality.   On 147
the other hand, ‘cose divine’ are eternal, and in the Italian dialogues, divinity represents a 
higher truth that Bruno desperately wishes to attain. Ciliberto has already begun to 
describe this intellectual journey to attain divine knowledge in temporal terms - such an 
achievement would represent a ‘possibilità di oltrepassare il tempo, il finito’.  Bruno’s 148
 ‘This is what alteration, mutation, passion and even corruption are: namely, the separation of certain parts from 145
others, and their recombination with still others. For death is nothing more than such a disintegration. No spirit and no 
body ever perishes; rather, there is only continual change of combinations and actualizationist.’ (Bruno, Essays on 
Magic, p. 126)
 Michele Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno (Roma: Laterza, 1990), p. 179.146
 Michel remarks that Bruno believes ‘nous sommes confinés en une zone’ (p. 57). Furthermore, ‘toutes les Fureurs se 147
déroulent entre cette souffrance d’une réussite impossible et cette certitude que l’opération doit être tentée’ (p. 48).
 Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno, p. 178.148
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works advocate a constant dedication to seeking truth in the present moment, mindful of 
the promise this may hold for the future. Bruno concludes thus: ‘Conchiudesi dumque 
che a chi cerca il vero, bisogna montar sopra la raggione de cose corporee’ (Furori II.692); 
in other words, he desires to go beyond ‘la raggione de cose corporee’ and his use of time 
is fuelled entirely by this notion. Time flows endlessly, but human beings can attempt to 
access the eternity that exists within ourselves through practising a focused devotion to 
uncovering the true workings of nature.Montaigne and Bruno understand that in order 
to act productively they have to accept the conditions of their existence in time and 
continue to learn and know about the world anyway, despite the uncertainty that 
temporal impermanence creates.  
 At the start of this chapter I examined eternity, the final element within their 
conception of time. Although eternity often possessed an important relationship to 16th-
century conceptions of time, in the Essais Montaigne paid little attention to it and instead 
devoted significant passages to emphasising the constantly fluctuating nature of the 
passage of time. Bruno employed some conventional ideas of eternity in his writing, but 
they were integrated into a heretical 16th-century cosmology that placed God directly into 
the universe. The second part of this chapter explored how Montaigne and Bruno 
consider the best way to use time. Despite approaching this issue from very different 
philosophical outlooks, both thinkers encourage introspection in order to try and act 
productively and seek knowledge in a world of temporal uncertainty. Whether or not 
Montaigne will ever manage to pin down the true essence of himself, or Bruno will ever 
penetrate divine knowledge, both thinkers insist that an individual must continue to 
exploit time productively anyway.  In Chapter Four, I continue to explore how both 149
thinkers examine living in a temporal world by analysing their thoughts on custom and 
the potential stability that tradition provides along the passage of time.  
 Nuccio Ordine has even used this determination to briefly but directly compare Montaigne and Bruno: ‘nella 149
prospettiva di Bruno, non è determinante raggiungere l’obiettivo’ (p. 141).
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Chapter Four: Time and Custom 
 One of the central challenges faced by Montaigne and Bruno was how they might 
attempt to establish truth when the world around them existed primarily in a state of 
temporal flux. If everything from mountains and trees to humans themselves are 
continually coming into being and then passing away, then - with the exception of 
eternity - what can be said to endure for any significant length of time? In practical terms, 
how do Montaigne and Bruno identify stable and universal truths about nature when the 
very world they are trying to learn about is constantly changing? Arguably, one important 
way in which thinkers understood duration was by appealing to the notion of custom. 
During the early modern period, custom possessed several specific meanings that are now 
unfamiliar to modern audiences.  
 In its primary sense, custom usually referred to a system of unofficial laws that 
were unique to specific locales or regions; such laws had often existed alongside the 
codified civil law of the land for many centuries.  In the 1500s, civil law and its 1
counterpart, custom, together formed a popular topic of debate amongst European jurists 
in response to questions of time and duration. Furthermore, custom also signified ‘second 
nature’; it described the customary bent or habits unique to a given individual that 
unconsciously guided many aspects of their everyday behaviour.  The idea of second 2
nature, which Hamlet famously referred to as ‘that monster, custome’, was frequently 
debated in light of its role in developing habitual behaviour over long periods.  Under all 3
of its various guises, custom poses an interesting dilemma in light of Montaigne’s quest 
for self-knowledge and Bruno’s desire to access divine knowledge. Bruno was frustrated by 
custom’s propensity to encourage the passive reception of truths since this impeded the 
novità of his ideas, while Montaigne was concerned with the legitimacy that custom 
thrived on since it challenged the questioning bent of his thought in the Essais. 
 See Lawrence Manley, Convention 1500-1750 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 67-105. Manley 1
describes 16th-century customary law as ‘those ceremonial rites and orders, customary forms and apparently arbitrary 
practices that constitute a class of norms whose rationale was neither immediately conspicuous nor articulate’ (p. 90). 
 See Donald R. Kelley, ‘Second Nature: The Idea of Custom in European Law, Society & Culture’, in The Transmission 2
of Culture in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Anthony Grafton & Ann Blair (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990), pp. 131-172. Kelley’s research has proved particularly useful in the writing of this chapter; while his focus 
clearly lies in the idea of custom as second nature, he also provides excellent context on its other uses in early modern 
Europe. 
 William Shakespeare, The Three-Text Hamlet: Parallel Texts of the First and Second Quartos and First Folio, ed. by 3
Bernice W. Kliman & Paul Bertram (New York: AMS Press, 2003), III.4.163. See Kelley, pp. 131-133. 
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 In this chapter, I explore these ideas in more detail through an examination of the 
interplay between time and custom. If Montaigne and Bruno approached the question of 
time in new and original ways, then it is reasonable to assume that this temporal 
innovation naturally affected other aspects of their thought. Custom emerged as a 
particularly useful topic due to its ability to thrust abstract and philosophical thoughts on 
time - such as vicissitude, mortality, and access to divine knowledge - into a more practical 
light (Ricardo Quinones presents custom as a popular 16th-century concept that 
nevertheless forced human beings to accept their ‘natural limitations’).  Furthermore, this 4
chapter will bring another perspective to bear on the already fine scholarship in 
circulation on early modern custom, by framing it within the conception of time that I 
have outlined so far in this thesis. Unlike time, Montaigne and Bruno both understand 
custom in familiar 16th-century terms. However, I argue that their frustration with many 
of its attributes stems from a shared desire to harness time productively. As a result, an 
analysis of custom in both of their works reveals some of the closest points of comparison 
between Montaigne and Bruno thus far. 
 Here I examine the first two dialogues from Bruno’s Cena de le ceneri and two 
chapters from the first volume of the Essais: ‘Du Jeune Caton’ (I.XXXVII), ‘Des 
Cannibales’ and ‘De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy receue’ (I.XXIII). The 
Cena is the first text in the Italian dialogues and it has also received the most critical 
attention.  This is largely due to its controversial nature - it is the first dialogue in which 5
Bruno systematically sets out his heliocentric universe. Nuccio Ordine has stated that the 
Cena represents ‘la creazione di un nuovo inizio, di una nuova cosmologia capace di 
distruggere le catene del geocentrismo’.  However, instead of immediately setting forth 6
this new philosophy, the first two dialogues of the Cena outline aspects of Bruno’s 
understanding of human civilisation - a reliance on custom and traditional ways of 
thinking form a large part of this discussion.  
 Meanwhile, the three chapters from the Essais addressed here are also well-known 
to modern scholars. ‘Des Cannibales’ is arguably Montaigne’s most famous chapter and 
was written around 1579; it received little in the way of alteration after the initial draft and 
represented a fascinating exploration of otherness and judgement which often draws 
upon the customs of Native Americans. The 2007 Pléiade edition of the Essais notes that 
 Ricardo J. Quinones, ‘Views of Time in Shakespeare’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 26.3 (1965), pp. 327-352 (p. 345).4
 For arguments on the status of the Candelaio as the first text see Nuccio Ordine, ‘Introduzione’ in Giordano Bruno, 5
Opere Italiane, 2 vols, ed. by Nuccio Ordine (Turin, UTET 2002).
 Ibid., p. 68.6
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an early draft of ‘De la coustume’ was completed around 1572, while ‘Du Jeune Caton’ 
was written around 1573 and received substantial additions after 1588.  In ‘Du Jeune 7
Caton’, Montaigne deals primarily with the virtues of Cato the Younger, ‘une des figures 
tutélaires des Essais’.  He considers Cato to be a model of Roman civic virtue and an 8
exemplary Stoic hero, while also discussing the nature of virtue more generally. Custom 
receives heavy criticism throughout this discussion. ‘De la coustume’ is a lengthy chapter 
that moves from discussing the internalisation of time through mental cognition to ‘une 
maîtresse qui contraint l’homme de l’extérieur, la coutume’.  Custom as law is 9
systematically dissected as Montaigne explains its precarious authority and the dulling 
effects it has over the human mind, a discussion which, as we will see, shares many 
similarities with the representation of custom in Bruno’s works. 
Context: Custom and Time in the 16th century 
 Like Montaigne and Bruno, the majority of 16th-century thinkers were highly 
aware of the advantages and disadvantages that custom generated, and modern-day 
scholars have already identified several key debates that emerged as a result of the 
continued presence of custom in European society.  In the late 16th century custom 10
primarily referred to a system of unofficial laws that were based on local practices. This 
collection of customary laws had originally held an important status within Medieval law, 
and their existence continued into the early modern period as well: 
 La coutume, droit non écrit ou codifié tardivement, et établie sur des usages   
 locaux, constitue l’essentiel de la pensée juridique du Moyen Age; malgré   
 l’extension du droict romain, le droict coustumier joue encore un rôle dominant au  
 XVIe siècle. La persistance de la coutume, forme sociale de l’imitation, angoisse  
 devant les innovations qui paraissaient inéluctables, est une manifestation des   
 attitudes contradictoires que la pensée collective du XVIe siècle a vécues à l’égard  
 du temps.  11
 See Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: 7
Gallimard, 2007), pp. 1333, 1372 & 1437.
 Ibid., p. 1437. 8
 Ibid., p. 1372.9
 For a brief summary of the history of debates over custom in France, see Françoise Joukovsky, Montaigne et le 10
problème du temps (Paris: Nizet, 1972), pp. 144-150.
 Georges Matoré, ‘Le temps au XVIe siècle’, L’Information Grammaticale, 32 (1987), pp. 3-8 (p. 7).11
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 As Georges Matoré states above, customary law still played a dominant role in 
16th-century society. And yet it existed alongside the official legal system of the country; 
there was a sharp distinction between custom as mores or consuetudines and civil law or 
leges.  On the one hand, there was an official written law which signified the will of the 12
ruler, and then, on the other hand was the law of custom, whose original purpose had 
usually been forgotten. Sovereign law was often referred to as droict romain in French (see 
the quotation by Matoré above) after the notoriously strict nature of Ancient Roman law, 
while custom was the slightly murkier ‘ensemble d’usages collectifs mis en pratique dans 
la nuit des temps, bien avant d’être codifiés’.  The first type of law was applied to 13
everyone in the land, it was decreed by the ruler and must be submitted to whether 
subjects like it or not. However, custom was the effect of common consent, of which the 
origin had long been forgotten.  Well-known jurists such as Louis Le Caron (1534-1613) 14
believed that the codified law of the land was exercised by weight of reason, which was 
considered to be timeless.  On the other hand, in France customs were proven to exist par 15
turbe, ‘that is, by an interrogation of a representative sample of members of a social group 
or profession by the presiding judge’.  A local usage was proclaimed to be a customary 16
law if it ‘had existed “from time immemorial,” […] limited time periods were also 
acceptable’.  In other words, customs were arguably exercised due to the length of their 17
existence in time.  
 A certain collective mindset still existed in the late 1500s that accepted the 
authority of laws which often had no clear origin in time. However, it must be briefly 
 Ullrich Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, Montaigne Studies, 4.1-2 (1992), pp. 81-96 (p. 83). Montaigne was extremely 12
familiar with French juridical procedures, having served as a magistrate with the Coustumier de Guyenne. For more on 
this aspect of Montaigne’s life, see André Tournon, Montaigne: la glose et l’essai (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 
1983). For more on Montaigne and the juridical difficulties surrounding custom, see Stéphan Geonget, ‘Montaigne et la 
question des “doubles loix” (I.23)’, Bulletin de la Société des amis de Montaigne, (2011), pp. 49-66. 
 André Tournon, ‘Coutume’ in Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, ed. by Philippe Desan (Paris: H. Champion, 13
2004), pp. 230-233 (p. 230).
 Ibid.14
 For further context on debates amongst well-known jurists from this period, see Stéphan Geonget, ‘“Je compare la loy 15
au Roy, & la coustume au tyran”. Débats entre juristes de la fin de la Renaissance’, in La coutume: formes, 
représentations et enjeux - 4e Rencontres internationales La Boétie de Sarlat  (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012), pp. 69-86. 
See also Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, p. 83.
 Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Custom’, p. 83. For an excellent introduction to custom in Renaissance England, which also 16
highlights concerns from other European countries at that time, see William M. Hamlin, ‘Florio’s Montaigne and the 
Tyranny of “Custome”: Appropriation, Ideology, and Early English Readership of the Essayes’, Renaissance Quarterly, 
63.2 (2010), pp. 491-544. Hamlin argues that custom interested Montaigne’s studious English readers the most; while 
Montaigne’s conclusion to this particular subject is ambiguous, ‘early English readers were less willing to reserve their 
judgement’ (p. 492). For a detailed explanation of the par turbe authentication of customs, see Kelley, ‘Second Nature’, 
p. 139. 
 Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, p. 84.17
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noted that this state of affairs was not fully supported by many leading European 
lawmakers. In the late 1400s, Louis XI had already proposed a series of major reforms 
with the aim of unifying French customs, only for those reforms to peter out after his 
death in 1483.  The 16th century signalled another push for reforms across Europe; 18
lawmakers in England, Germany and Spain ‘made Latin commentaries on vernacular 
texts, customs as well as statutes, and so did studies of comparative law at least implicitly, 
whether invidiously or approvingly’.  In France between 1560 and 1582, Christofle de 19
Thou (1508-1582), a ‘champion of legal uniformity’ and the president of the parlement de 
Paris began a series of further reforms, travelling the country in an attempt to synthesise 
local and regional laws.  A question mark hung over the efficacy of observing several sets 20
of laws at the same time, particularly ones which varied from place to place and whose 
origins were often unclear.  
 Custom also possessed other distinct meanings. Randle Cotgrave’s English-French 
dictionary of 1611 translates coustume as ‘habit, manner; continuall fashion, or order’ as 
well as the ‘ancient Law, or custome in a countrey’.  Custom was not only a set of laws - it 21
also referred to an individual’s ‘second nature’ or the personal habit or bent of one’s 
disposition.  William Hamlin emphasises its personal nature and describes it as ‘an 22
individual human’s established manner of being in the world: it refers to personal habit, 
routine, comportment, or practice, and as such may be said to belong to an individual 
rather than to a group’.  Kelley defines custom as a shadow of primitive human nature 23
and argues that 16th-century debates surrounding second nature (consuetudo altera 
natura) had been a commonplace since Aristotle’s day.   24
 Xavier Martin, ‘Vie et destinée des coutumes françaises, 1454-1804: Essai de synthèse’, Revue historique de droit 18
français et étranger, 93.4 (2015), pp. 529-558 (p. 532).
 Donald R. Kelley, ‘Law’, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought (1450-1700), ed. by J.H. Burns & Mark Goldie 19
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 66-94 (pp. 81-82). 
 Kelley, ‘Second Nature’, p. 142. For more on de Thou’s role in customary reform see Martin, p. 536. 20
 Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London: Adam Islip, 1611), ‘Coustume’. 21
 I have already briefly highlighted where Montaigne refers to the pli of the human body as its customary ‘bent’. See 22
Chapter One, ‘Montaigne, death and ageing’.
 Hamlin, p. 498. It must be noted that Hamlin has incorporated his discussion on custom into a larger monograph 23
exploring Montaigne’s early English readership; see William M. Hamlin, Montaigne’s English Journey: Reading the 
Essays in Shakespeare’s Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 Kelley, ‘Second Nature’, p. 131. Aristotle had already discussed the possibility of habit becoming natural in the Ars 24
Rhetorica (p. 131). Many Renaissance thinkers were also concerned about the relationship between custom and nature. 
Custom was arguably supplanting natural laws and replacing them with artificial ones specific to certain regions; for 
more on this see Ricardo J. Quinones, ‘Views of Time in Shakespeare’,  Journal of the History of Ideas, 26.3 (1965), pp. 
327-352 (p. 345).
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 Furthermore, modern scholars of Renaissance custom have outlined an important 
trend stemming from consuetudo altera natura which links heavily to Christian 
eschatology. According to Hamlin, 16th-century convention involved ‘situating all human 
cultures within a biblical narrative that explains custom with reference to the Fall’.  Once 25
more, it was St. Augustine who had already begun to ponder such a timeline in detail; 
Augustine and the other early Church fathers  viewed second nature as a surrender to 
humanity’s corrupting nature.  Augustine invoked custom as habit in order to explain 26
‘the permanence of habitual, repetitive evil in the soul of the impenitent sinner. […] 
Habitual sin, ultimately ineradicable, stubbornly insinuated itself into the inner life of the 
sinner until it became second nature’.  Not only did this become an explanation for the 27
corruption of individual human beings, but it also referred to a collective and sinful habit 
that had led to the degeneration of humanity for centuries. Humans had fallen from 
God’s grace, and the ongoing development of civilisation continued to sever human 
beings from the divine.  Consequently, Shakespeare’s exploration of second nature in 28
Hamlet is merely a reflection of what Cefalu has labelled as a popular Augustinian-
Protestant preoccupation with habit, sin, and action.   29
 In the 1500s, jurists were considering whether or not to incorporate enduring 
common law into civil law, while theologians had shaped second nature into a Biblical 
narrative concerning innate human corruption. In both cases, it is clear that custom 
generated its authority from its ability to exist over long periods, and many thinkers had 
already made this link between custom and time explicit. Writing in 1595, Le Caron 
lamented that customary law was upheld due to time rather than reason, and made efforts 
to stress the atemporal (and thus preferable) nature of civil law: ‘la coustume n’a souvent 
pour raison que l’usage: mais la loy est fondée en raison naturelle ou civile’.  The French 30
 Hamlin, p. 505. 25
 Kelley, ‘Second Nature’, p. 131. 26
 Paul A. Cefalu, ‘“Damnéd Custom…Habits Devil”: Shakespeare’s “Hamlet”, Anti-Dualism, and the Early Modern 27
Philosophy of Mind’, ELH, 67.2 (2000), pp. 399-431 (p. 409). In ‘Second Nature’, Kelley explains the Biblical 
foundation to this debate: ‘Emblematic of this deep-seated prejudice was the reminder of Cyprian, often repeated (by 
Luther among others) and preserved in canon law, that Christ had represented himself not as the “custom” but rather as 
the “truth”, referring to John 14:6, “Sed Dominus noster Christus veritatem se non consuetudinem cognominavit’” (p. 
133). 
 See Richard Handler, ‘Of Cannibals and Custom: Montaigne’s Cultural Relativism’, Anthropology Today, 2.5 (1986), 28
pp. 12-14 (p. 13). 
 Cefalu, p. 428. Kelley emphasises that it is important to remember that custom wasn’t a wholly Christian 29
appropriation and that the idea of nature/second nature ‘outlasted the medieval Christian formulation’ (p. 133).
 Louis Charondas Le Caron, Pandectes ou digestes du droict françois, 1st. edn (Paris: P. L’Huillier, 1607), p. 398. For a 30
detailed discussion of this quotation and other passages found in Le Caron’s assessment of custom, see Langer, 
‘Montaigne’s Customs’, pp. 82-83.
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lawyer Estienne Pasquier (1529-1615) set forth an exact definition of how many years 
constituted ‘time immemorial’, which was considered to be the necessary length of time 
for a law to be considered customary: ‘je tien qu’il fault une possession immémoriale, c’est 
a dire cent ans’.  As Rab Houston has recently suggested, the idea of custom as long 31
practice was central to English definitions of the term, and this characteristic applied 
equally to European countries including France, Spain and Germany.  James Dalrymple, 32
Viscount Stair (1619-1695) would later suggest that nations were happier ‘whose laws have 
entered by long custom’, since ‘through a tract of time’ experience would show whether 
they were acceptable and, if inconvenient, they would ‘prove abortive in the Womb of 
Time’.   33
 Memory was another temporal concept that thinkers were aware aided in the 
growing authority of a custom; again discussing the example of England, which has 
received a lot of attention from modern scholars, Houston remarks that ‘English society 
had a collective memory embedded in custom, which gave it a strong sense of its own 
identity’.  In other words, custom was a social contract which relied on collective 34
memory to endure in time. According to Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), an emphatic 
supporter of custom in the English legal system, ‘“of every custom there be two essential 
parts, time and usage, time out of mind and continual and peaceable usage without 
lawful interruption”’.  It is these fundamental characteristics of custom that will direct 35
much of the next part of the discussion. 
Custom and Time 
Custom in the Essais and the Italian Dialogues 
 Estienne Pasquier, L’Interprétation des Institutes de Justinian avec la conférence de chasque paragraphe aux ordonnances 31
royaux, arrestz de parlement et coustumes générales de la France, ed. by M. le Duc Pasquier (Paris: V. Ainé, A. Durand, 
1847), pp. 34-35. 
 Rab Houston, ‘Custom in Context: Medieval and Early Modern Scotland and England’, Past & Present, 211.1 (2011), 32
pp. 35-76 (p. 38). Houston suggests that customary law in Scotland was highly unusual in Europe since temporality was 
not a key feature of its implementation. Discussing custom in Europe, Kelley has also summarised that ‘the element of 
time remained central to the idea of custom’ (p. 137). 
 James Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland: Deduced from its Originals, and Collated 33
with the Civil, Canon and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations: in IV Books, 2nd edn 
(Edinburgh: Andrew Anderson, 1693), p. 10.
 Houston, p. 73.34
 Manley, p. 218. 35
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 In the 16th century, custom’s existence in time was considered to be threefold: its 
origins had often been forgotten, it endured for very long periods, and yet - as the idea of 
legal reform suggests - custom was not immune to time itself. Like everything else in time, 
it was mutable. In this section, I will explore in more detail the extent to which 
Montaigne and Bruno portray custom along these lines, highlighting where they engage 
with standard 16th-century ideas of custom and also emphasising significant points of 
connection between the two thinkers. First I examine how Montaigne and Bruno 
consider the effects of custom on human behaviour, a discussion which reveals itself to be 
highly critical of both common law and second nature. I then move on to assess the role 
of time in this portrayal through a detailed exploration of two distinct tropes: the New 
World and imagery of poisons and potions. 
 Interestingly, both Montaigne and Bruno introduce the adverse effects of custom 
through humour, satire, and comedy. They do so in order to highlight the manner in 
which custom can lead absurd or nonsensical behaviour to become normalised. Custom 
enjoys a lighthearted introduction into the texts discussed here as both thinkers begin by 
mocking customary laws (or consuetudines in Latin) and the institutions that represent 
them. Indeed, the opening lines of ‘De la coustume’ appear to clash with the rather 
solemn title of the chapter and its connection to legal concerns. Instead, Montaigne 
recounts ‘la force de la coustume’ in all of its absurdity with the following anecdote: 
 Celuy me semble avoir tres-bien conceu la force de la coustume, qui premier   
 forgea ce conte, qu’une  femme de village, ayant apris de caresser et porter entre ses 
 bras un veau des l’heure de sa naissance, et continuant tousjours à ce faire, gagna  
 cela par l’accoustumance, que tout grand beuf qu’il estoit, elle le portoit encore.  
 (I.XXIII.108-109) 
 What exactly led the poor woman in this story to pursue such an unnatural line of 
behaviour?  Certain customs or usages may appear bizarre to other people, while those 36
individuals who practice them are unaware of their true nature. The woman in question 
began by looking after a new-born calf - she enjoyed stroking it and carrying it around. 
Over time, the woman became accustomed to carrying the calf even as it slowly turned 
into a fully-grown cow in her arms, thus rendering the act a ridiculous farce to an outside 
observer such as Montaigne. This story was based on an anecdote taken from the Roman 
rhetorician Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (95 AD) in which Milo of Croton, a renowned 
athlete, built up his strength by carrying a calf every day until it became a full-grown 
 Here the term ‘unnatural’ signifies defying the laws of nature or ‘reigles de nature’ (as Montaigne refers to them later 36
in this particular chapter). For a description of what exactly these laws entail in the context of the Essais, see Ian 
Maclean, Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), pp. 63-64.  
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bull.  As Langer remarks, this was a well-known story in the 16th century. However, 37
whereas previous humanist references to the story interpreted the ability to carry the bull 
as a positive sign, Montaigne purposely skews this particular example in order to portray 
custom in a distinctly unfavourable light, highlighting the true power of custom at work 
through a humorous retelling of Quintilian’s anecdote.  Indeed, in order to emphasise 38
this point, he swiftly introduces a metaphor that describes custom as ‘une violente et 
traistresse maistresse d’escole’ (I.XXIII.109). Customary law is meant to educate human 
beings about how to live in the world, when in fact it betrays them, causing the silly and 
unnatural phenomenon of the femme de village carrying a fully-grown cow. Writing on 
the effects of custom in Shakespeare’s plays, Ricardo J. Quinones notes that ‘custom […] 
is monster in dulling purpose and habituating the rational awareness to evil practice’. In 
Montaigne’s case, I believe that the practice in question naturally appears nonsensical to 
an outsider, but the woman’s ‘rational awareness’ has been eroded by custom to such a 
degree that she has normalised this strange behaviour.    39
 As with ‘De la coustume’, the opening lines of the first dialogue of the Cena 
introduce custom in a fairly tongue-in-cheek manner; here Bruno specifically criticises 
those people he believes are most guilty of upholding custom. Montaigne described 
custom as a traitorous school teacher, something that betrays when it is meant to teach. In 
a similar vein, Bruno begins by mocking Oxford dons and thus undermining their claim 
to authority - instead they are merely portrayed as people bent on upholding superficial 
traditions. The two main interlocutors, Teofilo and Smitho, commence the dialogue by 
discussing a pair of Oxford professors with whom the Nolan has met.  Smitho asks a 40
series of short questions about the calibre of guests that will be attending the Ash 
Wednesday supper, to which Teofilo replies ‘sì…sì’: ‘Parlavan ben latino?’ ‘Galantuomini?’ 
‘Di buona riputazione?’ He then asks how qualified the Oxford scholars are, to which 
Teofilo humorously responds: 
 Come non? uomini da scelta, di robba lunga, vestiti di velluto; un de’ quali avea  
 due catene d’oro lucente al collo, e l’altro, per Dio, con quella preziosa mano, che  
 Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, p. 88.37
 Langer offers the following background: ‘The calf-bull is given an obscene meaning in Petronius. There are many 38
other references to the anecdote in Montaigne’s time, such as in Guazzo’s La civil conversatione. However, being able to 
carry the bull or cow is always interpreted as an advantage or ability, not as a constraint or enslavement’ (Ibid., p. 89). 
 Quinones, Discovery of Time, p. 345.39
 Kodera discusses Bruno’s use of ‘the Nolan’ instead of using the pronoun ‘I’. He claims this is an example of Bruno 40
trying to forge a new identity for himself as an author. Referring to himself in such a way allows Bruno to take himself 
out of the bounds of institutions to some degree. See Kodera, p. 230. 
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 contenea dodeci anella in due dita, sembrava un ricchissimo gioielliero, che ti   
 cavava gli occhi ed il core, quando la vagheggiava. (Cena I.441-442) 
  
 Mocking the Oxford institutions he had disastrous encounters with during his 
second stay there, Bruno highlights the superficial nature of these so-called ‘learned men’ 
by focusing on their extravagant clothing. They resemble jewellery shops with all of their 
exaggerated finery, and yet it is these figures that are responsible for upholding the 
received wisdom of the English educational institutions. Clearly, Bruno considers them to 
be a joke, and he is quick to emphasise this point right from the start of the Cena. 
However, although Teofilo discerns their true, superficial nature, their authority is so 
deeply embedded in English society that they are generally considered to be gentlemen ‘di 
buona riputazione’, regardless of their ridiculous garb.  
 Despite the amusing nature of these examples, in both cases, the underlying 
message reveals a profoundly negative aspect of custom - namely, that custom gradually 
normalises nonsensical behaviour. Furthermore, custom continues this absurd hold over 
an individual due to its ability to imitate natural behaviour to a certain degree. In ‘De la 
coustume’, Montaigne recalls the somewhat disturbing example of a young girl, ‘la fille 
qu’Albert recite s’estre accoustumée à vivre d’araignées’ (I.XXIII.109). Custom successfully 
alters the natural feeding habits of the young girl, and instead she learns to eat spiders. 
However, while the nature of what she is eating is deeply unsettling to an outside 
observer, she herself has merely grown accustomed to it since she is still responding to the 
natural signs of hunger. 
  Rather than letting oneself be guided by nature in their everyday actions, 
individuals are guilty of following custom instead. As Hamlin states, ‘for Montaigne, 
humanity’s frailty proves only that custom is often a corrupting force, further distancing 
us from nature’s providence and our own sufficiency’.  Custom has supplanted what is 41
natural and instead, it succeeds in overturning ‘les reigles de nature’ by shaping someone’s 
behaviour so completely that it appears to take the form of human instinct. This action 
allows custom to continue its hold over an individual undetected. A few pages later 
Montaigne remarks that ‘les loix de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de nature, 
naissent de la coustume: chacun ayant en veneration interne les opinions et moeurs 
approuvées et receues autour de luy, ne s’en peut desprendre sans remors, ny s’y appliquer 
sans applaudissement’ (I.XXIII.115). Here Montaigne admits that custom imitates second 
nature very effectively - often humans label their instincts as natural, but they may equally 
 Hamlin, p. 506.41
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be born of custom.  This idea is a startling admission by Montaigne, which suggests that 42
the human conscience is a product of human culture - represented in this instance by 
custom - rather than nature. Hamlin has previously commented on Montaigne’s 
distinction between the decreasing influence of nature compared with the rising influence 
of artifice.  In the examples above I offer an insight into Montaigne’s portrayal of the 43
decidedly abnormal consequences of custom’s erosion of nature as it manifests itself 
through individual behaviour over time.  
 Custom gradually overrides natural behaviour with the absurd, and it is allowed 
to do so primarily due to an ability to imitate second nature. Time plays a central role in 
this process. In the Essais time is clearly labelled as a contributing factor towards the 
authority of the so-called traitorous school teacher; in one of the opening paragraphs of 
‘De la coustume’, Montaigne states the following:  
 Elle [la coutume] establit en nous, peu à peu, à la desrobée, le pied de son   
 authorité: mais par ce doux et humble commencement, l’ayant rassis et planté avec 
 l’ayde du temps, elle nous descouvre tantost un furieux et tyrannique visage,   
 contre lequel nous n’avons plus la liberté de hausser seulement les yeux. Nous luy  
 voyons forcer, tous les coups, les reigles de nature. (I.XXIII.109) 
  
 Slowly but surely - ‘avec l’ayde du temps’ - custom strengthens its authority 
without an individual becoming consciously aware of it doing so. Then suddenly one 
may realise the degree of power that custom has accumulated. The more it manages to 
endure over time, the more authoritative it becomes - a characteristic which applies not 
only to second nature but also to common law.  
 It is important to note at this point in the discussion that Western Europe was 
being forced to confront a vastly different society from its own - the New World. The 
discovery of America had been a complete and utter surprise; the revelations that followed 
concerning the nature of its peoples were both fascinating and disturbing. Just over one 
hundred years after Columbus first discovered the continent, Europeans such as 
Montaigne were still trying to understand a people whose culture was unlike anything 
 In ‘Des Destries’ (I.XLVIII) Montaigne describes a custom of the Mammelus (partisan soldiers from the Savoy 42
region): ‘Les Mammelus se vantent d’avoir les plus adroits chevaux de gensdarmes du monde. Et dict on que, par nature 
et par coustume, ils sont faits, par certains signes et voix, à ramasser aveq les dens les lances et les darts, et à les offrir à leur 
maistre en pleine meslée et à cognoistre et discerner’ (I.XLVIII). See also Bruno, Opere Latine, trans. by Carlo Monti 
(Turin: UTET, 2013); on customs surrounding the covering of the genitals in different cultures, Bruno also attributes 
such behaviour to custom or nature: ‘[…] altri no’ mostrarsi davanti a tutti e girare nudi con il membro in erezione non 
è disonorevole, turpe e indecoroso per tutte le specie degli esseri animati né per tutto il genere umano, ma per alcuni 
diventa tale per natura, per altri per consuetudine’ (p. 112).
 See Hamlin, p. 507. ‘Montaigne sees custom as a subcategory of artifice, and he suggests that artifice and nature have 43
shaped human existence in an inverse ratio across the sweep of history’ (p. 507).
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they had ever encountered before. ‘Des Cannibales’ famously lists the most extreme usages 
of this society - ‘cet autre monde’ - in unflinching detail. One such case involves a flesh-
eating ritual in which the native American tribes execute a prisoner and feed on him 
afterwards: ‘ils le rotissent et en mangent en commun et en envoient des lopins à ceux de 
leurs amis’ (I.XXXI.209). By mutilating and eating the body afterwards the remaining 
tribe members truly punish the prisoner - Montaigne calmly explains that this is not done 
to sustain themselves, but rather it represents ‘une extreme vengeance’. Despite the 
shocking nature of such an act, in ‘Des Cannibales’ Montaigne uses these customs to 
make his readers reflect on the nature of their own societal norms, particularly the role of 
civil law in Europe. Indeed, his discussion of the New World and property laws discussed 
below - which Bruno also highlights in the Spaccio - presents the Americas as a society in 
which common law has not had time to implant itself and in some cases does not exist at 
all. 
 The issue of property laws leads Montaigne and Bruno to criticise the violent and 
greedy nature of their society. America is a nation of people in which Montaigne writes ‘il 
n’y a aucune espece de trafique: […] nuls contrats; nulles successions; nuls 
partages’ (I.XXXI.206). European Post-Reformation violence comes to the fore once 
again as Montaigne reflects on how ‘civilised’ Western Europe is in comparison to the 
newly-discovered lands across the ocean. Nature should exist above the petty concerns of 
territory and boundaries. However, as Montaigne sarcastically remarks, European society 
has desecrated nature with its inventions: ‘Ce n’est pas raison que l’art gaigne le point 
d’honneur sur nostre grande et puissante mere nature. Nous avons tant rechargé la beauté 
et richesse de ses ouvrages par nos inventions’ (I.XXXI.205-206). Montaigne criticises his 
society’s use of warfare and colonisation to carve up the land, while the Native Americans 
still live according to loix naturelles in spite of their cannibalism.  
 I would also argue that Montaigne’s insistence on highlighting to his readers the 
defects of European society in this way might encourage them to treat their fellow 
countrymen and women with tolerance and respect, not just the Native Americans. After 
all, Montaigne claims that we readily judge the faults of the cannibals and yet ‘nous 
soyons si aveuglez aux nostres’ (I.XXXI.209). The entire strategy of inversion that we 
have seen Montaigne employ in ‘Des Cannibales’ preaches a need to become more open-
minded towards other cultures. Against the backdrop of religious conflict this literary 
strategy gains added meaning. Montaigne’s mother Antoinette López de Villanueva was a 
Marrano (a Jew who had converted to Christianity) while the author himself regularly 
sought out contact with Protestants, particularly as two of his family members converted 
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to the religion.  It is likely that Montaigne included so many remarks on the importance 44
of judgement in ‘Des Cannibales’ to encourage a more open-minded approach towards 
people of other religions. After all, cannibals wait til their victims are dead before eating 
the remains - the European religious authorities burn their heretics alive, ‘le faire rostir par 
le menu, le faire mordre et meurtrir aux chiens et aux pourceaux’ (I.XXXI.209).  
 Returning to the issue of property law, Bruno is also inspired by the complete lack 
of legal or commercial framework in the Americas and uses it to criticise how Europeans 
have attempted to supplant what is natural through colonial conquest. In the third 
dialogue of Spaccio de la bestia trionfante Bruno derides the property laws which 
European invaders have used to divide up the previously-untouched land of the Americas:  
 Tutti magnificano l’età de l’oro e poi stimano e predicano per virtù quella   
 manigolda che la estinse; quella ch’ha trovato il mio et il tuo: quella ch’ha divisa, e  
 fatta propria a costui e colui non solo la terra (la quale è data a tutti gli animanti  
 suoi), ma et oltre il mare, e forse l’aria ancora. (Spaccio II.319)  
  
 In the 16th century, the New World was commonly associated with the Golden 
Age (despite the grislier customs of some of its inhabitants), which was considered to be a 
period of time when nature remained outside the reaches of humanity.  As a result, the 45
New World came to represent a different period of time altogether; in America, nature 
was still whole, complete, undivided - it had not yet undergone the same destructive 
transformation between ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ as supposedly civilised, developed European 
society. Bruno contrasts the pure state of this allegorical version of America with the 
actions of the Europeans and their current desecration of nature - ‘la quale è data a tutti 
gli animanti suoi’ - through the introduction of ‘leggi usurpative e proprietarie del mio e 
del tuo’ (Spaccio II.320). European invaders were beginning to undermine nature’s 
capacity to provide everything for everyone, by imposing their own superficial property 
laws. In the New World, nature still belongs to nature, although as Bruno notes, it is 
about to be divided up and changed for a very long time by artificial human laws. Bruno’s 
highly critical response to colonialism arguably reveals a preoccupation with a ‘time 
before’ and a ‘time after’ the imposition of custom in the New World.  
 The loss of a natural, perfect landscape to artificial common law also recalls the 
conventional 16th-century notion of custom as second nature and its popular connection 
 On Montaigne’s family tree, see Philippe Desan, Montaigne: A Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 44
2017), pp. 7-20.
 On the Golden Age, see Pietro Martire D’Anghiera, ‘Sommario dell’istoria dell’Indie occidentali’, in Navigazioni e 45
viaggi, vol. 5, ed. by Giovanni Battista Ramusio (Turin: Einaudi, 1985), pp. 25-205 (p. 55). 
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to the Fall.  The Native Americans are considered to be primitive reflections of the 46
Europeans, whose own tribal origins have long been forgotten. As Bruno emphasises 
above, custom possesses a higher status in European society, whereas Montaigne believes 
that the New World cannibals are much closer to their original natural state.  Therefore 47
Europeans are also living evidence of the continuing corruption of humanity that began 
when Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden of Eden. Handler has previously 
suggested an interesting link in the Essais between original sin, Native Americans and the 
gradual erosion of humanity’s connection to nature: 
 Here Montaigne’s interpretation of the cannibals recalls the doctrines of original sin 
 and the expulsion from paradise: human beings, originally pure, fell from God’s  
 grace, and the development of human civilisation merely perpetuates and intensifies 
 the corruption of humankind wilfully alienated from the divine.    48
 The New World acts a reminder of how European society has evolved; it forces 
thinkers such as Montaigne to reflect on his or her own identity. European civilisation is 
supposedly more developed, but if custom is a key marker of this evolution, then it 
appears to have held humans back in some respects, severing their connection to nature 
and thus their ability to access the divine knowledge of nature. 
 All of these images and ideas can be summarised with a final reflection on the 
trope of poison in both Bruno’s Italian dialogues and Montaigne’s Essais. For example, 
towards the end of the first dialogue of the Cena, Smitho and Teofilo engage in a lengthy 
conversation which dwells mainly on the power that custom wields in their society. 
Smitho asks Teofilo whether he is aware of the extent of custom’s power to infect people 
‘da fanciullezza in certe persuasioni, ad impedirne da l’intelligenze de cose 
manifestissime?’ (Cena I.464). He explains that custom’s authority grows over time 
without humans even realising: 
 […] non altrimente ch’accader suole a quei che sono avezzati a mangiar veleno, la  
 complession de quali al fine non solamente non ne sente oltraggio, ma ancora se  
 l’ha convertito in nutrimento naturale: di sorte che l’antidoto istesso gli è   
 dovenuto mortifero. (Cena I.464) 
  
 For an interesting discussion of the connection between Montaigne’s reflections on clothing and the Fall, see John 46
O’Brien, ‘Fashion’, in Montaigne after Theory/Theory after Montaigne (Washington: University of Washington Press, 
2011), pp. 55-74 (pp. 57-58). See also George Hoffmann, ‘Anatomy of the Mass: Montaigne’s “Cannibals”’, PMLA, 11.2 
(2002), pp. 207-221 for a fascinating analysis of Catholic symbolism in ‘Des Cannibales’. 
 Handler has suggested that in the New World inhabitants, ‘he [Montaigne] can still see others as exemplars of some 47
pristine and natural, that is, uncultured or uncustomed, human reality’ (p. 13).
 Ibid.48
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 From birth, custom or consuetudine becomes so ingrained over time that human 
beings are no longer able to remember what it really is - they forget that it is a ‘poison’ and 
instead feed on it as if it were real sustenance. Bruno draws on the image of poison again 
in the Eroici Furori; he declares that custom ‘è uno de grandissimi e fortissimi 
inconvenienti che trovar si possano’ and explains that ‘similmente accade a essi, che come 
a color che da puerizia e gioventù sono consueti a mangiar veneno, quai son dovenuti a 
tale, che se gli è convertito in suave e proprio nutrimento’ (Furori II.729). Both here and 
in another passage from the Camoeracensis Acrotismus, Bruno attributes the comparison 
of custom with poison to the Arab polymath Averroes (1126-1198), and uses it to conclude 
that people who follow custom too deeply come to abhor what is natural or exists 
‘secondo la comun natura’ (Furori II.729-730).  Furthermore, there is no reasonable 49
explanation for why humans follow customary law except that they have done so for a 
long time and have become dulled to its effects. In a key passage from the Cena, Smitho 
laments to Teofilo: ‘Non sai quanta forza abbia la consuetudine di credere, ed esser 
nodrito da fanciullezza in certe persuasioni, ad impedirne da l’intelligenza de cose 
manifestissime’ (Cena I.464).  Once more custom is equated to something that is 50
ingested - ‘nodrito’ - and again the emphasis is on the dangers of this process at work ‘da 
fanciullezza’. An individual repeatedly ‘feeds’ on custom from a young age which 
eventually impedes the seeking out of ‘cose manifestissime’; instead it encourages an 
unquestioning acceptance of what has come before, time and again, rather than a 
meaningful discussion of laws and rites. Therefore custom is rooted not in reason, but in 
time, and since it often implants itself in the mind from birth, it is very difficult for an 
individual to question what they have always believed to be right. 
 The effects of custom are also described as poisonous in the Essais. In ‘De la 
Coustume’ Montaigne expresses the same concerns as Bruno, drawing on extremely 
similar imagery. He refers to the ancient King Mithridates of Pontus who, ‘par son 
moyen, rengea son estomac à se nourrir de poison’ (I.XXIII.109), using an identical 
 Giordano Bruno, Acrotismo cameracense. Le spiegazioni degli articoli di ﬁsica contro i Peripatetici, trans. and ed. by 49
Barbara Amato, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 7 (Pisa: Serra, 2009): ‘Allo stesso modo, infatti - aggiunge il suo 
commentatore Averroè - coloro che sono soliti nutrirsi di veleno si dice che siano dotati di una facoltà tale per cui, 
mentre sono ristorati dal veleno come da un cibo appropriato, risulta per essi fatale, di conseguenza, quanto per gli altri 
è vitale e funge da medicamento’ (p. 46). For analysis of this trope in relation to Averroes, see M.A. Granada, ‘“Esser 
spogliato dall’umana perfezione e giustizia”. Nueva evidencia de la presencia de Averroes en la obra y en el proceso de 
Giordano Bruno’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 5.2 (1999), pp. 305-331 (pp. 311-314). 
 For a discussion of Averroes’ influence on these passages from the Cena, see Alfonso Musci, ‘L’«antiqua 50
Consuetudine di vivere…». Commento a un luogo machiavelliano dello Spaccio’, in Favole, metafore, storie: Seminario 
su Giordano Bruno, ed. by Olivia Catanorchi & Diego Pirillo (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2007), pp. 141-156 (pp. 
149-150); also Nicola Badaloni, ‘Sulla struttura del tempo in Giordano Bruno’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 3.1 (1997), 
pp. 11-45 (p. 17). 
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metaphor to Bruno in order to describe the dulling of the senses due to custom. In ‘De 
l’experience’ he dwells on additional instances that express both how custom may provoke 
unsettling behaviour in people and also how this behaviour comes to be tacitly accepted 
over time. The following passage employs similar metaphors and instances of personal 
experience in order to explain the relationship between custom, time and human 
existence:  
 Mon collet de fleurs sert à mon nez, mais, apres que je m’en suis vestu trois jours  
 de suitte, il ne sert qu’aux nez assistants. Cecy est plus estrange, que, nonobstant  
 des longs intervalles et intermissions, l’accoustumance puisse joindre et establir   
 l’effect de son impression sur noz sens: comme essayent les voisins des clochiers. Je  
 loge chez moy en une tour où à la diane et à la retraitte,  une fort grosse cloche   
 sonne tous les jours l’Ave Maria. Ce tintamarre effraye ma tour mesme: et, aux   
 premiers jours me semblant insupportable, en peu de temps m’apprivoise, de   
 maniere que je l’oy sans offense et souvent sans m’en esveiller. (I.XXIII.109-110) 
 Interestingly, Montaigne draws the examples above from his own direct 
experience - he considers himself to be a suitable illustration of the effects of custom just 
as much as the historical examples he cites. He is aware that his perception of reality is 
shaped by custom, and uses this awareness to emphasise a wider point on the nature of 
custom. The examples of the ‘collet de fleurs’ and the nearby clock tower again express the 
same ideas as Bruno - namely that time accommodates custom’s growing authority to 
such an extent that its effects on our understanding of the world are slowly mutated over 
time. Perhaps at first, certain local laws or changes to society were met with disapproval, 
just as Montaigne was initially irritated by the church bells near his bedroom, but 
eventually they become a new kind of normal.  
 Another concrete example of this phenomenon is the introduction of the 
Gregorian calendar in 1582, which Montaigne remarks upon at various points throughout 
the Essais. A reform of the earlier Julian calendar, the Gregorian version was designed by 
its namesake Pope Gregory XIII to keep the vernal equinox on the 21st March and 
reconcile the Easter calendar with lunar cycles as closely as possible.  The most significant 51
alteration involved removing ten days from the Julian calendar. Although it has now been 
in use for centuries, at the time of its inception, the Gregorian calendar was an important 
change to 16th-century European society.  
 However, the change itself was not entirely welcome. In ‘De mesnager sa 
volonté’ (III.X), Montaigne confesses that he is struggling to adjust to the new calendar 
 For a detailed account of Western computation of time, see Part II ‘Our Time: The Imposition of Order’ in Anthony 51
Aveni, Empires of Time - Calendars, Clocks and Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
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after switching from the Julian version: ‘l’eclipsement nouveau des dix jours du Pape 
m’ont prins si bas que je ne m’en puis bonnement accoustrer’ (III.X.1010). This event is an 
interesting example in which technical time, represented by the correction of the calendar, 
has a tangible effect upon Montaigne. Gerard T. Moran has previously illustrated how the 
French rural nobility was often the least receptive to marking time in modern ways.  In a 52
fascinating study, Moran demonstrates how traditional feast days were poorly observed 
during the late 1500s due to the Wars of Religion; rural nobles were often amongst the last 
to abandon such celebrations. The same may be said for the calendrical reform, since 
Montaigne initially remarks that the previous way of counting was used for centuries: ‘un 
si ancien et long usage me vendique et rappelle à soy’ (III.X.1010).  However, after a few 53
days - or in the case of the calendrical reform, a few decades - have passed, they eventually 
cease to be a problem; the introduction of both customary law and the noisy church bells 
is validated with time.  
 Indeed, in a typical example of the contradictions inherent in the Essais, 
Montaigne gradually becomes inured to the change in technical time. In ‘Des 
Boyteux’ (III.XI) he appears to play down its effect on his fellow countrymen and 
women: ‘Il y a deux ou trois ans qu’on acoursit l’an de dix jours en France. Combien de 
changemens devoient suyvre cette reformation’ce fut proprement remuer le ciel et la terre 
à la fois. Ce neantmoins, il n’est rien qui bouge de sa place’ (III.XI.1025).  Custom’s ability 54
to endure over time means that humans mistakenly rely on it in order to inform their 
understanding of reality, even though the actual roots of custom have been long forgotten 
over the passage of time. In the quotation above, Montaigne illustrates how the initial 
shock surrounding the upheaval has already begun to wane - in time, the former method 
of counting time will be forgotten altogether, and this ‘new’ change will become normal. 
This ability to influence human understanding of reality is a central component of 
custom’s authority. Custom is powerful because, as Montaigne remarks, ‘c’est à la 
 See Gerard T. Moran, ‘Conceptions of Time in Early Modern France: An Approach to the History of Collective 52
Mentalities’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 12.4 (1981), pp. 3-19. 
 Montaigne also briefly mentions the calendrical reform in the opening lines of ‘Des Boyteux’ (III.XI): ‘Ce 53
neantmoins, il n’est rien qui bouge de sa place: mes voisins trouvent l’heure de leurs semences, de leur recolte, 
l’opportunité de leurs negoces, les jours nuisibles et propices, au mesme point justement où ils les avoyent assignez de 
tout temps. Ny l’erreur ne se sentoit en nostre usage, ny l’amendement ne s’y sent’ (III.XI.1025-1026).
 Montaigne adds another element of time to this discussion, demonstrating that the seasons do not change despite the 54
change to the calendar. Thus a contrast arises between technical time and natural time: ‘Il y a deux ou trois ans qu’on 
acoursit l’an de dix jours en France. Combien de changemens devoient suyvre cette reformation’ce fut proprement 
remuer le ciel et la terre à la fois. Ce neantmoins, il n’est rien qui bouge de sa place: mes voisins trouvent l’heure de leurs 
semences, de leur recolte, l’opportunité de leurs negoces, les jours nuisibles et propices, au mesme point justement où ils 
les avoyent assignez de tout temps. Ny l’erreur ne se sentoit en nostre usage, ny l’amendement ne s’y sent’ (III.XI.
1025-1026). 
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coustume de donner forme à nostre vie, telle qu’il lui plaist; elle peut tout en cela: c’est le 
breuvage de Circé’ (III.XIII.1080). In Homer’s Odyssey the goddess Circe’s potions turn 
Odysseus’ men into animals - Montaigne employs the image here in order to emphasise 
that custom makes human beings forgetful of their former selves and their true form.   55
Custom, time and truth 
 The poisonous portrayal of custom seeks to define it as something that pretends 
to nourish while gradually infecting an individual’s behaviour; it mirrors natural feeding 
habits until it comes to be accepted, strengthening its hold by dulling the senses until its 
venomous nature is forgotten. However, in comparison to their contemporaries in the 
legal sphere and theologians concerned with the corruption of humankind, Montaigne 
and Bruno were particularly interested in how custom affected their use of time. Rather 
than acknowledging the role of custom in shaping collective identity in a positive manner, 
i.e. as a potential symbol of pride in age-old traditions, both thinkers were continually 
frustrated by custom since they believed that it encouraged a passive mindset to embed 
itself within a given society. In Chapter Three I described the epistemological initiative 
which grew from a desire to put philosophy to practical use. However, custom appears to 
discourage this kind of activity and as a result, both Montaigne and Bruno constantly 
lament the manner in which custom’s authority over time encourages the passive 
acceptance of knowledge in wider society. His remarks in ‘De la Coustume’ on the passive, 
unquestioning mindset that custom breeds may help to explain this unwelcome effect of 
custom in more detail: 
 Mais le principal effect de sa puissance, c’est de nous saisir et empieter de telle   
 sorte, qu’à peine soit-il en nous de nous r’avoir de sa prinse et de r’entrer en nous,  
 pour discourir et raisonner de ses ordonnances. De vray, parce que nous les   
 humons avec le laict de nostre naissance, et que le visage du monde se presente en  
 cet estat à nostre premiere veue, il semble que nous soyons nais à la condition de  
 suyvre ce train. (I.XXIII.115-116) 
 Montaigne is concerned that if certain ways and practices are instilled into us 
from birth - ‘nous les humons avec le laict de nostre naissance’ - then what would be the 
motivation to question them? This aspect of custom continues the earlier discussion I 
highlighted concerning the relationship between artifice and nature; it is easy to accept 
 For more on the figure of Circe see Pierre Grimal, Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine, 15 edn (Paris: 55
Presses universitaires de France, 2015). 
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customs as natural and normal when one has grown up adhering to them. Humans are 
more prepared to accept customary laws and practices without question, particularly 
when ‘nous soyons nais à la condition de suyvre ce train’; in the ‘Apologie de Raimond 
Sebond’ (II.XII) such practices may be fuelled by ‘la coustume de leur païs, ou par 
l’institution des parens’ (II.XII.504). A rather more violent example from ‘De la 
coustume’ further emphasises the manner in which customary laws may firmly cement 
their authority as several generations of human beings come and go: 
 Celuy qu’on rencontra battant son pere, respondit que c’estoit la coustume de sa  
 maison: que son pere avoit ainsi batu son ayeul; son ayeul, son bisayeul; et,   
 montrant son fils: Et cettuy-cy me battra quand il sera venu au terme de l’aage où  
 je suis. (I.XXIII.115) 
 Here the actual action of beating one’s father is futile and cruel, but the men in 
question do not view it in such a way because ‘la coustume de sa maison’ predates them all 
and will outlast all of them too, which appears to be the sole (yet acceptable) justification 
to this custom.  This passive acceptance of certain customary behaviour in society leads 56
most humans to understand the world in a way which has been altered by the 
superficialities of customary practices. ‘Chacun en fait ainsi, d’autant que l’usage nous 
desrobbe le vray visage des choses’ (I.XXIII.116). As Margaret McGowan has suggested, 
Montaigne employs anecdotes such as the one above in order to disturb received 
opinion.  Custom alters the true nature of the world due to its persistence. It presents an 57
individual with an idea of right and wrong as soon as that person enters the world, and as 
we have seen, what makes this all the more disturbing is the manner in which custom 
derives its authority from time, not reason.  
 Naturally this clashes decisively with the spirit of questioning and understanding 
that is to be consistently found in the Essais, a characteristic that forms part of 
Montaigne’s commitment to seeking truth over time. Instead customs are often accepted 
without due analysis or nuanced discussion; they are instilled into a person ‘sans jugement 
et sans chois, voire le plus souvant avant l’aage de discretion’ (II.XII.504). Interestingly, 
Bruno expresses exactly the same concerns as Montaigne with regard to the idea that 
custom influences an individual from the moment they are born. Towards the end of the 
 In another example regarding ancient bathing rituals, Montaigne describes custom’s duration as something that 56
overshadows the lifetime of human beings: ‘mais dépuis, et d’une coustume qui a duré plusieurs siecles et en la plus part 
des nations du monde, ils se lavoyent tous nudz d'eau mixtionnée et parfumée, de maniere qu’ils emploioyent pour 
tesmoignage de grande simplicité de se laver d'eau simple’ (p. 297).
 Margaret McGowan, ‘The Art of Transition in the Essais’, in Montaigne: Essays in Memory of Richard Sayce, ed. by 57
I.D. McFarlane & Ian Maclean (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 38. 
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first dialogue of the Cena, after Teofilo has repeatedly announced the imminent arrival of 
the Nolan and his philosophy, his companion Smitho raises some concerns about how 
Teofilo can be sure that the Nolan’s theories are indeed the ‘right’ philosophy to follow.  58
He asks this because he is all too aware of the power that custom wields, and how it is 
passed down over time: 
 Vedo bene, che tutti nascemo ignoranti, credemo facilmente d’essere ignoranti;   
 crescemo, e siamo allevati co’ la disciplina e consuetudine di nostra casa, e non   
 meno noi udiamo biasimare le leggi, gli riti, le fede e gli costumi de nostri adversari 
 ed alieni da noi, che quelli di noi e di cose nostre. (Cena I.464) 
 Smitho accepts that humans are born into the world without any knowledge of 
anything - ‘tutti nascemo ignoranti’ - but this state of unknowing can quickly be 
supplanted by custom. According to Smitho, one is merely born into the customs and 
traditions of their own house, and raised to believe that they are correct, for no other 
reason than they are the customs of that particular house. Smitho’s concerns are also 
illustrated by Montaigne in ‘Des Cannibales’; the thinker is discussing the manner in 
which Native Americans are judged as barbaric simply because they follow different 
customs: 
 Or, je trouve, pour revenir à mon propos, qu’il n’y a rien de barbare et de sauvage  
 en cette nation, à ce qu’on m’en a rapporté, sinon que chacun appelle barbarie ce  
 qui n’est pas de son usage; comme de vray il semble que nous n’avons autre mire  
 de la verité et de la raison que l’exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs où  
 nous sommes. (I.XXXI.205) 
  
 Like the fictional Smitho, Montaigne also emphasises that as human beings we are 
always bound to the reason which springs forth from the ‘opinions et usances du païs où 
nous sommes’. Thus we are raised to believe that anything which does not follow our 
own traditions is wrong and barbaric: ‘chacun appelle barbarie ce qui n’est pas de son 
usage.’ In this chapter Montaigne was very concerned with the manner in which 
judgement is affected by custom, and it appears that often our understanding of peoples 
different to our own is heavily clouded by the uses and customs we have been raised in 
from birth.  
 Furthermore, in ‘Du pedantisme’ (I.XXV), Montaigne alludes to how exactly this 
process may be further instilled in an individual through childhood education. The 
 Kodera throws light on why Smitho raises these concerns in the text: ‘[Bruno] recounts the story that in his younger 58
years, the Copernican theory really ‘shook his mind’, because back then his entire intellectual life was imbued with the 
old ways of thinking and a corresponding regimen of the body he now regards as erroneous and obsolete’ (p. 239). His 
own education meant he was constantly aware of these doctrines and their implications for daily practice.
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Spartan method of learning encouraged students to think carefully about historical or 
philosophical examples and how one might practically put them to use. Montaigne 
compares this system to the teaching methods of the pedant, which rely on hearsay (ouïr 
dire) and ‘preceptes et parolles’ (I.XXV.142). Unlike Spartan society, with its emphasis on 
engraining works (and the action one might derive from them) into the very soul of a 
student, the pedant passes information down to children from a young age without 
encouraging any form of inquiry. Since custom’s authority grows over time, customs and 
teachings are only strengthened in the mind of an individual and they are accepted 
without question. Thus, according to the first two dialogues of the Cena it becomes 
acceptable for groups such as the English university professors to judge others - in this case 
the Nolan and his philosophy - as enemies or somehow abnormal on the basis that they 
do not conform to the same customs. 
 Indeed, in both the Italian dialogues and the Essais one particularly significant 
issue that supposedly characterises ‘the masses’ of the late 16th century is their willingness 
to allow custom to dictate their lives. Bruno criticises the entrenched ways of thinking 
that arise from this kind of behaviour. His dissatisfaction with Scholasticism stems from 
his belief that he is fighting against what has been considered for centuries to be the only 
acceptable cosmos: the finite cosmos.  Bruno portrayed the majority of university 59
scholars as perpetuating certain philosophical ideas simply because they had existed for 
centuries: ‘For Bruno, the passive reception of truths…is the distinctive mark of asses’.  60
Furthermore, as I suggested in the previous section, the causes of custom are often 
unknown, and yet they are accepted unquestioningly. Consequently, anyone who doesn’t 
accept this bizarre form of authority is ‘hors des gonds de raison’; as a thinker who 
declares himself open minded and willing to suspend judgement, this is a significant 
problem.  61
 Clearly both Montaigne and Bruno were open to exploring ideas that did not 
conform to the status quo, which not only clashed with the enduring nature of custom 
but also its propensity - particularly in its context as common law - to create divisions 
between different groups of people. In ‘Du Jeune Caton’ (I.XXXVII), a chapter which is 
 See Védrine for more on the link between Bruno and Aristotelianism: ‘Comme le proclame le titre du De Immenso 59
l’univers est devenu “infigurable” car l’infini échappe, par principe, à toute détermination spatiale, géométrique ou 
physique’ (p. 129). 
 Kodera, p. 246. See also Musci, ‘L’«antiqua Consuetudine di vivere…». Commento a un luogo machiavelliano dello 60
Spaccio’, pp. 141-156. Musci’s study focuses on custom in the Spaccio de la bestia trionfante.
 Ibid. And yet, Montaigne openly accepted the status quo, despite his many reservations about the power of custom; 61
the essayist errs on the side of conservatism when faced with the common 16th-century debate between law and custom. 
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devoted in large part to discussing the effects of custom, Montaigne emphasises his 
willingness to suspend his judgement in order to look past difference and instead try to 
understand it. In the opening lines he states: ‘Je n’ay point cette erreur commune de juger 
d’un autre selon que je suis. J’en croy aysément des choses diverses à moy’ (I.XXXVII.
229). Unfortunately, custom reduces difference to sameness - it perpetuates the same laws 
and maintains the same behaviour until there is no room for difference to operate. This is 
a vitally important point in the Essais. Once custom has been ingrained in society over 
time, then it naturally forces people to become suspicious of newness, novelty or novità. 
 This problem takes on a further significance when we consider the important 
contextual events that were revealing choses diverses to Montaigne and his own society. For 
example, arguably such a mindset would not be well-suited to understanding the 
seemingly savage nature of the newly-discovered Native American tribes. At the start of 
‘Du Jeune Caton’ Montaigne discusses his attempts to understand a given topic: 
 Pour me sentir engagé à une forme, je n’y oblige pas le monde, comme chascun   
 fait; et croy, et conçois mille contraires façons de vie; et, au rebours du commun,  
 reçoy plus facilement la difference que la ressemblance en nous. (I.XXXVII.229) 
 According to this quotation, Montaigne sees the opportunity to embrace things 
different from his own contextual milieu as a positive thing; he is able to profit from the 
changes he observes around him by opening up thousands of new avenues of thought. 
This is clear from the expression ‘au rebours du commun’ which indicates his willingness 
to move against the standard view and investigate difference rather than sameness. There 
is also a marked difference between the ‘moy’ of Montaigne, and ‘chascun’, ‘le commun’ - 
other people in society. As we will see in more detail below, custom is regularly used by 
Bruno - and to a lesser extent Montaigne - in order to tarnish the intellectual capacity of 
the ‘masses’. Montaigne believes here that what he is doing is different to other people, 
and embracing la diﬀerence in others is arguably at the heart of his work. While it is true 
that ‘l’assuefaction endort la veue de nostre jugement’ (I.XXIII.112) - assuefaction derives 
from the Latin assuefacio i.e. ‘to accustom to, to habituate’ - Montaigne proudly states 
that he is able to look past his first impressions: ‘Je m’insinue, par imagination, fort bien 
en leur place’ (I.XXXVII.229). This is another vital aspect of his intellectual endeavour - 
the desire to look at the extreme and curious without prejudice, whereas custom is an 
entity which complicates this process. 
 In the Essais Montaigne applies this reasoning to the New World again. At the 
start of this chapter I emphasised that custom was responsible for normalising absurd or 
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questionable behaviour. On the other hand, Montaigne also recognises that when an 
individual is bound to the customs of their region - however strange they may be - anyone 
who does not follow them appears equally bizarre or unusual to that particular individual. 
Nowhere does this become more apparent than in ‘Des Cannibales’. Montaigne brings 
forth a number of themes in the opening lines of this chapter by first drawing on a quote 
from Pyrrhus - a Greek general and statesman - which discusses the nature of the Roman 
army: ‘Je ne sçay, dit-il, quels barbares sont ceux-ci (car les Grecs appelloyent ainsi toutes 
les nations estrangieres), mais la disposition de cette armée que je voy, n'est aucunement 
barbare’ (I.XXXI.202). Language, judgement, the artifice of war, secondhand experience 
vs. direct experience - all of these things are explored in ‘Des Cannibales’. However, 
arguably the word barbare takes centre stage, and Montaigne is careful to remind us that 
the Greeks described all foreign nations as ‘barbaric’, a term which in this case appears to 
signify ‘different to themselves’. A large section of ‘Des Cannibales’ is taken up with 
listing various New World customs which 16th century European readers would have 
presumably described as ‘barbaric’ - soothsayers are killed if they don’t provide accurate 
predictions; tribespeople generally walk around naked and of course, the Native 
Americans occasionally engage in cannibalism.  
 However, at the end of the chapter, readers are treated to the perspective of three 
Native Americans who journeyed to France and saw firsthand the workings of French 
society. Rather than acting as though they are in awe of this seemingly civilised society, 
Montaigne reveals that they held some very valid concerns about French custom:  
 Ils dirent qu’ils trouvoient en premier lieu fort estrange que tant de grands   
 hommes, portans barbe, forts et armez, qui estoient autour du Roy (il est vray-  
 semblable que ils parloient des Suisses de sa garde), se soubsmissent à obeyr à un  
 enfant, et qu’on ne choisissoit plus tost quelqu’un d’entr’eux pour commander;  
 secondement (ils ont une façon de leur langage telle, qu’ils nomment les hommes  
 moitié les uns des autres) qu’ils avoyent aperçeu qu’il y avoit parmy nous des   
 hommes pleins et gorgez de toutes sortes de commoditez, et que leurs moitiez   
 estoient mendians à leurs portes, décharnez de faim et de pauvreté; et trouvoient  
 estrange comme ces moitiez icy necessiteuses pouvoient souffrir une telle injustice, 
 qu’ils ne prinsent les autres à la gorge, ou missent le feu à leurs maisons. (I.XXXI. 
 213-214) 
 By including the perspective of the Native American visitors, Montaigne’s literary 
device reflects the ‘otherness’ and ‘strangeness’ of the New World tribes back onto his own 
society. In doing so, he demonstrates how the French appear foreign and barbaric in the 
eyes of the Native Americans, because they follow customs which are completely alien to 
the visitors. In ‘De la coustume’ Montaigne frequently dwells on the exotic customs of 
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the Native Americans; for example the Europeans have found tribes of people who eat 
‘sauterelles, formiz, laizards, chauvessouriz…ils les cuisent et apprestent à diverses 
sauces’ (I.XXIII.109). Montaigne then preempts the reactions of his Western readers to 
this ‘strange’ behaviour by reminding them of another characteristic of custom: ‘Ces 
exemples estrangers ne sont pas estranges, si nous considerons, ce que nous essayons 
ordinairement, combien l’accoustumance hebete nos sens’ (I.XXIII.109). Because of this 
process ‘over time’, humans become much less aware of how strange their behaviour may 
seem to outsiders and thus more accepting of its normality. At the same time, as our 
senses and judgement become gradually more dulled, the behaviour of people from 
different cultures appears more and more unusual: 
 Revenons à l’empire de la coustume. Les peuples nourris à la liberté et à se   
 commander eux mesmes, estiment toute autre forme de police monstrueuse et   
 contre nature. Ceux qui sont duits à la monarchie en font de mesme. (I.XXIII.116) 
 People who have grown accustomed to ruling themselves consider any other form 
of government ‘monstrueuse et contre nature’. However, customs such as these vary from 
place to place (some societies may be ruled by a single monarch), and are capable of 
harnessing a large degree of influence over different groups of people. Consequently, the 
customs of other groups outside a particular cultural milieu will naturally be viewed with 
suspicion. At times, Montaigne appears to embrace this mindset himself, lulling his 
readers into a false sense of security by describing how ‘odd’ he considers the customs of 
foreign - particularly non-European - cultures to be; in ‘De la coustume’ he spends almost 
two pages listing the strangest customs he has encountered. There are ‘nations entieres, où 
non seulement la mort estoit mesprisée, mais festoyée’ (I.XXIII.115), and societies in 
which ‘on peut honnestement faire des enfans à sa mère, les peres se mesler à leur filles, et 
à leur fils’ (I.XXIIII.114). In fact, this incessant listing of examples is a literary trap. The 
customs of 16th-century France may easily be considered just as strange from an outsider’s 
perspective, only his readers have been numbed to their true nature over time: ‘Les 
barbares ne nous sont de rien plus merveilleux, que nous sommes à eux’ (I.XXIII.112). 
Montaigne further emphasises this point with the story of a man who refuses to use toilet 
paper in favour of his own hand. This fairly disgusting example is followed by a 
humorously wry thought from Montaigne: 
 Je trouvai qu’il ne parloit pas du tout sans raison: et m’avoit la coustume osté   
 l’appercevance de cette estrangeté, laquelle pourtant nous trouvons si hideuse,   
 quand elle est recitée d’un autre païs. Les miracles sont selon l’ignorance en quoy  
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 nous sommes de la nature. L’assuefaction endort la veue de nostre jugement.   
 (I.XXIII.112) 
 Using an anecdote that compares how different cultures go to the toilet, 
Montaigne employs humour again in order to highlight the close-mindedness that 
custom breeds in his own society. Strangeness or otherness is entirely subjective and 
depends on the perspective of the observer which - more often than not - has been greatly 
influenced by custom.  Anthony Grafton has previously described how the ancient 62
Greek historian Herodotus provided a model ‘for detailed, vivid descriptions of the 
origins, institutions, and manners of unfamiliar peoples’ such as the native American 
tribes.  Montaigne’s own listing of exotic customs leads to a common dilemma for early 63
modern thinkers; namely that ‘the proliferation of opposites in custom and belief made 
plain that no civilisation could claim universal validity’.  All of these ideas are neatly 64
summarised with a brief but damning remark towards the middle of the chapter: ‘Par où 
il advient que ce qui est hors des gonds de coustume, on le croid hors des gonds de 
raison’ (I.XXIII.116). That which does not adhere to custom does not adhere to reason in 
the minds of most people, since they often conflate the two - Montaigne’s own readers 
included.  Yet the author of the Essais considers this to be a dubious way to view the 65
world and uses his writing to play with the preconceptions of his audience in order to try 
and convince them otherwise. In a similar manner to his concerns regarding the 
proliferation of philosophies over time, and the unwieldy impermanence that humans 
exist within anyway, he asks how human beings can truly know what is correct and true 
about the world when even something like custom, which may endure for much longer 
 Montaigne implicitly conveys a similar message in his famous chapter ‘Des Cannibales’ (I.XXXI). See Luciana 62
Stegagno Picchio, ‘The Portuguese, Montaigne and the Cannibals of Brazil: The Problem of the ‘Other’’, Portuguese 
Studies, 6 (1990), pp. 71-84. For example, Picchio states that Montaigne was perfectly aware of the bias inherent in the 
sources he relied on to inform himself about the New World in ‘Des Cannibales’: ‘Montaigne was fully aware of the fact 
that all the reports reaching Europe on new anthropophagy bore the stamp of clichés […], these time-honoured motifs 
had been applied to the new environment and human situation by observers (beginning with Columbus) who were so 
embedded in their own culture that they were unable to report impartially what their eyes had seen’ (p. 75). 
 Grafton, p. 41. 63
 Ibid., p. 40. 64
 Here Montaigne is discussing custom’s ability to effectively imitate human reason; ‘hors des gonds de raison’ refers to 65
actions which contradict rational human behaviour. One must always be careful when analysing the word ‘reason’ in 
the Essais as its meaning has been known to change from chapter to chapter. Reason generally refers to a human 
function necessary for all forms of knowing (e.g. logic, debate). However, rather than linking reason to truth (which is 
unwavering), in the Essais Montaigne tends to align reason with opinion and emphasises that reason itself may change 
over time: ‘[les hommes] ont sophistiqué [la raison] de tant d’argumentations et de discours appellez de dehors, qu’elle 
est devenue variable et particuliere à chacun, et a perdu son propre visage, constant et natural’ (III.XII.1049-50). For an 
introduction to the nature of reason in the Essais, see Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 144-147; Paul Mathias, ‘Raison’ in Dictionnaire de Michel de 
Montaigne, ed. by Philippe Desan (Paris: H. Champion, 2004); also Maclean, Montaigne philosophe, pp. 74-75. 
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periods of time, provokes such nonsensical behaviour and gradually conceals the folly of 
our own uses and tradition. If he believes that one must look inwardly in order to ‘se 
cognoistre’ then it is vitally important to understand the effects of custom on one’s 
judgement and behaviour.  
 Of course, Bruno has a very specific reason to be concerned about the suspicions 
that arise from new ways of seeing the world. The authority of Aristotelianism and its 
finite cosmos, together with the prominence of the Ptolemaic solar system in intellectual 
circles and wider society, is presented as the old way of thought that Bruno’s theories will 
be pitted against. Although Bruno considers scholars who uphold these ancient views to 
be wrong, unfortunately ‘son creduti e (quel ch’è peggio) si credeno, dotti e 
dottori’ (Cena I.458). Nevertheless, Teofilo begins to extol the virtues of il Nolano while 
criticising these supposed learned people who ‘vogliono ostinatemente perseverare ne le 
tenebre’ (Cena I.458) of geocentric thought, of a cosmos without infinite worlds. Like 
Montaigne, Bruno preempts the response of his audience, but does so by inserting 
Prudenzio into the discussion as a literary stone wall who refuses to accept the idea of 
something new, potentially mirroring the reactions of his more conservative 16th-century 
readers. After Teofilo expresses his frustration at the devotion of those who wish to 
‘perseverare ne le tenebre’ of ‘acceptable’ Aristotelianism, Prudenzio simply states: ‘Sii 
come la si vuole, io non voglio discostarmi dal parer de gli antichi, per che dice il saggio: 
«Ne l’antiquita è la sapienza»’ (Cena I.459). Teofilo tries again to persuade him that one 
should make an effort to learn from the mistakes of others in society, as Copernicus has 
done, ‘quasi a’ nostri tempi appresso la medesma anni mille ottocento 
quarantanove’ (Cena I.460). Prudenzio responds thus: 
 Dite quel che vi piace, tiratela a vostro bel piacer dove vi pare, io sono amico de   
 l’antiquità; e quanto appartiene a le vostre opinioni o paradossi, non credo che sì  
 molti e sì saggi sien stati ignoranti come pensate voi et altri amici di novità. (Cena  
 I.460) 
 He solidly refuses to extricate himself from centuries of traditional thought, and 
specifically states at the end that he is suspicious of any ‘amici di novità’ such as the 
mysterious Nolan. Newness is undesirable - Prudenzio is not interested in any philosophy 
that does not conform to l’antiquità (and more specifically the philosophy of Aristotle 
and his followers). In ‘Du pedantisme’, Montaigne refers to the kind of ‘knowledge’ that 
Prudenzio purports to possess as a form of ‘sçavoir pedantesque’ - while Prudenzio may 
well possess knowledge of ancient thinkers, their words have done little to improve his 
own critical thinking and willingness to embrace new ideas. Montaigne recalls a 
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Perigordin phrase for such a pedant: ‘Mon vulgaire Perigordin appelle fort plaisamment 
“lettreferits” ces sçavanteaux…ausquels les lettres ont donné un coup de marteau’ (I.XXV.
139). In other words, knowledge of ancient sources has been stamped onto them like a 
hammer but their own understanding has not evolved in the slightest - like Prudenzio and 
his oafish behaviour, ‘le plus souvent ils semblent estre ravalez, mesmes du sens 
commun’ (I.XXV.139). The author briefly asks whether his own tendency to quote or 
paraphrase the words of others is symptomatic of the same kind of behaviour: ‘Je m’en 
vay, escorniflant par cy par là des livres les sentences qui me plaisent’ (I.XXV.136). 
However, Montaigne suggests throughout this chapter that pedants receive the words and 
teachings of others without these quotations elevating their own mind to a higher level, 
they fail to develop a spirit that is ‘plus vive et plus esveillée’ (I.XXV.133) in the process.  
 Smitho’s behaviour is later compared with that of Prudenzio, perhaps reflecting 
Bruno’s ideal reader. We have seen that Smitho is actively concerned about the effect of 
custom on his idea of right and wrong, and shows the same awareness as Montaigne in 
‘De la Coustume’ concerning the manner in which custom can prevail over someone from 
birth. Smitho is aware that he might be guilty of prejudging the customs and rites of those 
‘alieni da noi’. When faced with difference, Bruno chooses not to reject it immediately like 
Prudenzio but instead to wonder how we know what is truly right and wrong, in much 
the same way as Montaigne. This dilemma is reflected in Smitho’s question to Teofilo, 
‘come io, che non so nulla, potrò conoscere la differenza de dignità ed indignità…’ (Cena I.
462). There are so many different ways of doing and thinking, how does Smitho know 
which one is ‘right’? Here Bruno clearly pits the stubborn response to novità of 
Prudenzio against the thoughtful discussion led by Smitho, presenting his reader with 
two possible reactions to the radical theories that he is about to expound.  
 Indeed, the very nature of the theories Bruno will present in the Cena are bound 
to shatter rigid preconceptions of the world. In the first dialogue of the Cena he laments 
that the explorers have been given credit for finding a new ‘world’ (and then mindlessly 
destroying it), whereas Bruno has in fact discovered a new universe. After describing the 
despicable actions of Columbus and his colonial successors, the main interlocutor Teofilo 
portrays ‘il Nolano’ (Bruno’s literary alter-ego) as someone who has discovered truth 
beyond even the stars themselves: 
   Or ecco quello [il Nolano] ch’ha varcato l’aria, penetrato il cielo, discorse le stelle,  
 trapassati gli margini del mondo, fatte svanir le fantastiche muraglia de le prime,  
 ottave, none decime, et altre che si s’avesser potute aggiongere sfere per relazione  
 de vani matematici e cieco veder di filosofi volgari. (Cena I.454) 
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 Of course, this rhetoric may seem fairly exaggerated to modern readers, since 
Bruno appears to be fashioning himself as a prophet or god-like figure who has been sent 
to mankind in order to free them from the shackles of pedantry. Sergius Kodera has 
already examined the true purpose behind what he terms Bruno’s ‘literary self-fashioning’ 
and in fact, these bombastic descriptions are partially used as another means of situating 
Brunian philosophy within the cosmological innovations already begun by Copernicus.  66
Indeed, in the late 16th century Bruno was attacking centuries of thought which had held 
the universe to be finite, with the Earth in the centre of the planets, not the sun. The ‘vani 
matematici’ he consistently refers to are thinkers who have blindly accepted the Ptolemaic 
system for centuries.  For this reason, he continually emphasises in the Cena the 67
groundbreaking nature of his theories through a notable use of bombast and exaggerated 
rhetoric. Like Montaigne, he is very aware that what he is trying to do in his writing is 
different from that of other people: 
 Al che rispose il Nolano, che lui non vedea per gli occhi di Copernico, né di   
 Ptolomeo, ma per i proprii quanto al giudizio e la determinazione; benché quanto 
 alle osservazioni, stima dover molto a questi ed altri solleciti matematici, che   
 successivamente, a tempi e tempi, giongendo lume a lume, ne han donati principii 
 sufficienti, per i quali siamo ridutti a tal giudicio, quale non possea se non dopo  
 molte non ociose etadi esser parturito. (Cena I.447) 
 Here Bruno accepts that he is indebted to the theories put forward by previous 
philosophies to a certain degree. But more importantly than this, he does not accept them 
as absolutely correct and instead has made his own considerations on the nature of the 
universe, which are different even to Copernicus, and certainly radically opposed to those 
of Ptolemy. First, Bruno carefully describes his own place in intellectual history as 
someone who is unafraid to break the status quo or ‘molto non ociose etadi’, even going 
further than Copernicus, an astronomer he clearly admires. He emphasises the unique 
nature of his writing in a similar way to Montaigne, pitting ‘il Nolano’, the one true 
bringer of this new philosophy, and comparing him to the masses. Teofilo states that ‘un 
solo, benché solo, può e potrà vencere, et al fine avrà vinto e triomfarà contra l’ignoranza 
generale’ (Cena I.456). Dario Tessicini describes this inflated rhetoric, of which there are 
several examples in the Cena, as Bruno’s ‘glorification of the Nolan philosophy, entrusted 
 Sergius Kodera, ‘Timid Mathematicians vs. Daring Explorers of the Infinite Cosmos: Giordano Bruno, Literary Self-66
Fashioning and De revolutionibus orbium coelestium’, in The Making of Copernicus: Early Modern Transformations of 
the Scientist and his Science, ed. by Wolfgang Neuber, Thomas Rahn & Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
 See Dario Tessicini, I dintorni dell’inﬁnito: Giordano Bruno e l’astronomia del cinquecento (Pisa: F. Serra, 2007) for a 67
much more detailed description of this historical background and corresponding bibliography. 
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with a salvific mission to restore truth against the errors of the Aristotelians’.  Bruno is 68
keen to distance himself from the ignoranza generale of the rest of society, which he feels is 
caused in no large part by the widespread dissemination of Aristotelianism. Instead he 
uses dramatic rhetoric to herald himself as someone willing to break with stagnant 
intellectual thought. 
 Bruno also emphasises that just because something is old and has been accepted 
for centuries, this does not automatically mean it holds great value. ‘Bene, maestro 
Prudenzio; si questa volgare e vostra opinione per tanto è vera in quanto che è antica, 
certo era falsa quando la fu nova’ (Cena I.460). Philosophies will always come and go - 
Bruno criticises the notion of newer schools of thought automatically being labelled as 
wrong within the framework of the cyclical ‘ruota del tempo’, since all philosophies were 
‘new’ once. Referring to Aristotelianism, Bruno states that ‘prima che fusse questa 
filosofia conforme al vostro cervello, fu quella degli caldei, egizii, maghi, orfici, pitagorici 
ed altri di prima memoria, conforme al nostro capo’ (Cena I.460). Bruno justifies his well-
documented interest in the pre-Socratics and other earlier currents of thought while 
simultaneously attacking custom’s tendency to reject what is supposedly ‘nova’ and 
therefore ‘falsa’.   69
 Finally, it must be briefly noted that alongside the pursuit of these philosophical 
aims, Bruno represents custom as being directly responsible for wasting valuable time. As 
suggested above, custom often erects unnecessary and yet powerful barriers to seeking 
true knowledge of nature, and adhering to it is not a productive use of time if it generates 
only the bizarre or unnatural. In this respect, custom proves to be a grave concern for 
Bruno, and in the Cena de le ceneri he states that due to the power of custom over time, 
the human ability to understand ‘cose manifestissime’ is impeded. For example, in the 
Cena, the mere fact that the Oxford scholars ‘parlavan ben latino’ is seemingly 
unimportant to Bruno. In a text written in Italian vernacular, Prudenzio’s Latin 
interjections interrupt and slow down the conversation frequently, a literary technique 
which is continually played out by Bruno throughout the dialogue. Only a few pages 
later, the pedant Prudenzio is guilty of rambling incorrectly about the origins of the word 
tetralogo. Both Teofilo and Smitho chide his idiotic digressions impatiently: ‘Di grazia, 
 Dario Tessicini, ‘Giordano Bruno on Copernican Harmony, Circular Uniformity and Spiral Motions’, in Unifying 68
Heaven and Earth: Essays in the History of Early Modern Cosmology, ed. by Miguel A. Granada, Patrick J. Boner & 
Dario Tessicini (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2016), p. 121. 
 See Iliana Klutstein, Marsilio Ficino et la théologie ancienne: Oracles Chaldaïques, Hymnes Orphiques, Hymnes de 69
Proclus (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1987); also Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: 
Routledge, 1964). 
'196
signor maestro, lasciamo questi rigori di gramatica’ (Cena I.445). Prudenzio is adamant 
that they must know the proper derivation of this word in order to continue the 
discussion, but Teofilo chides him once again: 
 Voi, messer Prudenzio, sete troppo prudente. Lasciamo, vi priego, questi discorsi  
 grammaticali; e  fate conto, che questo nostro raggionamento sia un dialogo,   
 atteso che benché siamo quattro in persona, saremo dui in officio di proponere e  
 rispondere, di raggionare e ascoltare. (Cena I.445-446) 
 Smitho and Teofilo are eager to begin talking about the Nolan philosophy. But 
they are continually interrupted by the vacuous observations of Prudenzio, a symbol of 
the useless nature of pedantry. Furthermore, Prudenzio represents the usage of 16th-
century educational institutions that normally insisted on communication entirely in 
Latin.  Instead of being able to reason and listen to one another in Bruno’s Italian, 70
Prudenzio’s Latin interruptions purposely slow down the dialogical flow of conversation 
between Teofilo and Smitho. Bruno's choice of language shows how adhering to custom 
by insisting on speaking in Latin ‘betrays’ the other interlocutors, literally slowing down 
their learned discussion and wasting time. Teofilo and Smitho are eager to reason about 
the nature of il Nolano’s new cosmology, while Prudenzio believes he is teaching them 
when in actual fact he is spouting nonsense and thus wasting time. Again the humorous 
descriptions of the Oxford professors, coupled with Prudenzio’s time-wasting, actually 
point to a deeper criticism of the effects of custom. The inspiring and energetic use of 
time introduced towards the end of Chapter Three is immediately dulled when custom 
and proper usage rears its head. 
 Thus far I have traced the deep concerns about custom that appear to run 
consistently through out both the Essais and the Italian dialogues. Alongside this 
criticism, it is important to note that Montaigne and Bruno often portray custom as 
something that affects other people in society, rather than themselves. It appears that most 
individuals would not be able to reach such conclusions about the timely, fragile 
authority of custom and the subsequent dangers that this type of authority poses. 
Admittedly, Montaigne tends to vary in this respect. In examples we have already seen in 
this chapter, his use of pronouns fluctuates between using a marked ‘je’ versus ‘eux’, and a 
more inclusive ‘nous’ in his discussions on custom. Furthermore, in ‘De la 
coustume’ (I.XXXVII) he emphasises his willingness to try and shed any prejudices he 
may hold and put himself in the shoes of other cultures. He offers various apologies for 
 For more on the traditions surrounding early modern universities see Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian 70
Renaissance (Baltimore, M.D.: John Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
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some of the more stranger customs in France with a series of rhetorical questions and 
answers. First Montaigne remarks on ‘un petit homme natif de Nantes, né sans bras, qui a 
si bien façonné ses pieds au service que luy devoyent les mains, qu’ils en ont à la verité à 
demy oublié leur office naturel’ (I.XXXVII.111). Rather than recoiling at this example, he 
asks ‘y a il opinion si bizarre […] mais d'autres opinions y en a il de si estranges, qu’elle 
n’aye planté et estably par loix és regions que bon luy a semblé?’ (I.XXXVII.111). He 
quickly reinforces this view with another remark in much the same vein: ‘J’estime qu’il ne 
tombe en l’imagination humaine aucune fantasie si forcenée, qui ne rencontre l’exemple 
de quelque usage public, et par consequent que nostre discours n’estaie et ne 
fonde’ (I.XXXVII.111). 
 On the other hand, Bruno is much more consistent in his overt criticism of the 
mentality that he believes grips those around him. For example, one of the reasons as to 
why he holds Copernicus in such high regard is his admiration of the astronomer’s rare 
ability to cast aside the opinions of the so-called stupid masses: 
 Con tutto ciò chi potrà a pieno lodar la magnanimità di questo germano, il quale  
 avendo poco riguardo a la stolta moltitudine, è stato sì saldo contra il torrente de  
 la contraria fede? (Cena I.449) 
 In this case the ‘stolta moltitudine’ is referred to in such a way because it 
continues to believe faithfully in the idea that the Earth is in the middle of the solar 
system.  In the wake of the publication of the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (1543), 71
a text which Bruno is often guilty of manipulating for his own purposes, Bruno presents 
Copernicus as purposely ignoring the beliefs of wider society, an attitude which allowed 
him greater freedom to pursue his new cosmology.  Consequently much of the first 72
dialogue of the Cena de le Ceneri is devoted to narrating how Bruno has also managed to 
do this, and how he has even exceeded Copernicus’ work by proving that the universe is 
infinite. Such criticism of the rest of society plays into the wider narrative that Bruno is a 
lone intellectual warrior. The last few exchanges between Smitho and Teofilo cement this 
idea at the end of the first dialogue, in which Teofilo states that truly wise men are few and 
 See Bruno, Opere Latine, ‘Capitolo XV - Conclusione per cui anche il senso è turbato dall’abitudine a credere il falso’. 71
Bruno once more goes on the attack, blaming the masses for adhering to custom in the mistaken belief that it represents 
nature - ‘battano alle porte della ragione con amichevole tocco e chiamino con la voce della natura, non per questo esso 
ha raggiunto la sapienza’ (p. 135). 
 This stance was famously tempered by Osiander’s preface to the work (which was added to the text after Copernicus’ 72
death), claiming that the heliocentric universe was just a hypothesis and nothing more. On the relationship between 
Osiander and Copernicus see Michel-Pierre Lerner, ‘Aux origines de la polémique anticopernicienne (II): Luther, 
Andreas Osiander et Philippe Melanchthon’, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 90.3 (2006), pp. 409-452 
(pp. 424-432).
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far between: ‘[…] per questo gli uomini savii e divini son assai pochi: e la volontà di dèi è 
questa, atteso che non è stimato né prezioso quel tanto ch’è comone e generale (Cena I.
465) To this general idea, Teofilo adds that in order to find truth one must purposefully 
extricate oneself from the way that the masses think: ‘è più sicuro cercar il vero e 
conveniente fuor de la moltitudine: perché questa mai apportò cosa preziosa e 
degna’ (Cena I.465). The last chapter examined ways in which Montaigne and Bruno 
attempted to further destabilise truth in their literature, in light of their existence in time 
and particularly when confronted with the idea of eternity. Bruno’s quest for truth is a 
lonely one which must take place outside the bounds of custom and its influence in wider 
society.  
 Previous chapters have emphasised that the notion of change is central to 
understanding time in the works of Montaigne and Bruno, whether it is being referred to 
explicitly as vicissitudine or alluded to in a more general sense as a state of temporal flux. 
Custom manages to resist change for longer periods of time and clearly shapes the 
collective mindset of society in a negative manner with regards to truth-seeking. 
Prudenzio the stock pedant ignores the exciting, almost prophetic nature of this new 
truth that is going to be revealed, and instead quotes directly some lines from the Disticha 
Catonis, a popular Latin textbook used both in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
which lists various proverbs and morals.  Teofilo despairs at this generic response and 73
then identifies it as one that carefully falls in line with customary ways of thinking: 
‘Questo è prudentissimamente detto in proposito del convitto e regimento 
comone’ (Cena I.457). However, such words will not lead to ‘la cognizione de la verità, e 
regola di contemplazione’ (Cena I.457). Accepting received wisdom simply because it is 
customary to do so will not lead to the discovery of truth. Bruno considers this to be an 
alarming symptom of the times, that people prefer to spout lines because they are 
traditional rather than truthful - ‘è conseglio che riguarda la moltitudine’ (Cena I.457).   
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, a similar sentiment arises in Montaigne’s ‘Du pedantisme’ 
(I.XXV), which compares ancient Greek systems of education with the rote learning 
methods used by scholars in the 16th century. As in the Cena, a deeply anti-pedantic 
sentiment runs through the chapter, and at one point Montaigne remembers a friend of 
his whose knowledge derives entirely from books (i.e. the words of others), rather than 
being formed in his own mind too: ‘J’en cognoy, à qui quand je demande ce qu’il sçait, il 
me demande un livre pour me le montrer’ (I.XXV.137). Such an attitude leads Montaigne 
 See Ordine, p. 457. 73
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to draw the same conclusions as Bruno with regards to received knowledge; the incident 
with his friend only serves to highlight the problem he identifies at the start of the chapter 
that ‘l’action de l’esprit, par trop d’estude et de matiere…perde le moyen de se 
desmeler’ (I.XXV.136). While pedantry is not linked to custom consistently in this chapter 
(the term ‘usage’ appears four times but is not always used in the sense of custom or 
habitual behaviour), Montaigne - like Bruno - is clearly mindful that a pattern of learning 
exists in the late 16th century which breeds an unquestioning acceptance of what has 
come before.  
  In this section I hope to have revealed the full extent to which Bruno and 
Montaigne are frustrated by the role of custom and its stagnating effect on the intellectual 
development of the rest of the society. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka was a phenomenologist 
interested in the problem of time who described the existence of the thinker thus: ‘[…] 
the reflective human being is pressed, impelled by the questioning bent of his or her 
beingness to wonder, to ask, to interrogate, to seek “reasons” for the turns of life’s 
route’.  For two thinkers writing fervently with an eye to seeking reasons for the ways of 74
human existence, custom is an entity which strongly discourages the ‘questioning bent’ of 
the philosopher. Furthermore, in previous chapters I have illustrated that human 
existence in time is precarious and brief; death is a significant aspect of human time, and 
both thinkers accept this while simultaneously devoting themselves to an open-ended 
pursuit of truth. As human beings, both Montaigne and Bruno are aware that they are 
quite literally being timed in their pursuit of knowledge.  Therefore in light of human 75
existence in time, custom can be frustrating quite simply because above all it is a waste of 
precious time. 
The ambiguous nature of custom 
 So far, this chapter has presented custom in an overtly negative light. Montaigne 
and Bruno portrayed custom in this way because they were distinctly aware of the barriers 
it presented to using time productively. As a result, both thinkers often expressed open 
 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘Editor’s Introduction: Timing Our Lives’ in Temporality in Life as Seen Through 74
Literature, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp. xiii-xix (p. xv).
 Ahmeti has previously commented on the brevity of time in the Essais: ‘Le thème de la brièveté du temps, 75
omniprésent tout au long des Essais, tend à perpétuer ce sentiment d’angoisse chez Montaigne. D’ailleurs, le mot 
“angoisse” ne renvoie-t-il pas au terme latin “angustia” qui désigne un passage étroit, un lieu resserré, en parlant 
d’espaces physiques, mais en parlant aussi du temps qui se fait court?’ (‘Introduction’).
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frustration with what they perceived to be the general decline of their society. In ‘Du 
Jeune Caton’ (I.XXXVII), Montaigne laments that ‘ce siècle auquel nous vivons…est si 
plombé que, je ne dis pas l’execution, mais l’imagination mesme de la vertu en est à 
dire’ (I.XXXVII.230). Montaigne believes that people are no longer truly virtuous and 
that this is due in part to the proliferation of custom as habitude: ‘le profit, la gloire, la 
crainte, l’accoutumance et autres telles causes estrangeres’ (I.XXXVII.230) are defined as 
concepts which masquerade as virtuous, ‘[mais] elles n’en ont pas pourtant 
l’essence’ (I.XXXVII.230).  Bruno shared a similar sense of disillusionment with ‘questo 76
confusissimo secolo’ (Cabala II.477); the Scholastics in particular ‘abomina il secolo 
presente’ (Spaccio II.320) with their lack of understanding. Such attitudes would appear 
to fall entirely in line with the pronouncement by Richard Mulcaster (1531-1611), the 
English lexographer, that custom was ‘a venim to all vertewes, and such a poison to all 
vertewous effects’.  However, ‘poisonous’ custom does also possess some advantages, 77
rendering it a more complex concept than the discussion so far has allowed. In order to 
better understand this ambiguity, it is important to keep in mind the influence of the 
Wars of Religion and the fractured state of Christianity in Europe on how both thinkers 
approached custom. 
 Custom is not immune to time, and habitual behaviour and laws do eventually 
mutate. One significant upheaval which affected Montaigne’s response to custom was the 
Reformation. The resulting Wars of Religion (1562-1598) which engulfed France in the late 
1500s had a severe impact on Montaigne and the general tone of the Essais, particularly the 
first volume. Indeed, due to the bloody nature of the civil war, Montaigne is mainly 
concerned with how customs are overturned and in ‘De la coustume’ he famously errs on 
the side of caution, rather than advocating full legal reform. After a lengthy presentation 
of the disadvantages of custom, Montaigne performs an about-face and states that ‘Je suis 
desgousté de la nouvelleté, quelque visage qu’elle porte, et ay raison, car j’en ay veu des 
effets tres-dommageables’ (I.XXIII.119). At first glance his hatred of ‘newness’ falls 
entirely in line with the criticism we have seen throughout this chapter. However, the 
religious conflict has brought ‘une si horrible corruption de meurs’ (I.XXIII.120) that 
Montaigne begins to seriously consider the benefits of customs that have endured 
without leading to such bloody repercussions. Catholicism led by the Papacy is far 
preferable to the ‘corruption de meurs’ brought about by the bloody disputes between 
 Emphasis own. 76
 For more on this description of custom in Mulcaster’s work, see Manley, pp. 67-68. 77
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Catholics and Reformers, which reached its peak with the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
massacre of 1572, a famous example of Catholic mob violence which killed anywhere 
between 5,000 and 30,000 Huguenots in Paris and the French provinces.  
 Custom, despite its disadvantages, reveals itself to be extremely complicated: ‘Il y a 
grand à dire, entre la cause de celui qui suyt les formes et les loix de son pays, et celui qui 
entreprend de les regenter et changer’ (I.XXIII.121). For Montaigne, the scale of violence 
he has witnessed in his own country is far from an acceptable method of undoing 
centuries-old religious convention: ‘l’aller legitime est un aller froid, poisant et contraint, 
et n’est pas pour tenir bon à un aller licencieux et effrené’ (I.XXIII.122). The chapter takes 
on a more practical air as Montaigne advances the idea that it is wrong to settle religious 
debates with violence: ‘Est ce pas mal mesnagé, d’advancer tant de vices certains et cognus, 
pour combattre des erreurs contestées et debatables?’ (I.XXIII.120). The shadow of the 
civil war looms large across the final pages of ‘De la coustume’ and pits all of custom’s less 
desirable effects against the massacre of thousands of people, both on and off the 
battlefield. In this sense, Montaigne emphasises the potential advantages of custom in the 
present moment.  Amidst his criticism of those who wish to change laws and upset 78
societal order, he describes an ideal version of statehood:  
 […] la discipline ordinaire d'un Estat qui est en sa santé, ne pourvoit pas à ces   
 accidens extraordinaires: elle presuppose un corps qui se tient en ses principaux  
 membres et offices, et un commun consentement à son observation et obeïssance.  
 (I.XXIII.122) 
  Concerns over the dubious origins of laws disappear, and instead the practical 
advantages of a stable society appear preferable to the ‘effets tres-dommeagables’ of the 
religious wars. In yet another example of the manner in which the Essais reflect 
Montaigne’s contradictions, doubts and changing opinions, custom re-emerges from the 
various criticisms that have previously been attributed to it and now represents a practical 
alternative to bloodshed.  
 Furthermore, Montaigne and Bruno both suggest that an individual may mould 
custom as habit or second nature in order to better him or herself. Some of Montaigne’s 
most famous reflections on his own habits and tastes appear in ‘De l’expérience’ (III.XIII) 
- Langer refers to them as ‘forms of personal habit, forms which preoccupied old age 
 For a detailed discussion of Montaigne’s conservatism and its atemporality see Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, pp.78
91-92. Langer argues that in ‘De la coustume’ ‘present law or custom is supreme precisely because of the feebleness of a 
first cause’ (p. 91). 
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neglects to change’.  In opposition to the positive effects of custom’s endurance in time, 79
here the idea that custom may engender positive behavioural patterns stems from 
custom’s ultimate mutability. The changing nature of custom is often as inconsequential 
as Montaigne’s changing preferences in wine; in one of many examples from ‘De 
l’expérience’ that acknowledges the fluctuating, internal nature of habit, Montaigne 
observes that, without his conscious input into the matter, ‘j’ay rechangé du blanc au 
clairet, et puis du clairet au blanc’ (III.XIII.1102-1103). Montaigne is fascinated by the 
seeming arbitrariness of what is pleasing to him at each moment in time and goes on to 
devote entire passages to his changing culinary preferences. Personal custom may alter 
without Montaigne’s intervention and instead ‘De l’experience’ witnesses Montaigne 
‘collecting and naming, in his quirky, unmotivated way, the personal habits that make up 
his quotidian self’.  However, Montaigne also believes that second nature or habit can be 80
consciously changed over time; for example in ‘Que philosopher’ (I.XX) Montaigne 
remarks that he had to teach himself to think about death regularly: ‘aussi ay-je pris en 
coustume d’avoir, non seulement en l’imagination, mais continuellement la mort en la 
bouche’ (I.XX.90). 
 Similarly, Bruno appears to suggest that sometimes, habit may be able to mould 
human intellectus in a positive manner. Custom is agreeable if it manages to mimic nature 
to a high degree: ‘Ma è dignissima, perché è fondata sopra la consuetudine de mirar la vera 
luce (la qual consuetudine non può venir in uso alla moltitudine come è detto)’ (Furori II.
730). As long as custom doesn’t affect ‘libero passagio e progresso di 
contemplazione’ (Furori II.731), then the intellect may be trained by habit: ‘cui l’intelletto 
è reso in abito e formato in atto’ (Furori II.712); ‘che vedersi possa per abito et atto di 
contemplazione’ (Furori II.577). Such views were not unheard of in the 16th century and 
are famously summarised in a scene from Shakespeare’s Hamlet; addressing his mother, 
Gertrude, Hamlet implores her to break with habit: ‘That monster, custom, who all sense 
doth eat,/Of habits devil, is angel yet in this,/[…]Refrain tonight,/And that shall lend a 
kind of easiness/To the next abstinence; the next more easy;/For use almost can change 
the stamp of nature’.  When circumstances demand, it is possible to change one’s habits 81
over time. Custom is still a force to be reckoned with, but over time its strength may 
actually be shaped towards a more productive type of behaviour.  
 Langer, ‘Montaigne’s Customs’, p. 81. 79
 Ibid., p. 82.80
 Shakespeare, The Three-Text Hamlet, III.4.163-170.81
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 Finally, in ‘Des Cannibales’ Montaigne provides us with one last humorous 
exploration of custom and whether it may well possess some benefits. The chapter’s 
overall ambiguity has already caused much debate amongst scholars, particularly 
concerning the original interpretation of the chapter as an illustration of the bon sauvage. 
Recently the Magniens have rejected this thesis by arguing that Montaigne includes an 
honest account of the more grisly and gruesome Native American traditions: ‘ses Indiens 
sont sanguinaires et cruels, anthropophages et polygames’.  However, one of the most 82
famous ambiguities in the chapter concerns the role of custom in society, which in spite of 
all Montaigne’s criticism is still left for the reader to weigh up. The final line of this 
chapter produces the biggest question mark concerning Montaigne’s true feelings on the 
nature of custom when he offers a partially-forgotten remembrance of his conversation 
with three Native American tribesmen in Rouen.  
 The end of ‘Des Cannibales’ is well-known for its hazy account of the three 
visitors. Montaigne had previously compared the New World with the lost city of 
Atlantis, but this mythical illusion is quickly shattered when Montaigne reveals he 
encountered three of these primitive tribespeople himself.  Earlier in the chapter, 83
Montaigne repeatedly emphasises the importance of clear eyewitness accounts that are 
unbiased, with no flourishes. He takes great pains to assure the reader that his own 
sources on the New World are reliable people who are not prone to ‘des inventions 
fauces’. However, the latter half of the chapter casts doubt on these claims, and in the last 
paragraph Montaigne seemingly fails to remember the conversation he had with one of 
the cannibals: ‘ils respondirent trois choses, d'où j’ay perdu la troisiesme, et en suis bien 
marry; mais j’en ay encore deux en memoire’ (I.XXXI.213). Throughout most of ‘Des 
Cannibales’ Montaigne pursued a strategy of inversion by reflecting Native American 
customs onto his readers. However, here he performs a deliberate about-face and casts the 
shadow of doubt on the reliability of everything he has just related. Finally, Montaigne 
compounds the shift in perspective with a humorous remark on how the Native 
Americans don’t wear trousers: ‘Tout cela ne va pas trop mal: mais quoy, ils ne portent 
point de haut de chausses’ (I.XXXI.214). It is typical of Montaigne’s style and form that 
he leaves this remark hanging in the air - it is left to his readers to interpret the ending 
either as a simple joke or another parodic twist on the nature of custom.  
 Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: 82
Gallimard, 2007), p. 1423. 
 In 1562, a party of three Native Americans visited Rouen during a tour of France. For more see Michel de Montaigne, 83
Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 1423.
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 Custom is a concept that helps to reveal the true complexity of the task that 
Montaigne and Bruno had set out in the latter half of Chapter Three. It also illustrates 
some of the closest points of connection between the two thinkers, particularly their 
depiction of the New World as occupying a different place in time due to its lack of 
custom in society, as well as their fascination with the idea of custom as poison. They are 
both concerned with custom as a potential obstacle on the journey towards a more 
meaningful use of the time at their disposal. In their approach to custom they are perhaps 
less controversial than in their responses to time from previous chapters, even touching on 
conventional 16th-century concerns including the ideas of habituation and the Fall. I also 
acknowledged that custom ultimately possesses an ambiguous role in their works, and in 
fact, they are not entirely free of the demands of custom themselves. Despite questioning 
custom’s authority, and thus questioning what humans generally accept as right or wrong, 
neither thinker is able or indeed completely willing to escape ‘following’ custom to a 
certain degree. However, they still chiefly discuss custom in line with the framework of 
time that I have outlined in previous chapters, an approach which leaves their readers in 
no doubt that custom in all of its various contexts is an important concept which one 
must be aware of when attempting to reconcile oneself to the mutability of time.  
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Conclusion 
 Mesnageons le temps; encore nous en reste-il beaucoup d’oisif et mal employé.   
 Nostre esprit n’a volontiers pas assez d’autres heures à faire ses besongnes, sans se  
 desassocier du corps en ce peu d’espace qu’il luy faut pour sa necessité. (III.XIII. 
 1115) 
 […] a questa massa intiera, della qual consta questo globo, questo astro, non   
 essendo conveniente la morte e la dissoluzione, ed essendo a tutta natura   
 impossibile l’annichilazione, a tempi a tempi, con certo ordine, viene a rinovarsi,  
 alterando, cangiando, le sue parti tutte. (Cena I.556) 
 In order to conclude this discussion about time, I begin by presenting two 
examples that summarise some of the key themes I have attempted to distill in this thesis. 
In the first quotation above, Montaigne laments the precious nature of time by dwelling 
once more on the dichotomy between the human mind and the human body. He claims 
that people are often guilty of using time in a wasteful manner. Nevertheless, the mind 
‘n’a pas assez d’autres heures à faire ses besongnes’ and cannot ‘disassociate’ itself from the 
body; bodily time - which must always come to an end - is unable to provide the mind 
with enough space to process all of its reflections and thoughts. Montaigne favours an 
approach to time that concentrates on individual experience, particularly one that 
understands the difference between bodily time and the mind that it houses. The second 
quotation by Bruno continues to work within the now-familiar conceptual framework of 
bodies in time. However, unlike Montaigne, he suggests that time does not render bodies 
extinct. In this example, Bruno argues that ‘la morte e la dissoluzione’ of divine, celestial 
bodies does not occur and instead, time causes the parts of these bodies to change and 
renew rather than perish forever. Time acquires a circular characteristic; it is based on a 
process of renewal, rather than a linear order. Bruno must incorporate time into a 
universe made up of infinite bodies and, in doing so, he understands that time can no 
longer be expressed in conventional terms of death and annihilation. Embodied time 
becomes malleable time thanks to the power of human intellectus, to the extent that death 
and duration can be redefined altogether. 
 This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that Montaigne and Bruno approached 
the question of time in a way that often defied the temporal concerns of their age. The 
quotations included above are just two examples which serve to illustrate some of the 
decidedly unconventional approaches to time that I have identified over the course of this 
thesis. I first examined the idea that humans must navigate a dual path between their 
mortal bodies and their awareness not only of their individual mortality, but also of time 
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in general, whether past, present or future. Furthermore, I argued that Montaigne and 
Bruno manipulated this ability to reflect on time in such a way that they proposed 
exciting and innovative new ways of thinking about time. In doing so they ignored or 
even destroyed the foundations of 16th century time; the Afterlife was replaced by infinite 
duration, eternity or God’s time was deemed irrelevant, suicide was presented as an act of 
control over time and time itself was defined in mutable terms that had more in common 
with classical atomism than Christian-Scholastic eschatology.  
 The initial research problem that inspired this thesis highlighted the fact that 
present-day criticism about 16th century time does not reflect any such radical 
conceptions of time. While it may be true that modern-day scholarship on Renaissance 
time has received little attention in comparison to other historical periods, in the 
Introduction I highlighted the fact that only a few key temporal trends are ever associated 
with the 16th century. Studies inevitably discuss chronology and precursors to the 
development of a scientific Newtonian method of measuring time; apocalyptical ends of 
time encompassing Christian eschatology and the idea of the Renaissance as a period that 
was constantly looking back in time to Antiquity. For example, Donald J. Wilcox portrays 
the period as one which was trying to reconcile the Classical past with the Renaissance 
present, while Jon E. Roeckelein argues that in the period between Aquinas’ death and 
the 17th century, ‘scholarship was estimated more highly than originality’.  In many cases, 1
the importance of the 16th century is ignored altogether, particularly in general histories 
of time. As a response to such assertions, I have sought to broaden the general patterns 
associated with 16th-century time and renew an interest in this period by investigating 
how and why certain thinkers were clearly deviating from conventional models in their 
understanding of temporality. Several research questions naturally emerged from this 
initial thesis statement. Why are Michel de Montaigne and Giordano Bruno particularly 
good examples of two thinkers who were defying conventional approaches to time? What 
is the alternative conception of time that they propose and how does it differ from 16th-
century temporal concerns previously established by modern-day scholarship on 
Renaissance time? Finally, how does this understanding of time affect certain aspects of 
Montaigne’s and Bruno’s thought? In attempting to answer these questions, I hope to 
have demonstrated that 16th-century conceptions of time were far more complex and 
thought-provoking than has previously been suggested. 
 Donald J. Wilcox, The Measure of Times Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric of Relative  T i m e 1
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 156; Jon E. Roeckelein, The Concept of Time in Psychology: A Resource 
Book and Annotated Bibliography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 26.
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 It is perhaps unsurprising that the most pressing research question I proceeded to 
answer concerned my justification of Montaigne and Bruno as the primary subjects of this 
study. At the start of this thesis, I acknowledged that both thinkers were, in many 
respects, rather different in terms of both their biographical context and the main aspects 
of philosophy that they wished to pursue. However, they both represent excellent 
examples of Renaissance thinkers whose thought has been notoriously difficult to pin 
down. I first suggested in the Introduction that Bruno is primarily a natural philosopher, 
but one who was also interested in the art of memory, mathematics and - as Frances Yates 
famously suggested - the esoteric tradition of Hermeticism.  Furthermore, the Italian 2
dialogues are an example of a series of texts in which Bruno was experimenting with 
literary convention; the Eroici Furori, for example, combines ‘for the first and the last time 
in Italian literature, the dialogue of the Platonic love treatise with the earlier tradition of 
prose commentary upon verses’.  Meanwhile, Montaigne cannot be described as a 3
conventional philosopher due to his refusal to commit to any one school of thought. And 
yet he is clearly interested in and educated in the modes of enquiry that philosophy offers. 
In Chapter One I also highlighted aspects of their biographical and historical context in 
the late 16th century, particularly Bruno’s relationship to authority and Montaigne’s tragic 
family life, in order to further emphasise their position as outsiders who would not have 
felt particularly beholden to the establishment (i.e. the universities) when expressing 
thoughts on time. I combined their unique positions as thinkers who defied conventional 
classification with the context that influenced their innovative writing style in order to 
justify why I believed that their approach to time would yield a similar level of originality. 
 This naturally led to the task of answering the most significant research question 
related to this study - establishing what exactly the conception of time was that 
Montaigne and Bruno presented in the works at hand. In order to do so, I proceeded 
from a conceptual framework of bodies in time which helped me to address how both 
thinkers present the individual human experience and perception of time. From the 
outset, the reality of time itself is never in doubt as the images that Montaigne and Bruno 
draw upon serve to reaffirm its visible manifestations. In Chapter One, we saw that 
Montaigne’s imagery revolves around the microcosm of the human body, while Bruno’s 
primary interest lies in the macrocosm of bodily change inherent within the entire 
 See Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge, 1964); on Bruno and 2
mathematics see Arielle Saiber, Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
 Giordano Bruno, The Heroic Frenzies, trans. by Paul Eugene Memmo (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Pr., 3
1964), p. 21. 
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universe. In both of these cases, mutability reveals itself to be a key attribute of time. In 
the Essais, existence in time is primarily defined by the physical processes of ageing and 
death, while for Bruno time is the constant change of vicissitude which constantly shapes 
and reshapes matter, from human bodies to rivers and mountains. Furthermore, this 
understanding of time only serves to emphasise human weakness - humans are powerless 
to try and alter the workings of time. However, if time is an objective phenomenon that 
merely facilitates physical change to bodies, how does it evoke such powerful responses 
from human beings? Montaigne and Bruno understand the significance of this question 
and express an acute awareness of the human perception of time, in which embodied time 
becomes further complicated by the mind or intellectus which is able to successively 
contemplate past, present and future. 
 I then began to establish how this juncture is further explored by examining 
responses to future time. Interestingly, Montaigne and Bruno identify fear of death as a 
typical and natural mental response to future time. However, they both dismiss its 
relevance and demonstrate that fear doesn’t have to dictate human responses to the 
future. Bruno uses fear of death as a means of demonstrating the radical temporality of 
his own cosmological position which denies that death exists. The body is not destroyed 
forever, leaving the soul to depart for Heaven. Instead, time is a cyclical process of which 
‘death’ in the traditional sense merely represents another change of state. The future is 
not to be feared since bodies, including our own body, will continue to exist and endure 
in different forms forever. Meanwhile, Montaigne wishes to show that humans can exert 
some degree of control over future time. The manner in which he presents his near-death 
experience suggests that humans may be able to straddle the time between life and death 
physically; he also uses Socrates and Cato the Younger to put forth suicide as an act that 
allows an individual to dictate the terms of their death, even if death itself cannot be 
prevented. What initially appeared in Chapter One to be a rigid and linear plane of time 
has suddenly become malleable. This conception of time was compounded in the final 
instance by an analysis of how Montaigne and Bruno proposed to live in time. Another 
similarity emerges as - for different reasons - introspection is put forward as one of the 
best ways to react productively to an existence defined by temporal mutability. 
Montaigne’s introspection is a response to the world in temporal flux; although his own 
body and mind are constantly changing, he can at least reliably record these changes and 
thus in doing so manages to capture the essence of the present moment in writing. 
Bruno’s introspection is a deliberate attempt to try and gain access to divine knowledge, to 
something that exists on a higher plane than temporal impermanence. The eternal World 
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Soul binds all temporal beings together, thus Bruno believes that studied introspection is 
a clear path to higher knowledge. While the chances of actually attaining this knowledge 
are slim due to the precious nature of human time, there is nothing for Montaigne and 
Bruno to conclude except that one must continue forth anyway. 
 A closely-related research question asked why this conception of time was so 
different from the temporality of their peers. The understanding of time that I detailed in 
Chapters One, Two and Three immediately conflicted with patterns that have already 
been explored by modern-day scholars. Rather than an emphasis on the centrality of 
Christian eschatology, or an insistence on 16th-century time as a precursor to Newtonian 
advancements, I focused on the immediacy of time as it reveals itself to the individual. In 
the first instance, embodied time is a relatively unusual concept to begin a thesis on 16th-
century time. However, this was a necessary response to the nature of the primary source 
evidence, which was constantly uncovering ways in which bodies physically existed in 
time. Change, mutability and ageing were key characteristics not only of the human body 
but indeed all bodies including mountains, trees, rivers, the weather, seasons and even 
atoms. Montaigne and Bruno were clearly approaching the body in a different way to 
their peers - rather than relegating it to a mere vessel for the soul, they used it to 
understand the nature of time. Chapter Two demonstrated that standard 16th-century 
conceptions of future time also held little relevance for Montaigne and Bruno. In 
demonstrating the radical temporality of his own philosophy, Bruno denied the existence 
of the Afterlife, a concept which was still vitally important in the 16th century. The 
traditional linearity of time disappeared; death was not to be feared, since it was not a final 
change of state before the soul disappeared to Heaven. Instead, everything in the universe 
was connected intimately in time, a realisation of all possible forms being reformed 
forever; it resembled a cyclical conception of time with no room for the time after death. 
Meanwhile, Montaigne’s response to the future was unconventional due to his attempts 
to put philosophy on the nature of death to more practical use. His own near-death 
experience - and subsequent account of it years later - undermined the finality of death, 
while in theological terms, suicide was an extremely taboo topic which Montaigne used to 
highlight the degree of choice that humans were given with regard to death. Arguably, 
thinkers who deny the existence of death or suggest the possibility of returning from a 
state between life and death are still radical today. In the 16th century, Bruno’s cosmology 
had no space or time to incorporate the Afterlife. His denial of a Christian time after 
death was considered to be a clear form of heresy, and would later be seized upon by the 
inquisitors in Bruno’s trial. Meanwhile, Montaigne was willing to openly discuss near-
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death experience and suicide - an act which the Church was desperately trying to clamp 
down on - in order to inform his understanding of time.   4
 Furthermore, in Chapter Three eternity is either largely ignored (in Montaigne’s 
case) or manipulated in such a way that it is incorporated into Bruno’s heretical universe. 
For Bruno, eternity no longer represents God’s time in a traditional sense - God does not 
reside in an eternal state outside the Earth. Instead eternity binds temporal bodies 
through the World Soul. Montaigne’s interest in his body and his experience of time 
supersedes any interest in eternity; he emphasises that humans will never experience 
eternity, whereas they experience change every single day. Without approaching the issues 
from the same philosophical background, Montaigne reveals a similar degree of interest in 
vicissitude as Bruno, who articulates time in terms of change, mutation and flux. Indeed, 
the key to understanding time in the Essais and the Italian dialogues lies in temporal flux, 
a concept that, amongst other philosophical currents, brings with it various shades of 
atomism, a school of thought that was still novel in the late 16th century: ‘Ainsi l’homme, 
à titre individuel, a prise sur le temps’.  Accepting the nature of time as a process of 5
constant change allows both thinkers to contemplate how best they can put this time to 
use. While the analysis of custom put forth brief instances of ways in which Montaigne 
and Bruno engaged more with typical 16th-century concerns, it is clear that both thinkers 
consistently showed a disregard or even open criticism of general conceptions of time. 
While I was careful to emphasise where Montaigne and Bruno were acknowledging more 
conventional notions of time in the 16th century, this was nearly always tempered by a 
realisation that what they were doing with these notions was decidedly different. 
 Finally, I wished to briefly examine how such a conception of time might impact 
on other aspects of their thought. The aim of accessing higher knowledge sounds 
extremely lofty and noble, but it also appeared to be a somewhat abstract conclusion to a 
conception of time that had originally considered time in such physical terms. Custom 
was an important theme in the early modern period that certain jurists had already begun 
to define in relation to time, particularly the idea of long usage. It also allowed me to 
outline some of the more practical obstacles that might interfere with the idea of 
meaningful knowledge-seeking. Analysis of customary law and second nature in the Essais 
 See Patrick Henry, ‘The Dialectic of Suicide in Montaigne’s “Coustume de l’Isle de Cea”’, The Modern Language 4
Review, 79.2 (1984), pp. 278-289 (p. 279). Rising suicide rates across Europe led the Church to respond ‘in the 
Catechisme du Concile de Trente, by proscribing suicide ‘sans aucune réserve’’ (p. 279). 
 Marie-Madeleine de La Garandière, ‘La méditation philosophique sur le temps au XVIème siècle: Budé,  Monta igne ’ 5
in Le Temps et la Durée dans la littérature au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance, ed. by Yvonne Bellenger (Paris: Nizet, 
1986), pp.  193-209 (p. 201).
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and the Italian dialogues reveals a shared concern over the relationship between custom 
and time. Montaigne and Bruno are both heavily critical of custom due to its relationship 
to time, especially how it uses time to affect the judgement of wider society when 
confronted with novità and also the manner in which it uses long usage to shape 
individual behaviour to its own will. Although there are instances in which they engage 
with conventional temporality, their concerns can be clearly traced back to the framework 
of time described in Chapters One, Two and Three. Custom wastes time when time 
should be put to good use; it uses time to cloud judgement which makes the path to 
higher knowledge more difficult; custom can even substitute itself for the workings of 
nature through habitual behaviour. In criticising the nature of custom, I established some 
of the most notable similarities between Montaigne and Bruno. They draw on the same 
metaphors of custom as poison, and lament the manner in which young children are 
raised in the customs of their households.   
 I began by suggesting a new conceptual framework that proceeded from the idea 
of embodied time and developed further layers of complexity from this initial foundation. 
Clearly the question of time in the 16th century was in fact highly intricate and provoked 
responses that were rooted in other concerns related to the human body, change, inner 
time and a need to feel control over time. I have examined how and why Montaigne and 
Bruno appear to accept the reality of time by exploring its most visible and significant 
effects on human beings and indeed the world around them. In doing so, I have shed light 
on significant responses to time. Rather than passively accepting the linear time of 
Christianity or constructing time in a manner which pre-empts the concerns of 
Enlightenment thinkers, Montaigne and Bruno consider time in an individual and 
perceptive way that leads them to test their own experience of time. 
 The main conceptual methodology that drove the central argument of this thesis 
was a response to the body of scholarship that has already attempted to probe the 
question of 16th-century time. As I acknowledge in the Introduction, some excellent 
work has already been done in this area, particularly by Ricardo Quinones, John Spencer 
Hill and J.K. Barret. I hope to have contributed to this body of work with the findings 
and conceptual framework used in this thesis. In both the Introduction and Chapter One 
in particular, I alluded to the fact that, prior to the writing of this thesis, several modern-
day scholars had already suggested an aporia between the idea of a mortal body and a 
mind which is able to reflect on its own mortality. Ian Maclean and Michele Ciliberto 
have reflected on this idea, while scholars such as Hélène Védrine and Paul-Henri Michel 
have previously mentioned this idea in passing. In this thesis, I wanted to explore this 
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dichotomy in more detail, particularly since the initial stages of my research quickly 
revealed an interest in bodies in time while simultaneously searching for ways to respond 
to time. How exactly was it confronted by Montaigne and Bruno? What were the 
implications of such a conundrum? I hope to have shown that far from triggering a 
morbid reflection on the certainty of death or other existential crisis, both thinkers thrive 
on exploiting this particular characteristic of human existence in time. Furthermore, I also 
assessed the primary source evidence where time is discussed without a pre-conceived 
desire to fit Montaigne and Bruno neatly into a Christian-Scholastic approach. I have 
demonstrated that it is possible to find meaningful responses to time in the 16th century 
without the need to frame these responses within a pre-arranged template. 
 I have also shown that it is possible to directly compare these two thinkers and 
uncover valuable new research in doing so. In terms of the contribution to knowledge 
that this thesis has made, I strongly believe that my research has helped to identify new 
connections between Montaigne and Bruno. They both possess a shared interest in the 
way in which continual change and movement confirms the existence of time, and are 
keenly aware of how this will affect their practical use of time. I also suggested that a 
tentative resolution to human existence in temporal flux was the idea of introspection. 
Admittedly these forms of introspection come from two very different philosophical 
places - Bruno believes that the World Soul is physically emanating through everything 
and everyone, and thus to turn inwardly is to turn towards divine substance. Montaigne 
attempts to know the only thing he is capable of knowing - himself - by recording his own 
thoughts and behaviour day-to-day, despite accepting the fact that he is an inexhaustible 
source of knowledge. However, the turn towards introspection in order to exploit the 
time at hand reveals a shared acceptance of the reality of time, which clearly reaches its 
apotheosis in death. Furthermore, I hope to have shown that it is possible to make these 
connections without a prior need to work from Fulvio Papi’s original discussion in 
Antropologia e civiltà nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno (1968).  Papi identified veiled 6
references to Montaigne in Bruno’s Spaccio and pursued this connection through an 
examination of their responses to the newly-discovered Native Americans (see also 
Introduction, ‘Literature Review’). While there are a handful of modern-day scholars 
who have established similar links between the two thinkers around this theme in smaller 
articles and book chapters, I believe that it is possible to make a promising comparison 
between Montaigne and Bruno without working chiefly from Papi’s excellent foundation. 
 Fulvio Papi, Antropologia e civiltà nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1968), Chapter 7 - ‘La 6
civiltà come dignità dell’uomo’. 
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Instead, I have sought to shed light on new connections between the two thinkers by 
emphasising their desire to theorise time beyond even its most stable and universal 
characteristics. The most striking similarities emerged towards the end of Chapter Three 
and Chapter Four when I attempted to understand how they might practically attempt to 
use time to their advantage. Both Montaigne and Bruno were considering existence in 
time through a lens of mutability; they were aware of the limitations of human time but 
also wanted to surpass these limitations and in doing so they both proposed forms of 
introspection as a way to exist in time. Ironically, this particular conclusion is an inversion 
of Papi’s main concern about the two thinkers - namely, that they often arrive at different 
conclusions based on exactly the same evidence.  In this case, their response to time is 7
similar but is shaded by different philosophical viewpoints. Nevertheless, these findings, 
alongside the evidence concerning custom and its manipulation of human judgement, 
have shed new light on an emerging field of research and have also proposed a different 
way to compare the two thinkers.  Furthermore, I hope that by exploring the relationship 
between time and custom in Bruno’s and Montaigne’s work I have provoked a renewed 
interest in this theme. I do not focus solely on custom in its legal context or as a type of 
second nature and instead link it more clearly to time and epistemological concerns. 
 Despite these contributions, it must also be acknowledged that there were certain 
limitations in this study that may affect one’s ability to apply these particular research 
outcomes to a more general pattern of 16th century time. One of the areas which only 
partially supported the idea that Montaigne and Bruno were approaching time differently 
to their peers was in Montaigne’s understanding of eternity. His representation of eternity 
was less a way of experimenting with eternity than avoiding it altogether due to its 
irrelevance to Montaigne’s project of documenting himself in time. However, arguably 
this omission in itself served to reinforce his clear interest in the visible images he could 
identify from himself and the world around him in order to understand the passing of 
time. Furthermore, I used two thinkers to test the main thesis statement of this study, and 
while I hope to have demonstrated that they were undoubtedly working outside the 
conventions of their age, it may be useful to extend this study to the works of other 16th-
century thinkers. For example, this thesis naturally focused on patterns related to French 
and Italian philosophical currents during this time, acknowledging the influence of the 
Wars of Religion on the continent, and the calendrical reforms. However, throughout my 
research, the thoughts of English philosophers from this time period have frequently 
 See Papi, p. 350. 7
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appeared on the surface, particularly in Chapter Four with the discussion of time and 
custom. 
 In light of these considerations, I feel that in the future there is still scope for 
further research in this particular area of study. While I believe that the English 
Renaissance has fared much better in terms of studies available on time during this 
period, it would be interesting to compare how the presentation of time in the works of 
Shakespeare compared to his peers on the continent, and whether the concept of 
embodied time may be relevant to his thought. Shakespeare often reappeared during my 
research, particularly in relation to time and custom in Hamlet, and the prior links to 
both Montaigne and Bruno through the English lexicographer John Florio (1553-1625) may 
help to cement a valuable study on time and strengthen the connections between 
Montaigne and Bruno.  In terms of other thinkers whose thoughts on time may represent 8
a certain degree of originality, Louis Le Roy may be a worthwhile subject of future study. 
A closer analysis of his thoughts on the relationship between custom and time may well 
help to further support or explain some of the ideas of time found in this thesis, 
particularly since he was also interested in vicissitude.  
 The conceptual framework of embodied time may also be a useful way to 
approach time in the works of Montaigne’s fellow French humanists, particularly François 
Rabelais (1494-1553) and Pierre de Ronsard (1524-1585). Rabelais was another thinker who 
arguably defied literary norms; the Tiers Livre (1546) has been described as an ‘anti-book’ 
due to its unique disregard for plot in favour of lively erudite debate; it is a fictional work 
that depicts time within the context of human anxiety over an uncertain future.  In the 9
Sonnets pour Hélène (1578) Ronsard demonstrates the same awareness of his ageing self as 
Montaigne by weaving in references to his white hair and aged skin amongst his courtly 
love poetry.  Would the concept of embodied time lead to similar or different conclusions 10
in the works of other 16th century thinkers? There may be a link between the tendency of 
certain thinkers to innovate through genre or use of the vernacular and the development 
of a more individual conception of time, a connection which future studies may well be 
advised to explore. Furthermore, it may be interesting to examine to what extent this 
 Gilberto Sacerdoti has produced excellent work on Bruno and Shakespeare in the field of cosmology and politics. See 8
Gilberto Sacerdoti, Nuovo cielo, nuova terra: la rivelazione copernicana di Antonio e Cleopatra di Shakespeare 
(Bologna: il Mulino, 1990) and Sacriﬁcio e sovranità: teologia e politica nell’Europa di Shakespeare e Bruno (Turin: 
Einaudi, 2002).
 Barbara C. Bowen, The Age of Bluﬀ: paradox and ambiguity in Rabelais and Montaigne (Urbana: University of 9
Illinois Press, 1972), p. 83. See also François Rabelais, Le tiers livre, ed. by Guy Demerson (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997).
 Pierre de Ronsard, Les Amours, ed. by Albert-Marie Schmidt & Françoise Joukovsky (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), pp. 10
279-360. 
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conception of time remains unchanged or evolves over the course of Bruno’s later works. 
While I have already included some excerpts both from the Acrotismus Camoeracensis and 
De immenso, it could be useful to consider whether the switch back to Latin and Bruno’s 
continued exile in Europe helped to shape his views on time, especially as the Latin works 
from this period are often cited as a further step towards exploring Bruno’s interest in 
atomism.  Lastly, a more detailed exploration of chronological layers in the Essais would 
help to distill further instances of temporality in Montaigne’s text by analysing the 
changing meaning of certain terms over time, particularly in relation to ‘nature’ and 
‘reason’.  
 What has remained abundantly clear throughout the course of my research is the 
fact that time in the 16th century is a highly complex area of study which has still not yet 
been fully explored. This issue has often seemed incomprehensible given the universal 
nature of time and the relevance it continues to hold today. Alongside recent promising 
studies from Simona Cohen, J.K. Barret and a special edition on time of the Journal of 
Early Modern Studies, it is hoped that this thesis has gone one more step towards 
distilling the true complexity of attitudes towards time in the Renaissance. Learning 
about and thinking about time will always be relevant. Time in the 16th century can still 
inform modern-day readers about important temporal concepts, albeit through a prism 
of less familiar context. Montaigne and Bruno were discussing mortality and how one 
might learn to confront this, as well as how humans process the reality of time and their 
place within the temporal world. Here I have begun to lay claim to the idea that 
Montaigne and Bruno were two examples of extraordinary thinkers whose originality of 
thought and unconventional approach to time arguably still challenges our 
understanding of time today. It certainly could not have been more different from the 
philosophical and theological currents of their own age. 
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